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 Abstract 
This study examines whether EU competition policy enforcement has led to stronger competition in 
European gas and electricity markets and hence lower prices, higher investment and improved 
productivity. Specifically, the study analyses the impact of competition policy enforcement on short-
run measures of intensity of competition such as profit elasticity and productivity dispersion (at sector-
country level); and medium and long-term competitive outcomes such as investment and productivity 
(at firm-sector-country level). The main result of this analysis is that EU merger policy enforcement is 
consistently and significantly related to better market outcomes, especially in low-regulated markets. 
The impacts of the EU’s anti-trust enforcement and state aid control on the other hand, are not  
statistically significant.  
The study also empirically evaluates the price effects of two individual competition policy enforcement 
cases using the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach.  
The first case study analyses the impact of the Commission’s case against E.ON (2008) for its 
alleged abuse of dominant position in the German wholesale electricity market.  Specifically, this case 
study examines the impact of the Commission’s Decision on wholesale electricity prices, using daily 
data on peak and off-peak prices from the European Energy Exchange (EEX). The results show that 
the Commission’s Decision, by affecting competition in the EEX, led to a reduction in wholesale 
electricity prices in Germany. To determine whether wholesale price reductions were eventually 
passed on to consumers by electricity suppliers, we further analysed retail electricity prices using 
highly disaggregated data (monthly data at zip code level) purchased from the German price 
comparison website Verivox.  The results suggest that the Commission’s Decision – by reducing 
market power upstream and thereby lowering wholesale prices – might have also contributed to 
reducing prices downstream. 
The second case study examines the price effects of the Gaz de France (GDF)-Suez merger, 
approved by the European Commission in November 2006. The results show that the merger and 
associated remedies had a significant downward impact on wholesale gas prices at the Zeebrugge 
Hub in Belgium. This could suggest that the remedies were effective in limiting the potential anti-
competitive effects of the merger. 
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1 Introduction to the Study 
Energy is essential to modern life. Reliable access to supply at competitive prices is crucial 
to people’s well-being and for the growth and competitiveness of EU industry.  
Energy markets, however, typically exhibit certain structural characteristics that could allow 
incumbent firms to exercise market power, which restricts competition and potentially 
generates higher prices and reduced consumer care.  
The structure of EU energy markets has fundamentally transformed during the past two 
decades as a result of three successive waves of liberalisation directives – from national 
markets with vertically integrated monopolies to more competitive markets with separation 
between regulated (transmission and distribution) and competitive segments (production 
and retail). But there are still concerns over the functioning of these markets as evidenced 
by continued high market shares of incumbents, limited market penetration of new entrants, 
lack of cross-border trade, rising retail energy prices in several Member States and a lack of 
consumer confidence in these markets. Along with regulation, the European Commission 
has therefore also used instruments of competition policy to improve the functioning of 
European gas and electricity markets.  
1.1 Objectives and scope of the study 
This study describes and evaluates the impact of the European Commission’s competition 
policy enforcement activities (see section 1.2) on the functioning of EU gas and electricity 
markets. Specifically, it addresses a set of five evaluation questions (listed in Table 1.1), 
using one or more of the following methods: 
 Literature review covering policy and academic papers on competition issues in energy 
markets and the impact of competition policy enforcement and regulation on the 
functioning of these markets; 
 Descriptive analysis of select indicators of market functioning and performance; 
 Empirical analysis of the impact of competition policy enforcement activities on market 
performance across the EU, while controlling for changes in the regulatory and 
competition policy framework; and 
 Case studies analysing the impact of specific decisions on relevant product and 
geographic markets using econometric approaches. 
The table below shows how the above methods were used to answer the specific evaluation 
questions set out in the terms of reference (ToR). 
Table 1.1 Methodological approaches to answering the study questions  
Evaluation questions Methods Indicators Data sources 
Q1. Can one observe a 
change in the functioning 
of energy markets in the 
EU over the past two 
decades?  
Descriptive analysis 
Literature review 
 
■ Concentration indicators 
(HHI, CR3, number of 
players)  
■ Number of new entrants/ 
change in number of players 
■ Level of vertical integration  
■ Market liquidity 
■ Price and market regulation 
■ Public ownership 
■ Wholesale and retail prices 
■ Price mark-ups 
■ Amadeus 
■ CEER 
■ Datamonitor 
■ DG ECFIN 
■ DG Energy 
■ ENTSO-E 
■ Eurostat 
■ IEA 
■ OECD 
■ Platts 
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Evaluation questions Methods Indicators Data sources 
■ Switching rates 
■ Productivity dispersion 
■ Boone indicator 
Q2. Can one observe a 
change in competition 
policy enforcement 
affecting energy markets in 
the EU over the past two 
decades? 
Descriptive analysis 
Literature review 
 
■ EU merger and anti-trust 
cases in electricity and gas 
markets 
 
■ DG 
Competition 
Q3. Has the enforcement of 
competition policy in the 
energy sectors contributed to 
better functioning energy 
markets? To what extent?  
Literature review 
Broad econometric 
analysis 
Case studies 
Broad econometric analysis 
■ Productivity dispersion 
■ Profit elasticity with respect to  
costs 
■ Investment 
■ Firm level productivity 
■ EU competition policy 
enforcement indicators 
■ National competition policy 
enforcement indicators 
■ Indicators of Product Market 
Regulation 
■ Other control variables (GDP 
per capita, population growth, 
energy imports, energy mix) 
 
E.ON case study 
■ Wholesale prices – German 
electricity markets 
■ Retail prices – German 
electricity markets 
■ Cross border electricity flows 
■ Oil prices 
■ Coal prices 
■ Gas prices 
■ Carbon prices 
■ Production of renewable 
energy 
 
GDF/ Suez case study 
■ Hub prices – ZEE hub and 
TTF 
■ Oil prices 
■ Coal prices 
■ Gas prices 
 
■ Amadeus 
■ APEX/ENDEX 
■ Argus 
McCloskey 
■ CEER 
■ CREG 
■ DG 
Competition 
■ DG Energy 
■ EEX/ EPEX 
■ ENTSO-E 
■ Fluxys 
■ National Power 
Exchanges 
■ OECD 
■ Platts 
■ Survey of 
NCAs 
■ US Energy 
Information 
Administration 
■ UX Company 
■ Verivox 
■ World Bank 
Q4. Is there 
complementarity (in terms 
of objectives and effects) 
between competition and 
regulatory policies 
affecting the functioning of 
the energy markets? To what 
extent have we observed an 
increase in complementarity 
over the past two decades? 
Please explain 
Literature review 
Econometric analysis 
Case studies 
Same as above Same as above 
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Evaluation questions Methods Indicators Data sources 
Q5. Do competition case 
investigations and case 
decisions affect the design 
of sector regulations and 
the enforcement of such 
regulations? 
Literature review 
Case studies 
Same as above Same as above 
 
NB: The ToR contained two optional evaluation  questions: (i) How did the sector inquiry affect: (a) competition 
policy enforcement (in terms of competition case investigations and case decisions); and (b) regulatory reforms 
aimed at market opening and market access (including regulations on unbundling, infrastructure access, 
interconnections between national markets, and tariff setting)?  (ii) What has been the added value of 
competition policy enforcement in the energy sector at the EU level as opposed to the national level (in terms of 
interconnections between national markets and in cross border trade)? These questions could not be addressed 
by the present study due to time and budget constraints. 
1.2 Competition policy enforcement by the European Commission in gas and 
electricity markets 
Over time, and particularly since 2002, the Commission has exercised the full raft of 
competition enforcement tools at its disposal, including merger control, antitrust legislation 
and state aid control, to prohibit anti-competitive conduct and mergers and eliminate state 
aids that distort the market.  
In 2005, the Commission also launched a Sector Inquiry into the functioning of energy 
markets in response to sharp increases in gas and electricity wholesale prices and 
persistent complaints about barriers to entry and limited consumer choice.  
This section provides an overview of these activities as context for the study.  
1.2.1 The Energy Sector Inquiry (2005 – 2007) 
The Final Report of the Sector Inquiry was published in 20071. It reiterated and confirmed 
the five areas of concern highlighted in the Commission’s 2005 Issues Paper, namely: 
(i) High levels of market concentration, creating the scope for incumbents to exercise 
market power; 
(ii) Vertical foreclosure resulting from  insufficient or ineffective unbundling between 
supply and transportation activities; 
(iii) Lack of cross-border integration and cross-border competition due to insufficient or 
unavailable interconnection capacity;  
(iv) Lack of transparency, to the benefit of incumbents; and 
(v) Opaque and complex price formation mechanisms such as oil indexed gas 
contracts, lack of trust in electricity spot prices, and the setting of regulated end user 
tariffs below market prices, thus discouraging new entry 
In addition to the above competition concerns, the Final Report also identified the following 
issues: 
 Long-Term downstream contracts: the Commission’s investigations showed that in 
some Member States, the duration of retail contracts for industrial customers or 
                                                     
1  The final report of the sector inquiry, as well as other related documents, are available on 
: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/2005_inquiry/index_en.html 
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local distribution companies was so long that it amounted to tying and created 
barriers to entry. The Commission however, acknowledged that long-term contracts 
may be legitimated in upstream gas markets considering the scale of investments 
required.    
 Balancing: balancing rules, imposed by network operators in both gas and electricity 
markets, were found to increase the complexity and costs of entry into a market. 
Existing balancing regimes were often found to favour incumbents and create 
obstacles for new market entrants.    
The launch of the Sector Inquiry triggered several individual investigations (see section 
1.1.2) and led to the adoption of the Third Energy Package in 2009. The Package consists 
of three regulations establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, on 
conditions for access to power network, and on conditions for access to gas network and 
two directives on common rules in the internal power market and in the internal gas market.  
To address concerns highlighted in the 2007 Sector Inquiry, the three key aspects of the 
package, - were2: 
 Effective unbundling: requiring that network operators be legally and functionally 
separate from the supply and generation or production activities.  
 Cross border integration: stronger independence of national regulators also 
conferred with greater regulatory powers to monitor compliance of transmission and 
distribution system operators with third-party access rules, unbundling obligations, 
balancing mechanisms, congestion and interconnection management. This included 
powers to investigate the functioning of the gas and electricity markets, and to 
impose necessary and proportionate measures to promote effective competition 
and ensure proper functioning of the market.  
 Regulatory oversight: to ensure fair competition between EU companies and third 
country companies, the package also included provisions to prevent control of 
transmission systems by companies from non-EU companies, unless they fulfil 
certain conditions. And the creation of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER).  
1.2.2 Anti-trust enforcement and merger control 
During the past two decades (1994 to 2014), the Commission has handled 351 merger 
and anti-trust cases in gas and electricity markets across Europe. There has been a 
noticeable increase in EU competition policy enforcement activity since 2000 (when the first 
liberalisation directives were transposed in Member State legislation). Figure 1.1 shows the 
annual distribution of antitrust and merger cases handled by the Commission during this 
period.  
The majority involved merger decisions in the electricity sector (Figure 1.2). Antitrust 
enforcement in gas and electricity markets by the EU has been relatively limited. Overall, 
the Commission handled 38 antitrust enforcement cases between 1994 and 2014, including 
three cartel investigations. 
 
                                                     
2  This section was written using the information on this 
page: http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Thirdenergypackage/Pages/Index.aspx  
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Figure 1.1 Distribution of EU merger and anti-trust cases in electricity and gas markets 
 
Source: DG COMP. Based on data extracted on 26/09/2014. NACE codes D35.1 and D35.2. NOTE: 
Sector inquiry excluded from anti-trust cases reported in 2007. By case end date. 
Figure 1.2 Distribution of EU merger and anti-trust cases by sector 
 
Source: DG COMP. Based on data extracted on 26/09/2014. NACE codes D35.1 and D35.2. NOTE: 
Sector inquiry excluded from anti-trust cases reported in 2007. By case end date 
Until 2003, merger cases in gas and electricity markets were commonly handled via 
simplified procedures. If the merging firms are not operating in the same or related markets, 
or if they have only small market share below specified market share thresholds, the merger 
will typically not generate significant competition problems: the merger review therefore 
follows a simplified procedure involving a routine check. 
Since 2003, a significantly higher share of the merger cases in gas and electricity 
markets have been subject to a full investigation, suggesting an increase in merger 
activity in these markets giving rise to competition concerns (Figure 1.3).  
23
15
Anti-trust cases
99
214
Merger cases
Gas Electricity
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Figure 1.3 Distribution of EU merger cases by procedure 
 
Source: DG COMP. Based on data extracted on 26/09/2014. NACE codes D35.1 and D35.2. By case 
end date. 
EU merger control has played a key role in limiting further horizontal and vertical 
integration in energy markets which are already highly concentrated. For example, the 2008 
GDF/Suez merger (examined later as a case study), which aimed to create one of the 
world’s largest energy companies, as originally planned, would have weakened competition 
in the gas and electricity wholesale and retail markets in Belgium and in the gas markets in 
France by removing competition between GDF and Suez in these markets.  
Our case study demonstrates that the remedies offered by GDF and Suez limited the 
potential anticompetitive effects of the merger (in Belgian wholesale gas markets which 
were the focus of case study) and that better access to the hub was achieved through 
ownership unbundling. 
In the Electricité de France S.A. (EdF)/British Energy merger decision (2008), the package 
of remedies secured by the Commission aimed to prevent unilateral horizontal effects. This 
merger combined British Energy, the UK’s largest power generator, and EdF, another 
significant UK electricity player with substantial coal- and gas-fired generation capacity. 
Although the merged entity would not have had high market share and still faced several 
competitors, the Commission’s investigation identified real concerns. Specifically, the 
Commission was concerned that the transaction created the possibility for the merged entity 
to net-off its generation and supply requirements, thereby precluding the need for British 
Energy to sell most of its generation into the wholesale market, and for EdF to buy power in 
the wholesale market.  
The Commission believed this could lead to a reduction of liquidity in the British wholesale 
electricity market, potentially causing demand foreclosure for generators, more difficulties 
for generators and suppliers to hedge their positions, increased market volatility and less 
reliable price signals (with attendant impact on generators’ ability to secure financing for 
new projects). The merger was ultimately cleared by the Commission based on a package 
of structural and behavioural remedies provided by EdF. 
In some cases, the remedies put in place to mitigate the potential anti-competitive effects of 
a merger have also contributed to promoting market liberalisation. For example, in 2001, the 
Commission authorised, subject to conditions, the acquisition of joint control of German 
electricity company Energie Baden-Württemberg AG  (EnBW) by EdF and Zweckverband 
Oberschwäbische Elektrizitätswerke (OEW), an association of nine south-west German 
districts. The investigation concluded that EdF enjoyed a dominant position on the French 
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market for the supply of eligible customers, with a market share of approximately 90 per 
cent. EnBW was considered one of the most likely potential competitors in the French 
market and was strategically well placed to enter the market for the supply of eligible 
customers. By acquiring EnBW, EdF would have strengthened its dominant position in 
France and also increased its potential for retaliation in Germany and would thus become 
less exposed to competition in France. There were two relatively standard elements to the 
remedies package and an innovative third element. This third element of the EdF remedy 
sought to address the competition concerns that had arisen in relation to so-called “eligible” 
customers in France, i.e., those whose electricity supply is open to competition. To resolve 
these concerns, EdF undertook to provide competitors with access to generation capacity 
located in France in the form of virtual power plants (5000 MW) and back to back 
agreements to existing co-generation power purchase agreements with a maximum of 1000 
MW. According to the terms of the commitments, the contracts for access to the virtual 
power plants were to be awarded through an open, non-discriminatory public auction open 
to utilities and traders alike. These arrangements for access to generation capacity were to 
remain in place for a period of five years so as to allow sufficient alternative supply sources 
to become available 
The Commission has not hesitated in prohibiting anti-competitive mergers. In 2004, the 
Commission decided to prohibit the proposed acquisition of joint control over Gás de 
Portugal (GDP), the incumbent gas company in Portugal, by Energias de Portugal (EDP), 
the incumbent electricity company in Portugal, and ENI, an Italian energy company. The 
Commission analysed the possible impact of the proposed operation on the gas and 
electricity supply markets in Portugal and concluded that the transaction would strengthen 
EDP’s dominant position in the electricity wholesale and retail markets in Portugal. In 
particular, it would remove GDP’s potential to compete in the electricity markets. 
Furthermore, since gas is now one of the most efficient ways to produce electricity, the 
concentration would have made current and possible future power producers in Portugal 
dependent on their main competitor, namely EDP. The concentration would also strengthen 
GDP’s dominant position in the relevant gas markets in Portugal, through the foreclosure of 
a significant part of the gas demand (controlled by EDP) and the elimination of EDP as most 
likely entrant in the gas markets. Since most competition in energy markets comes from 
electricity incumbents entering the gas market and vice versa, this case demonstrates the 
Commission’s strict approach to mergers involving gas and electricity companies 
(“‘convergence’’ mergers). 
The Commission’s intervention has also prevented mergers with potentially anti-competitive 
effects from going forward. In 2008, the proposed acquisition of the Hungarian oil and gas 
company, MOL by the Austrian oil and gas group, OMV was abandoned following the 
Commission's concerns relating to the combined market share of the companies in several 
energy markets. The proposed acquisition would have brought together two strong 
integrated oil and gas companies and given the merged entity a strong hold in both the 
petrol retail market and in the refining sector in several Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries. OMV offered a number of remedies (for example, offering to open the 
refineries to competitors) to address the competition concerns raised by the Commission, 
but these were deemed insufficient.  OMV was not prepared to accept the remedies sought 
by the Commission and eventually withdrew the merger notification. 
Finally, the Commission has also acted when the conditions imposed by national authorities 
create unjustified restrictions to mergers of Community dimension. In particular, the 
Commission has adopted three decisions under Article 21 of the Merger Regulation (two in 
the framework of the E.ON/Endesa case and one in the Enel/Acciona/Endesa case) to 
declare that some measures adopted by the Spanish authorities were incompatible with 
Community law, constituted unjustified restrictions to those mergers and should, therefore, 
be withdrawn. Given the Spanish authorities' failure to comply with the Commission request 
to withdraw the illegal measures, the Commission started infringement proceedings under 
Article 226 EC in the two cases. The European Court of Justice has recently clarified that in 
relation to the first one of these infringement cases (EON/Endesa) Spain violated EC law by 
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failing to comply with the Commission decisions adopted on 26 September and 20 
December 2006.  
The Commission has taken anti-trust enforcement action to tackle exclusionary conduct 
by dominant incumbents; exploitative abuses by dominant incumbents; and collusive 
behaviour.  For example, in 2007, the Commission opened an investigation into ENI’s 
suspected abuse of a dominant position in the market for the transport of gas. There were 
concerns that ENI may have foreclosed competition in the Italian gas supply market by not 
granting competitors’ access to capacity available on the transport network (capacity 
hoarding) or doing so in an am impractical manner (capacity degradation) and by 
strategically limiting investment in ENI’s international transmission pipeline system(strategic 
underinvestment). In response to these concerns, ENI committed to divest its shares in the 
three companies operating the relevant international transport pipelines3, thus ensuring that 
third-party requests to access the gas pipeline would be dealt with by an entity independent 
of ENI, thereby removing the potential conflict of interest resulting from the vertical 
integration of ENI. 
In 2007, the Commission initiated anti-trust action against Distrigas in response to potential 
market foreclosure concerns relating to long-term gas supply contracts between Distrigas, 
the Belgian incumbent national supplier, and its large gas customers in Belgium.  Given the 
very strong market position of Distrigas on the relevant market, the Commission was 
concerned that other suppliers find it difficult to do business with Belgian customers, due to 
the combination of two factors: the duration of the contracts and the volumes of gas tied to 
Distrigas. To address the Commission’s concerns, Distrigaz made a series of commitments. 
In order to address the Commission concerns, Distrigas proposed commitments for a period 
of four years. According to these commitments, Distrigas was to ensure that at least 35 per 
cent of its volumes sold to large industrial users and electricity producers (representing 
about 20 per cent of total sales in the relevant market) would be contestable every year. In 
addition, the duration of all new contracts would be limited, with a maximum of five years 
applying to contracts with industrial users and electricity producers, and a maximum of five 
years applying to gas resellers 
In the electricity sector, the Commission investigated E.ON’s suspected abuse of its 
dominant position on the German wholesale market (2008). There were concerns that E.ON 
may have withdrawn available generation capacity from the German wholesale electricity 
markets (to raise prices), and may have deterred new investors from entering the generation 
market. The case resulted in substantial commitment by E.ON to divest 5000 MW of 
generation plants along with its extra-high voltage distribution network that structurally 
changed the German electricity market to the benefit of consumers (see case study later 
on). 
Anti-trust enforcement in the electricity sector has also included interventions to prevent 
restrictions on trade in electricity between EU countries (e.g. Swedish interconnectors case, 
2010). 
The European Commission has tackled collusive behaviour in both gas and electricity 
markets: 
 In July 2009, the Commission issued a Decision fining both E.ON and GDF Suez for 
having colluded to share the German and French gas markets. Each firm was ordered 
to pay €553m in fines for malpractices over the period 1999 to 2005.  
 In 2014, the Commission imposed fines totalling € 5.979m on EPEX Spot and Nord 
Pool Spot – the two leading European spot power exchanges – for agreeing not to 
compete with one another.  
                                                     
3  Namely: TAG, TENP and Transitgas, which bring gas to Italy from Russia (TAG) and northern Europe (the 
TENP/Transitgas system) 
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The above cases illustrate the range of competition issues addressed by the Commission. 
They also demonstrate the significance and variety of remedies applied by the Commission 
to prevent or eliminate anti-competitive practices.  
1.3 Structure of this Report 
The rest of the document is organised as follows: 
 Section 2 summarises existing theories and empirical evidence of the effect of 
competition policy interventions on the functioning and performance of energy 
markets; 
 Section 3 provides a stylised overview of the current state of EU gas and electricity 
markets; 
 Section 4 presents the results of an empirical analysis of the impact of EU and 
national competition policy enforcement on long term market outcomes such as 
productivity and investment; 
 Section 5 examines the impact of the Commission’s decision in the specific case of 
abuse of dominance by E.ON on the functioning of German wholesale and retail 
electricity markets;  
 Section 6 evaluates the impact of the Commission’s decision on the GDF-Suez 
merger case on the functioning of wholesale gas markets in Belgium. 
 Section 7 addresses the seven evaluation questions and discusses the policy and 
methodological conclusions emerging from this study. 
This Non-technical Summary is accompanied by a separate Technical Report which 
provides full details of the theoretical and empirical work undertaken in the context of this 
study. 
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2 Findings from the literature 
Previously, only one study has empirically evaluated the (ex-post) impacts of competition 
policy enforcement in gas and electricity markets. A wider pool of academic literature 
examines how mergers, ownership unbundling, long-term contracts or merger remedies 
affect competition in energy markets, but only a handful provide an empirical analysis of 
competition issues in energy markets using econometric approaches. This section 
summarises the most significant and relevant findings from these studies.  
2.1 Ex-post analysis of the impact of competition policy enforcement in gas 
and electricity markets 
Pozzi (2004) investigates the causes (or triggers) and ex-post effects of antitrust 
enforcement in US energy industries using a dataset of all federal cases (26 cases in total) 
representing the litigation activity of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission in the oil, gas, coal and power sector from 1990 to 2004. He found some 
evidence of causality between antitrust enforcement and firm performance (industry 
markups and profits) in the electricity sector. Antitrust enforcement had no impact on overall 
industry profits in the oil and gas sector, although it reduced downstream markups. Pozzi 
explains that downstream markups have little bearing on firms’ operating profits in the oil 
and gas sector, arguing that they mainly profit from crude oil prices and upstream 
operations. 
2.2 Competition effects of mergers in the energy sector 
In a relatively recent paper, Federico (2011) provides an in-depth qualitative analysis of the 
competition concerns raised by ten significant mergers in the energy sector in Europe4 as 
well as the remedies proposed by the authorities to mitigate the potential adverse effects of 
these mergers on competition.  
The author finds that six of the eight European transactions studied, raised horizontal 
concerns (which result from the loss of direct competition between players in a particular 
industry) in relevant wholesale energy markets (gas and/or electricity).  
At a wholesale level: 
 Horizontal effects were identified even in cases where the combined market share 
of the merging parties was relatively low (e.g. the 2008 EDF/British Energy merger 
case described in 1.2.2); or where one of the parties was a fairly small competitor to 
incumbent suppliers (e.g. the 2006 GDF/Suez case analysed later); and even where 
loss of competition is potential as opposed to actual (e.g. the RWE/ Essent merger 
case, 2009).  
 Horizontal effects were particularly prominent in the electricity generation sector, 
given the volatile demand of the market and the presence of several generation 
technologies with different marginal costs. According to the author, these 
characteristics lend themselves to the risk of price spikes, which may benefit the 
merged entity.   
                                                     
4  These consist of the eight largest transactions assessed by the European Commission in the energy sector 
between 2004 and 2009 and two major gas-electricity mergers in Spain over the same period. The first was a 
proposed merger between the gas and electricity incumbents (Gas Natural and Endesa in 2005-2006) that 
eventually did not materialise for commercial reasons. The second was a smaller, but still significant merger 
between Gas Natural and Union Fenosa which was cleared by Spanish competition authorities in 2009. 
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At a retail level, horizontal effects were identified in five out of the eight European 
transactions analysed. These concerns predominantly related to actual or expected loss of 
competition for both residential and industrial consumers, due to greater convergence 
between gas and electricity retail offers.  
The author notes that the Commission also identified several “non-horizontal” or vertical 
theories of harm in its assessment of mergers, which he warns are inherently harder to 
evaluate and substantiate than horizontal effects. The main vertical effects raised by the 
eight European mergers studied by Federico can be summarized as follows:  
 Input foreclosure due to lack of full ownership unbundling of some network assets 
(e.g. electricity transmission, gas storage and transportation). If a merger brings 
together network assets that have not been unbundled with activities in the 
liberalized parts of the market (e.g. electricity generation; and gas and electricity 
retail), adverse non-horizontal effects may arise. In the presence of effective price 
regulation of the network inputs, these could take the form of quality-degradation of 
the network input to rivals of the merging parties. The integrated firm may face 
incentives to engage in such strategy precisely because it is price regulated; 
meaning that the standard argument that there is only ‘one monopoly profit’ to be 
obtained would not hold.  
 Input foreclosure of non-network inputs. A vertical merger could potentially serve as 
an incentive for the merging party to increase the price of the input paid by 
competitors. 
 Customer foreclosure. Vertical mergers may deprive upstream entrants from 
contestable downstream demand, raising entry barriers and discouraging new 
competitors. 
 Loss of market liquidity. In energy mergers, there may be a danger that that 
consolidation could result in the internationalization of wholesale electricity trading 
between merging parties may significantly reduce market liquidity and thereby harm 
customers. Federico warns internalization would not in itself raise wholesale 
electricity prices since an equal amount of power would be removed from the sales 
and purchases in the market (by definition). However, the theory of consumer harm 
is more indirect and relates to the greater price volatility that a reduction in liquidity 
may lead to, and possible barriers to entry (either upstream and/or downstream) 
that would arise as a result. 
2.3 Impact of convergence mergers on competition in energy markets 
Because gas is an important input for electricity generation, wholesale natural gas and 
electricity markets are also vertically inter-related. Mergers between gas and electricity firms 
are sometimes called ‘convergence’ mergers and are increasing fast,  driven by more use of 
gas as a fuel for electricity generation and downstream opportunities for utilities to offer 
bundled gas and electricity supply to their consumers (Hunger, 2003; Verde (2008)).  
Several papers have extensively analysed whether vertically related firms could benefit from 
foreclosing non-integrated rivals (see Rey and Tirole 2004 for a recent survey). Studies of 
vertical relationships in energy markets (e.g. Granitz and Klein 1996, Bushnell et al. 2005) 
often explain their findings using this foreclosure argument.  Rupérez-Micola et al. (2008) 
claim that higher prices are related to the existence of financial netback effects, or spark 
spread pricing, in energy markets, which prices wholesale natural gas against wholesale 
electricity prices, which, in turn, are usually set with reference to retail tariffs.      
Federico (2011) also documents concerns in several merger cases regarding the integration 
of gas and electricity companies. Both input and customer foreclosure can be an issue. The 
vertically integrated merging party may face incentives to seek to increase the price of the 
input (e.g. wholesale gas) to rival downstream supplier (e.g. electricity generation company), 
in order to benefit its own downstream subsidiary. A vertical merger may also deprive 
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upstream entrants from a source of contestable downstream demand, thus raising entry 
barriers and potentially discouraging entry in the first place. 
Arguing against clearance of the Gas Natural/Endesa proposed merger, Barquin et al. 
(2006) claimed that a merger between electricity and gas incumbent companies would also 
instantly become dual fuel operators before any other existing or potential competitor have a 
chance to do so. Further to this, once a country is dominated by a national giant that 
integrates gas and electricity, it will be rare to find these champions engaging in cross-
border competition. Instead, Padilla et al. (2005) claim that it is not necessary that, absent 
the merger, a foreign electricity company could buy gas from Gas Natural to generate 
electricity and then for Gas Natural would use that generation to offer dual fuel services. A 
foreign company could sell gas to Endesa to be used in its gas-fired plants and then 
cooperate with Endesa in the resell market to sell dual fuel offer services.  
2.4 Impact of vertical linkages on competition in energy markets 
2.4.1 Impact of vertical integration 
Newbery (2007) argues that vertical mergers may be efficient. Wholesale markets create 
risks that are complementary for generators and suppliers and this complementarity could 
result in efficiency gains. When wholesale prices are high, generators profit, but suppliers 
who have contracted to sell at fixed prices face rising costs and falling profits, and vice 
versa. These negatively correlated risks create both a demand for and supply of hedging. 
But if contract markets are thin or illiquid, mergers (and as discussed below, long-term 
contracts) between generation and supply are an attractive risk-reducing and hence 
synergistic strategy.  Moreover, vertical integration can also potentially reduce the cost of 
capital for firms, by reducing exposure to volatile market risk5. 
On the flip side, vertical integration can reduce liquidity in wholesale markets which can act 
as a barrier to entry or expansion for non-integrated suppliers already in the market. 
Vertically integrated firms may use their position in the wholesale markets to undermine 
competition from independent generators by reducing willingness to sign long-term offtake 
contracts with independent generators; reducing willingness to trade certain products or to 
trade with independent generators; or dispatching their own generation even when cheaper 
generation was available from other firms (customer foreclosure). Vertically integrated firms 
may also take action in the wholesale electricity market to disadvantage independent 
retailers through input foreclosure: if a firm has any market power in generation, it could 
increase wholesale electricity prices by generating less at any given price, which would 
increase input costs for independent suppliers. A vertically integrated firm could also try to 
restrict trading or otherwise worsen liquidity, which might either raise traded prices or 
impose a risk premium on independent suppliers (Ofgem, 2015). 
Fiorio and Florio (2009) show that vertical integration in the electricity sector leads to higher 
final consumer prices. Using a standard probit model, they conclude that consumers are 
less satisfied if firms are integrated. In line with earlier studies, their results for the gas 
industry differ substantially. Herein, prices and vertical integration are uncorrelated and 
consumers are more satisfied with higher levels of integration. Similar studies dealing 
exclusively with the gas industry are Brau et al. (2010) and Growitsch and Stronzik (2009). 
2.4.2 Impact of vertical relationships  in the form of long term contracts 
Long-term contracts have become one of the main priorities for antitrust enforcement (and 
one of the most active areas of academic research). In the energy sector enquiry, the 
                                                     
5  Integrated suppliers are likely to have stronger credit ratings, allowing them to post lower levels of collateral. 
Without the benefit of this, non-integrated suppliers are required to post significant collateral to trade in 
wholesale markets (Ofgem, 2014) 
13 
Non-technical Summary 
Commission stresses that integration between generation and retailing, including in the form 
of long-term supply contracts, creates a risk of foreclosure. Indeed both vertical integration 
and vertical linkages between generation and supply (in the form of long term contracts) 
have more or less the same impact on the market.  The only difference between a long-term 
contract over 20 to 40 years (corresponding to the lifetime of a generator) and vertical 
integration is that the former lacks “direct investment and operational management and 
control” (Chao et al., 2005). In both cases, wholesale markets are by-passed and market 
entry of new competitors may be hampered. 
The general argument put forward – which is valid for both gas and electricity – is that 
vertical relationships reduce the liquidity of wholesale markets. Consequently, prices are 
more volatile and the signal quality sent to market actors is lower. This increases the risks 
for potential entrants into generation; they must either withdraw or invest both downstream 
and upstream. In the latter case, a vicious circle is created and the development of 
wholesale markets remains marginal. In the case of gas, entry barriers are even higher 
because of contracts that bind national historical importers and oil and gas majors for long 
periods. New entrants face both low liquidity in downstream wholesale markets and a 
shortage of gas available for import. The enquiry argues that it is hardly possible for a long-
term supply contract not to lead to the elimination of competition on a substantial part of the 
products.  
However, as argued by Hauteclocque and Glachant (2008), long-term contracts allow firms 
to hedge price and quantity risks and therefore, facilitate investment particularly in a context 
of under-developed and/or volatile  markets. In under-developed spot markets, future cash 
flows are uncertain which puts off risk-adverse investors from investing in generation 
capacities, thus leading to under-investment (Neuhoff and de Vries, 2004). Long-term 
contracts – by providing cash flow certainty and stability – can help generation companies 
secure project financing. By reducing risks, long term contracts facilitate market entry and 
investments, thus contributing to long term generation adequacy. Moreover, it is argued that 
long term contracts contribute to fuel mix diversity by facilitating investment in baseload 
technologies such as nuclear.  
2.4.3 Impact of ownership unbundling 
In contrast to the European Commission’s view, the academic literature is ambiguous as 
regards the positive effects of ownership unbundling. The arguments against ownership 
unbundling arise from the existence of vertical scope economies. Specific features of 
electricity markets - such as the need to balance demand and supply in real time; scale of 
investment required in generation and network assets and the irreversible nature of the 
investment - favour vertical integration between different supply stages resulting in vertical 
scope economies. The benefits of vertical integration can be significant in terms of 
coordination economies, market risk economies (including hold-up risks) and specialisation 
economies (Kwoka, 2002; Meyer, 2011). In his review of theoretical and empirical literature 
on sources and magnitudes of vertical synergies in the electricity sector, Meyer finds that:
  
 Generation unbundling - separation of the generation stage from the two network 
stages (transmission and distribution) and the retail function – can result in synergy 
losses of 17 percent of total costs for the average company.  
 For distribution and retail unbundling – separation of distribution and retail from the 
combined generation and transmission - synergy losses are estimated at below 5 
percent.  
 Pure network unbundling options - transmission unbundling and distribution 
unbundling only separate the respective network part from all other supply stages – 
result in synergy losses between 2 and 5 percent. 
Several studies cover the impact of different types of regulation or liberalisation. Steiner 
(2001) is one of the first authors to deal with the effects of liberalisation on consumer prices. 
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In her analysis, she takes data from 19 OECD countries between 1986 and 1996. She finds 
that unbundling increases efficiency for the overall sector, but the benefits are not 
necessarily passed on to private consumers via lower prices. Unlike Steiner (2001), Hattori 
and Tsutsui (2004) find that unbundling increases prices.  
Copenhagen Economics (2005) examines the level of market opening in several network 
industries via a dynamic panel data model. It focuses on the EU-15 countries from 1993 to 
2003 and concludes that higher levels of unbundling (with ownership unbundling as the 
highest form) generates price reductions and increased efficiency. They also conclude that 
unbundling the transmission grid is the most important element of market opening. But they 
cannot confirm this negative effect of unbundling on prices for the gas sector. 
Alesina et al. (2005) analyse different regulatory reform processes in seven network 
industries in 21 OECD countries between 1975 and 1998. They show that regulatory reform 
of product markets has a positive effect on investments. Analysing the gas and electricity 
sector jointly, they conclude that investments increase with higher levels of unbundling.  
Nardi (2010) disputes these findings. He analyses the impact of ownership unbundling on 
grid investments and quality. Although he finds higher grid investments in the network, he 
further shows that a substantial lack of quality emerges that confirms the resulting 
diseconomies of coordination when separating ownership and control of different company 
parts. He asserts his results should be seen as first findings since only qualitative 
investment data is available and therefore there is no multivariate regression analysis.  
Gugler et al. (2013) provide an empirical analysis of the effects of ownership unbundling of 
the transmission grid and final consumer prices on investments and corroborate the inherent 
trade-offs present in large sunk-cost network industries. They estimate a dynamic panel 
regression model for the electricity industry in 16 European countries between  1998 and 
2008, and find that ownership unbundling significantly reduces aggregate investment in the 
electricity industry. They also estimate an investment reducing effect of third-party access to 
the electricity transmission grid. Moreover, there is a general trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency. Higher electricity end-user prices induce larger aggregate investments in 
the sector.   
2.5 Remedies applied by authorities to mitigate competition concerns 
Some of the most recent and important energy merger cases have been approved after 
parties proposed commitments to the Commission (for example between GDF and Suez 
which is analysed later in this report in section 7). Some of the antitrust cases, as for 
example the E.ON case analysed later on in this report (see Section 6), have also involved 
commitments or remedies, both structural and behavioural.  
In the energy market, structural remedies require the merging parties to divest part of their 
capacity and to open the market to new entrants and competitors interested in buying out 
the divested plants. Federico (2011) found that the European commission relied almost 
exclusively on structural divestments to address the competition concerns raised by the 
eight European mergers he examined. In his view, fairly demanding remedies were imposed 
by the Commission even in circumstances where the combined market shared of merging 
entities was relatively low. He concludes that particularly effective remedies are those that 
involve the sale of price-setting generation plants, network assets and merging entity’s 
controlling stakes in existing competitors. 
As argued by Verde (2008), structural remedies are irreversible and their success and 
effectiveness largely depend on the party to which the capacity is permanently divested. If 
the party is able to compete effectively, the additional capacity could reinforce its position 
and bring pro-competitive effects. Otherwise, negative effects prevail and the benefits in 
terms of lower concentration of the market are outweighed by the losses in terms of lower 
scale/scope economies.  
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Aside from structural remedies, competition authorities have also made use of behavioural 
remedies in energy markets. The latter broadly fall into two categories: virtual power plant 
(VPP) divestitures and gas release programmes (GRPs). The first one applies to the 
electricity market and the second to the gas market. In both cases, the company is not 
required to divest indefinitely its capacity, but only to release temporarily part of its 
production/capacity to its competitors, generally through devices such as auctions or 
bilateral agreements. 
There is a vast body of academic grey literature examining the appropriateness of the 
remedies applied by the Commission in specific energy market cases.  A particularly 
insightful and in-depth analysis has been carried out by Sadowska (2011), wherein the 
author critically notes that anti-trust cases are not being fully investigated to establish 
whether or not there has been a breach of competition rules; instead, the Commission only 
summarises its preliminary concerns regarding allegedly anti-competitive behaviour and 
specifies commitments agreed with the undertaking as a remedy to these concerns. On the 
basis of an in-depth legal analysis of two anti-trust cases6, the author argues that 
competition policy was applied by the Commission beyond its proper limits in order to meet 
the objectives of sector-specific regulation in the electricity sector i.e. liberalisation and 
integration of energy markets. And while the commitment decisions might have contributed 
to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that 
purpose might have negatively affected the electricity market either indirectly, by application 
of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment 
decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inappropriate commitments in individual 
cases. 
2.6 Summary of key findings 
The key findings from literature are summarised as follows: 
Impact of competition policy enforcement on the functioning of energy markets. There is 
hardly any empirical literature on the effects of competition policy enforcement in energy 
markets. We could only identify Pozzi, (2004) as a major study that  empirically investigates 
the causes and (ex-post) effects of competition policy (antitrust) enforcement in US energy 
industries. The broad econometric analysis and the case studies analysed in subsequent 
chapters are new to the literature.  
As regards the main results of Pozzi’s work, he found little evidence to suggest that anti-
trust enforcement leads to a “material and measurable” reduction in the exercise of market 
power. Still, enforcement is found to have had some impact on firm profits: in electricity 
markets, profits decrease, whereas in the oil and gas industry there is no effect on firm 
profits, but downstream margins fall as a result of anti-trust enforcement.  
Impact of mergers on competition. Energy sector mergers can give rise to horizontal effects 
(loss of direct competition between merging firms) and non-horizontal effects such as input 
foreclosure due to lack of full ownership unbundling of some network assets (e.g. electricity 
transmission, gas storage and transportation); input foreclosure of non-network inputs; 
customer foreclosure; and loss of market liquidity.  
In theory, it may be argued that vertical mergers (between generation and supply 
companies) lead to efficiencies by providing a financial hedge against volatile wholesale 
energy prices and a natural hedge against balancing risk. Moreover, vertical integration 
could potentially reduce the cost of capital relative to similar non-integrated businesses, by 
                                                     
6  The first case concerns the alleged abuse of its dominant position by E.ON by withholding generation 
capacity in order to raise prices in the German wholesale electricity markets. The second case concerns the 
alleged abuse of dominant position by the Swedish network operator, Svenska Kraftnät (SvK). The network 
operator allegedly limited cross-border transmission capacity  
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reducing exposure to volatile market risk. On the flip side, vertical integration has the 
potential to adversely affect competition by reducing liquidity in wholesale markets. 
Moreover, empirical evidence shows that vertical integration leads to higher final consumer 
prices in electricity markets and lower levels of customer satisfaction.  In gas markets on the 
other hand, vertical integration was found to be uncorrelated with prices, but associated with 
higher levels of customer satisfaction. 
Impact of convergence mergers. The literature warns of the potential anti-competitive effects 
of convergence mergers (i.e. mergers between gas and electricity companies) such as input 
and customer foreclosure. 
Impact of vertical linkages. Both vertical integration and vertical relationships between 
generation and supply (in the form of long term contracts) can act as a barrier to market 
entry or expansion by reducing liquidity in the wholesale markets. On the other hand, 
vertical linkages allow firms to hedge price and quantity risks, thus facilitating investment 
and contributing to long-term generation adequacy and fuel mix diversity.  
Impact of ownership unbundling. The literature is inconclusive about the effects of 
ownership unbundling on end-user prices or on investment incentives. At a very basic level, 
unbundling can result in loss of economies that arise from vertical integration or linkages. 
On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that unbundling generally results in improved 
efficiency. But, academic literature provides contradictory evidence on whether these 
efficiency gains are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices or not. Similarly, 
empirical evidence on impact of unbundling on investment is contradictory. 
Design of remedies. Authorities have used both structural and behavioural remedies to 
address competition concerns arising from mergers or potential anti-competitive behavior. 
Structural remedies require the merging parties to divest part of their capacity and to open 
the market to new entrants and competitors interested in buying out the divested plants. 
Behavioural remedies mainly consist of virtual power plant (VPP) divestitures in electricity 
markets and gas release programmes (GRPs). Some academics have expressed concern 
that the Commission may have used competition policy tools to promote regulatory 
objectives i.e. liberalisation and integration of energy markets across Europe. 
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3 Descriptive analysis of the functioning of European gas and 
electricity markets 
We carried out a high-level descriptive analysis of select indicators of market characteristics 
and outcomes to detect observable changes in the functioning of European gas and 
electricity markets over the past decade or so and to get a broad picture of the current state 
of the markets (see Figure 3.1). Due to limited availability of time series data for several 
indicators, it was not possible to cover a 20 year period for this analysis.  At best, available 
data allows us examine the changes that have occurred in the markets since the 2007 
Sector Inquiry. 
Figure 3.1  Indicators selected for the descriptive analysis of European gas and electricity 
markets 
  
Market characteristics Market outcomes  
 
Market concentration 
 CR3 - The share of the three largest 
companies (gas / electricity) 
 Number of players in a market 
 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
Barriers to entry 
 OECD vertical integration index 
 Number of new entrants / change in 
players 
 Market share of cross border 
entrants 
Market liquidity 
 Trading volumes at hubs 
Regulation 
 Overall levels of market regulation 
 Price regulation of households and 
non-household consumers. 
Public ownership 
 Public ownership of first generation 
producer 
Prices
 Price trends / evolution: 
- Wholesale prices 
- Retail prices 
 Price dispersion 
Mark-up 
 Mark up wholesale to retail prices 
Switching 
 Switching rates  
Intensity of competition 
 Productivity  dispersion 
 Boone indicator (elasticity of relative 
profits with respect to relative costs)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: own figure 
3.1 The state of competition in European electricity markets 
3.1.1 Market shares and concentration 
High market concentration can be problematic because it creates the scope for dominant 
firms to exercise market power. The 2007 Sector Inquiry highlighted that generators can 
influence prices in two main ways: either by withdrawing capacity from the market, or by 
setting high prices when their production is required to meet demand. Since the Sector 
Inquiry, market concentration in electricity generation – as measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) - has fallen in almost all Member States except for Germany and 
Hungary (which have seen a tiny increase in the value of the index).  However, wholesale 
markets in several Member States remain highly concentrated and characterised by 
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the continuing dominance of former monopoly generators. Market shares of above 20 
per cent for the largest generator could be considered a cause for concern. In 16 Member 
States, the market share of the largest generator exceeds 20 per cent and in 18 Member 
States, the value of the HHI measure exceeds the commonly accepted threshold for highly 
concentrated markets (HHI= 2,000). Moreover, the small island nations of Cyprus and Malta 
are still characterised by a complete monopoly, with 100 per cent of their electricity 
generated by the largest (sole) generator. Member States such as   Germany, Finland, Italy 
and the Netherlands exhibit relatively low levels of market concentration. 
Retail electricity markets show similar patterns of concentration (with an average HHI 
of almost 4,500 and CR37 of 74 per cent across the EU). In 14 Member States, the market 
share of the three largest suppliers exceeds 60 per cent, indicating high levels of 
concentration in these markets. Incumbents have been able to maintain their market shares, 
and there have not been enough new entrants in these markets (European Parliament, 
2010). On the positive side, market concentration, in general, has decreased during the last 
decade (on average the CR3 indicator has decreased by 5 per cent at an EU level between 
2007 and 2013). A mixed picture emerges at national level. For example, in Bulgaria and 
Lithuania, the CR3 indicator almost halved between 2007 and 2003, whereas in Poland and 
Slovakia, the CR3 ratio has increased significantly in recent years.  
3.1.2 Vertical integration 
Available data shows that, although the level of vertical integration has on average 
decreased since 2007, it remains reasonably high across Europe (as measured by the 
OECD vertical integration indicator8). There are differences across Member States. For 
example, Bulgaria had the highest level of vertical integration in 2013 with an index value of 
5.25, followed by France, Germany and the UK with an index value of 4.69.  The lowest 
levels of vertical integration were observed in Portugal (2.45), Belgium (3.00) and Ireland 
(3.00). 
3.1.3 Regulation 
The OECD indicators of Product Market Regulation provide an indication of the overall level 
of regulation in electricity markets across Europe.  The indicator is composed of four sub-
indicators measuring the degree of public ownership, entry regulation, vertical integration 
and market structure. As expected, regulatory environment in electricity markets varies 
across Europe with Germany, Portugal, Spain and the UK having a less regulated market  
compared to Cyprus, Croatia, Latvia and Malta which are highly regulated. As part of the 
broader econometric analysis, we examine the interplay between competition policy 
enforcement and regulation by distinguishing between effects in high and low regulated 
markets.   
Drilling down further into specific elements of regulation, we note that price regulation in 
the household segment of the market exists in more than half of the Member States. 
For industrial consumers, regulated prices are present in 11 of the 28 Member States. 
Price regulation  - particularly when these prices are set below market prices and not in line 
with wholesale market prices – can distort the functioning of the market by (i) strengthening 
the position of the historical incumbent; (ii)  making it difficult for suppliers to recuperate their 
costs, thus discouraging market entry; (iii) reducing the incentives for firms to invest and 
modernise in infrastructure and services; (iv)  damaging the competitiveness of European 
                                                     
7  Market share of the largest three suppliers. Ideally, the top three suppliers should have a combined market 
shares of less than 60 per cent 
8  The value of the OECD vertical integration indicator ranges from1-6 . It is based on a simple average of the 
degree of vertical integration over the four segments of the market: generation/import, transmission, 
distribution and supply. Rating scale is as follows: a 0 is ownership separation, 3: legal separation, 4-5: 
accounting separation, 6: no separation 
19 
Non-technical Summary 
businesses by burdening them with higher energy costs ; (v) leading to over-consumption 
(European Commission, 2014). Moreover, regulated prices may discourage switching by 
acting as focal point for alternative offers which will cluster around the regulated offers. This, 
in turn, may produce a negative effect on incentives to enter the market, competition among 
suppliers and quality of services (ACER, Market Monitoring Report 2014). 
We also looked specifically at ownership unbundling in electricity markets. The Third 
legislative Energy Package proposed in 2009, which applies to both electricity and gas, 
requires an effective separation of the transmission networks´ operation from supply and 
generation activities (unbundling). In the transmission segment, there are several ways to 
unbundle: (i) separation of accounts and an independent operator (ITO – Independent 
Transmission Operator); (ii) operational separation where a company can operate the 
network without owning the network (ISO – Independent System Operator); and (iii) full 
divestiture of both entities (ownership unbundling). The latter is widely accepted as the 
optimal model because it eliminates any incentives to discriminate. According to the latest 
information (2013), 15 Member States have chosen to apply the ownership 
unbundling model on at least one Transmission System Operator (TSO) in electricity.  
3.1.4 Public ownership 
Competition problems associated with public ownership include control issues, preferential 
access to capital and distortions of competition both for and in the market which can be 
exacerbated by regulatory capture. We therefore looked at data on public ownership of the 
first generation producer compiled by the European Commission (DG ECFIN, 2014). Latest 
available data (2010) shows that the electricity sector still displays high levels of public 
ownership of the first generation producer (> 50 per cent). The average across all 
Member States stands at 61.6 per cent with 95-100 per cent public ownership in 11 Member 
States. There is 100 per cent ownership in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and Sweden. Many of these are more recent accession 
countries (with the exception of Sweden), which may have been pursuing market 
liberalisation policies for less time. In contrast, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK have completely divested the previously state-owned assets of the first generation 
producers.   
3.1.5 Prices 
Although there is evidence of wholesale price convergence across national markets in 
recent years (2008 to 2013), price differentials remain significant.  In 2013, the lowest 
average wholesale baseload electricity prices were observed in Romania (38.59 €/ MWh), 
while the highest prices were observed in Italy (74.21 €/MWh), resulting in a price 
differential ratio of 1.9 between the cheapest and the most expensive country in the EU. 
Prices in Italy, Ireland and the United Kingdom were among the highest in the EU in 2013, 
either because of the lack of sufficient interconnection capacities to neighbouring power 
markets (Italy and Ireland) or because of the dominance of expensive generation fuels in 
setting the marginal price in the wholesale market (natural gas in the case of the UK) 
(European Commission, Quarterly Report on Electricity Markets, Q4-2014).  
The average retail electricity price for households has increased from €0.14/KWh to 
€0.18/KWh between 2007 and 2014, with an average year-on-year change of 5 per cent9. 
For industrial customers, prices have increased to a slightly lesser extent from €0.09/KWh to 
€0.11/KWh over the same period and similarly had an average year-on-year change of five 
per cent10. Both of these are much higher than the average inflation rate of 2.12 per cent for 
the EU over the same period.  
                                                     
9  Consumption band DC for households (2,500 KWh < consumption < 5,000 KWh)  
10  Consumption band IC for industrial customers (500 MWh < consumption < 2,000 MWh)  
20 
The economic impact of enforcement of competition policies on the functioning of EU energy markets 
Huge price differentials remain across Member States as far as retail electricity prices for 
households are concerned, although retail electricity prices for industrial consumers appear 
to be gradually converging: 
 For households, prices range from €0.09/KWh in Belgium to €0.30/KWh in Denmark and 
Germany, resulting in a price differential of 3.5. The lack of convergence could be due to 
the increasing importance of non-market elements (such as network costs, taxes and 
policy levies) within the final retail prices, or other structural issues such as competition 
or the presence of end-price regulation. 
 For industrial consumers, prices range from €0.07/KWh in Finland and Sweden to 
€0.19/KWh in Malta, resulting in a price differential of 2.7. The smaller price differential 
could be due to the fact that industrial consumers are subject to less retail price 
regulation compared to the household sector and better negotiating position of industrial 
consumers, leading to better competition among power utilities. 
The mark up on wholesale prices (i.e. the difference between wholesale prices and the 
energy component of the retail price) can be indicative of the level of competition in the 
electricity market (with persistently high mark-ups associated with low levels of competition). 
The average electricity price mark-up across the EU has increased in recent years 
from €11.17/ MWh in 2008 to € 14.12/ MWh to 2013. Electricity price mark-ups are the 
highest in Greece, the UK and Germany and negative in some Member States (the Czech 
Republic, Lithuania, Romania). Mark-up differences can be explained by cross-country 
differences in operating costs of suppliers, volatility in wholesale prices, market size and 
consumption levels . In Member States like Lithuania and Romania, mark-ups are negative 
because of the existence of regulated prices (as retail energy price component seems to 
have been set below wholesale energy prices). In the Czech Republic and Spain on the 
other hand, negative mark-ups could be due to significant entry/ exit activity (CEER/ACER, 
2014 Market Monitoring Report). 
3.1.6 Switching 
The ability and willingness of consumers to switch in response to price signals is an 
important aspect of well-functioning markets.  In competitive markets, we would expect to 
see consumer actions, such as the threat of switching supplier, exerting competitive 
pressure on suppliers. If switching is discouraged or impeded, it could deter new entrants 
from entering the market, on the assumption it will be difficult to persuade consumers to 
switch from their existing provider. This could potentially diminish the effectiveness of 
competition.   
Data on switching rates in electricity markets is patchy and scarce, making it difficult to draw 
any conclusions.  Available data shows that electricity switching rates are low in several 
Member States (< 10 per cent) except for Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK 
which have relatively high levels of switching (ranging from 13 to 26 per cent). A low 
switching rate in itself is not indicative of market mal-functioning, but other qualitative 
evidence suggests that there might be barriers to switching in energy markets 
(CEER/ACER, 2014 Market Monitoring Report). Low switching rates support the conclusion 
that the actual level of competitive pressures arising from consumers in electricity markets 
may be limited. 
3.2 The state of competition in European gas markets 
3.2.1 Market shares and concentration 
Although high levels of market share of the largest gas operator >20 per cent) can be seen 
for 20 Member States (including the presence of a monopoly supplier in three Member 
States), it is difficult to interpret the market share of the largest producer in isolation because 
the market structure depends on many factors (e.g., the level of gas endowments within a 
country, the infrastructure to import, etc.). In the UK, the largest gas producer has a 
relatively low share of the market, because the UK has pursued strong liberalisation 
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strategies, particularly in the upstream elements of the gas market (e.g, wholesale shipping 
for gas). These markets have been liberalised more completely than retail markets, and 
such policies are considered relatively successful11.  
Retail gas markets remain highly concentrated in most Member States, even more so 
than electricity markets. In 18 Member States, the market share of the three largest 
suppliers exceeds 60 per cent, indicating high levels of concentration in these markets and 
the HHI is above the 2,000 threshold in many countries for which data is available. The high 
level of concentration indicates that retail competition in many countries is still not well 
developed. 
3.2.2 Vertical integration 
Vertical integration features strongly in most EU national gas markets. In 18 Member 
States, the value of the OECD vertical integration was greater than 4 in 2013, suggesting 
high levels of vertical integration. Exceptionally in the UK, the gas market does not have a 
vertically integrated structure. 
3.2.3 Regulation 
The overall level of regulation of gas markets is notably high in Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, 
Latvia and Poland, as per data compiled by the OECD. Gas markets are fully liberalised in 
the UK and there is little regulation in Germany, Spain and Portugal.  
The level of entry regulation, indicating the ease of entry into the market, is on 
average very low with an index value of 0.54 for the EU . In most Member States this 
indicator is below 1 with the exception of Finland (4) and Latvia (5). Post-2007 this indicator 
has slightly increased from an average of 0.41 in 2007. 
Many Member States continue to regulate retail gas prices. Price regulation in the 
household segment was prevalent in 14 EU Member States in 2013, while 11 countries also 
regulated prices for industrial customers. Most commonly a rate-of-return or cost-plus 
regulation is applied. All price regulation regimes use some kind of market reference in 
setting prices. Regulation with direct link to wholesale price exists in Denmark.  
Finally, we also looked at ownership unbundling in gas markets. According to the latest 
information (2013), 15 Member States have chosen to apply the ownership unbundling 
model.  
3.2.4 Public ownership 
High levels of public ownership of first generation producer (>50 per cent) can be 
observed in eight Member States. Romania, Bulgaria, Denmark and Ireland all have a 
significantly higher than average proportion of public ownership (all above 75 per cent). 
3.2.5 Prices 
There are significant differences in retail gas prices across the EU: in 2014, the lowest 
estimated household price in consumption band D2 (5.56 MWh < consumption < 55.6 MWh) 
could be observed in Romania (3.10 Eurocent/kWh), while the highest price was recorded in 
Sweden (11.86 Eurocent/kWh), resulting in a price differential ratio of 3.8 between the 
cheapest and the most expensive Member State in the EU. While this ratio is rather high, it 
shows a declining trend since 2011 when it was 4.2.  
Overall, retail gas prices for households have increased by 35 per cent (EU average) 
between 2007 and 2014 (from 5 Eurocents /KWh in 2007 to 7 Eurocents/KWh in 2014) with 
an average year-on-year change of 4 per cent (higher than EU average inflation of 2.12 per 
                                                     
11  London Economics. 2012. ‘Energy Retail Markets Comparability Study’. A report for DECC. 
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cent). Almost all Member States recorded inflation-busting increases in retail prices over this 
period, with the exception of Hungary and Romania where retail prices actually fell. In these 
countries, end-user prices are regulated and are set below wholesale prices (see below). 
Compared to 2013 however, retail gas prices for households on average fell by 2 per cent in 
2014 across the EU. 
Similar to prices for the household segment, there are large cross-country variations 
in prices (VAT and other recoverable taxes excluded) for industrial consumers across 
the EU. In 2014, the lowest estimated industrial price in consumption band I4 ((27,780 MWh 
< consumption < 277,800 MWh) was in Belgium (2.69 Eurocent/kWh), with the highest price 
in Greece (4.30 Eurocent/kWh), producing a price differential ratio of 1.74 between the 
cheapest and the most expensive Member State of the EU. This ratio has decreased from 
2.28 in 2007, indicating a gradual convergence of industrial prices.  
Gas prices for industry on average increased by 34 per cent between 2007 and 2014. 
However, when compared to 2013, retail prices for industrial consumers on average fell by 8 
per cent across the EU, resulting in a price differential ratio of 1.48 between the cheapest 
and the most expensive Member State in the EU. The wholesale price differential across the 
EU is lower for gas markets as compared to electricity markets.  
Average wholesale gas prices ranged from 25.27 €/MWh in Hungary to 37.45 €/MWh in 
Lithuania (2013 data). Wholesale prices fell on average by 4 per cent across the EU 
between 2012 and 2013.  
Significant gas price mark-ups were seen in 10 Member States in 2013 (although price 
mark-ups are much lower in gas markets when compared to electricity markets). In the UK 
and Luxembourg, mark-ups of more than  60 per cent over wholesale prices were recorded 
in 2013. Negative mark-up rates were noted in Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia. These Member States are characterised by retail gas price regulation. 
Data for gas price mark-ups is only available for two years: 2012 and 2013.  During this 
period, the average gas price mark-up has fallen from 6.72 €/MWh to 4.81 €/MWh. The 
largest fall was observed in Finland, Estonia, Portugal, Slovenia and Belgium. 
3.2.6 Switching 
Switching rate among gas consumers is relatively low at 5 per cent (EU average). Higher 
switching rates are noted in Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium (a similar country 
trend as seen in the electricity market).  
3.3 Intensity of competition in European energy markets 
We calculated the following two indicators to assess the intensity of competition in the 
energy markets:  
 Productivity dispersion, an indicator of how far competition drives productivity 
within a market by forcing inefficient firms to exit and allowing more efficient firms to 
enter. Lower levels of productivity dispersion are typically associated with a more 
competitive market (this indicator is explained in more detail in Section 5.2 of the 
Technical Report).   
 The Boone indicator, a measure of degree of competition calculated as the 
elasticity of relative profits with respect to relative costs. The main idea behind this 
indicator is that competition rewards efficiency. In other words, competition leads to 
a transfer of profits towards relatively more efficient firms (those with lower marginal 
costs) at the expense of less efficient ones. Therefore, the more negative the Boone 
indicator, the higher the degree of competition is (because the effect of reallocation 
is stronger). The calculation of the Boone indicator is further explained in section 5 
of the Technical Report. 
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Our analysis shows that productivity dispersion has remained stable overtime, although the 
Boone indicator has been relatively more volatile, suggesting a fall in  the intensity of 
competition in European energy markets between 2005 and 2012 (Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2 Competition measures over time 
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3.4 Summary of key findings 
The main observations that can be drawn from the data presented in this section are as 
follows: 
 Overall European gas and electricity markets remain highly concentrated, although 
there are significant differences at a national level. Particularly high levels of market 
concentration can be observed in small countries such as Bulgaria, Cyprus Estonia 
and Malta. Member States such as Germany, Finland, Italy, Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, on the other hand, exhibit relatively low levels of market 
concentration. 
 While progress has been made in liberalising markets, the positon varies across 
Member States: 
o Many Member States continue to regulate end-user prices and there is still 
insufficient separation of infrastructure and supply functions in energy 
markets. 
o Although the level of vertical integration has- on average – been declining 
across the EU over the last decade or so, it remains reasonably high, 
particularly in gas markets. 
o Public ownership of the first generation producer remains high in many 
Member States in both gas and electricity markets. 
 Wholesale prices have declined significantly for electricity and remained stable for 
gas.  
 Gas and electricity prices have been rising for consumers (except in 2014 when 
prices fell) and high levels of mark-ups can be observed in a number of Member 
States. 
Productivity dispersion Boone indicator
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 Productivity dispersion has remained stable overtime, although the Boone indicator 
suggests that the intensity of competition in European energy markets has declined 
between 2005 and 2012. 
 Switching levels are generally very low across Europe, with the exception of a 
handful of Member States.  
Alongside the above market developments, one can also observe an increase in EU 
competition policy enforcement activity overtime and particularly since 2000. The extent to 
which there is correlation or causality between some of the market developments noted 
above and EU competition policy enforcement is examined in the next section using 
econometric approaches. An interesting point to note is the divergence between retail and 
wholesale prices. In some Member States, this price divergence could potentially be 
attributed to factors which cannot be influenced by competition policy (such as rising taxes 
and network costs, and the continued regulation of energy prices to many European 
households), but it could also be indicative of markets not working well. The case study 
presented in section 5 specifically examines the relationship between wholesale and retail 
prices in the German electricity market in the context of a specific Commission Decision 
addressing alleged abuse of dominant position by E.ON. 
  
25 
Non-technical Summary 
4 Broad econometric analysis 
The main objective of this study is to analyse the impact of the European Commission’s 
competition policy enforcement activities on the functioning of EU gas and electricity 
markets. To achieve this, a broad econometric analysis was carried out to empirically 
examine the impact of EU (as well as national) competition policy enforcement on: 
 The intensity of competition in energy markets, as measured by elasticity of relative 
profits with respect to relative costs (Boone indicator) and productivity dispersion.  
 Medium and long-term outcomes such as investment and productivity.  
We chose not to focus on short-run measures such as wholesale or retail prices as 
part of the broad econometric analysis because the case studies focus on these 
variables.     
Additionally, our analysis also looks at the interaction between competition policy 
enforcement and regulation in energy markets. The remainder of this section describes our 
approach and results in further detail. 
4.1 Underlying theoretical framework for the econometric analysis 
The theoretical framework underpinning the empirical analysis postulates the following 
relationship between policy enforcement – i.e., competition policy and regulatory 
interventions— and market outcomes (Figure 4.1): 
 Competition policy enforcement has a direct impact on the strategic interactions 
between firms in the involved markets, hence affecting competition.  
 As a result of changes in competitive pressure, firms adapt their investment behaviour. 
We specifically chose investment as an outcome variable because there are many 
studies showing that firms facing stronger competition make substantial investments to 
improve productivity (Holmes and Schmitz, 2010). Moreover, investment is particularly 
relevant and interesting as an outcome variable in the energy markets. It is widely 
accepted that more investment is needed in Europe’s energy sector to ensure security 
of supply and to improve efficiency. To meet the EU’s ambitious climate and energy 
targets and at the same time secure the provision of energy, Member States are 
expected to increasingly invest in electricity generation, especially in renewable 
energies, as well as in electricity grids and natural gas infrastructure (e.g., 
Hirschhausen et al., 2014). Especially to incentivise investments in cross-national 
infrastructure projects such as interconnector transmission grids, but also in order to 
spur national investment in generation capacity, market and regulatory conditions are 
key. Measures of investments are therefore pivotal variables to look at when trying to 
understand how competition and regulatory policies affect energy markets. 
 Changes in market competition and firms’ investment behaviours in turn have an 
impact on outcomes such as firms’ productivity.  According to the literature, there are 
three main channels through which higher competition could lead to higher productivity: 
(i) within firms, competition acts as a disciplining device, placing pressure on the 
managers of firms to become more efficient. This is sometimes called the ‘within-firm’ 
effect; (ii) competition increases productivity by forcing inefficient firms to exit, by 
allowing more efficient firms to enter, and by reallocating resources from inefficient to 
efficient firms. market forces may cause inefficient firms to exit and may cause a 
reallocation in market shares from inefficient to efficient firms. These effects are 
generally called the ‘between-firms effects’; and (iii) competition drives firms to 
innovate. Innovation increases dynamic efficiency through technological improvements 
of production processes, or the creation of new products and services. 
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Figure 4.1 Theoretical framework underpinning the broad econometric analysis  
 
Source: own figure   
There is another, indirect channel through which policy enforcement affects long-term 
market outcomes. Each specific policy intervention affects the firms and markets directly 
involved in the specific case, and also has important indirect effects in the form of spill-overs 
across (vertical) markets, and acts as a deterrent. . For example, specific policy decisions 
affecting investment in electricity generation capacity also likely affect incentives and market 
outcomes in transmission and distribution. Enforcing antitrust rules sends signals about the 
power of the antitrust authorities. Consequently, a particular decision affects both the firms 
involved in the case concerned, and other firms’ behaviour in the same and related markets. 
These indirect effects are recognised as important elements of competition policy 
enforcement in literature. 
Regarding the impact of regulation, there is evidence that regulation in product markets 
affects market outcomes and investment. No investigation thus far has considered how 
competition policy and regulation interact in determining competition and market outcomes. 
4.2 Data and variables used for the analysis 
To perform our econometric analysis we collected and constructed data on competition 
policy enforcement (our main explanatory variables), and measures of regulation, 
competition and market outcomes. The following indicators and data sources were used for 
the analysis: 
EU competition policy enforcement data 
To quantify the Commission’s enforcement activities, we compiled a detailed dataset on EU 
competition policy enforcement between 2005 and 2013 in energy markets, comprising 200 
merger decisions, 17 antitrust decisions (16 abuses and 1 cartel case), and 203 state aid. A 
distinction was drawn between ‘activity’ (i.e. the number of cases handled) and 
‘intervention’: 
 In merger cases, ‘intervention’ was defined as follows: remedies (in phase 1 or 
phase 2) and merger withdrawals during phase 2; no merger was prohibited during 
the sample period in the energy sector.   
 In the case of state aid, an intervention was defined as the decision to initiate a 
formal investigation.   
 For abuses and cartels, we simply use the number of cases as a measure of 
intervention, since all cases led to remedies or fines.   
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National competition policy enforcement data 
Since this data is not readily available, a questionnaire was sent to all national competition 
authorities in the EU to collect this information. On the basis of the responses received, we 
constructed measures of national competition policy enforcement in a similar fashion as we 
did for the EU (bearing in mind that there are no state aid cases at the national level).  
Control variables 
The following datasets were used create the control variables: 
 OECD Indicators of the Product Market Regulation project, specifically the 
indicators of regulation in energy, transport and communication (ETCR) described 
in section 3.2; 
 Country specific data on GDP per capita, population growth and energy imports as 
a share of total energy consumption sourced from the World Bank; 
 Country specific data on the energy mix sourced from DG Energy’s factsheets. 
The OECD indicators of Product Market Regulation were used to classify countries as high- 
or low-regulated. Further detail on our approach including the country classification can be 
found in section 5.1 of the Technical Report. 
Outcome variables 
In line with the framework illustrated in Figure 4.1, we constructed the following outcome 
variables: 
 At the sector level, we created two measures of intensity of competition:  
─ Elasticity of relative profits with respect to relative costs (Boone indicator); 
and 
─ Productivity dispersion.  
These indicators have previously been described in section 3.3 of this report and 
are further detailed in section 5 of the Technical Report. 
 At the firm-level, we constructed the two outcome variables (investment and total 
factor productivity) using data from Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus/Osiris database12 : 
4.3 Results the broad econometric analysis 
Table 4.1 presents the main results of the broad econometric analysis. Detailed regression 
equations and results can be found in section 5 of the Technical Report. 
Our analysis shows that EU merger control lowers both Boone’s indicator and productivity 
dispersion; thereby indicating that national energy sectors became more competitive after 
these interventions. Moreover, EU merger control is significantly related to better market 
outcomes i.e. higher investment and higher total factor productivity. These findings are 
consistent with the reasoning that EU merger policy actions—through the channel of 
competition— induce energy firms to invest more, which ultimately leads to a higher 
productivity.  
                                                     
12  The database covers the period 1997-2014, but since data availability thins out considerably for the earlier 
and later periods, we only used the years 2005 to 2012. We focused on firms active in energy markets as 
represented by the NACE group D.35. The firms in the sample fall in the subgroups D35.1 (Electric power 
generation, transmission and distribution) and D35.2 (Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels 
through mains). We performed our analysis for those firms that Amadeus classifies as ‘very large’, in order to 
focus on the sizeable players in the market. Only these firms are expected to engage in significant 
investment activities and to (strongly) react to changes in the regulatory and competitive environment. The 
chosen firms had a median of 117 employees and median fixed assets of around € 130 million 
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Table 4.1 Main results of the broad econometric analysis 
 
Source: DIW’s analysis 
These results are however, only present in low-regulated sectors. This finding supports the 
view that competition policy is mostly effective where the competitive process is not 
influenced by existence of high levels of regulation. For example, if investment is regulated 
then a different market structure will not change investment. If, on the other hand, it is not, 
then a different market structure may induce different behaviour from market participants. 
According to this logic, regulation and competition are substitutes. Indeed, once an industry 
has reached a particular threshold of deregulation, then competition should be introduced 
and further safeguarded through competition policy. Competition policy’s role and impact 
should therefore be higher in low-regulated industries. Therefore, as regulation is lowered 
over time, competition should be gradually introduced. Competition policy, of course, should 
then also be strengthened to preserve competition (Bergman et al, 1998). While this time 
dimension has not been the subject of the current study, this would be an interesting issue 
to further explore. The empirical results for state aid and anti-trust interventions are much 
less robust, and hence no clear picture emerges. 
4.4 Caveats and limitations of the analysis 
Two important caveats should be mentioned: 
 Although state aid notifications and antitrust enforcement do not have a statistically 
significant impact on market outcomes, they cannot conclusively be seen as 
ineffective. It is possible that their lack of numbers did not allow us to empirically 
identify consistent relationships. 
 Causal inferences should be treated carefully. While we tried to deal with issues 
such as reverse causality bias (by lagging the policy variables) and omitted variable 
bias (by using fixed effects as well as other controls), our identification strategy is 
not based on a clear source of exogenous variation since it is virtually impossible to 
find exogenous variation in such a broad and heterogeneous framework. Therefore, 
we cautiously interpret our results as illustrating strong correlations between EU 
merger control and market outcomes rather than truly causal links. 
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5 Case study: E.ON’s alleged abuse of dominant position in the 
German wholesale electricity market 
To complement the broad econometric analysis, we did a detailed analysis of the effects of 
an antitrust enforcement case, namely E.ON’s alleged abuse of dominant position in the 
German electricity market. 
As mentioned earlier, in 2008, the European Commission investigated claims that E.ON 
allegedly withdrew available generation capacity from the German wholesale electricity 
market to raise prices and to deter new investors in generation. In response, E.ON agreed 
to divest a total of 5000MW of generation capacity. While the Commission Decision was 
announced at the end of 2008, the remedies were implemented over subsequent years. 
Specifically, the various plants were sold to different buyers between January 2009 and 
January 2010. 
The Commission also raised concern that E.ON may have favoured its production affiliate 
for providing balancing services, while passing the resulting costs on to consumers, 
preventing other power producers from exporting balancing energy into its transmission 
zone. To address the Commission’s concerns in the electricity balancing market, E.ON 
committed to divest its extra-high voltage network.  The divestiture of E.ON balancing net 
also took place in early 2010. 
Cumulatively, the Commission Decision(s) affected two main product markets: the 
wholesale German energy market and the balancing energy market. Although the effect of 
unbundling in the balancing market could have been important, based on existing evidence 
on the relationship between these two markets, we consider it of second order when 
compared to the direct abuse in the wholesale market. Therefore, in this case study, we 
focus on the evaluation of the first part of the Decision, i.e. the alleged abuse of dominant 
position in the wholesale electricity market. But we cannot clearly separate the effects in the 
two markets (wholesale and balancing) and what we empirically measure is the cumulative 
effect of all remedies imposed in the Decision. 
5.1 Contextual overview of the German electricity market  
The German market is characterised by a vertical structure comprising a generation 
segment, a wholesale market, and retail markets (see Figure 5.1). A transmission system 
assures that energy generated or imported is delivered to regional supply companies, which 
then distribute it via low or medium voltage networks to energy retailers and final customers. 
Finally, a parallel balancing market ensures that the necessary tension is present in the 
network at any given time. 
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Figure 5.1 The Structure of the German Electricity Market 
 
Source: own figure 
The generation segment is Germany is dominated by four vertically integrated, although 
legally unbundled, big players: E.ON, RWE, Energie Baden-Württemberg (EnBW), and 
Vattenfall, also the main players in the retail market and owners of a large part of the 
network. These operators jointly meet 2/3–3/4 of the total German electricity demand. The 
rest of the German energy needs are covered by local production by a large number of 
municipal operators (‘Stadtwerke’) and other smaller producers, or it is imported from 
abroad. 
Regarding the wholesale market, most of the generated electricity is either passed on 
internally to the retail outlets of the vertically integrated producers or sold to other retailers 
via bilateral, over-the-counter (OTC) contracts and through a centralised energy exchange 
market. Since 2002, the German wholesale energy market has been at least partially, 
determined through the European Energy Exchange (EEX) market located in Leipzig. Most 
energy trade between wholesalers and retailers in Germany is however still performed  by 
means of OTC long-term bilateral contracts between producers and suppliers, with only a 
minor albeit increasing percentage of energy trade covered through the EEX. According to 
the German Competition authority – the Bundeskartellamt (BKartA) – the German wholesale 
electricity market is characterised by joint dominance by the four big players mentioned 
above.  
The German retail energy market is fairly concentrated. The ‘big four’   cover almost half of 
national demand. However, energy markets are regional and defined by coverage areas 
(‘Versorgungsgebiete’). They differ substantially in terms of market structure, level of 
competition and, accordingly, retail prices.  
In particular, the four big players upstream are also downstream incumbents 
(‘Grundversorger’) in various regions.  But several of the small vertically integrated operators 
(particularly the ‘Stadwerke’) are also incumbents in different regional markets, generally in 
the municipalities where they operate. Figure 5.2 represents the geographical dispersion of 
these vertically integrated operators. The white spots represent coverage areas where the 
incumbent is either an independent and non-integrated operator or has a mixed ownership 
structure and it is partially owned by one or more of the big players and or one municipal 
firm. 
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Figure 5.2 Incumbents in regional retail markets in Germany in 2010 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Verivox data. 
In each region, several retailers offer different tariffs, incumbent operators are legally 
obliged to sell energy at a baseline tariff (‘Grundversorgungstarif’) to all household 
customers who do not explicitly choose another provider. Accordingly, this baseline tariff 
constitutes an upper bound for the energy retail prices in a given region because customers 
unwilling or lacking the information to switch supplier chose it by default. Incumbent 
operators consequently have particularly high market power over their customers and these 
tariffs are likely to be less responsive to changes in wholesale tariffs compared to those 
offered by the competitive fringe to more informed customers with lower switching costs in 
that region. 
Even though each retailer has non-discriminatory access to all customers in every regional 
market and every customer has the choice of sometimes hundreds of operators in each 
regional, there is very little switching among household customers in Germany. In 2009, 
incumbent operators still served more than 70 per cent of the households in most German 
regional markets (Bundesnetzagentur, Monitorbericht (2009)).  Moreover, most of these 
customers (on average more than 65 per cent) are still served at the most expensive 
baseline tariff.   
The heterogeneity in energy purchase costs, consumer switching behaviour, and network 
costs results in significant price dispersion within local markets. Typically, the most 
expensive tariff is the baseline tariff offered by the local incumbent, while the cheapest 
alternative tariffs are typically offered by the smaller competitors. 
5.2 Overall approach to the analysis 
We focused our empirical analysis on two levels: 
Wholesale prices: since E.ON’s alleged abuse of dominant position directly affected 
wholesale markets, we consider the impact of the Commission’s Decision on wholesale 
electricity prices in Germany. Specifically, we used wholesale prices as determined through 
the EEX market located in Leipzig.  EEX prices are relevant to the analysis because  they 
are readily available, transparent, and are used extensively in the literature on energy 
markets. A potential issue with using EEX prices is that most energy trade between 
wholesalers and retailers in Germany operates via OTC long-term bilateral contracts 
between producers and suppliers, while only a small (though increasing) percentage of 
energy trade is covered through the EEX. Because OTC prices should at least correlate with 
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the EEX prices that constitute a sort of benchmark or opportunity cost for energy trading, but 
analysing the evolution of EEX prices would likely represent the effect of competition on 
upstream energy markets. 
Retail prices: although the Commission’s Decision only concerned the wholesale markets, 
we also examined the impact of the Decision on retail prices to discover whether the 
beneficial effects of competition in wholesale markets were eventually passed downstream.  
The level of pass-through between wholesale and retail prices depends on several factors: 
 As mentioned earlier, three main types of energy retailers are active in the German 
markets: large, vertically integrated incumbents, municipal firms, and small, independent 
retailers. Energy suppliers differ structurally in the degree of vertical integration between 
different segments, their size, geographical scale, ownership structure, and objectives. 
These differences affect their energy purchasing strategies and, particularly, the type 
and length of their long-term contracts with wholesalers. Therefore, heterogeneous 
retailers have different incentives to pass-on upstream savings to downstream markets. 
Specifically, large, vertically integrated incumbents have less  incentive to quickly pass-
on upstream savings as compared to small, non-vertically integrated incumbents. 
 The pass-through of wholesale price reductions to retail tariffs depends on the extent of 
downstream market power. Customer inertia, particularly among private households, 
creates a stable customer base for incumbent retailers, which can be exploited with high 
tariffs. Incumbent firms are therefore less likely to pass-on reduced wholesale energy 
costs than other competitors.  
 Most contracts between energy suppliers and retailers are long-term. Therefore, if at all, 
the impact of the Commission's Decision on retail prices will probably  take effect 
gradually as existing  supply contracts are replaced by new ones. Hence, slow changes 
in retail prices following changes in wholesale prices are likely. 
 Finally, other important factors such as the (mostly regulated) cost of transmission and 
distribution and taxes affect retail prices. Wholesale energy prices constitute only a small 
part – in Germany ca. one third - of retail tariffs. This implies that regional and temporal 
variability in retail prices might be explained by these other factors (carefully controlled 
for in our analysis). 
A unique dataset from German price comparison site Verivox was used for the retail level 
analysis, with monthly price data between 2007 and 2014 for more than 8,000 zip codes by 
more than 800 electricity providers. We differentiate between three different types of 
household consumption (annual consumption: 1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh) and one 
typical commercial costumer (10,000 kWh).  
5.2.1 The choice of methodology 
We used a Difference –in- Difference (DiD) approach to identify the effects of the EU 
antitrust enforcement Decision. This methodology involved looking at 
markets/firms/products that are similar to those affected by the conduct and the subsequent 
policy decision (“treated group”) but which had themselves not been affected (“control 
group”) or, at least, had been less affected. The identification strategy exploited both time 
and cross sectional variation in the main outcome variables (wholesale and retail prices) to 
identify the effects of the Decision. We compared the differences in the average behaviour 
and outcomes of the treated group, before and after the abusive conduct and the 
Commission’s Decision had been observed, with the difference in the average behaviour of 
the control group, during the same period. This double differencing removes the time 
invariant individual effects (of treatment and control group) and the common time effects 
that might be otherwise confounded with the effect of the conduct and Commission 
Decision. It enabled the identification of the average causal effect of these actions. The two 
main issues for identification of the causal effects were 1) the choice of the counterfactual 
(treated vs. control groups) and 2) the choice of the before-and-after periods. These issues 
are explained below. 
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5.3 Analysis of the wholesale market 
5.3.1 Identification of the “control group” 
We looked at two different outcomes in Germany, the on-peak and off-peak wholesale 
electricity prices, which should have been differently affected by the Commission’s Decision. 
The underlying idea is that energy suppliers have more market power during peak periods 
when demand is higher due to business activities. Since the supply schedule is highly 
convex and much steeper in the peak period, a shift to a lower capacity schedule obtained if 
capacity is withdrawn from the market would have a bigger effects during peak time. The 
difference in the peak price between the high capacity scenario (PPeak,H) and the low 
capacity scenario (PPeak,L) is much larger than the difference in the off-peak price between 
the high capacity scenario (POff-Peak,H) and the low capacity scenario (POff-Peak,L). Therefore, a 
policy intervention that shifts the supply schedule to the ‘high capacity’ scenario should most 
critically reduce market power, and hence prices, during peak hours while having much 
smaller effects during off-peak times (0). 
Figure 5.3 Differential Effect of a shift in Supply Peak vs. Off-Peak Prices 
 
Source: own figure 
We decided against alternative ways of defining the control group based on cross-country 
comparisons.  
First, we considered choosing a country structurally similar to Germany but not impacted by 
any abuse, merger, or other relevant competition policy decision during the sample period 
as comparator.  But it was impossible find a truly comparable national market  because 
Germany has an unusual electricity market mainly because it pursued a unique ‘green-
strategy’ (the so-called ‘Energiewende’). Direct neighbours are also a poor counterfactual 
because electricity markets are becoming more connected and cannot be seen as fully 
independent. Finally even markets not strongly connected would be a poor counterfactual if 
they have been affected by some competition policy interventions during the sample period.  
A second approach relied on the creation of a so-called synthetic control group’ which 
consists of creating a synthetic, hypothetical market, whose outcome pre-treatment is an 
almost perfect match for the outcome of the treated group. In our case, this ‘synthetic group’ 
could be constructed as a weighted average from a selection of other countries and 
representing Germany as it would be, had it not been subject to the Commission’s Decision. 
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The difficulty here lies in the selection of suitable countries to be included in the creation of 
the control group. Moreover, this approach is data intensive, potentially depending on a 
large set of key control variables that affect the outcome variable, i.e. energy prices for both 
Germany and all other countries used in the control group. 
In a substantial data collection exercise, we gathered almost complete information on 
wholesale prices and their drivers for Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Poland and Sweden. We then tried to generate a synthetic control 
group for the two German prices (peak and off-peak) using several variables such as energy 
consumption, temperature, and holidays as observable characteristics. Because we could 
not satisfactorily match German electricity prices using the synthetic control group13, this  
approach was eventually abandoned.  
5.3.2 Identification of “before” and “after” period 
The following time periods were considered relevant to the analysis: the ‘before’ period (up 
to December 2008), the ‘implementation’ period when the remedies were implemented 
(January 2009 to April 2010), and the ‘after’ period (since May 2010). Given the high 
frequency of our data and because wholesale energy markets are very dynamic and should 
respond swiftly to changes in supply conditions, we considered four different impact 
scenarios to identify both the short-term and long-term effects of the policy intervention. The 
advantage of the short-run scenario is that they try to identify the effect of each single 
remedy and focus on very short time periods. Hence, the risk of contaminating the effect of 
the intervention with other, unobserved factors is much lower. However, the effects of an 
important policy intervention could be much more pervasive. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
look at the long-term  impact of the decision over several years. The disadvantage of this is 
that the precise causal identification of the policy intervention might be weakened by the 
existence of confounding factors, particularly in such a liquid and dynamic market. 
5.3.3 Results of the analysis 
The results of the analysis at wholesale level are presented in Table 5.1. We find that 
wholesale electricity prices in Germany decreased on average by 7 to 20 €/ MWh following 
the Commission’s Decision in 2009. But this cannot be seen as the causal impact of the 
Decision. It is  crucial for this study to check whether the divestitures reduced the difference 
between peak and off-peak prices, because this convergence is what we would expect if the 
Decision effectively reduced wholesalers’ market power. We find strong and statistically 
significant convergence effects in the short and long-run. The size of the effects is also 
economically very relevant, with convergence varying between 3 and15 €/MWh. The 
magnitude of price convergence is significant when considering that the average difference 
between peak and off peak prices was 30 €/MWh over the long run  
These findings support the view that the Commission’s decision, by affecting competition in 
the EEX market, reduced wholesale prices. 
 
 
                                                     
13  A synthetic control group would have been deemed reliable if the German pre-treatment prices were almost 
perfectly matched by the prices generated for the synthetic control group in the pre-treatment period.  
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Table 5.1 E.ON case: Impact of the Commission Decision on wholesale electricity prices in 
Germany 
 
Source: DIW’s analysis 
5.3.4 Robustness check: Placebo regressions using France and Spain 
To verify the reliability of our results, we performed several robustness checks. The most 
important one is based on the use of cross-country variation in the convergence between 
peak and off-peak prices.14 Instead of using other countries as alternative control groups, 
we use them in a sort of ‘placebo’ scenario. We selected two countries that share some 
similarities with Germany —France and Spain—where we have good data especially 
regarding the production of renewable energy and cross-border flows. These two countries 
have also the peculiarity of being more (France) or less (Spain) connected to Germany 
through common borders. We then implement the same identification strategy used for 
Germany on the French and Spanish prices, comparing peak and off-peak prices and using 
the same definition of the before and after periods.  
If the chosen ‘placebo’ markets are independent from the German one and our divestiture 
dummies indeed identify the effect of the Commission’s decision rather than other omitted 
factors, then we should not observe any significant results for the ‘placebo’ markets. 
However since the French electricity market is potentially more integrated to the German 
one than Spain, we might expect to observe some potential spill-over effects of the E.ON 
decision on French wholesale electricity prices. This approach is particularly useful to verify 
if our identification of the short-term effect of the remedies was accurate. Specifically, if we 
were to find significant results for the single divestiture in Spain, a country which should not 
be affected by the behaviour of the German market, then we could conclude that our 
                                                     
14  Additionally, we performed other robustness checks to control how the way we model autocorrelation in the 
residuals –one of the main econometric issues we face by having high frequency, time-series data—affects 
our results. We show that the main findings are not affected by different modelling assumptions. 
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divestiture dummies are measuring some other shocks rather than the effect of the specific 
remedy.  
In line with our expectations, we did not find any large and significant convergence effect in 
both the short-term and long-terms specifications for Spain. The picture for France is more 
mixed, which is also consistent with our expectations. Generally, we do not observe that the 
integration between the German and the French market reaches such an extent that the 
observed short-term changes in German prices are matched by the French ones. Overall, 
these additional results provide additional evidence to our claim that we are able to identify 
the effect of the implementation of the remedies imposed by the Commission on E.ON and 
we are not measuring unrelated shocks affecting electricity markets. 
5.4 Analysis of the retail market 
5.4.1 Approach to the analysis 
Given the structural characteristics of German retail electricity markets, our ‘treatment’ 
group (i.e. companies affected by the Commission decision) consisted of the three major 
incumbents (E.ON, RWE and EnBW and, potentially Vattenfall) whereas the ‘control’ group 
comprised the small, independent retailers. The logic behind this can be explained as 
follows:  
 The German retail market can be broadly segmented into two groups of customers: 
(i) a group of captive customers who stick with the incumbent baseline tariff or 
perhaps another cheaper tariff of the incumbent and (ii) a more mobile group of 
customers willing to switch.  
 The three major incumbents (E.ON, RWE and EnBW) can be expected to exert 
more market power than independent incumbents because they serve a larger 
fraction of the ‘captive’ customers with high switching costs.  
 The three major incumbents (E.ON, RWE and EnBW) can also be expected to react 
less to changes in wholesale prices as compared to the small, independent retailers 
because they are vertically integrated and use a more conservative purchasing 
strategy in the wholesale markets. They tend to purchase more than 40 per cent of 
their sales volumes more than one year in advance and only c. 5 per cent in the 
year of delivery as opposed to new entrants purchase c. 35 per cent of their sales 
volume during the year of delivery (as reported by the German regulator, 
Bundesnetzagentur, (2011) p 41). The regulator notes that ‘(…) Since a short-term 
purchasing strategy is currently on average cheaper than a long-term one, new 
entrant can offer at present more convenient conditions to their customers without 
losing money in supply and distribution.’ 
We would expect the price level of the big three incumbents and price dispersion at a local 
level to be significantly higher in markets where E.ON, RWE and EnBW are incumbent 
operators, compared with markets with independent incumbents, after the remedies have 
been implemented. 
Even if part of the effect of the Commission’s Decision on wholesale prices is  short-term 
and materialises soon after the individual remedies have been implemented, because 
energy is purchased via long-term contracts, we would expect a corresponding decrease in 
retail prices at the earliest several months after the enforcement of the intervention. We also 
expect the three major incumbents to react less swiftly to changes in wholesale prices 
relative to other firms given their purchasing strategy. We would therefore expect the effects 
the Commission’s decision to slowly materialise over time following the implementation of 
the remedies. 
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5.4.2 Results of the analysis 
We find that the Commission’s Decision, by affecting wholesale tariffs, also had an impact 
on electricity prices downstream.  
Overall, most retail prices significantly increased over the period 2008 to 2011. However, 
our analysis suggests that retail prices would have increased even further in the 
counterfactual scenario, i.e. in absence of the wholesale price reduction spurred by the 
Commission Decision (Table 5.1).  
Specifically, we find strong and significant evidence that all retail tariffs and the within-area 
price dispersion — i.e., the difference between lowest and highest tariff— increased in areas 
where the incumbent was one of the big three energy incumbents (E.ON, RWE, EnBW) if 
compared to small independent firms (Table 5.2). For instance, the price increase for E.ON 
with respect to the independent incumbents in the 1,500 kWh consumption plan is € 
5.512/MWh per year which represents 1.5 per cent of the average conditional annual 
expenses for that consumption plan (€346.7). The municipal firms, or ‘Stadtwerke’, seem to 
have reacted even more extremely than the (few) independent incumbents. Their baseline 
tariffs have significantly decreased with respect to that of the independent incumbent 
retailers and, clearly, to those of E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and Vattenfall. In the case of 1,500 
kWh consumption plan, the price reduction post intervention compared to independent firms 
is by €5.85 per year and it represents ca. 1.7 per cent of the annual bill. Compared to E.ON, 
the reduction of the ‘Stadtwerke’ is therefore ca. €11/MWh and accounts for more than 3 per 
cent of the annual bill. These findings are consistent across different consumption plans and 
are even stronger for RWE. 
Moreover, we find that these effects slowly materialised during the two years following the 
implementation of the Commission’s remedies. 
These results are thus, consistent with the observation that independent retailers and 
municipalities more substantially passed through wholesale price reductions to consumers 
than the major incumbents. 
Table 5.2 E.ON case: Impact of changes in the wholesale market (resulting from the 
Commission Decision) on retail electricity prices, Incumbents’ baseline tariff 
 
Source: DIW’s analysis 
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5.5 Caveats and limitations of the analysis 
We would recommend a cautious interpretation of our results in terms of drawing a clear 
causal relationship between the Commission’s Decision and electricity prices. 
Even though we tried to exploit the specificities of electricity markets to very carefully design 
our empirical approach and set up our identification strategy, at both level of the analysis we 
cannot completely exclude that other relevant events which affected the functioning of 
markets might also be driver of the observed results. In both analyses we tried to identify 
these alternative channels and we were partially able to provide evidence that they played a 
less crucial role than the E.ON decision.  
However, especially for what concerns retail markets, this is very difficult to do. Indeed, 
given that the Commission’s decision only relates to wholesale markets, the impact of 
remedies can in principle only be assessed at this level. Hence, the retail market’s analysis 
cannot be considered to be a true ex-post evaluation of the Commission’s decision. The 
downstream analysis has the broader purpose to provide quantitative evidence of the 
potential implications of an antitrust decision on adjacent markets and shed lights on other 
important competitive aspects of electricity markets.  
On the whole, we believe that the empirical regularities identified in this chapter provide 
consistent and convincing evidence that the Commission’s decision had a key influence on 
the functioning of the German electricity markets after 2009 and brought some benefits to 
consumers. 
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6 Case study: GDF / Suez merger 
Gaz de France’s (GDF) proposed acquisition of Suez in 2006 aimed to create one of the 
world’s largest energy companies. The merger raised competition concerns in both, 
electricity and gas markets, and at several stages of the supply chain in Belgium as well in 
France. In Belgium in particular, there were horizontal and vertical competition concerns in  
the wholesale and supply segments of the gas market. In response to these competition 
concerns, both parties offered extensive remedies on the basis of which the merger was 
eventually approved by the Commission in November 2006.  
6.1 Background to the case 
At the time of the merger, the Suez group and its subsidiaries (notably, Distrigas, Fluxys, 
Electrabel) dominated the Belgian gas markets, operating across all segments of the supply 
chain as illustrated in Figure 6.1. Moreover, GDF was also a key player in the gas markets 
in Belgium as well as being active in the electricity market, with joint control (along with 
Centrica) over SPE – the second biggest player in the Belgian electricity market.  
Figure 6.1 Stylised overview of the Belgian gas market before the merger 
 
Based on information sourced from CREG Annual Reports (years 2005 and 2006) and Cambridge 
Economic Policy Associates (2008) Structure and functioning of the natural gas market in Belgium in a 
European context. Notes: (i) Belgium consumes two different types of natural gas, namely H-gas (with 
high caloric value) and L-gas (with low caloric value) (ii) Distrigas was previously known as Distrigaz 
(iii) the above diagram is a simplification and should not be seen as a comprehensive depiction of the 
Belgian gas market. For example, it does not include the storage segment of the supply chain 
On 19 June 2006, the Commission initiated proceedings under Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger 
Regulation due to competition concerns. The Commission’s ensuing investigation found 
that, given the horizontal and vertical overlaps between the two companies’ activities, the 
proposed transaction raised significant competition concerns at all levels of the Belgian gas 
market. 
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At the wholesale level in gas markets, the Commission was concerned that the merger 
would significantly impede competition, because it would: 
 Give the new entity (GDF Suez) control of most gas imports into Belgium through its 
ownership of Distrigas. This risked excluding competitors from downstream gas (and 
electricity) markets. 
 Result in potential vertical problems due to the parties’ control over essential 
infrastructure (such as the transmission and transit networks, and storage facilities). 
Their control over Fluxys (the network operator) would give the parties  privileged 
access to supply infrastructure and storage. 
 Fail to address the existing access issues to the Zeebrugge (ZEE) hub, with Distrigas & 
Co. (a subsidiary of Distrigas) possessing all rights of access to the hub (this meant 
non-transparent agreements with all hub customers negotiated on a bilateral basis). 
Parties wishing to access the hub only (but not the domestic transmission market) were 
still required to obtain capacity rights through an entry/exit agreement with Distrigas & 
Co. Distrigas was also a competitor (actual or potential) of the other market players, so 
its monopolistic role posed further problems to competition. In particular, the non-
discriminatory treatment of information obtained by its control of access to the hub. 
In response, GDF and Suez offered extensive remedies, including relinquishing control of 
Fluxys (the Belgian network operator), Distrigas & Co and the divestiture of Distrigas (and 
SPE). GDF and Suez also committed to a series of investment projects to increase 
infrastructure capacity. Together, these remedies were intended to facilitate entry of new 
competitors and foster competition. They were also intended to facilitate access to the hub, 
with the expectation this would increase liquidity and trading volumes, and lower prices at 
the hub. As a result, the Commission concluded that the merger would not significantly 
impede competition in the European Economic Area (EEA) or any substantial part of it. 
6.2 Scope of the case study 
This case study focuses on the Belgian gas market and specifically aims to quantitatively 
evaluate the price effects of the merger (the associated remedies approved by the 
European Commission) on the market for trading on the ZEE hub. The hub, as part of the 
Belgian gas wholesale market, suffered infrastructure access and liquidity issues before the 
merger. The negotiated remedies partially aimed to free up access to the hub, which, if 
effective, would have generated higher volumes of trade and relatively lower prices. The 
study also provides some post-merger insights into competition in the supply market.  
The depth and breadth of the econometric analysis to evaluate this merger case was 
severely limited by non-availability of data. The econometric analysis therefore focuses on 
hub prices only. The study team searched for additional data from various sources such as 
CREG (Belgian regulator) and the firms involved (GDF, Suez and Fluxys), but Data 
additionally sourced from CREG and Fluxys was not suitable for econometric analysis and 
could only be used for descriptive analysis. 
6.2.1 Key aspects of the merger 
The table below provides an overview of GDF and Suez groups’ interest in the Belgian gas 
market. The last row of the table shows the combined market share of the merging entities 
(with no divestitures or remedies). The merged entity – in absence of any remedies -  would 
have acquired a dominant position in all segments of the gas supply chain in Belgium. 
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Table 6.1 Market shares of the Suez group and the Gaz de France group in the Belgian natural 
gas market in 2004, % 
 Wholesale market 
Supply market Transmission / Transit networks Distribution network H-gas L-gas 
Suez 84.37 
(Distrigas) 
88.21 
(Distrigas) 
86.3 
(Distrigas + ECS) 
100 
(Fluxys + Fluxys LNG + 
Distrigas & Co.) 
76 
(mixed distribution 
network operators) 
Gaz de 
France 
9.82 
(GDF) 
11.79 
(GDF) 
7.2 
(GDF + Luminus + ALG 
Negoce) 
0 0 
Total (after 
merger) 94.19 100 93.5 100 76 
Source: CREG. 2006. 
In its assessment of the merger, the Commission defined the relevant markets as follows: 
1. The market for trading on the hub. Based on price correlations, the Commission 
reached the conclusion that the trading market on the two hubs of Zeebrugge and the 
National Balancing Point (NBP, UK) belonged to the same geographic market. This was 
determined on the basis of a study undertaken by Ofgem15, which assessed price 
differences between the hubs. The study found that prices at NBP and Zeebrugge were 
increasingly converging, with this trend was expected to continue with plans to increase 
the Interconnector’s capacity. Notably important for this study (as later explained in this 
report) is the fact that on the basis of the same evidence, the ZEE hub was decided to 
be a geographically distinct market from the Title Transfer Facility (TTF hub) in the 
Netherlands. The Commission concluded the TTF did not form part of the same market 
as the price differences were more frequent and significant16. 
2. The various gas-supply markets. Based on surveys, the Commission decided to 
constitute separate markets according to the various categories of customers such as 
supply of H and L gas to dealers, large industrial customers and small industrial 
customers. 
6.2.2 The merger remedies 
The remedies, as per the Commission Decision, were composed of several elements. 
Those relevant to the Belgian gas market are summarised below:17 
1. Divesture of the Suez group’s holding in Distrigas: It was agreed that Suez would divest 
its holding in Distrigas to a third party.  
2. Restructuring of the activities of Fluxys s.a. and relinquishing of all control over the 
company. Fluxys’ activities were to be reorganised into two entities – Fluxys SA and 
Fluxys International. Fluxys International was to own the LNG terminal (and the non-
regulated Belgian and international assets). Fluxys SA was to own the entire Belgian 
gas transmission and transit system and all the Belgian gas storage infrastructure. To 
this end, Suez would transfer to it Distrigas & Co (which marketed transit capacity on 
                                                     
15  Ofgem, the British Regulator, had undertaken a detailed analysis of prices, including transmission costs, 
during the period January 2000 to April 2006. Ofgem also undertook further analysis upon the request of the 
Commission to carry out the same analysis for the last 24 months i.e. the period July 2004 – June 2006. 
16  Paragraph 99. Commission decision of 14 November 2006 declaring a concentration to be compatible with 
the common market and the EEA Agreement. Case No COMP/M.4180 Gaz de France/Suez. 
17  Commission decision of 14 November 2006 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the EEA Agreement. Case No COMP/M.4180 Gaz de France/Suez. 
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the Troll and rTr routes). Fluxys SA was to be regulated under Belgian law. In the case 
of Fluxys SA, the parties also undertook not to hold more than 45% of the capital (with 
Publigas holding 45%). The parties further agreed not to hold more than 60% of the 
capital of Fluxys International SA. 
3. A series of additional measures relating to the gas infrastructures in Belgium. The parties 
undertook to create a single point of entry at Zeebrugge which would bring together the 
hub, the LNG terminal, the point of arrival of the Interconnector Zeebrugge Terminal and 
the point of arrival of the Zeepipe terminal. 
4. Divesture of GDF’s holding (via Segebel) in SPE. GDF agreed to relinquish 50 per cent 
of its shareholding in Segebel, a company which itself had a 51 per cent shareholding in 
SPE’s capital. 
6.3 Descriptive analysis of the Belgian gas market post-merger 
6.3.1 Changes in market structure and regulation 
GDF Suez merger and corresponding remedies resulted in significant changes in the 
Belgian gas market and triggered the implementation of regulatory and strategic choices 
afterwards (implemented by the CREG). Table 6.2 provides a timeline of the key milestones 
following the GDF Suez merger.  
Table 6.2 Timeline of key events 
Timeline Event 
May 2006 The merger between GDF and Suez is proposed  
Nov 2006 The Commission approves the merger with remedies  
May 2008 Suez’s sale of Distrigas to ENI.  
This was the first  part of the unbundling process. Due to this action, the vertical 
chain to its subsidiary Electrabel in retail markets was broken 
Jun 2008 The sale of of Distrigas & Co. to Fluxys  
This action potentially opened the pipelines towards the hub for competitors, as 
GDF Suez could no longer control the physical gas flows into / out of the hub. 
On its own, this remedy would have been insufficient to open up competition in 
the hub as Fluxys International (controlling the hub via the Huberator) was still 
60 per cent owned by GDF Suez. However, part of the ruling by the 
Commission was that the decisions in both Fluxys SA and Fluxys International 
would be taken by the same board (see next point below). Given that GDF Suez 
could only control 45 per cent of Fluxys SA, this meant that it could not 
dominate decisions in Fluxys International. This effectively meant Suez lost 
control over the functioning of all of Fluxys’ operations 
Jul 2008 The partial sale of Fluxys by Suez which reduced the shareholding of the 
merged  entity (GDF Suez) as follows: 
 Fluxys SA (transmission and storage):  45 per cent  
 Fluxys International (LNG Terminal, BBL, Huberator, GMSL): 60 per 
cent  
Moreover, it was agreed that decisions in Fluxys SA and Fluxys International 
would be taken by the same board. 
Jul 2008 The newly created GDF Suez officially comes into existence 
May 2009 Publigas (an organisation owned by local municipalities in Belgium) increases 
its share in Fluxys SA to 51.47 per cent and becomes the de facto owner of 
Fluxys 
March 2010 A decision is taken by GDF Suez to sell its remaining stake in Fluxys to 
Publigas  
Overall, the merger remedies implemented in 2008 led to an ownership ‘unbundling’ of the 
merged entity GDF Suez in the hub, the supply markets and the retail market. In particular, 
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the transfer of Fluxys and the remaining assets underlying the physical structure of the 
Belgian gas market (such as transit, transmission, hub, LNG and storage) were essential for 
simplifying access to the Belgian gas markets. 
The merger remedies were to a large extent supported by the national regulator CREG, who 
was also involved in their implementation. Interviews with CREG suggest that the merger 
remedies empowered the regulator to further push and bargain for more regulatory changes 
to improve the functioning of the Belgian gas market. These included: 
 Introduction of pro-active congestion management systems; 
 Reduction in the number of balancing zones from four to one; 
 Implementation of a new Code of Conduct in June 2010 (CREG, 2010). 
6.3.2 Trading at the ZEE Hub 
The following positive developments can be observed at the ZEE hub, f the approval of the 
merger: 
Improved access to the hub as evidenced by 
 An increase in the number of participants at the hub: while increasing prior to 2006, the  
number of participants at the hub further rose from 68 in 2006 to 84 in 2014. 
 A significant increase in traded volumes: the net traded volume increased  from1,164 
GWh in 2008 to a peak of 2,721 GWh in mid-2013. 
Improved liquidity at the hub 
Data sourced from Huberator shows that average daily net traded volume slightly increased 
with respect to the daily average physical throughput in the period following the merger 
(2008-2013).  
6.3.3 Belgian supply markets 
There were significant changes in market shares of various players in the Belgian gas 
supply market following the implementation of the merger remedies and consummation of 
the merger. The sale of Distrigas in 2008 to ENI accelerated a decline in its market share. 
GDF Suez on the other hand, increased its market share from about 13 per cent in 2008 to 
over 30 per cent in 2012. The number of companies active in the market increased from 20 
in 2005 to 34 in 2012. 
Distrigas’ share of the sales volume (expressed as a proportion of the total volume in the 
Belgian market) significantly declined over the period 2005 to 2012, while its competitors 
expanded their market share from 2009 onwards.  
Furthermore, across the supply market (aggregated over all types of customers), the 
number of active suppliers (or ‘shippers’) sharply increased post-2008, both for the L and H 
markets.  
6.4 Empirical analysis: the market for trading on the ZEE hub 
While the above descriptive analysis provides an indication of the changes that occurred 
following the approval of the merger, it does not tell us the extent to which these changes 
can be attributed to the merger decision (if at all). We therefore, conducted an econometric 
analysis to quantify the effects of the merger (and the associated remedies approved by the 
European Commission) on wholesale gas prices at the ZEE hub. It was not possible to 
conduct this analysis at a retail level due to lack of data.   
Studying the impact of the merger (and its associated remedies) on the market for trading 
on the ZEE hub is highly relevant for an ex-post study as one of the main objectives of the 
remedies was to remove barriers to entry and facilitate access to the hub. A lower degree of 
market power, i.e. better access and liquidity at the hub could be expected to lead to an 
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increase in trading volumes and lower prices.  Thus, our main variable of interest was 
wholesale day ahead gas prices at the ZEE hub, time series data which is available through 
the Platts database. 
This was a complex undertaking due to a range of structural remedies imposed, as well as 
other simultaneous changes to the structure of the Belgian gas market triggered by the GDF 
Suez merger.  
6.4.1 Overall approach 
A Difference in Difference (DiD) analysis was undertaken to compare prices at the ZEE hub 
with prices at a different hub taken as a control. Similar to any ex-post evaluation exercise, 
the robustness of the identification strategy crucially depends on a suitable control group. In 
a DiD exercise, the control group represents what would have happened to the treated 
group had the event not taken place. Ideally, then, it should be: i) unaffected by the event; 
and ii) as similar as possible to the treated group. Identifying a suitable control group is a 
problem for this this case. First, European hubs are, to an extent, interconnected, making it 
difficult to rule out that a major event affecting one hub might impact another hub. Second, it 
is hard to identify and control for all the events that may virtually impact wholesale prices, 
both at the ZEE hub and other hubs.  
Given the above, the TTF hub in the Netherlands was identified the most suitable.18 The 
reasons for this are: 
1. At the time of the merger decision, the ZEE hub and the TTF hub were the two 
largest hubs (in terms of liquidity) in continental Europe19. 
2. The degree of interconnection between the ZEE hub and the TTF hub was very low 
at the time of the decision, and the European Commission20 considered that they 
belonged to different markets.   
3. There are few hubs for which data on prices are available from the mid-2000s.21  
One may argue that the two hubs are not comparable as the ZEE hub is a physical hub (i.e. 
where the gas physically passes through the hub) whereas the TTF hub is a virtual hub (i.e. 
where gas enters only virtually after entering into a national system). However, we would 
argue that this is not a critical issue for our analysis considering that even in virtual hubs the 
gas physically passes through , albeit at a national level. 
Importantly, the two price series seem to follow quite a similar pattern, which is consistent 
with the “common trend assumption” which the DiD strategy hinges upon.22 The two price 
series seem to follow quite a similar pattern, which is consistent with the “common trend 
assumption” which the DiD strategy hinges upon23  - see Figure 6.2 compares prices at the 
ZEE hub (in blue) to those in the TTF hub in the Netherlands (in orange).  
                                                     
18  One point of difference between the Belgian hub and the Dutch hub is that the ZEE hub is a physical hub (i.e. 
where the gas physically passes through the hub) while the TTF hub is a virtual hub (i.e. where gas enters 
only virtually after entering into a national system). However, this aspect does not pose too serious problems 
in terms of comparing both hubs, as even in virtual hubs the gas physically passes through , albeit at a 
national level. 
19  See CREG. 2006. ‘Study on the measures needed to improve the functioning and the liquidity of the 
Zeebrugge hub’. (F)060719-CREG-554. 
20  See para. 99 of the Commission decision (Case No COMP/M.4180 Gaz de France/Suez). 
21  The only alternative control hub would be the British hub, which however is not suitable due to the reason 
outlined in point 2, i.e. the high degree of interconnection with the Belgian hub. 
22  This assumption states that the treatment and control group would follow the same trend in the absence of 
the treatment. 
23  This assumption states that the treatment and control group would follow the same trend in the absence of 
the treatment. 
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There are some short-term price spikes in the ZEE hub at the end of 2005 / beginning of 
2006, reflecting extreme external events. A brief cold snap took place in the UK for a short 
period of time at the end of 2005 coupled with a fire outbreak in the UK’s main gas storage 
facility. The National Grid transmitted an emergency warning and this had an immediate 
effect on spot prices which experienced a period of exceptional spikes. Given the 
interconnectedness of the Belgian and UK hubs, this caused a spike in prices at the Zee 
hub as well24.  
Figure 6.2 Evolution of prices at the ZEE hub and at the TTF hub, 2006 - 2013 
 
Source: Platts database. 2013.  
6.4.2 The model 
The main empirical model used was similar to the model used to estimate the effects of the 
E.On decision in the German wholesale market.  
Our methodology aimed to quantify both the individual effect of each of these events, and 
their overall long-term effects.   
Figure 6.3 Individual and overall effects of the events related to the merger 
 
                                                     
24  BBC News. 2006. ‘Gas shortage sends prices soaring’. Available at: 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4802786.stm   
Event 1 
(Nov 2006) 
Event 2 
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(Mar 2010) 
Dec 2011 Jan 2005 
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Source: own figure 
To quantify the impact of different events related to the merger decision, different definitions 
of the ‘post’ period were tested. Three dates most relevant to assess the overall effect of the 
merger were identified: 
Event Date of event Time period over which effects are analysed 
Event 1: The Commission’s decision  November 2006 
January 2005 (beginning of our 
sample period) and June 2008 (date 
of event 2) 
Event 2: The effective divestitures of Distrigas 
and Fluxys and the consummation of the 
merger 
June 2008 November 2006 (date of event 1) and March 2010 (date of event 3) 
Event 3: GDF Suez sells its remaining stake in 
Fluxys to Publigas (+ some regulatory 
changes) 
March 2010 June 2008 (date of event 2) until the end of 2011 
6.4.3 Variables and data sources 
We used the following outcome variables for the analysis: daily transaction price data for 
day-ahead wholesale natural gas traded during working days as published by Platts, both 
for the Belgian hub and for the Dutch hub. Our sample period ran from January 2005 until 
December 2011. For each working day (i.e., Monday to Friday), these data reflect the price 
range of a standardised quantity of natural gas to be delivered at a constant flow rate 
throughout the next working day after assessment (e.g., Friday’s assessment reflects 
Monday’s delivery).  
The regressors were demand-side variables such as season and business cycles (day, 
month and year), as well as temperature (temp).25  
Supply-side controls were prices indices of power prices as well as oil products, to which 
gas prices are typically related (power, brent, coal).26  
6.4.4 Results 
The results of the empirical analysis - presented in Table 6.3 - suggest that the 
Commission’s decision and the implementation of the merger and its associated remedies 
impacted on wholesale gas prices in Belgium. Prices at the ZEE hub fell relatively to the 
TTF hub around November 2006 and June 2008, and to a lesser extent around March 2010. 
The first event (i.e. the Commission’s approval of the merger subject to conditions) may 
have had the largest strongest effect, although one needs to be slightly cautious in drawing 
implications from the magnitude of this coefficient (-2.364) because it might partly be due to 
the unusual price movements in the pre-merger period explained above.  
However, a large coefficient for the merger approval might suggest an anticipatory effect. In 
particular, since the implementation of the remedies and the consummation of the merger 
took time, it is likely that at least some of the effects took place before the merger and 
remedy events were official. This would imply that the effect of the merger decision might 
partly incorporate the following events. In this regard, it is not surprising that the last event 
had small effect to, because  it was largely anticipated by the market and therefore realized 
in advance.  
                                                     
25  We also account for non-linearity in the effect of temperature by including a quadratic term in the regression. 
26  Coal prices may influence gas prices as coal and gas plants both are important electricity generators. 
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As a whole, the evidence suggests that the remedies successfully limited the merger’s 
potential anticompetitive effects, since  the net effect of merger and remedies shows 
a price decline.27 Moreover, the estimated decline in prices, together with descriptive 
evidence of increased liquidity and traded volumes at the hub, supports the view that 
ownership unbundling improved access to the hub28. The remedies seem to have done 
more than simply  mitigating the potential anticompetitive effects of the merger. 
Table 6.3 GDF/Suez merger case: Impact of the Commission Decision on hub prices 
 
Source: DIW’s analysis. The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In all specifications 
we control for prices of gas, oil, and coal, as well as temperature (both linear and quadratic), day, 
month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
6.4.5 Caveats and limitations 
The above results should be interpreted cautiously because  the empirical analysis is 
subject to several caveats: (i) it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the events related to 
the merger and the divestitures; (ii) the selection of the control group is not perfect; and (iii) 
other relevant events (in particular regulatory changes) affecting the functioning of the 
wholesale gas market and hubs might contribute to our results.   
 
  
                                                     
27  It is not possible to disentangle the merger and the remedies, as they occurred around the same time. 
However, the net effect is informative of which effect dominated.  
28  One cannot totally exclude that price declines in principle indicate that the merger has led to efficiency gains, 
which in turn have led to price declines thereafter. However, this is more unlikely, given that no potential 
efficiency gains at the hub were indicated by the merging parties.  
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Overall
Treat 2.593*** 0.228*** -0.096 2.571***
(0.576) (0.061) (0.058) (0.572)
Post 1.339 0.255** 0.615*** 9.236**
(1.358) (0.101) (0.145) (4.334)
Treat × post -2.364*** -0.319*** -0.105 -2.759***
(0.586) (0.083) (0.074) (0.577)
N 1,759 1,660 1,772 1,873
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7 Conclusions 
7.1 Policy conclusions 
7.1.1 Q1. Can one observe a change in the functioning of energy markets in the EU over the 
past two decades?  
The structure of European gas and electricity markets has fundamentally altered during the 
last two decades. Most electricity and gas markets in Europe were national (vertically 
integrated) monopolies until the 1990s, when the EU and its Member States decided to 
gradually open them up to competition and establish a common energy market. Nowadays, 
in most Member States, there is a separation between regulated (transmission and 
distribution) and competitive segments (production and retail). Moreover, significant 
progress has been made towards energy market integration: many missing infrastructure 
links between EU countries have been built or are under construction; cross-border trade in 
gas and electricity between EU countries has increased; and wholesale prices are gradually 
converging.    
Nevertheless, gas and electricity markets across Europe continue to exhibit certain 
characteristics that are potentially harmful to competition, most notably:  
 Electricity and gas markets are still very concentrated in both wholesale and retail 
segments, creating scope for incumbents to exercise market power. 
 While progress has been made in liberalising markets, the positon varies across 
Member States. Many Member States continue to regulate end-user prices and there is 
still insufficient separation of infrastructure and supply functions in energy markets. 
 Public ownership of the first generation producer remains high in many Member States 
in both gas and electricity markets. 
 Gas and electricity prices are increasing for consumers (except in 2014 when prices 
fell) and there are high levels of mark-ups in certain Member States 
 There are significant price differentials for households across Member States, although 
energy prices for industrial consumers appear to be converging 
 Switching levels are generally very low across Europe, with the exception of a few 
Member States. 
Detailed investigations, beyond the scope of this study, are needed to measure any 
adverse effects on competition of the above features.  
7.1.2 Q2. Can one observe a change in competition policy enforcement affecting energy 
markets in the EU over the past two decades? 
There has been an increase in EU competition policy enforcement activity overtime and 
particularly since 2000 (when the first liberalisation directives were transposed in Member 
State legislation).  Moreover, until 2003, merger cases in gas and electricity markets were 
more commonly handled under simplified procedures. Since 2003, a significantly higher 
share of the merger cases in gas and electricity markets have been subject to a full 
investigation, suggesting an increase in merger activity in these markets giving rise to 
competition concerns.  
EU merger control has played a key role in improving market structure and functioning by 
limiting further horizontal and vertical integration in energy markets, which are already highly 
concentrated. In some cases, the remedies put in place to mitigate the potential anti-
competitive effects of a merger have also contributed to promoting market liberalisation (e.g. 
EnBW/ EdF case in 2001). In extreme cases, the Commission has prohibited anti-
competitive mergers (e.g. the proposed acquisition of joint control over GDP by EDP in 
2001), although such cases are rare.  
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Anti-trust enforcement in gas and electricity markets has predominantly focused on tackling 
three issues: exclusionary conduct by dominant incumbents; exploitative abuses by 
dominant incumbents; and collusive behaviour.     
Overall, energy markets have been subject to increasing competition enforcement action 
over time.  
7.1.3 Q3. Has the enforcement of competition policy in the energy sectors contributed to 
better functioning energy markets? To what extent?  
We compiled several pieces of evidence to provide a broad picture of the different channels 
through which competition policy enforcement affects the functioning of energy markets. 
Specifically, we analysed the impact of competition policy on measures of competition - the 
elasticity of profits with respect to costs (Boone’s indicator) and productivity dispersion - and 
the effect of completion policy enforcement (through the competition channel) on outcomes 
such as investment and, ultimately, productivity. We also captured both direct and indirect 
effects of the policies i.e. both the impact of policy decisions on the firms involved, and on 
other firms in the same market, plus potential spill-overs and deterrents in other (national) 
markets.  
EU merger control has had a robust positive and significant effect on the functioning of 
energy markets. Specifically, we found that the EU merger control has lowered both 
Boone’s beta (elasticity of relative profits with respect to relative costs) and productivity 
dispersion,  indicating that national energy sectors became more competitive following these 
interventions.  
EU merger control is also related to higher investment and higher total factor productivity. 
This supports the reasoning that EU merger policy actions - through the channel of 
competition - may have encouraged energy firms to invest more, ultimately generating 
higher productivity. But, as mentioned earlier, caution should be applied in inferring 
causality; our results should be interpreted as providing strong correlations. 
Impacts of antitrust enforcement and state aid control are much less clear cut. This does not 
necessarily imply that they were less effective. The result could reflect the limitations of 
empirical analysis: State aid and antitrust cases were fewer compared to merger cases, and 
it is possible that this prevented us from empirically identifying consistent relationships.  
Although a single case study does not allow generalisations, the E.ON antitrust case does 
illustrate the positive impact of EU antitrust enforcement on German electricity markets. In 
this particular case, the Commission investigated E.ON’s suspected abuse of its dominant 
position on the German wholesale market in 2008. There were concerns that E.ON may 
have withdrawn available generation capacity from the German wholesale electricity 
markets (to raise prices), and may have deterred new investors from entering the generation 
market.  
The case resulted in substantial commitment by E.ON to divest 5000 MW of generation 
plants along with its extra-high voltage distribution network that structurally changed the 
German electricity market to the benefit of consumers. We empirically examined the impact 
of the Commission’s Decision on wholesale electricity prices, using daily data on peak and 
off-peak prices from the EEX. The results show that the Commission’s Decision, by affecting 
competition in the EEX, led to a reduction in wholesale electricity prices in Germany. To 
determine whether electricity suppliers eventually passed on wholesale price reductions to 
consumers we did an extended analysis of retail electricity prices using highly 
disaggregated data (monthly data at zip code level) purchased from the German price 
comparison website Verivox.  The results suggest that the Commission’s Decision - by 
reducing market power upstream and hence, reducing wholesale prices – might have also 
reduced prices downstream. 
We also empirically evaluated the price effects of a merger case. The GDF/Suez merger 
finalised in July 2008, which aimed to create one of the world’s largest energy companies, 
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would have, as originally planned, weakened competition in the gas and electricity 
wholesale and retail markets in Belgium and in the gas markets in France, by quashing 
market competition between GDF and Suez. Our case study demonstrates that the 
remedies offered by GDF and Suez limited the potential anticompetitive effects of the 
merger (in Belgian wholesale gas markets which were the focus of study) and ownership 
unbundling, and might actually have improved access to the hub.  
The broader econometric analysis, together with the two case studies, provides a consistent 
picture of positive impact of EU competition policy enforcement. Specifically, the two case 
studies show that commitments and remedies can be effective in addressing potential 
anticompetitive behaviour or effects and improve the functioning of markets. 
7.1.4 Q4. Is there complementarity (in terms of objectives and effects) between competition 
and regulatory policies affecting the functioning of the energy markets? To what extent 
have we observed an increase in complementarity over the past two decades? Please 
explain 
Regulation and competition policy can be complementary in several ways. The two can 
work together to support new entrants and smaller rivals in markets with an entrenched 
incumbent. Regulation is ex-ante and can provide certainty and facilitate market entry (by 
helping firms make forward-looking investment and production decisions). The facilitation of 
entry and promotion of effective rivalry creates the environment for more effective 
competition. The tools available to regulators and competition authorities could also 
generate complementarity. If extensive and/or frequent intervention is necessary, or where 
the remedies available to competition authorities are insufficient to address such conduct, 
regulation may be preferable. Competition law, on the other hand, typically has stronger 
powers to address anticompetitive behaviour.  
It was not possible to carry out in-depth analysis of complementarities between competition 
policy and regulation within the scope of this study. Our broad econometric analysis 
(presented in section 4) examined the interplay between competition policy enforcement 
and regulation in energy markets. It shows that competition policy enforcement is more 
effective in liberalised markets as compared to markets that continue to be highly regulated. 
This supports the view that competition policy is mostly effective in markets where 
competition is not substituted by heavy regulation (as measured by the degree of entry 
regulation, public ownership, vertical integration and market structure).  
There is however, the counter-argument that the impact of competition policy interventions 
can sometimes be stronger in highly regulated markets. For example, in countries where 
energy companies are vertically integrated or monopolised, anti-trust interventions to avoid 
market foreclosure and abuse of dominance can be important tools. 
In practice, the Commission has been using instruments of competition policy enforcement 
together with regulation to promote reforms aimed at market liberalisation to improve the 
functioning of energy markets.  
For instance, the Commission adopted the first liberalisation directives in 1996 (electricity) 
and 1998 (gas) to open up heavily regulated and monopolised national energy markets. A 
second round of liberalisation directives was agreed in 2003 and by 2007, all its provisions 
were in play. 
Following the 2007 Sector Inquiry the Commission adopted the Third Energy Package to 
address some of the concerns highlighted in the Inquiry (e.g. insufficient unbundling and 
lack of cross border integration).  
Repeated attempts at liberalisation, however, have had uneven success and competition 
has been slow to take off. The Commission has therefore been using the full range of 
competition policy tools at its disposal to improve the functioning of energy markets.  For 
example, alongside regulation, the Commission has been using competition policy tools to 
promote unbundling and market liberalisation (e.g. GDF/Suez case, EdF/EnBW case).   
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7.1.5 Q5. Do competition case investigations and case decisions affect the design of sector 
regulations and the enforcement of such regulations? 
Detailed qualitative research beyond the scope of this study is required to fully answer this 
question.  However, it does provide some evidence. The GDF Suez merger is an example 
where a specific competition case affected the design of sector regulations and the 
enforcement of such regulations at a national level. In this particular case, the merger 
remedies led to ownership unbundling in the Belgian gas market. In addition, the Belgian 
regulator, CREG enforced, several regulatory changes to follow-up the merger remedies.  
 The merger remedies were largely supported by the national regulator CREG, which 
was also involved in their implementation. This empowered CREG to  push for more 
regulatory changes in the Belgian gas market as described above. In particular, the 
transfer of Fluxys and remaining assets underlying the physical structure of the Belgian 
gas market (such as transit, transmission, hub, LNG and storage) were essential to 
simplify access to the Belgian gas markets. Thus, merger remedies made regulatory 
changes on national level easier to implement. 
 To further improve the functioning of its markets, it implemented a better congestion 
management of the network, reduced the number of balancing zones to one (instead of 
four) and introduced new rules of conduct. 
 The part of the E.ON case not discussed (the balancing market) also sheds light on this 
because E.ON was forced to sell (unbundle) is balancing network. 
At European level, the Third Energy Package was designed to address competition 
concerns identified by the 2007 Sector Inquiry. In this case, sector regulations were directly 
influenced by competition policy enforcement 
7.2 Methodological reflections 
We used different methodological tools to analyse the effectiveness of competition policy 
interventions in this study. This was necessary because of the wide array of questions the 
study was expected to answer. One the one hand, we were interested in analysing the 
broad impact of a large set of interventions—EU competition policy, national competition 
policy, and regulation--- and their interactions on a large number of firms active in different 
geographical markets (as energy markets are still to a large extent operating nationally). 
While such an analysis has the potential benefit of providing the ‘big picture’, it has the  
drawback that that many important details and specific questions cannot be cleanly 
answered due to the level of aggregation. 
To tackle some of these detailed issues, we therefore, analysed single decisions through 
case studies. While case studies allow us to be more precise in modelling the peculiarities 
of relevant product and geographic markets and, hence, carry out a more detailed and 
granular analysis of the causal effects of specific competition policy enforcement decisions, 
the results of individual cases cannot be generalised.  
Hence, the different methods proposed in this study should be seen as complementary and 
designed to answer related, but not entirely overlapping questions. A first important 
conclusion that can be derived from this study is that each research question or policy 
question requires a tailored method. Therefore, each particular result can be seen as a 
piece of the puzzle. A robust and credible evaluation exercise is one where several of these 
pieces can be put together in a coherent and convincing way.  
While this study managed to stay close to this approach, the substantial issue of resource 
constraints needs to be noted. A large team of experts produced four separate empirical 
analyses, based on different data sources and empirical frameworks with a limited budget 
and within a rather tight timetable (less than 12 months). This inevitably imposed certain 
limitations on the depth and breadth of analysis that could be undertaken. 
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This study demonstrates that both, quantitative and qualitative approaches have their own 
limitations. Quantitative approaches require rich datasets that can be resource intensive to 
compile or expensive to acquire (e.g. firm level data from sources such as Amadeus/ Orbis 
database) . In some cases, the necessary data may not even be available. For example, in 
the GDF Suez merger case, we had to restrict the empirical analysis to only one part of the 
affected market due to non-availability of data. Moreover, data availability is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition to design a robust quantitative study. Quality, granularity and 
reliability of data are equally important considerations. For instance, in the E.ON case study, 
notwithstanding our efforts to collect a rich dataset for several European countries entailing 
information on wholesale prices and their drivers, this information was not good enough to 
create a reliable synthetic control group for the German wholesale markets. Hence, our 
identification strategy had to be adapted 
In the broad econometric analysis, for instance, we put an enormous effort in collecting 
disaggregated, and comparable data on competition policy enforcement both at the EU and 
national levels. Given the limited variation in the data, however, we had to aggregate this 
rich information to be able to use it in an econometric exercise. This allowed us to generate 
findings which are more easily interpretable but, on the other hand, it did not allow us to  
fully identify channels through which policy enforcement affected outcomes. Moreover,  
limited variation in the data did not allow us to make clear inference on some dimensions of 
policy enforcement. The fact that we did not find statistically significant effect for some 
variables could, in our opinion, be due to the quality of the data—and thus not necessarily 
due to the absence of true effects.  
Qualitative analysis can be helpful in filling gaps in data, enriching the quantitative results 
and in building a coherent framework. However, qualitative analysis cannot stand on its own 
as it does not establish causality; nor does it allow measurement of the precise effects of an 
intervention. 
The ability to identify causal relationships is a key aspect of an evaluation study. 
Identification is the key methodological question of any econometric model. For a sound 
policy evaluation, it is crucial to be able to conclude that exactly that specific intervention 
was causing that specific outcome. Hence, it is vital to be able to exclude that other omitted 
factors were the explanation for the empirical findings. 
In all chapters of this study, we put a serious effort to make our identification strategy as 
clean and as transparent as possible. In some cases, for example in the broad econometric 
analysis, it was unfortunately not possible to make strong causality claims. However, the 
findings can still be carefully interpreted as ‘controlled correlations’. Moreover, the focus on 
heterogeneous effects can help to further improve this interpretation. For instance, the fact 
that we observe competition policy enforcement to be more effective in countries that are 
less regulated is helping in attaching a causal interpretation to the results: competition policy 
cannot be particularly effective in markets where firms are not freely competing among each 
other, but are regulated by state intervention. However, especially because such analysis is 
expected to have significant policy implications, it is important to be transparent about the 
limitations and caveats of the analysis. 
The issue of identification is also related to the level of aggregation and the quality of the 
data. The more ‘micro’ the level of analysis, the more likely it is that specific peculiarities of 
the case(s) or market(s) under consideration can be exploited to develop a clean 
identification strategy. Specifically in the two case studies, we were able to more cleanly 
identify causal effects by focusing on a difference-in-difference methodology tailored to the 
specificities of the case. The basic idea of this methodology, which is the most popular 
identification strategy in evaluation studies, is to look at the outcome of a group affected by 
an intervention and compare to the outcome of a control group. The variation over time in 
the outcome variable is then used to establish what would have occurred in the absence of 
the intervention. Such an approach is powerful and appropriate when looking at single 
decisions, but cannot be adopted to evaluate a large policy programme as there is not only 
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one policy intervention (treatment) to be analysed and therefore, it is impossible to define a 
good counterfactual.  
We believe that the last important step in a policy evaluation exercise is to provide evidence 
of the robustness of the provided inference. We carried out several robustness checks (e.g. 
placebo test) to provide additional empirical support for specific assumptions or to provide a 
broader picture— as in the econometric analysis where we look at different outcome 
variables to understand whether the effect of the policy was consistent along these different 
dimensions. All in all robustness checks, when leading to consistent results, are a strong 
instrument in assessing causal relationships and are a vital tool for policy evaluation. 
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Abstract 
This study examines whether EU competition policy enforcement has generated stronger competition 
in European gas and electricity markets and hence lower prices, higher investment and improved 
productivity. Specifically, the study analyses the impact of competition policy enforcement on short-run 
measures of intensity of competition such as relative profit elasticity and productivity dispersion (at 
sector-country level); and medium and long-term competitive outcomes such as investment and 
productivity (at firm-sector-country level). The main result of this analysis is that EU merger policy 
enforcement is consistently and significantly related to better market outcomes, especially in low-
regulated markets. The impacts of the EU’s anti-trust enforcement and state aid control on the other 
hand, are not statistically significant.  
The study also empirically evaluates the price effects of two individual competition policy enforcement 
cases using the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach.  
The first case study analyses the impact of the Commission’s case against E.ON (2008) for its alleged 
abuse of dominant position in the German wholesale electricity market.  Specifically, this case study 
examines the impact of the Commission’s Decision on wholesale electricity prices, using daily data on 
peak and off-peak prices from the European Energy Exchange (EEX). The results show that the 
Commission’s Decision, by affecting competition in the EEX, led to a reduction in wholesale electricity 
prices in Germany. To determine whether wholesale price reductions were eventually passed on to 
consumers by electricity suppliers, we further analysed retail electricity prices using highly 
disaggregated data (monthly data at zip code level) purchased from the German price comparison 
website Verivox.  The results suggest that the Commission’s Decision – by reducing market power 
upstream and thereby lowering wholesale prices – might have also contributed to reducing prices 
downstream. 
The second case study examines the price effects of the Gaz de France (GDF)-Suez merger, 
approved by the European Commission in November 2006. The results show that the merger and 
associated remedies had a significant downward impact on wholesale gas prices at the Zeebrugge 
Hub in Belgium. This could suggest that the remedies were effective in limiting the potential anti-
competitive effects of the merger. 
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1 Introduction 
This study evaluates the impact of the EU’s enforcement activities on the functioning of 
European gas and electricity markets. It is based on: 
■ A review of existing theoretical and empirical evidence of competition concerns in gas 
and electricity markets and the impact of competition policy enforcement on the 
functioning of these markets; 
■ A descriptive analysis of select indicators of market functioning such as levels of 
concentration and vertical integration, wholesale and retail prices, switching rates, etc.; 
■ A broad econometric analysis of the impact of competition policy enforcement on  (i) 
short-run measures of intensity of competition such as relative profit elasticity and 
productivity dispersion, and (ii) medium and long-term competitive outcomes such as 
investment and productivity;  
■ Two case studies empirically analysing the price effects of specific Commission 
Decisions namely (i) the commitment decision addressed to E.ON for suspected abuse 
of a dominant position in the German wholesale electricity market1 and (ii) the merger of 
Gaz de France (GDF) and the Suez group approved by the European Commission in 
November 20062. 
Table 1.1 sets out specific evaluation questions addressed by the study and the methods, 
indicators and data sources used to build the evidence base behind these questions. 
Table 1.1 Methodological approaches to answering the study questions  
Evaluation questions Methods Indicators Data sources 
Q1. Can one observe a 
change in the functioning 
of energy markets in the 
EU over the past two 
decades?  
Descriptive analysis 
Literature review 
 
■ Concentration indicators 
(HHI, CR3, number of 
players)  
■ Number of new entrants/ 
change in number of players 
■ Level of vertical integration  
■ Market liquidity 
■ Price and market regulation 
■ Public ownership 
■ Wholesale and retail prices 
■ Price mark-ups 
■ Switching rates 
■ Productivity dispersion 
■ Boone indicator 
■ Amadeus 
■ CEER 
■ Datamonitor 
■ DG ECFIN 
■ DG Energy 
■ ENTSO-E 
■ Eurostat 
■ IEA 
■ OECD 
■ Platts 
Q2. Can one observe a 
change in competition 
policy enforcement 
affecting energy markets in 
the EU over the past two 
decades? 
Descriptive analysis 
Literature review 
 
■ EU merger and anti-trust 
cases in electricity and gas 
markets 
 
■ DG 
Competition 
Q3. Has the enforcement of 
competition policy in the 
energy sectors contributed to 
better functioning energy 
markets? To what extent?  
Literature review 
Broad econometric 
analysis 
Case studies 
Broad econometric analysis 
■ Productivity dispersion 
■ Boone indicator (elasticity of 
relative profits  with respect to 
relative costs) 
■ Amadeus 
■ APEX/ENDEX 
■ Argus 
McCloskey 
■ CEER 
■ CREG 
                                                     
1  Commission Decision of 26 X1 2008 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39388/39388_2796_3.pdf  
2  Press release: IP/06/1558 available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-1558_en.htm   
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Evaluation questions Methods Indicators Data sources 
■ Investment 
■ Firm level productivity 
■ EU competition policy 
enforcement indicators 
■ National competition policy 
enforcement indicators 
■ Indicators of Product Market 
Regulation 
■ Other control variables (GDP 
per capita, population growth, 
energy imports, energy mix) 
 
E.ON case study 
■ Wholesale prices – German 
electricity markets 
■ Retail prices – German 
electricity markets 
■ Cross border electricity flows 
■ Oil prices 
■ Coal prices 
■ Gas prices 
■ Carbon prices 
■ Production of renewable 
energy 
 
GDF/ Suez case study 
■ Hub prices – ZEE hub and 
TTF 
■ Oil prices 
■ Coal prices 
■ Gas prices 
 
■ DG 
Competition 
■ DG Energy 
■ EEX/ EPEX 
■ ENTSO-E 
■ Fluxys 
■ National Power 
Exchanges 
■ OECD 
■ Platts 
■ Survey of 
NCAs 
■ US Energy 
Information 
Administration 
■ UX Company 
■ Verivox 
■ World Bank 
Q4. Is there 
complementarity (in terms 
of objectives and effects) 
between competition and 
regulatory policies 
affecting the functioning of 
the energy markets? To what 
extent have we observed an 
increase in complementarity 
over the past two decades? 
Please explain 
Literature review 
Econometric analysis 
Case studies 
Same as above Same as above 
Q5. Do competition case 
investigations and case 
decisions affect the design 
of sector regulations and 
the enforcement of such 
regulations? 
Literature review 
Case studies 
Same as above Same as above 
NB: The ToR contained two optional evaluation  questions: (i) How did the sector inquiry affect: (a) competition 
policy enforcement (in terms of competition case investigations and case decisions); and (b) regulatory reforms 
aimed at market opening and market access (including regulations on unbundling, infrastructure access, 
interconnections between national markets, and tariff setting)?  (ii) What has been the added value of competition 
policy enforcement in the energy sector at the EU level as opposed to the national level (in terms of 
interconnections between national markets and in cross border trade)? These questions could not be addressed by 
the present study due to time and budget constraints. 
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The rest of the report describes the work in more detail, and presents the results of the 
study: 
■ Section 2 looks at the specific features of gas and electricity markets with the potential to 
restrict competition; 
■ Section 3 summarises existing theories and empirical evidence of the effect of 
competition policy interventions on the functioning and performance of energy markets; 
■ Section 4 provides a stylised overview of the current state of EU gas and electricity 
markets. It also briefly describes the Commission’s competition policy interventions in 
these markets; 
■ Section 5 presents the results of an empirical analysis of the impact of EU and national 
competition policy enforcement on long-term market outcomes such as productivity and 
investment; 
■ Section 6 examines the price effects of the Commission’s Decision in the alleged abuse 
of dominance by E.ON in German wholesale electricity markets;  
■ Section 7 evaluates the price effects of the GDF-Suez merger case; 
■ Section 8 addresses the five evaluation questions and sets out the policy and 
methodological conclusions of the study. 
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2 Specific characteristics of energy markets 
Energy markets exhibit certain features that can prevent, restrict or distort competition, such 
as high entry costs, vertical market structure, and complex pricing mechanisms. Some of 
these require government intervention. For example, transmission and distribution networks 
are natural monopolies that need to be regulated. The resulting web of government policy 
and regulation has to be taken into account when examining the functioning of energy 
markets.  
This section discusses the complex structural and policy characteristics of energy markets to 
put into context the analyses presented in the remainder of this report.  
2.1 Structural characteristics 
2.1.1 Complex supply chain 
The energy supply chain consists of a number of segments with different characteristics 
(Figure 2.1). Energy transportation (transmission and distribution) is a naturally monopolistic 
and therefore, regulated activity, because of the infrastructure required (it would be 
expensive to duplicate gas pipelines or electricity grids).  
Regulation determines the transportation costs passed on to consumers in their final energy 
bills (competition does not generally play a role in the setting of these prices).  Production, 
wholesale and/or retail segments, on the other hand, are open to competition in liberalised 
energy markets. Wholesale and retail energy prices are therefore generally set by the 
interaction of demand and supply in fully liberalised markets, although some Member States 
(with partially liberalised markets) have retained regulated tariffs. The extent of price 
regulation in European energy markets is discussed in section 3. 
Figure 2.1 The energy supply chain  
 
Source: own figure 
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2.1.2 High entry costs 
Another key characteristic of the energy supply chain is high entry costs i.e. the need for 
significant capital investment in infrastructure, particularly in power generation/gas 
production. As volatile wholesale prices do not easily support such large capital investment, 
energy producers tend to enter into long-term contracts with suppliers to ensure revenue 
certainty and stability. Policy intervention is often deemed necessary to support that 
investment and to avoid supply interruptions, although mechanisms for policy response vary 
across EU Member States and internationally (ranging from direct state investment in energy 
infrastructure, to market reforms and financial instruments aimed at securing private sector 
investment).  
2.1.3 Vertical and horizontal integration 
Economies of scale and scope in the supply chain often lead to vertical integration of energy 
generation/production with retail supply. Vertical integration also helps to support investment 
by providing a more reliable route to market for electricity generated. In Europe, liberalisation 
has led to universal separation of transportation networks. Nonetheless, many companies 
retain vertically integrated wholesale electricity generation or gas production and retail 
supply businesses. 
The industry also has a considerable degree of horizontal integration, with energy suppliers 
supplying both electricity and gas and offering ‘dual-fuel’ deals, whereby customers get a 
discount by buying both fuels from the same supplier. 
2.1.4 The need to balance supply and demand instantaneously 
Unlike gas, electricity cannot be stored economically and needs to be consumed 
instantaneously. This means that supply and demand for electricity must be continuously 
matched or balanced to avoid black outs. In competitive electricity markets, there is generally 
a balancing mechanism. A Transmission System Operator (TSO) undertakes balancing 
actions i.e., identifies the need for, and procures adjustments in generation or demand to 
maintain balance in the electricity system.  
TSOs can also use imbalance pricing arrangements to encourage market players to 
maximise their efforts to remain in balance (suppliers who use the networks are obliged to 
input the same amount of electricity as their customers take out, and are charged by the 
network operator for any imbalances). The TSO also maintains some generating reserves to 
ensure that the network remains in balance. The balancing mechanisms’ technical 
arrangements have important implications on competition and market prices, because 
procuring reserve capacities for system security and balancing energy normally entails 
commercial arrangements with imbalancing costs levied on the market through settlement 
mechanisms. 
2.1.5 Complex pricing mechanisms 
Wholesale prices: gas markets 
In Europe, one can distinguish between two main wholesale price formation mechanisms 
for natural gas: long-term contracts with oil-indexation and gas-on-gas competition. 
Oil indexation is the traditional pricing mechanism with the price of gas pegged to the price of 
oil or oil products. Conventionally, oil-indexed gas is traded under long-term supply contracts 
(to provide security of supply to buyers and security of demand to producers). Under gas-on-
gas competition, the price of gas is determined by the interplay of supply and demand, with 
trading taking place at physical hubs (e.g. Henry Hub) or notional hubs (e.g. NBP in the UK). 
Although oil indexation has historically been the dominant price formation mechanism in the 
EU, this changed in 2013. Gas on gas competition now represents 53 per cent of total 
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consumption, displacing oil indexation as the dominant pricing mechanism3. However, these 
changes in wholesale gas price formation differ throughout Europe (Box 2.1).  
Box 2.1 Wholesale gas price formation mechanisms in different parts of Europe 
Northwest Europe (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, UK) has seen the 
most dramatic change in price formation mechanisms, with a reversal from 72 per cent oil 
indexation and 27 per cent gas on gas competition in 2005 to 20 per cent oil indexation and 80 per 
cent gas on gas competition in 2013, as a result of increased hub trading and contract 
renegotiations, most notably in the Netherlands where gas on gas competition was 100 per cent in 
2013.  
In Central Europe (Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland) oil indexation 
declined from 85 per cent in 2005 to just below 35 per cent in 2013, while gas on gas competition 
increased from almost zero in 2005 to more than 50 per cent in 2013, reflecting increased imports 
of spot gas, often from Germany, with an element of contract renegotiation.  
There has been much less change in other areas of Europe such as the Mediterranean (Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey), where oil indexation declined from 100 per cent in 2005 to around 
85 per cent in 2013, and gas on gas competition rose from nothing to just more than 15 per cent, 
largely reflecting spot LNG imports with some spot pipeline imports into Italy, plus changes in the 
pricing of domestic production in Italy.  
In Southeast Europe (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia) there is still 
no gas on gas competition. 
Source: International Gas Union, 2014, Wholesale Gas Price Survey, 2014 edition, A global review of price 
formation mechanisms 2005-2013. 
Wholesale prices: electricity 
In liberalised electricity markets, electricity is traded at power exchanges and 
bilaterally (Over the Counter [OTC]). Power exchanges have well-defined, standard power 
products, while OTC trade allows market participants to define contract details individually. 
OTC trade (typically, long-term contracts) may be supported by trade platforms other than 
exchanges, or by brokers, but can also be concluded bilaterally between parties without 
intermediates. In general, power exchanges have a spot market for physical delivery of the 
traded electricity on the following day (day ahead) for individual hours of the day, while 
intraday trade allows for very short-term deals for same day or next day delivery of base load 
or peak load blocks. Day-ahead prices are fixed in an auction for each hour of the following 
day, while intraday trade is continuous.  
To set the price, power exchanges use the supply curve, called the ‘merit order curve’, that 
reflects the marginal costs4 of the available generation technologies (nuclear, hydro, coal, 
gas, renewables, etc.). The co-existence of several generation technologies with different 
marginal costs, alongside other features of electricity markets (relatively inelastic demand 
coupled with daily/seasonal variations in demand) imply that generators with several 
generation plants may benefit from withdrawing some of their capacity from the market 
(where technically feasible) to increase prices and benefit their infra-marginal capacity 
(Federico, 2011). 
Retail prices 
Retail energy prices have three major price components, as illustrated in Figure 2.2: 
■ Energy costs: the wholesale element covers the costs incurred by companies to deliver 
the energy product on the grid (e.g. cost of production), while the retail element covers 
costs related to the sale of energy products to final consumers, including portfolio 
                                                     
3  International Gas Union, 2014, Wholesale Gas Price Survey, 2014 edition, A global review of price formation 
mechanisms 2005-2013. Accessed 26 September 2014 at http://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-page-
field_file/IGU%20Wholesale%20Gas%20Price%20Survey%20Report%20-%202014%20Edition.pdf  
4  Marginal costs include fuel costs,CO2 emission costs and other operational and maintenance costs 
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management (size and structure of client base), personnel, IT, overheads, insurance for 
imbalance, etc.; 
■ Network charges i.e. transmission and distribution costs;  
■ Taxes and other charges. 
Figure 2.2 Components of electricity and gas prices 
 
Source: COM(2014) 21 final - Energy prices and costs in Europe 
The relative share of these components varies depending on the type of consumer 
(household or industry) and consumption band. Network charges, taxes, and other charges 
are regulated. The relative share of non-regulated price components (i.e. energy and supply 
costs) varies from 16 per cent in Denmark to 75 per cent in the UK5. 
2.2 Policy characteristics 
Governments and regulators understand the need to minimise gas and electricity supply 
interruptions, both short and long term. Their policies for energy markets are generally 
threefold: security of supply, carbon emission reduction and affordability. However, these 
objectives often compete, for example climate change policies promote low-carbon 
technologies such as nuclear or renewables which are often more expensive than fossil fuel 
alternatives (thus conflicting the policy objective of affordable energy prices). 
Government policy also affects the functioning of the market and the development of 
competition. For example, retail prices generally include a significant component attributable 
to taxes and levies. The levies tend to finance a mix of policies targeting energy 
sustainability or affordability. Between 2008 and 2012, this component grew faster in 
percentage terms across EU Member States than either the cost of energy or network costs, 
for both households and industrial customers.   
Finally, some energy regulators have competing objectives. This can lead to regulatory 
policy that directly influences some indicators of market functioning, lowering their 
interpretive value. For example, product variety and customer choice are often seen as a 
positive indicator of developing competition. However, regulatory policy can affect or limit 
tariff choice, so influencing this particular indicator.  
In the UK, the National Regulatory Authority (Ofgem) currently restricts the number of tariffs 
a retailer can offer household customers.  In France, former incumbent monopoly suppliers 
EDF and GDF are required to offer customers a regulated retail tariff alongside competitive 
tariffs. Regulation can also indirectly influence the structure of both wholesale and retail 
markets, for example by affecting how easily new firms can enter those markets. 
                                                     
5  Based on 2013 Eurostat data on electricity prices components for domestic consumers 
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3 Findings from the literature 
There is only one prior study that has empirically evaluated the (ex-post) impacts of 
competition policy enforcement in gas and electricity markets. There is however, a wider 
pool of academic literature examining how mergers, ownership unbundling, long-term 
contracts or merger remedies affect competition in energy markets. Even so, only a handful 
of these studies provide an empirical analysis of competition issues in energy markets using 
econometric approaches. This section summarises the most significant and relevant findings 
from these studies. 
3.1 Ex-post analysis of the impact of competition policy enforcement in gas and 
electricity markets 
Pozzi (2004) conducted the only comprehensive empirical study of the (ex-post) effects of 
competition policy enforcement in energy markets is. He investigates the causes (or triggers) 
and effects of antitrust enforcement in US energy industries using a dataset of all federal 
cases (26 cases in total) representing the litigation activity of the US Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission in the oil, gas, coal and power sector from 1990 to 2004.  
He uses a simple regression model to measure the ex-post effects of antitrust enforcement. 
Antitrust enforcement activity is modelled both as (i) the number of case per year (frequency) 
and (ii) the number of cases multiplied by a cardinal measure between one and four 
assigned to each case according to the gravity of the competitive restraint involved (intensity 
of enforcement activity). Dependent variables consist of HHI6, price markups (measured as 
the spread of residential over industrial prices), industry profits, industry returns and HHI, 
markups and profits as a Granger cause7. 
The study finds some evidence of causality between antitrust enforcement and firm 
performance (industry markups and profits) in the electricity sector. And although antitrust 
enforcement appears to reduce downstream markups in the oil and gas sector, it has no 
impact on overall industry profits. Pozzi argues that downstream markups have little bearing 
on firms’ operating profits in the oil and gas sector (according to the author, oil and gas firms 
mainly profit from crude oil prices and upstream operations).  
3.2 Competition effects of mergers in the energy sector 
 Federico (2011) analyses in-depth the competition concerns raised by 10 significant 
mergers in the energy sector in Europe8 and the remedies proposed by the authorities to 
mitigate their potential adverse effects on competition. Six of the eight European transactions 
studied raised horizontal concerns (which result from the loss of direct competition between 
players in a particular industry) in relevant wholesale energy markets (gas and/or electricity). 
Federico notes that horizontal effects were identified even when the combined market share 
of the merging parties was relatively low (examples include the 2008 EDF/British Energy 
merger case and the 2009 EDF/Segebel case), or where one of the parties was a small 
competitor to incumbent suppliers (e.g. the 2006 GDF/Suez case, analysed in this study), 
and even where loss of competition is potential as opposed to actual (e.g. the RWE/ Essent 
merger case, 2009).  
Federico explains that horizontal effects are particularly prominent in the electricity 
generation sector, given the volatile demand of the market and the presence of several 
                                                     
6  HHI is used as a dependent variable only in the  electricity sector 
7  For oil and gas, the author uses markups and profits, as a Granger cause 
8  These consist of the eight largest transactions assessed by the European Commission in the energy sector 
between 2004 and 2009 and two major gas-electricity mergers in Spain over the same period. The first was a 
proposed merger between the gas and electricity incumbents (Gas Natural and Endesa in 2005-2006) that 
eventually did not materialise for commercial reasons. The second was a smaller, but still significant merger 
between Gas Natural and Union Fenosa which was cleared by Spanish competition authorities in 2009. 
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generation technologies with different marginal costs. He predicts that these characteristics 
lend themselves to the risk of price spikes, which may benefit the merged entity.   
At a retail level, horizontal effects were identified in five of the eight European transactions 
analysed by the author. These concerns predominantly related to actual or expected loss of 
competition for both residential and industrial consumers, due to greater convergence 
between gas and electricity retail offers.  
He notes that the Commission also identified several ‘non-horizontal’ or vertical theories of 
harm in its assessment of mergers, warning these are inherently harder to evaluate and 
substantiate than horizontal effects. The main vertical effects raised by the eight European 
mergers are:  
■ Input foreclosure due to lack of full ownership unbundling of some network assets (e.g. 
electricity transmission, gas storage and transportation). If a merger brings together 
network assets that have not been unbundled with activities in the liberalised parts of the 
market (e.g. electricity generation; and gas and electricity retail), adverse non-horizontal 
effects may arise. In the presence of effective price regulation of the network inputs, 
these could take the form of quality-degradation of the network input to rivals of the 
merging parties. The integrated firm may face incentives to engage in such strategy 
precisely because it is price regulated, thus, undermining the standard argument that 
only ‘one monopoly profit’ can be obtained. 
■ Input foreclosure of non-network inputs. A vertical merger could potentially be an 
incentive for the merging party to increase the price of the input paid by competitors. 
■ Customer foreclosure. Vertical mergers may deprive upstream entrants from contestable 
downstream demand, raising entry barriers and discouraging new competitors. 
■ Loss of market liquidity. In energy mergers, there may be the danger that consolidation 
could result in the internationalisation of wholesale electricity trading between merging 
parties and significantly reduce market liquidity and thereby harm customers. Federico 
warns internalisation would not itself raise wholesale electricity prices, since an equal 
amount of power would be removed from the sales and purchases in the market (by 
definition). However, the theory of consumer harm is more indirect and relates to the 
greater price volatility that a reduction in liquidity may generate and the possible barriers 
to entry (either upstream and/or downstream) that may result. 
According to Federico, the competition authorities overwhelmingly focused on analysing 
potential unilateral effects and no substantial analysis of the potential for coordinated effects 
was undertaken by the authorities concerned.  
Unilateral effects 
Although in theory there is a high potential for unilateral exercise of market power in electricity and gas 
markets, academic literature warns it can be extremely difficult to determine in practice. According to 
Leveque (2006), market power can be exercised in at least three different ways: by physical withdrawal 
of capacity that reduces a plant's output, by financial withdrawal, and by withdrawal of interconnection 
and storage capacity. He warns that anticompetitive behaviour is hard to detect because there can be 
valid reasons for capacity restrictions that push up prices (e.g., power failure or risk of equipment 
breakdown). He also argues that calculating the price-cost margin (key evidence for determining 
whether competition is being distorted) is complex because it requires distinguishing between different 
types of plants, factoring in variable costs on top of the cost of fuel, and considering the opportunity 
cost of not generating at a given time to be able to generate later (e.g., postponing the use of water 
from dams). 
Several studies analyse unilateral exercise of market power in wholesale electricity markets. Some 
have identified strategic bidding and output decisions by individual firms (Borenstein and Bushnell 
(1999), Wolak (2000), Wolak (2003) and Wolfram (1998)), while s others have measured the 
departures of market outcomes from the competitive benchmark (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak 
(2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002) and Wolfram (1999)). Wolfram (1998), for example, analysed actual 
bidding behaviour in the daily electricity auction in the spot market in England and Wales 1992-94. Her 
findings suggest that generating companies strategically increase their bids to raise the price they are 
The economic impact of enforcement of competition policies on the functioning of EU energy markets  
64 
paid for infra-marginal capacity. Wolfram (1999) found that the size of mark-up was not as large as 
predicted by conventional oligopoly models. Her explanation is that the generators may be restraining 
prices either for deterring entry or for staving off substantial regulatory action.  
Potential for coordinated effects 
Electricity markets also contain features that facilitate the sustainability of collusion more than most 
other markets: daily trading organised as a uniform-price auction, firms are capacity constrained, 
demand is very inelastic in the short-term, and typically a small number of players protected by high 
entry barriers. Fabra and Toro (2004) analyse the time-series of prices in the Spanish electricity market 
and show t it is characterised by two significantly different price levels. They construct trigger variables 
that affect the likelihood of starting a price war. By interpreting the signs of the triggers, they can infer 
some of the properties of the collusive strategy that firms might have followed.  
There is some empirical evidence to support the above theories of harm. For example, Fiorio 
and Florio (2009) show that vertical integration in the electricity sector leads to higher final 
consumer prices. Using a standard probit model, they conclude that consumers are less 
satisfied if firms are integrated. In line with earlier studies, their results for the gas industry 
differ substantially. Here, prices and vertical integration are uncorrelated and consumers are 
more satisfied with higher levels of integration. Similar studies dealing exclusively with the 
gas industry are Brau et al. (2010) and Growitsch and Stronzik (2009). 
Newbery (2007) on the other hand argues that vertical mergers may be efficient. Wholesale 
markets create risks that are complementary for generators and suppliers, which could 
increase efficiency. If wholesale prices are high, generators’ profits are high, but suppliers 
who have contracted to sell at fixed prices face rising costs and falling profits, and vice 
versa. These negatively correlated risks create a demand for, and supply of, hedging. But if 
contract markets are thin or illiquid, mergers (and, as discussed below, long-term contracts) 
between generation and supply are an attractive risk-reducing and hence synergistic 
strategy.  Vertical integration also potentially reduces the cost of capital for firms, by reducing 
exposure to volatile market risk9. 
However, competition authorities argue that vertical integration can adversely affect 
competition in energy markets. Low levels of liquidity in the wholesale electricity markets act 
as a barrier to entry for non-integrated suppliers. They also block expansion for non-
integrated suppliers already in the market. While vertical integration gives large suppliers 
guaranteed supplies of gas and/or electricity, it also reduces the availability of those products 
to smaller non-integrated suppliers 
3.3 Competition effects of convergence mergers 
As gas is an important input for electricity generation, wholesale natural gas and electricity 
markets are also vertically inter-related. Mergers between gas and electricity firms are 
sometimes called ‘’convergence’’ mergers and are happening fast. (Hunger 2003). Several 
papers extensively analyse whether vertically related firms could benefit from foreclosing 
non-integrated rivals (see Rey and Tirole (2004) for a recent survey). Studies of vertical 
relationships in energy markets (e.g. Granitz and Klein (1996), Bushnell et al. (2005)) often 
explain their findings using this foreclosure argument. Rupérez-Micola et al. (2008) suggest 
higher prices are related to the existence of financial netback effects, or spark spread 
pricing, in energy markets, which prices wholesale natural gas against wholesale electricity 
prices, usually set with reference to retail tariffs.      
Federico (2011) also documents concerns in several decisions regarding the integration of 
gas and electricity companies. Both input and customer foreclosure can be an issue. The 
vertically integrated merging party may face incentives to increase the price of the input (e.g. 
wholesale gas) to rival downstream supplier (e.g. electricity generation company), to benefit 
                                                     
9  Integrated suppliers are likely to have stronger credit ratings, allowing them to post lower levels of collateral. 
Without the benefit of this, non-integrated suppliers are required to post significant collateral to trade in 
wholesale markets (Ofgem, 2014) 
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its own downstream subsidiary. A vertical merger may also deprive upstream entrants from a 
source of contestable downstream demand, thus raising entry barriers and potentially 
discouraging entry in the first place. 
Arguing against clearance of the Gas Natural/Endesa proposed merger, Barquin et al. 
(2006) claimed that a merger between electricity and gas incumbent companies would also 
instantly become dual fuel operators before any other existing or potential competitor has a 
chance to do so. Once a country is dominated by a national giant that integrates gas and 
electricity, it will be rare to find these champions engaging in cross-border competition. 
Instead, Padilla et al. (2005) claim that it is not necessary that, absent the merger, a foreign 
electricity company could buy gas from Gas Natural to generate electricity and then for Gas 
Natural would use that generation to offer dual fuel services. A foreign company could sell 
gas to Endesa to be used in its gas-fired plants and then cooperate with Endesa in the resell 
market to sell dual fuel offer services.  
3.4 Impact of ownership unbundling 
In contrast to the European Commission view, in academic literature there is not 
unambiguous support of the positive effects of ownership unbundling, neither in terms of 
consumers' welfare or prices, nor its effects on investment incentives.  
In the theoretical literature, Bolle and Breitmoser (2006) argue that legal unbundling may be 
preferred to ownership unbundling because the negative effects of double marginalisation of 
ownership regulation outweigh the positive effects of more effective regulation. Cremer et al. 
(2006) also show that ownership unbundling is more detrimental to social welfare than legal 
unbundling because of the higher incentives for investments under legal unbundling.  
Pollitt (2008) criticises Bolle and Breitmoser (2006) and Cremer et al. (2006) for their 
underlying assumptions. He reports that opposing results can be expected if more realistic 
assumptions are incorporated. For the former study he states that their model should take 
into account anti-competitive information advantages of legal unbundling for the rest of the 
integrated firm. In comparison, for the latter he does not consider the competition enhancing 
effect of ownership unbundling as well as the fact that double marginalisation assumes one-
part tariffs, which is usually not the case for the electricity sector. Meyer (2012) offers a 
comprehensive survey on the effects of unbundling in the electricity sector. 
Several studies cover the impact of different types of regulation or liberalisation. Steiner 
(2001) is one of the first authors to analyse the effects of the regulatory environment, the 
degree of vertical integration and the degree of private ownership on efficiency and end user 
prices. Efficiency is measured by capacity utilisation rate and reserve margin in electricity 
generation. Liberalising regulation, restructuring and private ownership are expected to lead 
to improved efficiency, and lower industrial electricity prices and industrial/residential price 
ratios. These hypotheses are tested for a panel dataset of 19 OECD countries for the period 
1987-1996. There are controls for previous commitment to generation technology and the 
control for GDP serves as proxy for electricity market size. There are however, no controls 
for institutions or for macroeconomic policy. She finds that unbundling leads to increasing 
efficiency for the overall sector, however, the possible benefits are not necessarily passed on 
to private consumers via lower prices. However, no distinction between legal and ownership 
unbundling is made. Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) unlike Steiner (2001), find that unbundling 
appears to increase prices. Copenhagen Economics (2005) examines the level of market 
opening in several network industries by means of a dynamic panel data model. The study 
focuses on the EU-15 countries from 1993 to 2003 and concludes that higher levels of 
unbundling (with ownership unbundling as the highest form) leading to price reductions and 
increasing efficiency. Moreover, they conclude that unbundling the transmission grid is the 
most important element of market opening, but cannot say the same for gas sector.   
In terms of investments, Alesina et al. (2005) analyse different regulatory reform processes 
in seven network industries in 21 OECD countries between 1975 and 1998. They show that 
regulatory reform of product markets has a positive effect on investments. Analysing the gas 
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and electricity sector jointly, they conclude that investments increase with higher levels of 
unbundling. But they do not differentiate between ownership and legal unbundling.  
Nardi (2010) disputes these findings. He analyses the impact of ownership unbundling on 
grid investments and quality. Although he finds higher grid investments in the network, he 
further shows that a substantial lack of quality emerges that confirms the resulting 
diseconomies of coordination when separating ownership and control of different company 
parts. According to Nardi, his results should be seen as first findings since only qualitative 
investment data is available and therefore no multivariate regression analysis can take 
place.  
Gugler et al. (2013) provides an empirical analysis of the effects of ownership unbundling of 
the transmission grid as well as final consumer prices on investments and corroborate the 
inherent trade-offs present in large sunk-cost network industries. They estimate a dynamic 
panel regression models for the electricity industry in 16 European countries over the period 
1998–2008, and find that ownership unbundling significantly reduces aggregate investment 
in the electricity industry. They also estimate an investment reducing effect of third party 
access to the electricity transmission grid. Moreover, there is a general trade-off between 
static and dynamic efficiency. Higher electricity end-user prices induce larger aggregate 
investments in the sector.  
3.5 Long term contracts and competition in energy markets 
Long-term contracts have become a priority for antitrust enforcement (and generate a lot of 
academic research). In the energy sector enquiry, the Commission stresses that integration 
between generation and retailing, including in the form of long-term supply contracts, creates 
a risk of foreclosure. The general argument–valid for both gas and electricity – is that vertical 
relationships reduce the liquidity of wholesale markets. Consequently, prices are more 
volatile and the signal quality sent to market actors is lower. This increases the risks for 
potential entrants into generation; they must either withdraw or invest both downstream and 
upstream. In the latter case, a vicious circle is created and the development of wholesale 
markets remains marginal. In the case of gas, entry barriers are even higher because of 
contracts that bind national historical importers and oil and gas majors for long periods. New 
entrants face both low liquidity in downstream wholesale markets and a shortage of gas 
available for import. The enquiry argues that it is difficult for a long-term supply contract not 
to lead to the elimination of competition on a substantial part of the products.  
However, as argued by Hauteclocque and Glachant (2008), long-term contracts allow firms 
to hedge price and quantity risks and therefore facilitate asset-specific investments. Large 
and stable spot markets should be liquid enough to enable firms to sink high fixed costs 
investments based on reliable investment signals. Yet, European spot markets remain 
relatively under-developed, with inelastic demand and highly concentrated market structures. 
If spot markets are under-developed, future cash flows are uncertain and the uncertainty on 
the returns will lead risk-adverse investors to under-invest in generation capacities (Neuhoff 
and de Vries, 2004). Long-term contracts may mitigate this by providing an insurance device. 
Empirical research supports the theory and shows for instance that gas supply contracts 
linked to an asset specific investment are on average four years longer (Neuman and 
Hirschausen, 2006). In the opposite direction, as soon as asset specificity decreases, 
efficiency gains attached to long-term contracting decrease as well (Parsons, 1989; Doane 
and Spulber, 1994). This probably explains why where liberalisation has been implemented 
contract length naturally tend to decrease (Neuman and Hirschausen, 2005). 
3.6 Remedies applied by authorities to mitigate competition concerns 
Some of the most recent and important energy merger cases have been approved after 
parties proposed commitments to the Commission (e.g., between GDF and Suez, analysed 
in Section 7). Some of the antitrust cases, e.g., the E.ON case analysed in Section 6, have 
also involved commitments or remedies, both structural and behavioural.  
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In the energy market, structural remedies require the merging parties to divest part of their 
capacity and to open the market to new entrants and competitors interested in buying out the 
divested plants. Federico (2011) found that the European commission relied almost 
exclusively on structural divestments to address the competition concerns raised by the eight 
European mergers he examined. In his view, fairly demanding remedies were imposed by 
the Commission even in circumstances where the combined market shared of merging 
entities was relatively low. He concludes that particularly effective remedies are those that 
involve the sale of price-setting generation plants, network assets and merging entity’s 
controlling stakes in existing competitors. 
As argued by Verde (2008), structural remedies are irreversible and their success and 
effectiveness largely depend on the party to which the capacity is permanently divested. If 
the party is able to compete effectively, the additional capacity could reinforce its position 
and bring pro-competitive effects. Otherwise, negative effects prevail and the benefits in 
terms of lower concentration of the market are outweighed by the losses in terms of lower 
scale/scope economies.  
Aside from structural remedies, competition authorities have also made use of behavioural 
remedies in energy markets. The latter broadly fall into two categories: virtual power plant 
(VPP) divestitures and gas release programmes (GRPs). The first one applies to the 
electricity market and the second to the gas market. In both cases, the company is not 
required to divest indefinitely its capacity, but only to release temporarily part of its 
production/capacity to its competitors, generally through devices such as auctions or bilateral 
agreements. 
There is a vast body of academic grey literature examining the appropriateness of the 
remedies applied by the Commission in specific energy market cases.  A particularly 
insightful and in-depth analysis has been carried out by Sadowska (2011), wherein the 
author critically notes that anti-trust cases are not being fully investigated to establish 
whether or not there has been a breach of competition rules; instead, the Commission only 
summarises its preliminary concerns regarding allegedly anti-competitive behaviour and 
specifies commitments agreed with the undertaking as a remedy to these concerns. On the 
basis of an in-depth legal analysis of two anti-trust cases10, the author argues that 
competition policy was applied by the Commission beyond its proper limits in order to meet 
the objectives of sector-specific regulation in the electricity sector i.e. liberalisation and 
integration of energy markets. And while the commitment decisions might have contributed 
to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that 
purpose might have negatively affected the electricity market either indirectly, by application 
of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment 
decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inappropriate commitments in individual 
cases. 
3.7 Summary of key findings 
The key findings from literature are: 
Impact of competition policy enforcement on the functioning of energy markets. There is 
hardly any empirical literature on the ex-post effects of competition policy enforcement in 
energy markets. We only found one major study that empirically investigates the causes and 
(ex-post) effects of competition policy (antitrust) enforcement in US energy industries (Pozzi, 
2004). In many respects, the broad econometric analysis and the case studies analysed later 
are new to the literature.  
As regards the main results of Pozzi’s work, he found little evidence to suggest that antitrust 
enforcement leads to a ‘material and measurable’ reduction in the exercise of market power. 
                                                     
10  The first case concerns the alleged abuse of its dominant position by E.ON by withholding generation 
capacity in order to raise prices in the German wholesale electricity markets. The second case concerns the 
alleged abuse of dominant position by the Swedish network operator, Svenska Kraftnät (SvK). The network 
operator allegedly limited cross-border transmission capacity  
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Still, enforcement is found to have had some impact on firm profits: in electricity markets, 
profits decrease, whereas in the oil and gas industry there is no effect on firm profits, but 
downstream margins fall as a result of antitrust enforcement.  
Impact of mergers on competition. Energy sector mergers can cause horizontal effects (loss 
of direct competition between merging firms) and non-horizontal effects such as input 
foreclosure due to lack of full ownership unbundling of some network assets (e.g. electricity 
transmission, gas storage and transportation); input foreclosure of non-network inputs; 
customer foreclosure; and loss of market liquidity.  
Theoretically, vertical mergers (between generation and supply companies) could lead to 
efficiencies by providing a financial hedge against volatile wholesale energy prices and a 
natural hedge against balancing risk. Moreover, vertical integration could potentially reduce 
the cost of capital relative to similar non-integrated businesses, by reducing exposure to 
volatile market risk. On the flip side, vertical integration has the potential to adversely affect 
competition by reducing liquidity in wholesale markets. Moreover, empirical evidence shows 
that vertical integration leads to higher final consumer prices in electricity markets and lower 
levels of customer satisfaction.  In gas markets, vertical integration did not to correlate with 
prices, but was associated with higher levels of customer satisfaction. 
Impact of convergence mergers. The literature warns of the potential anti-competitive effects 
of convergence mergers (i.e. mergers between gas and electricity companies) such as input 
and customer foreclosure. 
Impact of vertical linkages. Both vertical integration and vertical relationships between 
generation and supply (in the form of long term contracts) can act as a barrier to market 
entry or expansion by reducing liquidity in the wholesale markets. On the other hand, vertical 
linkages allow firms to hedge price and quantity risks, thus facilitating investment and 
contributing to long-term generation adequacy and fuel mix diversity.  
Impact of ownership unbundling. The literature is inconclusive as regards the effects of 
ownership unbundling on end-user prices or on investment incentives. At a very basic level, 
unbundling can result in loss of economies that arise from vertical integration or linkages. On 
the other hand, empirical evidence shows that unbundling generally results in improved 
efficiency. However, academic literature provides contradictory evidence on whether these 
efficiency gains are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices or not. Similarly, 
empirical evidence on impact of unbundling on investment is contradictory. 
Design of remedies. Authorities have used both structural and behavioural remedies to 
address competition concerns arising from mergers or potential anti-competitive behavior. 
Structural remedies require the merging parties to divest part of their capacity and to open 
the market to new entrants and competitors interested in buying out the divested plants. 
Behavioural remedies mainly consist of virtual power plant (VPP) divestitures in electricity 
markets and gas release programmes (GRPs). Some academics have expressed concern 
that the Commission may have used competition policy tools to promote regulatory 
objectives i.e. liberalisation and integration of energy markets across Europe. 
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4 Descriptive analysis of the functioning of European gas and 
electricity markets 
This section provides a descriptive analysis of select indicators of market characteristics and 
outcomes and an overview of EU competition policy enforcement activity in gas and 
electricity markets.  
4.1 Conceptual framework for the descriptive analysis 
The 2007 sector enquiry carried out by the European Commission highlighted several 
competition concerns with the functioning of European energy markets: 
■ High market concentration, particularly  at wholesale level; 
■ Vertical foreclosure resulting from an insufficient level of unbundling between network 
operation on the one side and supply and/or generation activities on the other; 
■ Long contract duration and restrictive practices in relation to the operation of supply 
contracts, causing a lack of liquidity on wholesale markets and the foreclosure of 
downstream markets; 
■ Insufficient cross-border capacities blocking further market integration; 
■ Lack of efficient and transparent price formation and information asymmetry between 
incumbents and market entrants; 
■  Existing balancing regimes favouring incumbents and discouraging new market 
entrants. 
More recently, the European Commission identified  the combination of public ownership 
with high market shares, low cross-border interconnection and price regulation as a potential 
source of market malfunctioning. 
It found that retail price regulation, particularly when prices were set below market prices 
rather than at wholesale market prices, contributed to market distortion by (i) strengthening 
the position of the historical incumbent; (ii)  making it difficult for suppliers to recuperate their 
costs, thereby discouraging market entry; (iii) reducing incentives for firms to invest in and 
modernise infrastructure and services; (iv)  damaging the competitiveness of European 
businesses by burdening them with higher energy costs11; (v) leading to over-consumption 
by consumers (European Commission, 2013). Additionally, low levels of switching - resulting 
in weak consumer pressure – are a concern in several national sector inquiries and market 
investigations (e.g. Germany, UK). 
Economic theory and empirical evidence suggests that weak competition in energy markets 
can lead to detrimental market outcomes such as: 
■ reduced investment and innovation; 
■ high retail prices; 
■ reduced service quality to customers; 
■ less choice of products and suppliers; and 
■ low levels of customer trust and satisfaction. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationships between the market characteristics and outcomes 
described above.  
                                                     
11  Electricity and gas suppliers tend to cross-subsidise loss-making segments (households) by setting higher 
prices for commercial customers (compared to the situation with no regulated prices).  
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Figure 4.1 Relationship between market characteristics and market outcomes 
 
Source: own figure 
While it is beyond our scope to assess in detail the functioning and performance of European 
gas and electricity markets, this section provides a high-level descriptive analysis of a 
selection of conventional indicators to identify key changes in market characteristics and 
outcomes that can be observed from the available data.  
The overall framework for the descriptive analysis is summarised in Table 4.1. The list of 
indicators is not exhaustive. We focus on a limited number of indicators for which data is 
available for most EU Member States. Each provides a useful check on the state of the 
market. However, an adverse finding for a single indicator does not necessarily suggest a 
systemic problem in the way the market functions. 
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Table 4.1 Framework for the descriptive analysis  
(P: Production/ generation, I: Infrastructure, W: Wholesale, R: Retail) 
Indicator type Indicator P I W R What does this indicator tell us? 
Market 
characteristics 
High levels of 
concentration 
CR3 - The share of the three 
largest companies 
(gas/electricity) 
✓   ✓ 
The market share of the three largest firms. This can give an indication of the 
extent of the largest firms’ market power. Concentration ratios can show the extent 
of the market control of the three largest firms, and how far it may be oligopolistic. 
Number of players in a market   ✓ ✓ The absolute number of players/firms in a market. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index - 
HHI 
✓  ✓ ✓ 
A commonly accepted measure of market concentration, calculated by squaring 
the market share of each firm competing in a market, then summing the resulting 
numbers. The HHI can range from 0 (low concentration) to 10,000 (high 
concentration). The benefit of this indicator is that it includes the number and size 
of market participants. 
Barriers to entry Vertical integration 
 ✓   
The effects of vertical integration can be ambiguous. It can lead to greater 
efficiency that would not be achieved without integration, but may also cause the 
foreclosure of supply to non-integrated firms and higher barriers to entry. Vertical 
integration can raise barriers to entry or expansion, e.g., by limiting, or foreclosing, 
access to essential inputs or means of distribution to a non-integrated firm, or 
requiring any entrant to consider entering at both stages. 
An OECD indicator of vertical integration is used here. 
Number of new 
entrants/change in players   ✓ ✓ 
Changes in the number of market players can indicate market entry/exit. New 
market entry can act as a constraint, preventing firms from exercising market 
power. 
Levels of market 
integration 
Interconnection capacity as % 
of total generation capacity  ✓   
Insufficient interconnection capacity hinders cross-border trade. Lack of cross-
border trade in turn reduces competitive pressure on domestic incumbents. 
Market liquidity Trading volumes at hubs   ✓  Low wholesale market liquidity blocks access to wholesale energy at a competitive price. 
Regulation Price regulation of households 
and non-household 
consumers. 
   ✓ 
End-user price regulation – particularly  when these prices were set below market 
prices rather than at wholesale market prices – can distort the functioning of the 
market by (i) strengthening the position of the historical incumbent; (ii)  making it 
difficult for suppliers to recuperate their costs thus  discouraging market entry; (iii) 
reducing the incentives for firms to invest in and modernise infrastructure and 
services; (iv)  damaging the competitiveness of European businesses by 
burdening them with higher energy costs ; (v) causing over-consumption. 
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Indicator type Indicator P I W R What does this indicator tell us? 
OECD Indicators of Product 
Market Regulation project, 
specifically the indicators of 
regulation in energy, transport 
and communication (ETCR) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
A rating of the level of regulation within a market (on a scale of 1-6, 6 being highly 
regulated). The overall rating is based on a weighted approach considering four 
sub-indicators: entry regulation, public ownership, vertical integration and market 
structure.  
 
The values of the four sub-indicators for regulation of energy and gas markets are 
determined via the countries’ answers to a set of questions. The degree of entry 
regulation depends on the answer to three (equally weighted) questions 
concerning i) third party grid access, ii) the existence of a liberalised wholesale 
market and iii) the ability of consumers to switch suppliers. The remaining sub-
indicators are determined through one question each: public ownership is 
measured by the average share of government ownership in the largest firms in 
electricity (gas) generation, transmission, distribution and supply; vertical 
integration is measured via the legal requirements regarding unbundling 
(ownership separation, legal separation, accounting separation, no separation); 
finally, the market structure indicator is determined by the market share  of the 
largest firm in the generation and supply sectors.  
Public ownership Public ownership of first 
generation producer 
✓    
Potential problems associated with public ownership not only include control 
issues, but potentially also preferential access to capital and distortions of 
competition both for and in the market, possibly exacerbated by regulatory 
capture. 
Market outcomes Price Price trends / evolution: 
- Wholesale prices 
- Retail prices 
  ✓ ✓ 
Competition should in theory exert a downward pressure on prices. Thus, as 
markets become more competitive, prices are expected to fall. However, retail 
energy prices also include several components: wholesale energy costs; cost of 
transmission and distribution which are regulated and not affected by competition, 
and taxes and levies also unaffected by competition. 
Interpretations of raw price data should be cautious due to retail price regulation 
existing in some Member States. 
Mark-up Mark up on wholesale prices 
   ✓ 
The level of mark-up on wholesale prices. Retail prices alone do not necessarily 
indicate the level of competition in a market –  e.g.,, high retail prices may reflect 
higher input prices. These may include costs not determined by suppliers (such as 
network charges and taxes). Retail suppliers compete on the margin and this is 
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Indicator type Indicator P I W R What does this indicator tell us? 
the mark-up on their incurred costs. This indicates the level of competition (with 
lower mark-ups most commonly associated with higher levels of competition12).  
Switching Switching rates 
   ✓ 
The ability and willingness of consumers to switch in response to price signals is 
an important aspect of well-functioning markets.  In competitive markets, we 
expect to see consumer actions, such as the threat of switching supplier, exert 
competitive pressure on suppliers.  
If switching is discouraged or impeded, it could deter new entrants from entering 
the market, assuming it will be difficult to persuade consumers to switch from their 
existing provider. This could potentially diminish the effectiveness of competition. 
However, switching data must be analysed with care and alongside other factors 
influencing the market. High switching levels do not automatically signify that a 
market is competitive. First, if pricing is unclear and products complex, price 
differentials and subsequently switching can occur over a long period of time, 
without the market becoming more competitive. Second, if suppliers’ co-ordinate 
their behaviour to keep prices high, the market will not be competitive, regardless 
of switching levels. Third, high switching levels can conceal certain undesirable 
activities, such as misselling and churning. 
Intensity of 
competition 
Productivity dispersion 
✓  ✓ ✓ 
Competition increases productivity by forcing inefficient firms to exit and allowing 
efficient firms to enter. Competition also works as a stimulus by incentivising 
innovation and improving efficiency. Due to these competitive pressures, less 
productivity dispersion is expected in markets where there is high competition, 
high innovation and greater entry. 
Boone indicator 
✓  ✓ ✓ 
This is an indicator of intensity of competition, punishing inefficient firms more 
severely in a competitive environment. The more negative the coefficient is, the 
more firms are punished for inefficiency Thus, more competitive environment with 
a greater policy push towards increasing competition is associated with a lower 
coefficient. 
                                                     
12  ACER. 2012. ‘ACER Market Monitoring Report 2012’. Available at: 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACER%20Market%20Monitoring%20Report%202012.pdf  
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4.2 Functioning of the European electricity markets 
The following discussion references the electricity markets dashboard (see Table 4.2), with 
relevant time trends detailed in the Annex (see A2.1).  
4.2.1 Market shares and concentration 
High market concentration can be problematic as it creates the scope for dominant firms to 
exercise market power. The 2007 Sector Inquiry highlights that generators can influence 
prices in two ways: either by withdrawing capacity from the market, or by increasing prices 
when their production is required to meet demand. Since the Sector Inquiry, market 
concentration in electricity generation – as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) - has fallen in almost all Member States except Germany and Hungary (which have 
seen very small increase in the index of 82 and 320 respectively). The most significant 
decreases occurred in Greece (a change of 3,613), Belgium (2,614), Estonia (1,928) and 
Lithuania (1,761).  
Wholesale markets in several Member States, however, remain highly concentrated and 
continue to be dominated by former monopoly generators. Market shares of above 20 per 
cent for the largest generator can cause concern. In 16 Member States, the market share of 
the largest generator exceeds 20 per cent and in 18 Member States, the value of the HHI 
measure exceeds the commonly accepted threshold for highly concentrated markets (HHI= 
2,000). Moreover, the small island nations of Cyprus and Malta continue to be monopolised, 
with 100 per cent of their electricity generated by the largest (sole) generator. Member 
States such as  Germany, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands, on the other hand, exhibit 
relatively low levels of market concentration. 
Retail electricity markets show similar patterns of concentration (with an average HHI of 
almost 4,500 and CR313 of 74 per cent across the EU). In 14 Member States, the market 
share of the three largest suppliers exceeds 60 per cent, indicating high levels of 
concentration. Incumbents have been able to maintain their market shares, with too few new 
entrants (European Parliament, 2010).  
On the positive side, market concentration, in general, has decreased during the last decade 
(on average the CR3 indicator has decreased by 5 per cent at an EU level between 2007 
and 2013). But a mixed picture emerges at a national level, for example in Bulgaria and 
Lithuania, the CR3 indicator almost halved between 2007 and 2003, whereas in Poland and 
Slovakia, the CR3 ratio increased significantly in recent years.  
4.2.2 Vertical integration 
While vertical integration can bring benefits to electricity suppliers (enables efficiency and 
offers security against volatility in the wholesale market, as discussed in Section 3) and 
consumers (generating lower prices), there are potential downsides. For instance, vertical 
integration can discourage independent, non-vertically integrated firms from entering the 
market by reducing liquidity in the wholesale electricity markets.  
Vertical integration guarantees wholesale electricity products to large suppliers, thus 
reducing their availability to smaller non-integrated suppliers (Ofgem, 2014).  Vertically 
integrated firms may use their position to undermine competition from independent 
generators by their unwillingness to sign long-term offtake contracts with them, unwillingness 
to trade certain products or to trade with independent generators, or dispatching their own 
generation even when cheaper generation is available from other firms (customer 
foreclosure). They may also disadvantage independent retailers through input foreclosure: if 
a firm has any market power in generation, it can increase wholesale electricity prices by 
generating less at a given price, increasing input costs for independent suppliers. A vertically 
                                                     
13  Market share of the largest three suppliers. Ideally, the top three suppliers should have a combined market 
shares of less than 60 per cent 
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integrated firm can also restrict trading or otherwise worsen liquidity, either increasing traded 
prices or imposing a risk premium on independent suppliers (Ofgem, 2015). 
Available data shows that, although the level of vertical integration has on average 
decreased since 2007, it remains reasonably high throughout Europe (as measured by the 
OECD vertical integration indicator14). There are some differences across Member States. 
For example, Bulgaria had the highest level of vertical integration in 2013 with an index value 
of 5.25, followed by France, Germany and the UK with an index value of 4.69.  Lowest levels 
were observed in Portugal (2.45), Belgium (3.00) and Ireland (3.00). 
4.2.3 Regulation 
The OECD indicators of Product Market Regulation show the overall level of regulation in 
electricity markets across Europe.  The indicator is composed of four sub-indicators 
measuring the degree of public ownership, entry regulation, vertical integration and market 
structure. As expected, regulatory environment in electricity markets varies across Europe, 
with Germany, Portugal, Spain and the UK operating a less regulated market compared to 
Cyprus, Croatia, Latvia and Malta, which are highly regulated. As part of the broader 
econometric analysis, we examine the interplay between competition policy enforcement and 
regulation by distinguishing between effects in high and low regulated markets.   
Figure 4.2 shows the average rates of regulation across Member States over time. The entry 
regulation and market structure indicators begin relatively low and gradually decline between 
2004 and 2012. The indicators for public ownership and vertical integration begin relatively 
higher and only decline slightly.  
Figure 4.2 Average rates of regulation across EU Member States in electricity markets, 2004-
2012 
 
Based on DIW’s analysis of OECD data 
 
Drilling down further, price regulation in the household segment of the market exists in more 
than half of the Member States. For industrial consumers, regulated prices exist in 11 of the 
28 Member States. Price regulation, particularly when these prices are set below market 
prices and not in line with wholesale market prices distort the functioning of the market by (i) 
                                                     
14  The value of the OECD vertical integration indicator ranges from1-6. It is based on a simple average of the 
degree of vertical integration over the four segments of the market: generation/import, transmission, 
distribution and supply. Rating scale is as follows: a 0 is ownership separation, 3: legal separation, 4-5: 
accounting separation, 6: no separation 
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strengthening the position of the historical incumbent; (ii)  discouraging market entry by 
making it difficult for suppliers to recuperate their costs; (iii) reducing incentives for firms to 
invest in and modernise infrastructure and services; (iv)  damaging the competitiveness of 
European businesses by burdening them with higher energy costs; (v) leading to over-
consumption by consumers (European Commission, 2014).  
Regulated prices also discourage switching by being a focal point for alternative offers that 
cluster around the regulated offers. This then undermines incentives to enter the market, 
competition between suppliers and quality of services (ACER, Market Monitoring Report 
2014). 
We also looked at the specific issue of ownership unbundling in electricity markets. The 
Third Energy Package proposed in 2009, which applies to both electricity and gas, requires 
an effective separation of the transmission networks´ operation from supply and generation 
activities (unbundling). In the transmission segment, there are several ways to unbundle: (i) 
separation of accounts and an independent operator (ITO, Independent Transmission 
Operator); (ii) operational separation where a company can operate the network without 
owning the network (ISO, Independent System Operator); and (iii) full divestiture of both 
entities (ownership unbundling). The latter is widely accepted as the optimal model because 
it eliminates any incentives to discriminate. According to the latest information (2013), 15 
Member States have chosen to apply the ownership unbundling model on at least one 
Transmission System Operator (TSO) in electricity.  
4.2.4 Market integration 
Belgium, Hungary, the Netherlands and the UK have a high proportion (between 50 and 90 
per cent) of the supplier market share represented by cross-border entrants. The average 
market share of cross-border entrants across the EU is much lower at 21 per cent. Although 
trend data is not available for this indicator, evidence from other sources suggests an 
increase in cross-border market entry in the energy sector in recent years. For example, 
Verde (2008) examined recent merger activity within the European energy sector and 
observed a clear trend towards the creation of pan-European players through cross-border 
merger and acquisition activity. 
The proportion of cross-border trade to total domestic electricity consumption can also show 
the extent a country engages in cross-border trade. Higher proportions of cross-border trade 
to domestic consumption may indicate greater capability for cross-border trade (due to 
infrastructure) but can also be part of a country’s capacity to meet its own demand 
domestically.  The Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Latvia show a greater share of 
outflows to domestic consumption.  
4.2.5 Public ownership 
Competition problems associated with public ownership include control issues, preferential 
access to capital and distortions of competition both for and in the market which can be 
exacerbated by regulatory capture.  
The latest available data (2010) on public ownership of the first generation producer 
compiled by the European Commission (DG ECFIN, 2014) shows that high levels of public 
ownership of the first generation producer (> 50 per cent) still exist in the electricity sector.    
The average across all Member States stands at 61.6 per cent, with 95-100 per cent public 
ownership in 11 Member States.  100 per cent ownership exists in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and Sweden. Many of these countries 
are more recent accession countries (with the exception of Sweden), and may have been 
pursuing market liberalisation policies for less time. In contrast, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK have completely divested the previously State-owned assets of the first 
generation producers.  
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4.2.6 Prices 
Although there is evidence of wholesale price convergence across national markets in recent 
years (2008 to 2013), price differentials remain significant. In 2013, Romania had the lowest 
average wholesale baseload electricity prices (38.59 €/ MWh), with Italy the highest (74.21 
€/MWh), resulting in a price differential ratio of 1.9 between the cheapest and the most 
expensive country in the EU.  
Prices in Italy, Ireland and the UK were among the highest in the EU in 2013, either because 
of the lack of sufficient interconnection capacities to neighbouring power markets (Italy and 
Ireland), or because expensive generation fuels dominated the marginal price in the 
wholesale market (natural gas in the case of the UK) (European Commission, Quarterly 
Report on Electricity Markets, Q4-2014).  
The average retail electricity price for households has increased from €0.14/KWh to 
€0.18/KWh between 2007 and 2014, with an average year-on-year change of 5 per cent15. 
For industrial customers, prices have increased slightly less from €0.09/KWh to €0.11/KWh 
during the same period and similarly had an average year-on-year change of five per cent16. 
Both are much higher than the average inflation rate of 2.12 per cent for the EU during the 
same period.  
Huge price differentials remain across Member States within retail electricity prices for 
households, although retail electricity prices for industrial consumers appear to be gradually 
converging: 
■ For households, prices range from €0.09/KWh in Belgium to €0.30/KWh in Denmark and 
Germany, causing a price differential of 3.5. The lack of convergence could be due to the 
increasing importance of non-market elements (such as network costs, taxes and policy 
levies) within the final retail prices, or other structural issues such as competition or the 
presence of end-price regulation. 
■ For industrial consumers, prices range from €0.07/KWh in Finland and Sweden to 
€0.19/KWh in Malta, causing a price differential of 2.7. The smaller price differential 
could be because industrial consumers are subject to less retail price regulation 
compared to the household sector and the better negotiating position of industrial 
consumers, leading to better competition among power utilities. 
The mark-up on wholesale prices (i.e., the difference between wholesale prices and the 
energy component of the retail price) can show the level of competition in the electricity 
market (with persistently high mark-ups associated with low levels of competition). The 
average electricity price mark-up across the EU has increased from €11.17/ MWh in 2008 to 
€ 14.12/ MWh to 2013.  
Electricity price mark-ups are highest in Greece, the UK and Germany and negative in some 
Member States (the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Romania). Mark-up differences can be 
explained by cross-country differences in operating costs of suppliers, volatility in wholesale 
prices, market size and consumption level .In Lithuania and Romania, mark-ups are negative 
due to the  existence of regulated prices (in these countries retail energy price component 
seems to have been set below wholesale energy prices). In the Czech Republic and Spain, 
negative mark-ups could be due to significant entry/exit activity (CEER/ACER, 2014 Market 
Monitoring Report). 
4.2.7 Switching 
The ability and willingness of consumers to switch in response to price signals is important to 
well-functioning markets. In competitive markets, consumer actions, such as the threat of 
switching supplier, exert competitive pressure on suppliers. If switching is discouraged, it can 
deter new entrants from entering the market, believing it will be difficult to persuade 
                                                     
15  Consumption band DC for households (2,500 KWh < consumption < 5,000 KWh)  
16  Consumption band IC for industrial customers (500 MWh < consumption < 2,000 MWh)  
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consumers to switch from their existing provider, potentially diminishing the effectiveness of 
competition.  
Data on switching rates in electricity markets is patchy, making it difficult to draw any 
conclusions.  Available data shows that electricity switching rates are low in several Member 
States (< 10 per cent) except for Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK which have 
relatively high levels of switching (ranging from 13 to 26 per cent).  
A low switching rate in itself is not indicative of market mal-functioning, but other qualitative 
evidence suggests that there might be barriers to switching in energy markets (CEER/ACER, 
2014 Market Monitoring Report). Low switching rates support the conclusion that the actual 
level of competitive pressures arising from consumers in electricity markets may be limited. 
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Table 4.2 European electricity markets – stylised overview 
 
Market share 
of the largest 
operator (%)
Market share of 3 
largest generators 
(by volume, %)
HHI power 
generation
Public ownership 
of first generation 
producer
Vertical integration 
(1: no vertical 
integration; 6: high 
levels)
Effective 
unbundling
Market share of 
cross-border 
entrants
Av. wholesale 
baseload 
electricity prices 
(€/MWh) 
HHI in 
electricity 
retail market
Market share 
of 3 largest 
retailers (by 
volume, %)
Price 
regulation - 
Households
Price 
regulation - 
non-
households
Year: 2012 2013 2013 2010 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2014 2013 2013 2014 2014 2013
t range: 2000 - 2012 2004 - 2013 2005 - 2013 2010 only 2000 - 2013
2010 & 2013 
only
2013 only 2008 - 2013
2011 & 2013 
only
2004 - 2013 2013 only 2008 - 2013 2008 - 2013 2007 - 2014 2007 - 2014
2013, 2008-
2012 av
Source: Eurostat CEER Platts DG ECFIN OECD* DG ECFIN ACER CEER DG ENER CEER DG ENER CEER CEER Eurostat Eurostat CEER
AT 56.60 50.1 1792.7 51.0 3.9375 ITO/OU n.a. 52.08 1800 57 NO NO  23.72 0.20 0.11 1.80
BE 65.80 92.0 3783.2 0.0 3 OU 91.47 48.70 3000 n.a. NO YES  22.20 0.21 0.11 14.60
BG n.a. 49.0 2650.0 100.0 5.25 ITO 33.68 n.a. n.a. 49 YES YES  n.a. 0.09 0.08 0.00
CY n.a. 100.0 9556.4 100.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10000 100 YES YES  n.a. 0.23 0.18 0.00
HR 82.00 95.8 8728.6 n.a. 3.5625 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4516 97.81 YES n.a. n.a. 0.13 0.09 0.00
CZ 68.00 77.1 4046.9 70.0 4.6875 OU 17.68 50.62 n.a. 70 NO NO  -6.42 0.13 0.08 5.70
DK 37.00 65** 2240.4 76.0 4.125 OU n.a. 41.03 n.a. n.a. partly YES  7.27 0.30 0.09 6.20
EE 88.00 92.0 7200.0 100.0 3.1875 OU n.a. 44.80 6869 99 YES NO  3.10 0.13 0.09 0.00
FI 25.20 n.a.  1164.2 51.0 3.9375 n.a. 15.84 45.55 n.a. 40 NO NO  14.75 0.16 0.07 7.50
FR 86.00 98.0 6453.1 84.0 4.6875 ITO 6.85 54.10 4500 84 YES YES  3.30 0.17 0.09 2.00
DE 28.4* 56.0 1274.0 0.0 4.6875 OU/ITO 4.65 50.70 n.a. n.a. NO NO  35.90 0.30 0.16 5.70
EL 77.00 90.2 4328.7 100.0 4.5 ITO n.a. 44.00 9604 99.72 NO YES  48.80 0.18 0.13 0.10
HU 47.10 55.1 2150.4 100.0 4.125 ITO 80.30 57.37 1584.38 86.42 YES YES  0.23 0.12 0.09 0.00
IE 55.00 79.0 2540.8 95.0 3 Other 22.80 70.60 4759 83.3 NO NO  25.48 0.25 0.13 11.30
IT 26.00 39.9 1527.9 31.2 3.9375 OU 6.92 74.21 1865 46.2 NO NO  10.83 0.24 0.17 7.60
LV 89.00 83.0 9097.2 100.0 3.9375 ISO n.a. 55.27 8196 99 YES NO  0.53 0.13 0.12 0.00
LT 30.40 65.0 5342.7 100.0 3.375 OU n.a. 51.01 2124.4 53 YES NO  -2.96 0.13 0.12 0.00
LU 81.80 73.9 5185.1 25.0 4.6875 n.a. 13.10 49.96 n.a. 96 NO NO  19.84 0.17 0.10 0.10
MT 100.00 100.0 9310.2 100.0 4.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 10000 100 YES YES  n.a. 0.14 0.19 0.00
NL n.a. 53* 1225.1 0.0 4.5 OU 49.30 55.82 2338 80.5 NO NO  20.38 0.18 0.10 13.10
PL 16.40 62.6 1698.9 62.0 4.6875 OU 5.10 47.88 2099 67.36 YES NO  10.72 0.14 0.08 1.00
PT 37.20 59.5 3847.7 4.0 2.4375 OU 25.60 52.17 6918 85.5 NO YES  14.56 0.22 0.12 26.80
RO 26.70 66.1 1480.7 80.0 3.375 ISO 40.80 38.59 1472 58 YES YES  -1.99 0.13 0.08 0.00
SK 78.90 56.4 5900.2 34.0 4.3125 OU 33.20 39.60 n.a. 64.55 YES YES  23.70 0.15 0.12 3.60
SI 55.20 90.0 5391.7 100.0 3.75 ITO n.a. 47.04 1575 57.1 NO NO  14.16 0.16 0.09 3.90
ES 23.80 58.1 1522.6 0.0 3.1875 OU 2.76 53.94 2240 71.43 YES NO  -0.26 0.23 0.12 12.80
SE 44.00 77.5 2778.2 100.0 3.1875 OU 24.36 40.38 n.a. 40.8 NO NO  16.12 0.19 0.07 10.70
UK 51.70 50.3 861.6 0.0 4.6875 OU 5.96 69.85 1720 48.3 NO NO  37.96 0.20 0.13 12.30
*2010 data *2012 data
**2009 data
Coding thresholds:
High 20 60 2000 50 4.67 0 40 60.84 2000 60 0 0 28.33 0.23 0.14 -1.27
Med 6 - 19 20-59 1000-1199 6-49 3.97 0 6-39 51.47 1000-1199 20-59 0 0 14.25 0.18 0.11 5.24
Low 5 19 999 5 3.27 0 5 42.10 2000 19 0 0 0.16 0.12 0.08 11.75
Market characteristics Market outcomes
Electricity generation Infrastructure
Retail price: 
Households 
(Euro / KWh)
Retail price: 
Industry (Euro / 
KWh)
Switching rate 
(%)
Mark-up - 
wholesale to 
retail 
electricity 
prices 
(EUR/MWh)
Retail markets
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4.3 Functioning of the European gas market 
The following references the gas markets dashboard in Table 4.3, with relevant time trends 
detailed in the Annex (see A2.2). 
4.3.1 Market shares and concentration 
Although high levels of market share of the largest gas operator >20 per cent) can be seen 
for 20 Member States (including the presence of a monopoly supplier in three Member 
States), it is difficult to interpret the market share of the largest producer in isolation, because 
the market structure depends on many factors (e.g., the level of gas endowments within a 
country, the infrastructure to import etc.). In the UK, the largest gas producer has a relatively 
low share of the market. This is because the UK has pursued strong liberalisation strategies, 
particularly in the upstream elements of the gas market (e.g., wholesale shipping for gas). 
These markets have been liberalised more completely than retail markets, a policy 
considered  relatively successful17.Retail gas markets remain highly concentrated in most 
Member States, even more so than electricity markets. In 18 Member States, the market 
share of the three largest suppliers exceeds 60 per cent, indicating high levels of 
concentration in these markets and the HHI is above the 2,000 threshold in many countries 
where data is available. The high level of concentration shows that retail competition in many 
countries is underdeveloped.  
4.3.2 Vertical integration 
Vertical integration is a strong feature of most national gas markets in the EU. In 18 Member 
States, the value of the OECD vertical integration was greater than 4 in 2013, suggesting 
high levels of vertical integration. Exceptionally in the UK, the gas market does not have a 
vertically integrated structure.  
4.3.3 Regulation 
The overall level of regulation of gas markets is notably high in Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, 
Latvia and Poland, according to OECD data. Gas markets are fully liberalised in the UK and 
there is little regulation in Germany, Spain and Portugal.  
The level of entry regulation, indicating the ease of entry into the market, is on average very 
low with an index value of 0.54 for the EU. In most Member States, this indicator is below 1, 
with the exception of Finland (4) and Latvia (5). Post-2007, this indicator has slightly 
increased from an average of 0.41 in 2007. 
Figure 4.3 shows the average rates of regulation across Member States over time (2004 – 
2012).Entry regulation is practically non-existent from 2006 onwards, while market structure 
regulation declines substantially after 2009. The levels of vertical integration and public 
ownership have remained more or less unchanged between 2004 and 2012. 
                                                     
17  London Economics. 2012. ‘Energy Retail Markets Comparability Study’. A report for DECC. 
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Figure 4.3 Average rates of regulation across EU Member States in gas markets, 2004-2012 
 
Based on DIW’s analysis of OECD data 
Many Member States continue to regulate retail gas prices. Price regulation in the household 
segment was prevalent in 14 EU Member States in 2013, while 11 countries also regulated 
prices for industrial customers. Most commonly a rate-of-return or cost-plus regulation is 
applied. All price regulation regimes use some kind of market reference in setting prices. 
Regulation with direct link to wholesale price exists in Denmark.  
Finally, the latest information (2013) on ownership unbundling in gas markets shows that 15 
Member States have chosen to apply the ownership unbundling model.  
4.3.4 Public ownership 
Eight Member States have high levels of public ownership of first generation producer (>50 
per cent). Romania, Bulgaria, Denmark and Ireland all have significantly higher than average 
proportion of public ownership (all above 75 per cent). 
4.3.5 Prices 
There are significant differences in retail gas prices across the EU. In 2014, Romania had 
the lowest estimated household price in consumption band D2 (5.56 MWh < consumption < 
55.6 MWh) (3.10 Eurocent/kWh), while Sweden had the highest price (11.86 Eurocent/kWh), 
causing a price differential ratio of 3.8 between the cheapest and the most expensive 
Member State in the EU. While this ratio is high, it shows a declining trend since 2011 when 
it was 4.2.  
Overall, retail gas prices for households have increased by 35 per cent (EU average) 
between 2007 and 2014 (from 5 Eurocents /KWh in 2007 to 7 Eurocents/KWh in 2014) with 
an average year-on-year change of 4 per cent (higher than EU average inflation of 2.12 per 
cent). Almost all Member States recorded inflation-busting increases in retail prices during 
this period, with the exception of Hungary and Romania where retail prices fell. In these 
countries, end-user prices are regulated and are set below wholesale prices (see below). 
When compared to 2013, retail gas prices for households on average fell by 2 per cent in 
2014 across the EU. 
Similar to prices for the household segment, there are large cross-country variations in 
prices (VAT and other recoverable taxes excluded) for industrial consumers across the EU. 
In 2014, the lowest estimated industrial price in consumption band I4 ((27,780 MWh < 
consumption < 277,800 MWh) was recorded in Belgium (2.69 Eurocent/kWh), while Greece 
had the highest price (4.30 Eurocent/kWh), causing a price differential ratio of 1.74 between 
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the cheapest and the most expensive Member State of the EU. This ratio has decreased 
from 2.28 in 2007, indicating a gradual convergence of industrial prices.  
Gas prices for industry on average increased by 34 per cent between 2007 and 2014. 
Compared to 2013, retail prices for industrial consumers on average fell by 8 per cent across 
the EU, causing a price differential ratio of 1.48 between the cheapest and the most 
expensive Member State in the EU. The wholesale price differential across the EU is lower 
for gas markets as compared to electricity markets.  
Average wholesale gas prices ranged from 25.27 €/MWh in Hungary to 37.45 €/MWh in 
Lithuania (2013 data). Wholesale prices fell on average by 4 per cent across the EU 
between 2012 and 2013.  
Significant gas price mark-ups could be observed in 10 Member States in 2013. In the UK 
and Luxembourg, mark-ups of more than 60 per cent over wholesale prices were recorded in 
2013. Negative mark-up rates were noted in Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia. These Member States are characterised by the existence of retail gas price 
regulation. 
4.3.6 Switching 
Switching rate among gas consumers is relatively low at 5 per cent (EU average). Higher 
switching rates are noted in Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium (a similar country 
trend as seen in the electricity market).  
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Table 4.3  European gas markets – stylised overview 
 
 
Wholesale 
market (i.e. 
hubs)
Public 
ownership of 
first generation 
producer (%)
Market share of 
3 largest 
shippers (%)
Market share of 
3 largest gas 
companies in 
power plants 
(by volume, %)
Market share of 
the largest 
entity brining in 
gas
Vertical 
integration 
indicator
Effective 
unbundling
Market share 
of 3 biggest 
gas storage 
system 
operators (%)
Traded volumes 
on European 
Gas hubs
Presence of 
cross-border 
entrants
Changes in 
number of 
players (%)
HHI in gas 
wholesale 
market
Average 
wholesale gas 
prices,  
(€/MWh)
HHI in gas retail 
market
Market share of 
3 largest 
companies (by 
volume, %)
Price regulation 
- Households
Price regulation 
- non-
households
Year: 2010 2012 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2012 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2014 2014 2014
t range: 2010 only 2004 - 2013 2004-2013
2011 & 2013 
only
2003, 2008, 2013
2010 & 2013 
only
2008 - 2013 2003 - 2012 2013 only 2008-2013 2008-2013 av 2012 - 2013 2013 only 2004 - 2013 2008 - 2013 2008 - 2013 2012 - 2013 2007 - 2014 2007 - 2014 2008 - 2013
Source: DG ECFIN CEER CEER DG ENER OECD* DG ECFIN CEER IEA Datamonitor CEER CEER CEER DG ENER CEER CEER CEER CEER Eurostat Eurostat CEER
AT 31.50 90.00 n.a.  n.a. 4.69 ITO/ISO 73.00 47.30 n.a. 9.76 7,500            26.95 2,200            58.00 NO NO 9.79 0.07 0.04 2.40
BE n.a. 75.100 n.a.  n.a. 4.50 OU 100.00 66.60 84.08 126.67 1,709            26.97 3,900            69.33* YES YES 8.35 0.07 0.03 12.80
BG 100.00 100.00 n.a.  99.80 3.19 ITO n.a.  n.a. n.a. 0.00 7,587            32.05 1,000            83.00 YES YES 5.34 0.05 0.03 0.00
CY n.a. Do not have commercial gas network
HR n.a. 93.00 89.00 60.80 3.38 n.a. 100.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5,987            35.07 1,588            72.55 n.a. NO 5.79 0.05 0.03 0.00
CZ n.a. 81.90 n.a.  82.30 4.50 ITO 100.00 n.a. 44.94 29.82 9,051            30.71 1,632            55.50 NO NO 3.13 0.06 0.03 10.00
DK 76.00 n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 4.50 OU 100.00 n.a. n.a. -7.14 2,570            27.57 3,648            n.a.  YES YES 8.89 0.09 0.03 9.60
EE n.a. 100.00 100.00 86.50 4.13 OU n.a.  n.a. n.a. 7.41 10,000         33.37 7,943            98.00 NO NO 0.48 0.05 0.04 9.00
FI 24.00 100.00 84.00 100.00 5.25 n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 0.00 10,000         35.15 n.a. 79.00 NO NO 0.60 n.a. 0.05 n.a.
FR 35.00 82.00 83.00 59.00 4.69 ITO 100.00 46.30 22.86 62.16 1,240            29.86 3,000            72.00 YES YES 7.82 0.07 0.03 6.10
DE n.a. n.a.  35.6* 30.10 4.69 OU/ITO 68.00 221.40 0.50 0.00 1,982            27.22 300               28.5* NO NO 10.28 0.07 0.03 5.50
EL 65.00 100.00 100.00 88.60 4.69 ITO/OU n.a.  n.a. n.a. 16.67 5,181            32.24 n.a. 100.00 YES YES 11.17 0.08 0.04 0.00
HU 22.00 100.00 86.26 32.91 3.19 ITO 100.00 n.a. 45.72 11.63 3,198            30.63 1,246            59.30 YES YES -7.63 0.04 0.03 0.00
IE 96.73 69.90 75.83 42.00 4.50 ITO 100.00 n.a. n.a. -12.50 1,215            25.27 4,780            66.00 YES NO 11.25 0.07 0.03 17.70
IT 30.30 81.80 62.90 44.60 4.88 OU/ITO 100.00 64.70 9.58 5.43 2,093            30.91 1,275            46.80 NO NO 9.55 0.09 0.03 5.50
LV n.a. 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.50 n.a. 100.00 n.a. 100.00 0.00 10,000         32.14 10,000         100.00 YES YES -3.98 0.05 0.03 0.00
LT n.a. 100.00 100.00 69.00 5.06 OU n.a.  n.a. n.a. 12.50 10,000         37.45 5,000            100.00 YES NO 3.23 0.05 0.03 0.10
LU 25.00 100.00 100.00 n.a. 4.69 n.a. n.a.  n.a. 4.06 -44.44 3,185            27.97 n.a. 99.00 NO NO 18.43 0.05 0.03 0.00
MT n.a. Do not have commercial gas network
NL 51.00 92.50 n.a.  n.a. 4.50 OU 100.00 187.90 59.46 41.94 2,488            27.19 2,258            97.00 NO NO 9.24 0.08 0.03 13.10
PL 72.00 n.a.  100.00 96.90 4.69 n.a. 100.00 n.a. n.a. -62.11 4,550            30.50 9,073            94.90 YES YES -5.19 0.05 0.03 0.00
PT 8.00 98.30 100.00 85.30 2.25 n.a. 100.00 n.a. 8.68 -28.57 2,821            29.26 4,484            60.36 YES YES -0.53 0.10 0.04 0.00
RO 100.00 77.2* 69.51 41.70 3.19 ISO n.a.  n.a. 45.14 1.03 3,270            28.52 n.a. 85.90 YES YES -14.19 0.03 0.03 0.00
SK 51.00 85.90 n.a.  61.80 4.50 ITO 100.00 n.a. 18.68 13.04 9,595            30.70 n.a. 73.00 YES YES -1.96 0.05 0.03 6.20
SI 39.00 99.26 n.a.  90.00 4.88 ITO 0  n.a. 7.18 9.52 5,027            31.03 4,186            69.60 NO NO 2.14 0.07 0.04 5.10
ES n.a. 70.00 78.70 48.00 3.00 OU/ISO 100.00 n.a. 2.20 10.96 2,000            27.27 2,264            n.a.  YES NO 2.98 0.09 0.03 12.40
SE n.a. n.a.  n.a.  100.00 3.75 OU n.a.  n.a. 6.68 33.33 2,766            33.30 n.a. 78.90 NO NO 10.95 0.12 0.04 0.50
UK n.a. 37.64 n.a.  17.00 0.00 OU n.a.  1271.00 40.81 22.22 950               27.65 2,373            48.69 NO NO 19.18 0.06 0.03 10.20
*2012 data *2012 data *2012 data
Coding thresholds:
High 50.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 5.18 - 40.00 -173.97 40.00 -24.66 2000.00 33.28 2000.00 40.00 - - 12.47 0.09 0.04 -0.39
Med 6-394 6-39 6-39 6-39 4.067307692 - 6-39 272.1714286 6-39 10.37307778 1000-2000 30.26667797 1000-2000 6-39 - - 4.81 0.07 0.03 5.05
Low 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 2.95 - 5.00 718.31 5.00 45.41 1000.00 27.25 1000.00 5.00 - - -2.85 0.05 0.03 10.49
Market outcomes
Infrastructure
Retail price: 
Households 
(inc. taxes & 
levies)
Retail price: 
Industry (ex. 
VAT)
Switching rate
Mark-up - 
wholesale to 
retail gas prices 
(EUR/MWh)
Retail marketProduction and import market
Market characteristics
Supply market (i.e. Transmission)
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4.4 Intensity of competition in European energy markets 
We use the following two indicators to assess the intensity of competition in the energy 
markets: (i) productivity dispersion and (ii) the Boone Indicator. Each of these is describe 
below.  
4.4.1 Productivity dispersion 
Productivity dispersion can indicate how far competition drives productivity within a market 
by forcing inefficient firms to exit and allowing more efficient firms to enter. Lower levels of 
productivity dispersion are typically associated with a more competitive market. In a market 
with little competitive pressure, firms are less likely to be disciplined by a competitive 
selection process, meaning the productivity dispersion might be bigger: Very efficient and 
less efficient firms co-exist. Conversely, an increase in competition persuades firms to catch 
up with the technology leaders and forces inefficient firms to exit, thereby reducing the 
dispersion of productivities (Syverson, 2011).  
Firm level data from Amadeus/Osiris was used to calculate this indicator (more detail is 
provided in Section 5.2). Our analysis shows that there is considerable variation in this 
indicator, both across segments (Figure 4.5) and across countries (Figure 4.5).  
Average productivity dispersion is much higher in production and trade, as compared to the 
transmission segment of the energy supply chain. This may sound counterintuitive 
considering that the transmission segment is a regulated monopoly. But the relationship 
between productivity dispersion and competition is non-monotonic. It is possible that 
productivity dispersion is low in a particular industry because all firms are more or less 
equally non-productive or productive.  Specifically, in the transmission segment, this 
indicator reflects the productivity differential between the limited number of companies that 
would be responsible for managing different parts electricity transmission lines and gas 
transportation pipelines, and not competing in the same geographic markets.  
Figure 4.4 Productivity dispersion across different segments of the energy supply chain (EU 
averages), 2003-2012 
 
DIW’s  estimations based on the Amadeus/Osiris database.  
 
Significant differences in productivity dispersion can also be observed at a country level.  In 
the production segment, productivity dispersion is noticeably high in Spain and Hungary,  
whereas high levels of productivity dispersion can be observed in the trade segment in 
France and Belgium.  
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Figure 4.5 Productivity dispersion in energy markets across EU Member States, 2012 
 
DIW’s  estimations based on the Amadeus/Osiris database. Data not available for Cyprus,  Greece, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg and Malta and only partially available for Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland and Latvia. 
4.4.2 Boone indicator 
The Boone indicator – a measure of industry competition – is calculated as the elasticity  of 
relative profits with respect to relative costs. The intuitive idea behind this indicator is that 
competition rewards efficiency. In other words, competition leads to a transfer of proﬁts 
towards relatively more efﬁcient ﬁrms (those with lower marginal costs) at the expense of 
less efﬁcient ones. In this context, the higher the intensity of market competition, the harsher 
the punishment of relatively less efﬁcient ﬁrms and the bigger the reward for relatively more 
efﬁcient ones. Relatively efﬁcient ﬁrms may see their proﬁts fall as a result of an increase in 
competition, but in this case the reduction in proﬁts is more severe for less efficient firms. In 
other words, a larger cost differential maps into a larger proﬁt differential.  Therefore, the 
more negative the Boone indicator, the higher the level of competition is in the market 
(because the effect of reallocation is stronger). The calculation of Boone indicator is further 
explained in section 5.2. 
Due to limited data, this indicator could only be estimated at a national level for 18 Member 
States (Figure 4.6). Overall, the Boone indicator does not show much cross-country 
variation, except for the Czech Republic, which stands out as a comparatively competitive 
energy market. 
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Figure 4.6 Boone indicator – energy markets, 2012 
 
DIW’s  estimations based on the Amadeus/Osiris database 
 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.6 show the evolution of the above measures of competition. The 
mean standard deviations of firms’ productivities are quite stable over years, with average 
values between 0.23 and 0.30. The Boone indicator shows more variation over time (Note 
that averages are negative in all years, as one would indeed expect profits to decrease in 
response to higher costs).  
Table 4.4 Competition measures over time 
Year Productivity dispersion Boone indicator 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
2005 0.23 0. 20 -0.53 1.10 
2006 0.23 0.20 -0.34 1.33 
2007 0.30 0.29 -0.11 0.35 
2008 0.27 0.29 -0.06 0.14 
2009 0.27 0.32 -0.02 0.18 
2010 0.29 0.29 -0.06 0.17 
2011 0.30 0.29 -0.13 0.40 
2012 0.27 0.22 -0.13 0.32 
DIW’s estimations based on the Amadeus/Osiris database 
4.5 EU competition policy interventions: a descriptive overview 
EU competition policy enforcement activity has increased since 2000 (when the first 
liberalisation directives were transposed in Member State legislation). Figure 4.7 shows the 
annual distribution of antitrust and key merger decisions. Overall, the Commission handled 
351 cases in the energy sector (229 electricity; 122 gas) between 1994 and 2014 consisting 
of 313 merger cases and 38 anti-trust cases.  
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Figure 4.7 Distribution of EU merger and anti-trust cases in electricity and gas markets, 1994 - 
2014 
 
Source: DG COMP. Based on data extracted on 26/09/2014. NACE codes D35.1 and D35.2. NOTE: 
Sector inquiry excluded from anti-trust cases reported in 2007. By case end date. 
 
Figure 4.8, shows that a significantly higher share of the merger cases in the energy sector 
have been subject to a full investigation since 2003.Previously, merger cases in the energy 
sector were subject to more simple procedures. 
Figure 4.8 Distribution of EU merger cases, 1994 - 2014 
 
Source: DG COMP. Based on data extracted on 26/09/2014. NACE codes D35.1 and D35.2. By case 
end date. 
 
EU merger control has played a key role in improving market structure and functioning by 
limiting further horizontal and vertical integration in energy markets which are already highly 
concentrated. For example, the GDF/Suez merger (later examined as a case study) finalised 
in July 2008, which aimed to create one of the world’s largest energy companies, would 
have, as originally planned, weakened competition in the gas and electricity wholesale and 
retail markets in Belgium and in the gas markets in France with the disappearance of 
competition between GDF and Suez in markets. Our case study demonstrates that the 
remedies offered by GDF and Suez were effective in limiting the potential anti-competitive 
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effects of the merger (in Belgian wholesale gas markets, the focus of study) and that 
ownership unbundling improved access to the hub. 
In case of the Electricité de France S.A. (EdF)/British Energy merger decision (2008), the 
package of remedies secured by the Commission aimed to prevent unilateral horizontal 
effects. This merger combined British Energy, the UK’s largest power generator, and EDF, 
another significant UK electricity player with substantial coal- and gas-fired generation 
capacity. Although the new entity would not have had very high market shares and faced a 
number of competitors, the Commission’s investigation identified concerns. Specifically, that 
the transaction created the possibility for the merged entity to net-off its generation and 
supply requirements, thereby precluding the need for British Energy to sell most of its 
generation into the wholesale market and for EDF to buy power in the wholesale market.  
The Commission believed this could lead to a reduction of liquidity in the British wholesale 
electricity market, potentially resulting in demand foreclosure for generators, increased 
difficulties for generators and suppliers to hedge their positions, increased market volatility 
and less reliable price signals (with attendant impact on generators’ ability to secure 
financing for new projects). The merger was ultimately cleared by the Commission on the 
basis of a package of structural and behavioural remedies provided by EdF. 
In some cases, the remedies put in place to mitigate the potential anti-competitive effects of 
a merger have also contributed to promoting market liberalisation. For example, in 2001 the 
Commission authorised, subject to conditions, the acquisition of joint control of German 
electricity company Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EnBW) by EdF and Zweckverband 
Oberschwäbische Elektrizitätswerke (OEW), an association of nine south-west German 
districts.  
The investigation concluded that EdF enjoyed a dominant position on the French market for 
the supply of eligible customers, with a market share of approximately 90 per cent. EnBW 
was considered one of the most likely potential competitors in the French market and was 
strategically well-placed to enter the market for the supply of eligible customers.  
By acquiring EnBW, EdF would have strengthened its dominant position in France and also 
increased its potential for retaliation in Germany and would thus become less exposed to 
competition in France.  
There were two relatively standard elements to the remedies package and an innovative 
third element. This third element of the EdF remedy sought to address the competition 
concerns in relation to so-called “eligible” customers in France, i.e., those whose electricity 
supply is open to competition. To resolve these concerns, EdF undertook to provide 
competitors with access to generation capacity located in France in the form of virtual power 
plants (5000 MW) and back-to-back agreements to existing co-generation power purchase 
agreements with a maximum of 1000 MW.  
According to the terms of the commitments, the contracts for access to the virtual power 
plants were to be awarded through a non-discriminatory public auction open to both utilities 
and traders. These arrangements for access to generation capacity were to remain in place 
for five years to allow sufficient alternative supply sources to become available 
The Commission has not hesitated in prohibiting anti-competitive mergers. In 2004, the 
Commission decided to prohibit the proposed acquisition of joint control over Gás de 
Portugal (GDP), the incumbent gas company in Portugal, by Energias de Portugal (EDP), 
the incumbent electricity company in Portugal, and ENI, an Italian energy company.  
The Commission analysed the possible impact of the proposed operation on the gas and 
electricity supply markets in Portugal and concluded that the transaction would strengthen 
EDP’s dominant position in the electricity wholesale and retail markets in Portugal. In 
particular, it would remove GDP’s potential to compete in the electricity markets. Because 
gas is also now one of the most efficient ways to produce electricity, the concentration would 
have made current and possible future power producers in Portugal dependent on their main 
competitor, namely EDP. The concentration would also strengthen GDP’s dominant position 
in the relevant gas markets in Portugal, through the foreclosure of a significant part of the 
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gas demand (controlled by EDP) and the elimination of EDP as most likely entrant in the gas 
markets.  
Since most competition in energy markets comes from electricity incumbents entering the 
gas market and vice versa, this case demonstrates the Commission’s strict approach to 
mergers involving gas and electricity companies (‘convergence’ mergers). 
The Commission’s intervention has also prevented mergers with potentially anti-competitive 
effects from going forward. In 2008, the proposed acquisition of the Hungarian oil and gas 
company, MOL by the Austrian oil and gas group, OMV was abandoned following the 
Commission's concerns relating to the combined market share of the companies in several 
energy markets. The proposed acquisition would have brought together two strong 
integrated oil and gas companies and given the merged entity a strong hold in both the petrol 
retail market and in the refining sector in several Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries. OMV offered a number of remedies (for example, offering to open the refineries to 
competitors) to address the competition concerns raised by the Commission, but these were 
deemed insufficient.  OMV was not prepared to accept the remedies sought by the 
Commission and eventually withdrew the merger notification. 
Finally, the Commission has also acted when the conditions imposed by national authorities 
create unjustified restrictions to mergers of Community dimension. In particular, the 
Commission has adopted three decisions under Article 21 of the Merger Regulation (two in 
the framework of the E.ON/Endesa case and one in the Enel/Acciona/Endesa case) to 
declare that some measures adopted by the Spanish authorities were incompatible with 
community law, constituted unjustified restrictions to those mergers and should, therefore, be 
withdrawn.  
Given the Spanish authorities' failure to comply with the Commission request to withdraw the 
illegal measures, the Commission began infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC in 
the two cases. The European Court of Justice has recently clarified that in relation to the first 
one of these infringement cases (EON/Endesa) Spain violated EC law by failing to comply 
with the Commission decisions adopted on 26 September and 20 December 2006.  
The Commission has taken antitrust enforcement action to tackle exclusionary conduct by 
dominant incumbents; exploitative abuses by dominant incumbents; and collusive behaviour.  
For example, in 2007, the Commission opened an investigation into ENI’s suspected abuse 
of a dominant position in the market for the transport of gas. There were concerns that ENI 
may have foreclosed competition in the Italian gas supply market by not granting 
competitors’ access to capacity available on the transport network (capacity hoarding) or 
doing so in an impractical way(capacity degradation) and by strategically limiting investment 
in ENI’s international transmission pipeline system(strategic underinvestment).  
In response, ENI committed to divest its shares in the three companies operating the 
relevant international transport pipelines18, thus ensuring that third-party requests to access 
the gas pipeline would be dealt with by an entity independent of ENI, thereby removing the 
potential conflict of interest resulting from the vertical integration of ENI. 
In 2007, the Commission initiated antitrust action against Distrigas in response to potential 
market foreclosure concerns relating to long-term gas supply contracts between Distrigas, 
the Belgian incumbent national supplier, and its large gas customers in Belgium. Given the 
strong market position of Distrigas in the relevant market, the Commission was concerned 
that other suppliers would find it difficult to do business with Belgian customers, due to the 
combination of two factors: the duration of the contracts and the volumes of gas tied to 
Distrigas.  
To address the Commission’s concerns, Distrigas proposed a series of commitments for four 
years. It was to ensure that no more than 35 per cent of its volumes sold to large industrial 
users and electricity producers (representing about 20 per cent of total sales in the relevant 
                                                     
18  Namely: TAG, TENP and Transitgas, which bring gas to Italy from Russia (TAG) and northern Europe (the 
TENP/Transitgas system) 
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market) would be contestable every year. In addition, the duration of all new contracts would 
be limited, with a maximum of five years applying to contracts with industrial users and 
electricity producers, and a maximum of five years applying to gas resellers 
In the electricity sector, the Commission investigated E.ON’s suspected abuse of its 
dominant position on the German wholesale market (2008). There were concerns that E.ON 
may have withdrawn available generation capacity from the German wholesale electricity 
markets (to raise prices), and may have deterred new investors from entering the generation 
market.  
The case resulted in substantial commitment by E.ON to divest 5000 MW of generation 
plants along with its extra-high voltage distribution network that structurally changed the 
German electricity market to the benefit of consumers (see later case study). 
Antitrust enforcement in the electricity sector has also included interventions to prevent 
restrictions on trade in electricity between EU countries (e.g. Swedish interconnector’s case, 
2010). 
The European Commission has tackled collusive behaviour in both gas and electricity 
markets: 
■ In July 2009, the Commission issued a Decision fining both E.ON and GDF Suez for 
having colluded to share the German and French gas markets.  
■ In 2014, the Commission fined EPEX Spot and Nord Pool Spot – the two leading 
European spot power exchanges – for agreeing not to compete with each other. 
Table 4.5 provides an overview of some of the cases handled by the Commission in the 
energy sector. These cases illustrate the range of competition issues covered by EU 
competition policy intervention and the significance and variety of commitments secured 
from the entities concerned. 
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Table 4.5 Illustrative examples of competition concerns addressed by EU competition policy interventions 
Relevant 
instrument 
Case (year) Competitive concerns Remedies / commitments 
undertaken 
Decision 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
Article 102 
TFEU 
AT.39315 – ENI  
 
(2010) 
Foreclosing practices by vertically integrated firms - Italy 
The Commission notified ENI that it may have been abusing its 
dominant position on the gas transport markets by: refusing to grant 
competitors access to capacity available on the network; by granting 
access in an impractical manner; and, by strategically limiting 
investment in ENI’s international transmission pipeline system. 
There were also concerns ENI may have had incentive to engage in 
a strategy of foreclosing rivals to protect its margins in downstream 
gas supply market. 
ENI made commitments to sell 
international transport pipelines and 
divest shareholdings in TAG. This 
aimed to ensure access was granted 
fairly amongst competitors (as dealing 
with entity independent of ENI). 
Commitment decision 
approved.19 
Article 102 
TFEU 
AT.39316 – GDF 
(foreclosure) 
 
(2010) 
 
Foreclosing practices by vertically integrated firms - France 
GDF Suez held a dominant position on the gas importation and 
supply markets in the two balancing zones in France (North and 
South of the GRTgaz transport network). GDF Suez allegedly 
abused its dominant position by foreclosing access to gas import 
capacities in France, restricting competition on the supply markets. 
Particular concerns were raised in regards to: the long-term 
reservation of most gas import capacity in France; the determination 
of reception capacity and the procedures for allocating long-term 
capacity at the new Fos Cavaou LNG terminal; and, the strategic 
limitation of investment in additional import capacity at the Montoir 
de Bretagne LNG terminal. 
GDF Suez committed to: 
■ provide for the rapid release of 
significant firm long-term import 
capacities in the balancing zones 
of the transport network 
concerned; and, 
■ to limit its capacity reservations to 
under 50 per cent of total firm 
long-term import capacity in 
France for a period of ten years 
(from 2014 the latest). 
 
Commitment decision 
approved. 
 
 
Article 102 
TFEU 
AT.39317 – E.ON 
gas foreclosure 
 
(2010) 
Foreclosing practices by vertically integrated firms - Germany 
E.ON allegedly abused its dominant position on the gas transport 
markets (in its L-gas network and the H-gas market area 
NetConnect Germany) by foreclosing access to entry capacity into 
its gas transmission grid. The long-term bookings on E.ON’s gas 
transmission network disabled access for competitors and restricted 
E.ON proposed to commit to the 
followings: 
■ release a volume of 17,8 GWh/h 
firm, freely allocable entry 
capacities by October 2010; 
■ reduce its overall share in the 
Commitments decision 
approved 
 
                                                     
19  According to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 (the EU antitrust law), the Commission may decide in cases where it intends to conclude antitrust violations to make 
commitments legally binding on companies that offer them. These, so-called Article 9 settlement decisions allow the Commission to resolve competition concerns more 
rapidly. Because they represent a settlement, Article 9 decisions do not conclude on the existence of an infringement. But were a company to break legally binding 
commitments, the Commission could impose a fine of up to 10% of the total annual turnover without having to prove the violation. 
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Relevant 
instrument 
Case (year) Competitive concerns Remedies / commitments 
undertaken 
Decision 
competition on the downstream gas supply markets. bookings of firm and freely 
allocable entry capacity in the H-
gas market area (NetConnect 
Germany) to 50 % by October 
2015 and for the L-gas network to 
64 % by October 2015 (and not 
exceed these thresholds until 
2025). 
 
Article 102 
TFEU 
AT.39351 
 
(2010) 
Abuse of dominant market position - Sweden 
The Commission was concerned that Svenska Kraftnät (SvK), the 
Swedish transmission system operator, may have been breaching 
EC Treaty antitrust rules on the abuse of a dominant market position 
(Article 82). Particularly, there were concerns that SvK were limiting 
the amount of export transmission capacity available on electricity 
interconnectors situated along Sweden’s borders, with the objective 
of relieving internal congestion on its network. 
SvK committed to subdivide the 
Swedish electricity market into two or 
more Bidding Zones and operate the 
transmission sytem on this basis 
(committing to a deadline of Nov 
20110. They also committed to 
reinforce the West Coast Corridor by 
building and taking into operation a 
new 400 kV transmission line. 
Commitments decision 
approved. 
 
 
HIGH LEVELS OF CONCENTRATION 
Regulation 
139/2004 
M.4180 – GDF / 
Suez 
 
(2006) 
Unilaterally exercising market power – Belgium and France 
The proposed merger between GDF and Suez group affected both 
the gas and electricity markets in France and Belgium. In the case 
of Belgium, the merger (as originally planned) would have resulted 
in very high combined market shares and would have removed 
GDF as the strongest competitor to the incumbents Distrigaz (gas) 
and Electrabel (electricity and gas). In France, it would have 
strengthened GDF’s dominant position in France. Other impacts 
in terms of barriers to entry were also identified. 
The parties offered a set of 
commitments to neutralise 
competition concerns: 
■ Suez to divest Distrigaz 
(including its French activities) 
and relinquish control over 
Fluxys;  
■ GDF to divest its shareholding in 
SPE and, to address the 
concerns in the district heating 
market, divest its subsidiary 
Cofathec Coriance; and 
■ a series of investment projects 
will be carried out both in Belgium 
and in France which should 
increase infrastructure capacities, 
thereby facilitate new entry and 
Merger approved subject to 
commitments. 
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Relevant 
instrument 
Case (year) Competitive concerns Remedies / commitments 
undertaken 
Decision 
competition. (most importantly 
the Zeebrugge hub to be 
enhanced to link all networks 
converging on Zeebrugge 
through an independent operator, 
Fluxys). 
Regulation 
139/2004 
M.2947 – 
Verbund / Energie 
Allianz 
 
(2003) 
Unilaterally exercising market power – Austria 
A joint venture was proposed between Verbund and EnergieAllianz 
in the Austrian electricity market. Verbund was a vertically 
integrated electricity company generating around half of the 
electiricity consumed domestically. EnergieAllianz was already a 
joint venture of Austrian electricity distributors. It was found that by 
combining Austraia’s main electricity producer with five of its 
regional electricity distributors, the transaction would lead to a high 
combined market share in the electricity generation and supply 
markets. This market power was deemed strong enough for 
electricity prices to be raised above the competitive level for both 
household and industrial customers. 
The parties undertook the following 
commitments; 
■ Verbund to sell its 55% 
shareholding in APC (a company 
that deals with large customers 
with a share of 10-15% of the 
Austrian market); 
■ Verbund not to exercise 
important voting rights in the 
Styrian regional supplier 
Steweag-Steg; 
■ to auctioned each year until July 
2008 a volume of electricity 
totalling 450 gigawatt-hours 
(including 50% hydroelectricity); 
and 
■ to set an interim price cap on 
balancing energy. 
Merger approved subject to 
commitments. 
PRICE FORMATION MECHANISMS – USE OF LTC’s 
Article 101 
TFEU 
AT.39386 – Long 
term electricity 
contracts in 
France 
 
(2010) 
 
Lack of liquidity on wholesale markets and the foreclosure of 
downstream markets – France 
The Commission launched an investigation suspecting EDF may 
have abused its dominant position on the market for electricity 
supplies to large industrial users by concluding contracts which 
closed off access to this market for other potential suppliers due to 
these contracts’ scope, duration and exclusive nature. They were 
also concerned EDF may restrict resale by its customers of the 
electricity it supplied. 
EDF committed to:  
■ ensure competitors could 
compete for 65% of the electricity 
it contracts with large industrial 
users in France; and  
■ make two distinct contractual 
offers to its customers, allowing 
customers the choice to partly 
source electricity needs from 
another supplier. 
 
Commitment decision 
approved. 
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Relevant 
instrument 
Case (year) Competitive concerns Remedies / commitments 
undertaken 
Decision 
Article 101 
TFEU 
AT.37966 – 
Distrigaz 
 
(2008) 
Lack of liquidity on wholesale markets and the foreclosure of 
downstream markets – Belgium 
Distrigaz (a member of the Suez group) concluded long-term gas 
supply agreements in Belgium. The Commission was concerned 
that these long-term supply agreements set back consumer 
switching. The long term contracts allegedly foreclosed the market 
by preventing suppliers from competing with Distrigaz for the 
consumers locked-in by these contracts.   
Distrigaz undertook the following 
commitments: 
■ ensure that each year on average 
a minimum of 70 % of the gas 
volumes supplied by Distrigas 
and connected undertakings to 
industrial users and electricity 
producers will return to the 
market, and thereby alternative 
suppliers can make a competing 
offer to the customers concerned; 
■ contracts with industrial users 
and electricity producers will not 
be longer than five years (but 
contracts relating to new power 
plants with a capacity exceeding 
10 MW are not subject to the 
commitments);  
■ gas supply agreements with 
resellers will not last longer than 
two years;  
■ no restrictions will be part of the 
supply contracts. 
 
Commitment decision 
approved. 
 
 
Article 101 
TFEU 
AT.36559 – 
British Gas et. al.  
 
(2002) 
Lack of liquidity on wholesale markets and the foreclosure of 
downstream markets – United Kingdom and Germany 
The Commission were notified of two contracts according to which 
EDF Trading would supply WINGAS (a joint venture between BASF 
of Germany and Gazprom) over a period of 10 years with a 
possibility of extension for a further five years. The volumes 
concerned corresponded to 20 per cent of WINGAS total annual gas 
purchases and two per cent of the total annual gas consumption 
Germany. Competition concerns were raised due to a clause 
allowing WINGAS to reduce the volumes bought in case EDF 
Trading would sell gas into WINGAS main supply territory. Within 
this clause, sales to new market participants in the German market 
Following discussions, the parties 
amended the contract in a way that 
the mechanism creates a level 
playing field between the incumbents 
and new entrants and therefore the 
Commission cleared the notified gas 
supply contracts. 
Commitment decision 
approved. 
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Relevant 
instrument 
Case (year) Competitive concerns Remedies / commitments 
undertaken 
Decision 
were not adequately exempt which raised entry barriers. 
BALANCING REGIMES 
Article 101 & 
102 TFEU 
AT.39389 – 
German electricity 
balancing market 
 
(2009) 
Abuse of dominant position on balancing market by favouring own 
production affiliates, restricting access of other affiliates and raising 
prices for access to the network - Germany 
The Commission investigated the German electricity market 
following the energy Sector Inquiry in 2007. Relevant to balancing 
regimes, the Commission felt E.ON may have abused its dominant 
market position as a transmission system operator on the secondary 
electricity balancing market. The Commission had concerns that 
E.ON prevented other power producers from selling balancing 
energy into the E.ON markets. 
E.ON proposed the divestiture of its 
transmission system business and 
the related activities.  
 
Commitment decision 
approved. 
 
 
COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOUR 
Article 81(1) EC AT. 39401 
 
(2009) 
Suspected collusion – France and Germany 
GDF had a monopoly on the import of gas into France. Following 
the removal of the import monopoly and during the gradual 
liberalisation of the European gas markets, GDF and E.ON 
continued to apply the 1975 side letters, meeting on a regular basis 
and discussion implementation of the agreement in the newly 
liberalised markets. The duration of the infringement was from at 
least 1 January 1980 until 30 September 2005 in Germany and from 
10 August 2000 to 30 September 2005 in France. 
The Decision required E.ON, E.ON 
Ruhrgas and GDF Suez to bring the 
infringement to an end to the extent 
they had not already done so (at the 
time of the decision) and to refrain 
from repeating any act or conduct 
having the same or equivalent 
undertakings. 
 
A fine of € 553 million was imposed 
on each E.ON Ruhrgas, jointly and 
severally with E.ON, and GDF Suez. 
E.ON Ruhrgas, E.ON and 
Gaz de France (now GDF 
Suez) had infringed Article 
81(1) EC by participating in 
an agreement and 
concerted practices in the 
natural gas sector in France 
and Germany. 
Article 101 of 
TFEU and 
Article 53 of 
EEA Agreement 
AT.39952 
 
(2014) 
Non-competitive arrangements covering electricity spot trading 
services -  France, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
EPEX (in France) and NPS (in Finland, Norway and Sweden) 
engaged in non-competitive arrangements covering all their 
electricity spot trading services in the EEA and beyond. The aim 
was to restrict competition between them, to protect their traditional 
strongholds, and agree on expansion to new countries while 
maintaining the power balance between them. The agreement 
included an allocation of territories. 
Fines were issued to EPEX of 
€3,651,000 and for Nord Pool 
€2,328,000. 
EPEX and Nord Pool were 
engaging in non-
competitive arrangements 
impacting the EEA and 
byoned. 
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4.6 Summary of key findings 
The main observations that can be drawn from the data presented in this section are as 
follows: 
 Overall European gas and electricity markets remain highly concentrated, although 
there are significant differences at a national level. Particularly high levels of market 
concentration can be observed in small countries such as Bulgaria, Cyprus Estonia 
and Malta. Member States such as Germany, Finland, Italy, Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, on the other hand, exhibit relatively low levels of market 
concentration. 
 While progress has been made in liberalising markets, the positon varies across 
Member States: 
o Many Member States continue to regulate end-user prices and there is still 
insufficient separation of infrastructure and supply functions in energy 
markets. 
o Although the level of vertical integration has- on average – been declining 
across the EU over the last decade or so, it remains reasonably high, 
particularly in gas markets. 
o Public ownership of the first generation producer remains high in many 
Member States in both gas and electricity markets. 
 Wholesale prices have declined significantly for electricity and remained stable for 
gas.  
 Gas and electricity prices have been rising for consumers (except in 2014 when 
prices fell) and high levels of mark-ups can be observed in a number of Member 
States. 
 Productivity dispersion has remained stable overtime, although the Boone Indicator 
suggests that the intensity of competition in European energy markets has declined 
between 2005 and 2012. 
 Switching levels are generally very low across Europe, with the exception of a 
handful of Member States.  
Alongside the above market developments, one can also observe an increase in EU 
competition policy enforcement activity overtime and particularly since 2000. The extent to 
which there is correlation or causality between some of the market developments noted 
above and EU competition policy enforcement is examined in the next section using 
econometric approaches. An interesting point to note is the divergence between retail and 
wholesale prices  which in some Member States, could potentially be attributed  to factors 
which cannot be influenced by competition policy (such as rising taxes and network costs, 
and the continued regulation of energy prices to many European households), but this 
divergence could also be indicative of markets not working well. The case study presented in 
section 6 specifically examines the relationship between wholesale and retail prices in the 
German electricity market in the context of a specific Commission Decision addressing 
alleged abuse of dominant position by E.ON. 
 
Technical report 
97 
5 Impact of competition policy enforcement on the functioning 
of EU energy markets 
The overall framework for the empirical analysis is based on the following relationship 
between policy enforcement, i.e., competition policy and regulatory interventions, and market 
outcomes: 
■ First, competition policy enforcement has a direct impact on strategic interactions 
between firms in the involved markets and affects competition (Aghion and 
Schankerman, (2004)).  
■ As a result of changes in competitive pressure, firms adapt their investment behaviour. 
Investment provides a good outcome variable because many studies show that firms 
facing stronger competition make substantial investments to raise productivity (Holmes 
and Schmitz, (2010)). Investment is particularly relevant as an outcome variable in the 
energy markets because it is widely accepted that more investment is needed in 
Europe’s energy sector to ensure security of supply and to improve efficiency. To meet 
the EU’s ambitious climate and energy targets and at the same time secure the provision 
of energy, Member States are expected to increasingly invest in electricity generation, 
particularly in renewable energies, and in electricity grids and natural gas infrastructure 
(e.g., Hirschhausen et al. (2014)).  To incentivise investments in cross-national 
infrastructure projects such as interconnector transmission grids, and also to spur 
national investment in generation capacity. Measures of investments are therefore 
pivotal variables to consider in understanding how competition and regulatory policies 
affect energy markets. 
■ Changes in market competition and firms’ investment behaviours have an impact on 
long-term outcomes such as firms’ productivity. There is strong empirical evidence to 
show that competition can drive greater productivity (CMA (2015)). Change in investment 
should also directly lead to changes in productivity (e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991).  
Productivity-based variables can therefore be seen as appropriate measures of long-
term competitive outcomes, which capture the selection effects of competition as a 
process. According to the literature, there are three main channels through which higher 
competition could lead to higher productivity: (i) within firms, competition acts as a 
disciplining device, placing pressure on the managers of firms to become more efficient. 
This decreases ‘x-inefficiency’ - the difference between the most efficient behaviour the 
firm is capable of and its observed behaviour in practice. This is sometimes called the 
‘within-firm’ effect; (ii) competition increases productivity by forcing inefficient firms to 
exit, by allowing more efficient firms to enter, and by reallocating resources from 
inefficient to efficient firms. Market forces may cause inefficient firms to exit and may 
cause a reallocation in market shares from inefficient to efficient firms. These effects are 
generally called the ‘between-firms effects’; and (iii) competition drives firms to innovate. 
Innovation increases dynamic efficiency through technological improvements of 
production processes, or the creation of new products and services (CMA (2015)). 
There is another, indirect channel through which policy enforcement impacts long-term 
market outcomes. Each specific policy intervention does not only affect the firms and 
markets directly involved in the specific case, it  also has important indirect effects due to 
spill-overs across (vertical) markets, as well as deterrent effects (e.g., Buccirossi et al. 
(2013); Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2013); CMA (2015); Duso et al. (2013); Seldeslachts 
et al. (2009)). For example, specific policy decisions affecting investment in electricity 
generation capacity, also affect incentives and market outcomes in transmission and 
distribution. Similarly, the enforcement of antitrust rules sends signals about the strength of 
the antitrust authorities20.  
                                                     
20  In 2011 the OFT commissioned research from London Economics to estimate the impact of enforcement on 
deterrence, based on surveys of businesses and advisors. The research estimated that investigations into 
abuse of dominance could be expected to deter 12 other instances of potential anti-competitive behaviour, 
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Consequently, a particular decision affects not only the firms involved in that case, but 
also other firms’ behaviour in the same and other markets. These indirect effects are 
recognized to be important elements of competition policy enforcement and cannot be 
measured when only evaluating single decisions (Joskow (2002)).  
Alsena et al (2005) look at the effects of deregulation on investment in transport, 
communication and utilities (electricity and gas) sectors. They find that competition 
enhancing regulatory reform (such as liberalisation of market entry) has had a significant 
positive impact on investment in these sectors. However, it has not yet been investigated 
how competition policy and regulation interact in determining competition and market 
outcomes.  
Our framework, summarised in Figure 5.1 captures direct and indirect effects of competition 
policy and illustrates how competition policy and regulation interact in determining outcomes. 
Figure 5.1 Framework: Competition policy & regulation, competition, and market outcomes 
 
Source: own figure 
The broad econometric analysis presented in this chapter provides empirical evidence for 
several channels highlighted in the above framework.  
It specifically analyses the impact of EU-wide and national competition policy 
enforcement, and regulation, on the intensity of competition and market outcomes. It 
focuses on long-term performance variables such as the intensity of competition, 
investment, and productivity rather than on more specific, short-term measures such 
as wholesale and retail prices. The latter variables are the main focus of the case 
studies presented later. . The econometric analysis in this section identifies the broad 
impact of the different policy interventions and compliments the specific case-study analysis 
in the following chapters. This section also looks at the effects of the interaction between 
competition policy enforcement and product market regulation. Both types of policies can be 
expected to influence market outcomes, yet little is known about their interdependencies. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
while investigations into potentially anti-competitive commercial agreements could deter similar behaviour in 
another 40 cases. 
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5.1 Data and variables used for the econometric analysis 
The econometric analysis is based on data on competition policy enforcement (our main 
explanatory variables) and measures on regulation, competition and market outcomes. 
Information from various sources and at different levels of aggregation was merged 
Measures of competition policy enforcement at the EU and national levels were specifically 
collected for this study from the European Commission (DG Competition) website and 
through tailored questionnaires sent to the national competition authorities.  
Regulation data were collected from the OECD regulation database. Data on firm-level 
measures come from the Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus/Osiris database. Additional control 
variables were collected from the World Bank, OECD, and European Commission. Data 
sources and the main variables used in the study are described below.  
5.1.1 Policy enforcement data 
5.1.1.1 EU competition policy enforcement data 
A detailed dataset on EU competition policy enforcement between 2005 and 2013 in energy 
markets21 was created to quantify the Commission’s activities. There are 200 key merger 
decisions, 17 antitrust decisions (16 abuses and 1 cartel) and 203 state aid decisions 
concerning energy markets in the relevant sample period.  
From these documents, we constructed indicators of competition policy enforcement at EU 
level. This was then transformed to match the national level of analysis proposed in this 
study, i.e. the Member State/year unit of observation, as energy markets still mainly function 
at national level.  
In state aid cases, and in most of the antitrust cases generally, only one country is involved. 
Therefore, this case is supposed to only affect that particular geographic national market and 
it is ‘allocated’ to the particular Member State involved. Mergers are often more complex. In 
most cases, the geographic market definition is not national. We therefore identified the 
geographic markets involved. If the market definition was broader than national, we allocated 
the case to all Member States involved in that decision. If the market definition was EU-wide, 
all EU countries in our sample are considered to be affected by the decision. If the market 
definition was left open, we allocated the case to the country of origin of the merging firms.  
In merger cases, we define ‘intervention’ as follows: remedies (in phase 1 or phase 2) and 
merger withdrawals during phase 2. While prohibitions should be considered the most 
extreme form of intervention, no merger was prohibited during the sample period in the 
energy sector.22 In the case of state aid, we define an intervention as the decision to initiate 
a formal investigation.23 For abuses and cartels, we simply use the number of cases as a 
measure of intervention, since all led to remedies or fines.24  Table 5.2 summarises the 
indicators of activity and EU competition policy enforcement.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
21  The Commission publishes all official decisions on its webpage 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html). We downloaded all cases with NACE code D. This broader 
market definition can be narrowed to focus on electricity (D.35.1) and gas (D.35.2) markets only. We used the 
decision date as the criterion for the selection. We downloaded all cases where the Commission’s decision 
was made between January 1st 2005 and December 31st 2013. 
22  Three mergers that were eventually withdrawn by the firms were coded as cases in which the Commission 
intervened. One case that was referred to a member state was dropped from the data. 
23  DG Comp’s officials agreed that this is the best (though imperfect) indicator of intervention in this area 
24  We further collected additional data on fines imposed. However, these EU data are too sparse for 
econometric analysis and are therefore left out. 
The economic impact of enforcement of competition policies on the functioning of EU energy markets  
100 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 EU competition policy enforcement at the member state/year level: Descriptive 
statistics 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 
Mergers   
   Cases  5.12 3.73 
   Interventions 0.50 0.74 
State aid   
   Cases  0.81 1.40 
   Interventions  0.05 0.19 
Antitrust   
   Abuse & cartel cases/interventions 0.46 0.76 
DIW’s analysis of European Commission data on competition cases 
To more precisely illustrate the data, we use box- and whisker plots to show the evolution of 
the entire distribution of the chosen measures over time.25 Figure 5.2 focuses on the number 
of merger and state aid cases. These variables will be used as control variables to capture 
the level of activity in the area of mergers and state aid that could have a per se impact on 
competitive outcomes (see Clougherty and Seldeslachts, 2013, for a detailed rationale).  
While there is a substantial number of merger cases (with an increasing trend in the first half 
of the sample), there are not many state aid cases.  
Figure 5.2 EU competition cases 
 
DIW’s analysis of European Commission data on competition cases 
In the case of mergers and state aid, the measures of enforcement intensity used in the 
regressions are then defined as the ratio between the number of interventions and the number 
of (notified) cases (see e.g., Clougherty and Seldeslachts, 2013, for a detailed rationale). In 
the case of abuses and cartels, all investigations led to remedies or fines. Therefore, their 
absolute number is used as enforcement variable.  
                                                     
25  These graphs represent the entire distribution of the depicted variables. Within the solid blocks, the first and 
third quartiles of the distribution are represented, the line in between representing the median. The lines 
extending vertically from the boxes (the so called ‘whiskers’) indicate the upper and lower adjacent values 
(the most extreme values within 1.5 inter quartile range of the nearer quartile). The dots represent outliers. 
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Most relevant to this analysis are the measures of competition policy enforcement (i.e., the 
ratio between merger interventions to mergers notified, the ratio between state aid schemes 
investigated and notified, and the absolute number of cartels and abuse cases).  
 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the intervention of the European Commission in a sizeable fraction of 
cases opened in energy mergers, but there appears to be a negative time trend. Despite 
increasing merger notifications, there were no remedies in 2010 and 2012, and little 
enforcement in 2011.  
Figure 5.3 EU key merger decisions 
 
DIW’s analysis of European Commission data on competition cases 
 
Figure 5.4 EU state aid enforcement 
 
DIW’s analysis of European Commission data on competition cases 
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Figure 5.5 EU abuse and cartel cases (=enforcement) 
 
DIW’s analysis of European Commission data on competition cases 
 
State aid programs are only rarely investigated (see Figure 5.4). Similarly, only few cartels and 
abuse cases were opened during the sample period (see Figure 5.5). The limited variability in 
the data is an important limitation for the econometric analysis, as it will make the empirical 
identification of a relationship between competition policy enforcement and outcome variables 
more difficult. We come back to this point when we discuss the results. 
5.1.1.2 National competition policy enforcement data 
Constructing measures of national competition policy enforcement was challenging. Since no 
clear source of data is available, we created a template/questionnaire, which was sent to all 
national competition authorities in the EU.26 Based on this, we constructed measures of 
national competition policy enforcement in a similar fashion as for the EU, where there are no 
state aid cases at the national level.27 Table 5.2.shows the descriptive statistics for these 
variables. 
Table 5.2 National competition policy enforcement at the member state/year level – Descriptive 
statistics 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 
Mergers   
   Cases 4.63 9.48 
   Interventions 0.11 0.47 
Antitrust   
  Cartel and abuse cases/interventions 1.35 3.26 
 Fines (million Euro) 2.99 21.38 
DIW’s analysis of data on national competition cases 
 
The dynamics of national competition cases and policy enforcement variables are then 
considered, and represented  again through box and whiskers plots. There is some variation in 
                                                     
26  We gratefully acknowledge the substantial support we had in this data collection exercise through DG 
Competition, the European Competition Network, and the National Competition Authorities. Without their help 
it would have not been possible to create this dataset. 
27  While we collected information separately for the electricity and gas sectors and, for each of them, for 
wholesale and retail markets, the very limited variability forced us to aggregate these figures at the national 
energy market level. 
Technical report 
103 
merger notifications at country level (Figure 5.6): while some large Member States (particularly 
Germany and Italy) average more than   30 energy mergers per year, some smaller Member 
States have very little activity or none at all. This is true for cartels and dominance cases, 
where Germany and Poland show most activity. 
Figure 5.6 National merger cases 
 
DIW’s analysis of data on national competition cases 
Even though national competition policy enforcement is low on average (the Member 
State/year observations are zero up to the 75th percentile), there is some variation across 
countries and time (see Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8).  
Figure 5.7 National merger policy decisions 
 
DIW’s analysis of data on national competition cases 
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Figure 5.8 National cartel and abuse cases (=enforcement) 
 
DIW’s analysis of data on national competition cases 
5.1.1.3 Regulation 
Regulation is the additional policy dimension in this framework. The OECD Indicators of 
Product Market Regulation project, specifically the indicators of regulation in energy, 
transport and communication (ETCR), described in Section 4, and were used as measures 
of intensity of regulation. This is the most comprehensive, accurate, and widely used 
database to measure the effect of regulation on market outcomes (E.g., Alesina et al. (2005); 
Duso and Seldeslachts (2011); and Bourles et al. (2013)).  
Due to the limited variation in the data and to simplify the interpretation of the results, we use 
an aggregated version of these eight indexes that represent the median intensity of 
regulation in national energy markets in our econometric analysis.28 
5.1.2 Outcome variables  
In line with this framework, we focus on three different measures: intensity of competition, 
investment and productivity-based measures. The choice of the specific outcome variables 
implicitly also defines the analysis’ level of aggregation. Some variables, such as investment 
and productivity growth, can be defined at the most disaggregated firm-country-year level, 
while others, such as the degree of competition, are instead naturally defined at the sector-
country-year level. The database and exact indicators are described below. 
5.1.2.1 The Amadeus database 
Firm-level data was obtained from the Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus/Osiris database. The 
database covers 1997-2014, but since data availability thins out considerably for the earlier 
and latest periods, we focus on 2005-2012. We focus on firms active in energy markets as 
represented by the NACE group D.35. The firms in the sample fall in the subgroups D35.1 
(Electric power generation, transmission and distribution) and D35.2 (Manufacture of gas; 
distribution of gaseous fuels through mains).29  
We analyse those firms classified by Amadeus as ‘very large’, to focus on the sizeable 
players in the market.30 Only these firms are expected to engage in significant investment 
                                                     
28  As a robustness check, we also separately estimated all our models with the eight indicators instead of the 
average regulation index. All main results on the effects of competition policy enforcement are not affected. 
29  The few firms active in NACE D35.3 (Steam and air conditioning supply) were dropped from the sample. 
30  Amadeus contains information on more than 80,000 European firms indicated to be active in the energy 
sector, most of which are very small. The 25th percentile/median/75th percentile of employees of firms are 
1/2/6, with a median total assets of just €600,000. Companies in Amadeus are considered to be very large 
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activities and to (strongly) react to changes in the regulatory and competitive environment. 
The chosen firms have a median of 117 employees and median fixed assets of around 
€130m.  
For these firms, we collected information on relevant variables such as total assets, fixed 
assets, revenue, cost of labour, and material expenditures, used to build the main measures 
of interest as discussed below.31 Table 5.3 reports preliminary statistics including the yearly 
number of firms in the database and the yearly means of the selected variables (all values 
are in million Euros and are PPI-adjusted using a country-year specific producer price index 
collected from the OECD). 
Table 5.3 Mean values of Amadeus variables (all in PPI-adjusted, million €) 
Year Firms 
Revenue 
 
(VA) 
Total 
Assets 
(K) 
Fixed 
Assets 
(FA) 
Labour 
Cost 
(L) 
Material 
Expend. 
(M) 
2005 902 773.65 1,264.16 882.26 62.79 546.35 
2006 1021 836.32 1,191.54 828.88 60.87 640.76 
2007 1149 785.81 1,251.79 870.37 56.80 565.18 
2008 1244 761.64 1,175.59 809.13 45.07 578.53 
2009 1325 775.21 1,343.40 977.50 52.11 556.99 
2010 1344 783.10 1,355.57 970.77 49.27 553.84 
2011 1365 775.34 1,256.22 898.21 42.01 564.84 
2012 1329 791.48 1,282.31 922.60 41.96 579.20 
Source: Amadeus/Osiris database 
Over the entire sample period, we observe 1,438 different firms operating in 19 countries.32 
Unfortunately, some of the variables are missing for some of the firms over time. In the 
various regressions we therefore have different numbers of observations depending on how 
demanding the data requirements are.33  
5.1.2.2 Outcomes  
We discuss here the different outcome variables, their relevance to our analysis and how 
they are measured via the Amadeus database. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
when they have: operating revenue larger than €100m, or total assets larger than €200m, or more than 1,000 
employees. 
31  Total assets represent the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets. Fixed assets represent 
total assets excluding current assets which represent cash and other assets that are reasonably expected to 
be realized in cash, sold or consumed within one year or one operating cycle. Operating revenues is turnover. 
Labour costs represent the cost of staff. 
32  The sample contains 19 member states: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. The most prominent countries in the sample are Germany, Spain and France with 
shares of 20%, 16% and 14% of total observations, respectively. Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are missing 
from the sample, because there is no firm level data for energy companies in these countries. Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania had to be dropped, because OECD product market regulation data is 
unavailable. Austria is missing from the sample because the national competition authority was unable to 
supply us with data on national competition policy enforcement. 
33  Specifically, the labour cost and material expenditures are the variables most likely to be missing and 
therefore reduce the sample on which we can estimate productivity measures. 
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5.1.2.2.1 Measures of the intensity of competition 
Measures of the intensity of competition are naturally defined at the market-level. Well-
defined product markets were desirable, but not possible for this study. The NACE codes 
discussed above represent the best alternative to define relevant sectors and are available 
for each firm in our sample. The measures of the intensity of competition used are calculated 
at different levels of aggregation of NACE codes. 
The elasticity of relative profits with respect to relative costs 
We calculate the Boone indicator – as described in Section 4, it is a measure of competition 
calculated as the elasticity of relative profits with respect to relative costs. Our calculations 
are explained below. 
A structural measure to capture an industry’s competitiveness: Boone’s (2008) Beta 
This indicator is based on the idea that when a market is more competitive, then firms that 
have relatively lower costs can earn relatively higher profits in this industry. In particular, 
Boone (2008) shows that for three efficiency levels 𝑛1 > 𝑛2 > 𝑛3 and a level of 
competition intensity 𝜃, it is the case that 
 
𝑑�
𝜋(𝑛1,𝜃)−𝜋(𝑛3,𝜃)
𝜋(𝑛2,𝜃)−𝜋(𝑛3,𝜃)�
𝑑𝑑
> 0, 
where 𝜋(𝑛𝑖,𝜃) are a firm’s i variable profits. Thus, relative variable profit differences are 
increasing in the intensity of competition, θ. 
 
This measure of competition is particularly useful in markets that are subject to intense 
reallocation dynamics, which entail significant changes in market shares, since it is 
monotonic with respect to the direction of the competition shock —i.e., it increases 
(decreases) with higher (lower) competition arising from lower entry barriers, as well as 
from reallocation of output to more efficient incumbent firms within the sector. One further 
key advantage of this measure is that it holds for any subset of firms within one market.34 
This makes it a very attractive for empirical purposes, as firm level data are often only 
available for a sub-sample of the firms that are active (e.g., Altomonte et al, 2010).   
 
The degree of competitive pressure is empirically measured via the relation of the firms’ 
profits (relative to other firms in the industry) to their (relative) cost, which we estimate based 
on Amadeus data. The relative profit difference (RPD) for firm i, in sector s, in country c, in 
time t is then defined as:  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜋𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑠𝑠𝑠− 𝜋𝑚𝑚𝑛,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝜋𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠− 𝜋𝑚𝑚𝑛,𝑠𝑠𝑠 ,                                               (1) 
where 𝜋𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as the profit rate (profits over revenue) of the most profitable firm in 
the sector s of country c and year t, 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑚,𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as the profits of the least profitable 
                                                     
34  Markups are often used as a measure of competition. However, conceptually, markups have problems to pick 
up consistently the following two ways in which competition can be intensiﬁed in a market: (i) having more 
ﬁrms in a market due to a fall in entry barriers and (ii) a more aggressive conduct by incumbent ﬁrms. In the 
former case, more ﬁrms in the market reduce markups in standard models. In the latter case markups can go 
up in response to an increase in competition intensity, incorrectly suggesting that competition went down 
(Amir, 2002, Bulow and Klemperer, 1999, Rosentahl, 1980,  and Stiglitz, 1989). Boone’s measure does not 
suffer from these problems.  
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firm in the same sector, country, and year and 𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as the profits of the focal 
firm.35 In similar fashion, the firms’ relative cost efficiency (RCE) is calculated as  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑠𝑠𝑠− 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠− 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑛,𝑠𝑠𝑠 ,                                                (2) 
where c represent the cost rate (total costs over revenue) of the most profitable firm in the 
sector s of country c and year t.36 
Since competition in most energy sectors is still mainly occurring at the national level we 
need to estimate the relationship between relative profits and relative costs at this level of 
observation. Furthermore, in order not to rely on a too small number of observations to 
identify the parameter of interest, we further aggregate data from the electricity and gas 
sectors.37 Hence, we estimate the equation using three sectors, namely production (of 
electricity and gas), transmission and distribution (of electricity and gas), and trade (of 
electricity and gas).  
Specifically, we run a pooled regression where we regress the log of RPD on the log of RCE 
and identify separate coefficients for each aggregated sector, country, and year:  
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .                                               (3) 
The resulting coefficients (the betas) —which represent the elasticity of the relative profits to 
respect to the relative costs— are an indication of the intensity of competition in that 
particular country, year and industry. In particular, the more negative the beta, the more firms 
are being ‘punished’ for being inefficient. Thus, if a policy serves to increase competition, this 
would result in a lower beta.  
Productivity dispersion 
As an additional measure of the intensity of competition at the country-sector level, 
calculated productivity dispersion, as the standard deviation of total factor productivity (TFP) 
for each country, sector and year (the following sub-section describes how we estimated 
TFP). The results are presented in Section 4. 
Given that we estimate productivity at the more detailed four-digit NACE level, we could also 
define productivity dispersion at this level of observation. Yet, we re-estimate productivity 
measures and define productivity dispersion at a more aggregated level. Namely, we use the 
same level of aggregation used to define our other measure of competition -production 
(electricity and gas), transmission and distribution (electricity and gas), and trade (electricity 
and gas) - to provide comparable results across the two measures.  
Our main regressions are based on this second definition. However, all key results are also 
obtained by using the more disaggregated definition based on more detailed four-digit NACE 
levels. Furthermore, for some countries we did not observe enough firms within each 
relevant market to obtain reasonable estimates of the TFP and, hence, reasonable values for 
the dispersion measure. As already mentioned in section 4, productivity dispersion could not 
therefore, be calculated for Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta and only 
partially available for Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland and Latvia. 
 As a robustness check, we also used an alternative measure of investment calculated at the 
(sector)-country level. We collected publicly available information on generation capacity in 
electricity markets as published in the Country fact sheet by DG Energy that measure energy 
production capacities from combustible fuels, nuclear fuels and renewable fuels separately. 
See the appendix for details 
 
                                                     
35  As a measure of profit we use the variable ‘profit and loss’, while as a measure of revenue we use the 
variable ‘operating revenues’ from Amadeus (e.g., Altomonte et al., 2005). 
36  As a measure of cost we use the variable ‘Cost of goods sold’ from Amadeus (Altomonte et al., 2005). 
37  Indeed for several countries, we would have just a couple of observations for each disaggregated sector and 
year, which would produce unreliable estimates for the coefficient of interest. 
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5.1.2.3 Market outcome measures  
Here we discuss the different market outcome variables, why they are relevant for our 
analysis and how they are measured by means of the Amadeus data discussed above. 
Investment 
We follow Grajek and Röller (2005) who use monetary measures of investment defined as 
the change in fixed assets owned by the firms. This variable is not a perfect measure, but it 
is a good first indicator of investment. The main advantage of using a monetary measure of 
investment is that fixed assets are observable for all firms present in the different sectors of 
energy markets and can be easily compared. On the downside, we cannot precisely identify 
the type of investment carried out by the firms. Specifically, we calculate the investment (I) of 
firm i in year t as the yearly change in firm-specific fixed assets:  
𝐼𝑖𝑖 =  𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 −  𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1                                                        (4) 
The resulting variable has a mean of €18 million, with the 25th and 75th percentile lying at -7 
and €11 million, respectively.38 
Total Factor Productivity 
At the firm level, we estimate the level of total factor productivity (TFP) as the residual from 
an industry-specific, firm-level translog production function where output is related to inputs 
—specifically labour, capital and material.39 More formally, we calculate total factor 
productivity of firm i in year t as the residual of a sector-specific (s), translog production 
function: 
𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐹𝑖𝑖 −  𝑓𝑖(𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑛 𝑀𝑖𝑖)                                             (5) 
where 𝑉𝐹𝑖𝑖 is the value added of firm i in year t, 𝐾𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝑖𝑖 , and  𝑀𝑖𝑖 represent its capital (as 
measure by total assets), labour (as measured by staff costs) and material expenditures 
respectively. We refer to the appendix for exact estimation details. We use the TFP levels as 
one main outcome variable in our regressions.40  
Table 1.1 and Figure 5.9 present the yearly summary statistics and the time evolution, 
respectively, for the two main firm-level outcome variables: Investment and TFP. As 
illustrated, investment follows a cyclical pattern with negative average investment in two 
years (2008 and 2011). The TFP values are calculated from parameters estimated to 
minimise the squared prediction errors of the model; thus, their overall mean is (very close 
to) zero by construction. The yearly averages therefore indicate, to which degree the firms 
over- or underperformed relative to the model predictions in that particular year. 
                                                     
38  As a robustness check, we also used an alternative measure of investment calculated at the (sector)-country 
level. We collected publicly available information on generation capacity in electricity markets as published in 
the Country fact sheet by DG Energy that measure energy production capacities from combustible fuels, 
nuclear fuels and renewable fuels separately. See the appendix for details. 
39  The production function is estimated in sub-samples at the sector level as defined by NACE codes (electricity 
generation, electricity distribution and transmission, electricity trade, gas generation, gas transmission, gas 
trade).  
40  Using previous estimates as a dependent variable in a second stage regression introduces an additional error 
to the model. Consider the equation of interest y =  α +  βX +  ε. Assume that we do not observe y but have to 
rely on estimates of y given by y� = y + u. Thus, we are effectively estimating the model  y� = α +  βX +  ε + u, 
meaning that the variances of both ε and u enter the variance-covariance matrix (e.g., Hausman, 2001). Thus, 
a dependent variable obtained from prior estimations is equivalent to a dependent variable observed with 
measurement error, i.e. the uncertainty introduced by the first stage model makes the dependent variable 
noisy. Under the assumption that this error is not correlated with regressors X in the model of interest, this 
inflates the estimated standard errors but does not bias the resulting coefficients’ estimates. 
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Table 5.4 Firm-level outcome variables over time 
Year Investment TFP 
 Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
2005 30.81 352.92 0.00 0.21 
2006 12.77 307.58 0.01 0.20 
2007 13.39 255.07 -0.00 0.23 
2008 -9.27 265.22 0.01 0.22 
2009 78.19 351.87 0.03 0.21 
2010 15.65 306.76 0.03 0.21 
2011 -24.07 217.70 -0.02 0.22 
2012 7.10 224.98 -0.03 0.24 
2013 47.30 437.28 -0.00 0.22 
Source: Own calculation based on the Amadeus/Osiris database 
Figure 5.9 Time evolution of investment and total factor productivity 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Amadeus/Osiris database 
5.1.3 Other control variables 
We use several additional sources to construct possible control variables. To account for 
differing institutional qualities across EU member states, we use data sourced from the 
World Bank (GDP per capita, population growth, energy imports as a share of total energy 
consumption). Information on the energy mix (i.e. the share of different fuels in energy 
production) used in different countries are obtained from DG energy’s fact sheets.  
5.2 The model specification 
Our econometric framework builds on recent empirical literature analysing the link between 
policy enforcement and market outcomes; specifically, on the impact of regulation on 
investment (e.g., Alesina et al. (2005), Lyon und Mayo (2005), Grajek and Röller (2005), 
Cambini und Rondi (2010) as well as the relationship between competition enhancing 
policies and productivity (e.g., Aghion et al. (2009); Buccirossi et al. (2013); Bourles et al. 
(2013)). Given that we use different dependent variables (as well as levels of aggregation), 
the specific models differ slightly.  
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5.2.1 The basic framework 
5.2.1.1 Country-sector specific outcomes: The effect of policy enforcement on competition  
To summarise, according to the framework presented, we postulate that there is a direct 
impact of policy enforcement on the level of competition. Since measures of competition are 
naturally defined at the market-level, we conduct our first analysis at this level of 
aggregation: country-sector-year. Hence, in the basic equation we estimate variables 
measuring policy enforcement on the chosen outcome variable, i.e., the two measures of 
competition, after controlling for other observable shifters.41 The specific functional form that 
constitutes our basic specification is the following: 
𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝑗𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜎𝑆𝐼𝑖 + 𝑍𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,    (6) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the outcome in sector s, in country c, at time t (Boone’s Beta or productivity 
dispersion). The variable 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖−1 denotes the intensity of regulation in a given national 
market c in year t-1, measured by using the means of the OECD regulation index for the 
energy sector. The variables (𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1) are the lags of the above 
explained measures of competition policy enforcement at the EU and national level 
respectively,42 covering different policy areas (mergers, abuse of dominance and cartel 
cases and, for the EU, state aid cases).43 
To cleanly identify the effect of enforcement, we take the number of merger cases notified to 
the Commission as well as the number of notified staid aid cases into account as they are of 
course important drivers of the level of competition. Specifically, the former measure the 
extent of country-specific merger waves while the latter measures the potential country-
specific distortions in competitive outcomes.  
We set a dummy SI equal to one in 2007, when the EU conducted a Sector Inquiry in gas 
and electricity markets to assess the state of competition. This should capture the effect of 
this EU-wide event on competition outcomes. With this simple approach we cannot 
separately identify the effect of the inquiry from any other major event that might have 
affected energy market in the same year. 
We further control for time-varying country-specific (𝑍𝑖𝑖−1) factors such as GDP per capita 
and population growth, as well as the share of imports in total energy consumption. 
Additionally, the same vector includes controls for country-specific existing production 
capacities in combustible fuels, nuclear and renewable energy.44 Finally, we control for 
unobserved time-invariant country-sector specific heterogeneity by means of country-sector 
fixed-effects (𝜔𝑖𝑖) as well as unobserved firm-invariant time-specific aggregate heterogeneity 
by means of year fixed-effects (𝜔𝑖). The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖 is assumed to be correlated among 
                                                     
41  The exact sample that we use for estimation depends on data availability with the principal constraint being 
missing data values in the Amadeus database. 
42  One could in principle investigate different lag structures as well, as the impact from competition policy 
enforcement on market outcomes could in principle last longer than just one year. Unfortunately, when adding 
more years to the equation, the estimation suffers from multi-collinearity issues. This has as a consequence 
that these additional variables are dropped and results stay the same. Therefore, while an interesting issue, 
the current dataset is not suited to investigate how long these effects last. The same holds for our other 
outcomes variables (investment and productivity) as well.  
43  As discussed in the data section for each policy action taken by the EU, we allocated the enforcement to the 
country (countries) which was (were) affected by that particular decision so that EU policy enforcement 
asymmetrically affects member states. We chose to aggregate the policy variables at the country-level rather 
than at the sector-country level for two main reasons. First and more importantly, we believe that policy 
enforcement in a specific product market has important indirect effect that spill-over into other markets. This 
might be due to deterrence effects (e.g., Buccirossi et al., 2013) or to the fact that different sectors in energy 
markets are strictly interrelated through the vertical chain. The second reason is more pragmatic and it is due 
to the limited variability in the data. As discussed in the data section, only the enforcement of merger control 
presents substantial variability at the country-level. If we were to further disaggregate this variable at the 
country-sector level, we would have too many observations with no variation over the entire sample period, 
which would make an empirical identification impossible. 
44  See the appendix for a description of the data on capacities. 
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observations within the same country-sector.45 All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
period to reduce endogeneity issues due to simultaneity bias. The problem of identification is 
further discussed in the following subsection. 
5.2.1.2 Firms-specific outcomes: the effect of policy enforcement on outcomes 
The second level of analysis focuses on market outcomes such as investment and 
productivity. In our framework, we suggest that policy enforcement affects firms’ outcomes in 
a given market through their impact on competition. Enforcement can also indirectly affect 
outcomes through spill-overs and deterrence, creating an indirect link between enforcement 
in one specific market and long-term outcomes in others. Therefore, following recent 
literature (e.g., Pavnick (2003); Buccirossi et al. (2013); Bourles et al. (2013)), we identify the 
effect of policy on outcomes by looking at the relationship between country-specific 
measures of enforcement and firm-specific outcomes. Our estimated model is represented 
by the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝑗𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑛𝑓_𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑛𝑓_𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜎𝑆𝐼𝑖 + 𝑍𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (7) 
𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖  is now the outcome to explain —investment or total factor productivity— of firm i in 
country c, at time t. The explanatory variables are the same as discussed above. The 
difference is that we now control for unobserved time-invariant firm rather than country-
sector specific heterogeneity by means of firm fixed-effects (𝜔𝑖𝑖). The error terms are again 
clustered at the country-sector level.  
Depending on the chosen outcome variable, we slightly modify the above model. When we 
use productivity measures, we augment the model to account for the distance to the 
technological frontier (e.g., Aghion et al. (2009)). We therefore add the productivity of the 
leader firm(s) in the specific industry and year as an additional control variable to our basic 
regression, defined as the 90th percentile of firm-level productivities in that particular sector 
and year. 
5.2.1.3 The Interactions between EU competition policy, national competition policy and 
regulation 
One of the questions of this study is to determine how far regulation and competition policy 
enforcement interact, both at national and EU level. The framework presented above allows 
us to do this. Therefore, we separately analyse the effect of competition policy in the sub-
samples of high- vs. low- regulated countries/periods.  
These sub-samples are defined by using the median of all regulation indices for each 
Member State and year as reported by the OECD. We then assign sectors and firms to the 
high-regulation sub-sample if the value of the regulation index in that country and year is 
higher than the median of the OECD regulation index over all countries and time periods in 
our sample.46  
Conversely, a country is low-regulated if the index takes a value lower than the median. In 
this way, we use not only the cross-sectional but also the time variation in the measures of 
regulation as countries can move from one to the other sub-sample over time by 
implementing major deregulatory reforms. 
We choose to use sub-samples based on this dichotomous definition of high- vs. low-
regulation rather than interactions between competition policy enforcement and the 
continuous regulatory indexes to better exploit the limited variation in the data. While the 
second option would allow a precise fine-tuning of the interaction effects, it might fail to 
deliver clear cut results due to the too scarce time-series variation in both variables. The 
results should also be measured in terms of marginal effects making the interpretation less 
                                                     
45  We cluster the standard errors at the country level, but we run robustness checks where we use different 
assumptions on the correlation structure (i.e., we use time cluster or country-time specific clusters). 
46  Results are the same if we use the mean instead of the median to indicate countries as high-regulated or low-
regulated. 
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straightforward. We therefore consider our approach to deliver more robust and easy to 
interpret findings.47 
5.2.2 Identification  
The identification of a causal nexus between competition policy enforcement and outcomes 
relies on being able to account for potential endogeneity of our key policy variables. It is 
important to understand the potential sources of endogeneity to develop the best strategy to 
effectively tackle the issue. Endogeneity might arise from omitted variable bias and from two-
way causality and measurement errors. 
Two-way causality is less of a concern in our case. In principle, the enforcement of 
competition policy in some specific cases might be also focused to solve problems of under-
investment or to increase productivity, which in turn might lead to a negative correlation 
between enforcement and the error term in the investment or productivity equations. 
However, we do not examine the effect of a specific decision on the behaviour of the firms 
involved in the decision, but focus on how the general enforcement of competition policy 
tools in one particular geographical sector (Member State) affected the behaviour of all 
players in that market.  
To reduce the potential bias resulting from two-way causality, we use lagged values of the 
policy variables with respect to our dependent variable. This is a standard approach that 
relies on the assumption that the lagged values of the policy are uncorrelated with the error 
terms of the estimated equation. Several other studies (e.g., Alesina et al.(2005); Buccirossi 
et al. (2013), Bourles, et al. (2013), Griffith et al. (2004)) use this type of exclusion 
restrictions to identify the causal effect of deregulation, competition policy and R&D on 
investment and industry TFP growth. 
The main identification issue in the context of our model is related to the potential existence 
of an omitted variable bias. The panel structure of our data-set allows us to control for time-
invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity at the firm/industry-country level through fixed-
effects, and for time fixed-effects. However, there might still be time-varying unobserved 
heterogeneity. In particular, this might derive from the existence of other policies correlated 
with competition policy enforcement that might affect firms’ behaviour.  
In our basic specifications following the existing literature (e.g. Alesina et al. (2005) and 
Grajek and Röller (2011)), we control for those factors that we believe are the most 
prominent policies affecting competition in energy markets, namely product market 
regulation, liberalisation, and privatisation. We are confident that these controls help mitigate 
the endogeneity problem, but should stress that our results have to be interpreted as 
enhanced correlations rather than cleanly identified causal effects.  
5.3 Results of the econometric analysis 
5.3.1 Country-sector level results: the intensity of competition 
We begin with the analysis of the link between competition policy enforcement and the level 
of competition at the country-sector level represented by equation (6). In this model, the 
outcome variables of interest are the country-sector Boone’s betas (i.e., the elasticity of 
relative profits with respect to relative costs) and the country-sector standard deviation of 
total factor productivity (i.e., productivity dispersion). 
5.3.1.1 The elasticity of relative profits with respect to relative costs: Boone’s beta 
The first step focuses on a measure of competition intensity that reflects the negative 
relationship between profits and cost efficiency, faced by firms in a competitive environment. A 
                                                     
47  The low regulation countries (indexed over all years in our sample) are:  Belgium, Czech Republik, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK. High regulation countries are: Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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decrease in this measure can be interpreted as an increase in competition. To facilitate the 
comparison of the coefficients’ estimates of the various explanatory variables that are 
measured in different units, we report standardised beta coefficients. The measured effects 
therefore represent the change in one standard deviation of the dependent variable due to one 
standard deviation change in the variable of interest.48 See Table 4.6 for the estimated 
standardised coefficients.  
We find a negative and significant impact of EU key merger decisions on elasticity of 
relative profits with respect to relative costs in low-regulated countries. In particular, a 
standard deviation increase in EU key merger decisions decreases the relative profit elasticity 
by 0.582 standard deviations in the sub-sample of low-regulated countries. The effect is 
negative but much smaller and non-significant also in the full sample and in the sub-sample of 
high-regulated markets. 
On the contrary, almost all other measures of enforcement either at EU or national level are 
not significant.49 Only the number of national cartel and abuse investigations significantly 
reduces the beta, and increases competition, in the sub-sample of high regulated countries. 
State aid schemes also have a significant positive impact on the relative profit’s elasticity and 
significantly reduce competition: one standard deviation increase in the state aid schemes 
increases the beta by 0.119 standard deviations. Finally, regulation does not seem to have a 
statistical impact on the level of competition on average. 
Table 5.5 Relative profit elasticity wrt. relative costs, full sample and low/high regulation 
subsamples 
 Full sample Low Regulation High Regulation 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
EU merger decisions (lagged) -0.290 (-1.51) -0.582*** (-9.37) -0.124 (-1.07) 
EU State aid enforcement (lagged) 0.003 (0.11) -0.010 (-0.28) 0.004 (0.06) 
EU abuse & cartel enforcement (lagged) -0.027 (-0.55) -0.187 (-1.39) -0.068 (-1.11) 
National merger decisions (lagged) -0.003 (-0.12) 0.035 (0.44) 0.080 (1.28) 
National cartel fines (lagged) 0.040 (1.33) 0.098 (1.11) 0.018 (0.32) 
National abuse & cartel enforcement (lagged) -0.264 (-1.00) 0.253 (1.17) -0.905** (-2.49) 
Sector Inquiry (production) 0.071 (0.80) 0.124* (1.87) 0.109 (0.80) 
Sector Inquiry (transmission) 0.137 (1.34) 0.117 (1.46) 0.219** (2.43) 
Sector Inquiry (trade) 0.133 (1.26) 0.098 (1.21) 0.202** (2.35) 
Regulation (OECD index) (lagged) 0.022 (0.04) -0.364 (-1.06) -0.419 (-1.47) 
EU merger cases (lagged) -0.004 (-0.03) 0.084 (0.47) 0.003 (0.01) 
State aid cases (lagged) 0.006 (0.08) -0.279 (-1.57) 0.119** (2.44) 
National merger cases (lagged) -0.182 (-1.15) 0.126 (0.42) -0.064 (-0.43) 
GDP per capita  0.633 (0.73) -0.350 (-0.32) -0.876 (-0.45) 
Population growth -0.015 (-0.12) -0.133 (-0.70) 0.220 (1.04) 
Energy imports (% of tot. cons.) 0.745 (0.98) 1.039* (2.13) 0.889 (1.67) 
R-squared 0.22 0.61 0.39 
Observations 259 129 130 
                                                     
48  The standardised beta coefficients are the coefficients estimates obtained by using standardised independent 
variables in the regressions, i.e. by dividing the values of the variable by its respective standard deviation so 
that their variances are one. 
49  As we already mentioned in the data session, this is may be related to the limited variability in these 
explanatory variables, which makes the empirical identification of significant relationships quite challenging. 
Hence, we do not consider these results as confirming that enforcement measures do not affect market 
outcomes; the non-significant outcomes may be related to statistical issues generated by the data quality. 
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The level of observation is country-sector-year. The dependent variable is the sector-country specific elasticity 
of relative profits with respect to relative costs, Boone’s beta. All policy variables are lagged one year to reduce 
endogeneity issues. We report standardised coefficients. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
country level. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. We control for country-sector fixed-effects as well as 
year dummies. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
5.3.1.2 Productivity dispersion 
Table 5.6 shows the results of using productivity dispersion as a dependent variable. The 
main result from these regressions is the negative and significant impact of EU key 
merger decisions on productivity dispersion. A standard deviation increase in EU key 
merger decisions decreases TFP dispersion by 0.101 standard deviation in the full sample. 
This effect is significantly larger in the sub-sample of low-regulated countries, where the 
standardised coefficient increases to 0.177 in absolute value. The effect is much smaller in 
the sub-sample of high-regulated markets (-0.046). These results hint to a significant 
interaction between competition policy enforcement and regulation: merger control helps 
reduce productivity dispersion, and increases competition, only in those countries where 
regulation is weak. 
The other measures of EU competition policy enforcement, and almost all measures of 
national competition policy enforcement, do not have a strong impact on TFP dispersion, 
with only two exceptions. National cartel and abuse enforcement decreases productivity 
dispersion in low-regulated markets: one standard deviation increase in cartels fines at the 
national level significantly decreases productivity dispersion by 0.084. Further, an increase in 
one standard deviation of EU abuse and cartel cases significantly increases productivity 
dispersion – and decreases competition - by 0.197 standard deviations in high-regulated 
markets. Finally, regulation does not seem to have a statistical impact on the level of 
competition on average.  
Table 5.6 Standard deviation of TFP, full sample and low/high regulation subsamples 
 
Full sample Low Regulation High Regulation 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
EU merger decisions (lagged) -0.101** (-2.31) -0.177*** (-5.41) -0.046 (-0.25) 
EU State aid enforcement (lagged) -0.019 (-0.57) 0.028 (1.43) -0.032 (-0.57) 
EU abuse & cartel enforcement (lagged) 0.060 (0.72) -0.040 (-0.36) 0.197** (2.52) 
National merger decisions (lagged) -0.011 (-0.34) 0.000 (0.00) -0.059 (-1.17) 
National cartel fines (lagged) 0.002 (0.05) -0.084* (-1.96) 0.001 (0.02) 
National abuse & cartel enforcement 
(lagged) -0.085 (-0.76) 0.006 (0.07) -0.077 (-0.46) 
Sector Inquiry (production) 0.065 (0.73) 0.094 (0.72) 0.085 (0.52) 
Sector Inquiry (transmission) 0.069 (1.42) 0.133 (1.44) 0.054 (0.74) 
Sector Inquiry (trade) -0.004 (-0.09) 0.042 (0.33) -0.000 (-0.00) 
Regulation (OECD index) (lagged) 0.064 (0.38) -0.432 (-0.80) -0.071 (-0.38) 
EU merger cases (lagged) -0.073 (-0.83) -0.155* (-2.07) 0.127 (0.56) 
State aid cases (lagged) 0.126** (2.52) 0.112 (1.80) 0.189** (2.59) 
National merger cases (lagged) -0.067 (-0.50) 0.195** (2.69) -0.224** (-2.89) 
GDP per capita 1.356 (1.16) 0.426 (0.40) 0.940 (0.64) 
Population growth -0.222 (-1.40) -0.631** (-2.73) 0.071 (0.71) 
Energy imports (% of tot. cons.) 0.137 (0.35) 0.246 (0.46) 0.438 (1.23) 
R-squared 0.37 0.40 0.51 
Observations 319 157 162 
The level of observation is country-sector-year. The dependent variable is the country-sector-year specific 
standard deviation of total factor productivity. All policy variables are lagged one year to reduce endogeneity 
issues. We report standardised beta coefficients. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. 
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The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. We control for country-sector fixed-effects as well as year dummies. 
The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
The control variables also produce interesting results. EU merger cases increase productivity 
dispersion in low-regulated markets, while national merger cases reduce it in high-regulated 
markets. This would imply that mergers are on average beneficial for competition, possibly 
by increasing efficiency. State aid schemes seem to have the opposite effect and increase 
productivity dispersion. This might be because subsidies reduce the exit of relatively 
inefficient firms and, accordingly, increase the productivity dispersion. This latter effect is 
predominantly found in the high-regulation sub-sample: a standard deviation increase in 
state aid cases increases productivity dispersion by 0.189 standard deviations.  
5.3.1.3 Firm investment 
Table 5.7 shows the results of using the estimation framework (7) to examine the impact of 
competition policy on investment. We estimate a significant positive impact of the 
enforcement of EU merger control on firms’ investment in the sub-sample of low-
regulated countries. In particular, one standard deviation increase in the ratio between 
merger intervention and merger notifications increases firm-level investment by 0.226 
standard deviations. 
Table 5.7 Investment in full sample and low/high regulation subsamples 
 
Full Sample Low Regulation High Regulation 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
EU merger decisions (lagged) -0.007 (-0.31) 0.226*** (2.90) -0.006 (-0.20) 
EU State aid enforcement (lagged) -0.001 (-0.07) - - -0.008 (-0.38) 
EU abuse & cartel enforcement (lagged) 0.020 (0.51) -0.265*** (-2.60) 0.059** (2.29) 
National merger decisions (lagged) 0.008 (0.36) 0.002 (0.05) 0.005 (0.26) 
National cartel fines (lagged) -0.003 (-0.11) -0.038 (-0.34) -0.018 (-1.01) 
Sector Inquiry 0.058 (1.07) -0.059 (-0.65) 0.062 (1.23) 
Regulation (OECD indicator) (lagged) 0.178 (1.67) 2.815*** (3.30) 0.153 (1.59) 
EU merger notifications (lagged) -0.037 (-1.49) -0.378*** (-2.87) -0.060 (-1.10) 
State aid cases (lagged) 0.029 (1.55) 0.195** (2.37) 0.024 (0.91) 
National merger cases (lagged) 0.015 (0.27) -0.210 (-0.63) 0.010 (0.12) 
National cartel & abuse cases (lagged) 0.020 (0.70) 0.008 (0.08) 0.065 (1.20) 
Electricity capacity (combustible) -0.627 (-1.52) -0.486 (-0.72) -0.604 (-1.44) 
Electricity Capacity (nuclear) -0.448 (-1.00) 9.016*** (3.46) 4.234 (1.40) 
Electricity Capacity (renewable) 0.329** (2.54) 0.909*** (2.66) 0.223* (1.70) 
GDP per capita  -0.676** (-2.56) -0.577 (-1.20) -0.621 (-1.53) 
Population growth 0.088* (1.99) 0.654*** (5.29) 0.034 (0.83) 
Energy imports, % of tot cons 0.077 (0.62) 0.288 (0.86) 0.223 (1.14) 
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.21 
Observations 8,344 4,098 4,246 
The unit of observation is firm-country-year. The dependent variable is firm level investment. All policy 
variables are lagged one year to reduce endogeneity issues. We report standardised beta coefficients. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. We control for firm fixed-effects as well as year 
dummies. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
Few of the other competition policy enforcement variables have a significant effect on 
investment. Only EU cartel and abuse cases significantly increase investment in high-
regulated markets while significantly decreasing it in low-regulated markets. 
We further estimate a positive and significant coefficient for state aid notifications in low-
regulated countries. This variable identifies the effect of the state aid programmes 
themselves. These programmes often aim to support companies in financial distress and 
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might be expected to have been used to acquire additional assets and to increase 
investment.  
We also find a significant positive effect of regulation in the sample of low-regulated markets. 
The results suggest that an increase of one standard deviation in the regulation indexes 
increases investment by 2.815 standard deviations.50 
Among the control variables, an increase by one standard deviation of existing production 
capacities in renewables significantly and substantially increases investment by 0.329 
standard deviations in the full sample and even more so (0.909 standard deviations) in the 
low regulation sample. This finding might be attributed to possible complementarities in 
renewable energy investments. More mergers at EU level also decrease investment in low 
regulation industries, which compliments the positive impact of merger remedies on 
investment. A higher concentration seems bad for investment. 
In the appendix, we further report three different robustness checks for the investment 
estimations: we look at heterogeneity across sectors, we estimate autoregressive investment 
equations, and we use an alternative measure of investment based on capacities. 
5.3.1.4    Firm-level Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
Next we analyse the effect of competition policy enforcement on the long-term outcome 
variable: the firm-level total factor productivity. We begin again with the full sample and then 
analyse the sub-samples of high- and low-regulated markets. The standardised beta 
coefficients are reported in Table 1.1. 
Consistent with our previous results, EU key merger decisions increase TFP in the sub-
sample of low-regulated countries. In particular, one standard deviation increase in the 
ratio of merger interventions and merger notifications increases TFP by 0.329 standard 
deviations. Most other policy enforcement variables are estimated to have little effect on 
TFP.  
Among the control variables, we estimate a significant positive coefficient for the productivity 
level of technology leaders. This can be interpreted as the ‘catching-up’ effect to the 
productivity frontier. The magnitude is similar in the full sample as well as in the low-
regulated markets, while it is much smaller and not significant in high-regulated markets: a 
standard deviation increase in the leader’s TFP increases firms’ TFP by 0.064 to 0.072 
standard deviations. We estimate a negative and significant effect of regulation in the high-
regulation sub-sample: regulation has a deleterious effect on productivity when it is too high. 
                                                     
50   When looking at the disaggregated effect of the different components of this index (not reported) we see that 
the estimated effect specifically comes from higher public ownership and more concentrated market structure 
in gas markets. 
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Table 5.8 TFP levels in full sample and low/high regulation subsamples 
 Full Sample Low Regulation High Regulation 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Leader Productivity 0.064** (2.61) 0.072* (1.79) 0.046 (1.21) 
EU merger decisions (lagged) 0.046 (1.73) 0.329*** (2.89) 0.061 (1.59) 
EU State aid enforcement (lagged) -0.029 (-1.55) - - -0.013 (-0.44) 
EU abuse & cartel enforcement 
(lagged) 0.011 (0.27) -0.017 (-0.11) -0.025 (-0.71) 
National merger decisions (lagged) 0.001 (0.10) 0.058 (1.03) 0.015 (0.49) 
National cartel fines (lagged) 0.003 (0.08) 0.211 (1.19) 0.003 (0.14) 
Sector Inquiry -0.023 (-0.32) 0.070 (0.50) -0.004 (-0.07) 
Regulation (OECD  indicator) (lagged) -0.067 (-0.32) 0.317 (0.26) -0.219* (-1.93) 
EU merger cases (lagged) -0.032 (-0.78) 0.178 (0.85) -0.131* (-1.76) 
State aid cases (lagged) -0.045 (-1.18) 0.003 (0.02) -0.025 (-0.67) 
National merger cases (lagged) 0.071 (0.69) -0.611 (-1.27) -0.098 (-0.80) 
National cartel cases (lagged) 0.027 (0.61) 0.115 (0.75) -0.000 (-0.01) 
Electricity capacity (combustible) -1.190 (-1.73) 1.815 (1.62) -1.033* (-1.80) 
Electricity Capacity (nuclear) 0.251 (0.65) -0.273 (-0.07) -8.628** (-2.02) 
Electricity Capacity (renewable) 0.376 (1.30) 0.086 (0.17) 0.511*** (2.67) 
GDP per capita -0.411 (-0.81) -0.720 (-0.99) -0.381 (-0.68) 
Population growth 0.001 (0.01) 0.210 (1.11) 0.064 (1.11) 
Energy imports, % of tot cons -0.415 (-1.64) 1.527*** (-3.05) 0.528* (1.79) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 0.22 0.33 
Observations 4,225 2,143 2,082 
The unit of observation is firm-country-year. The dependent variable is firm level total factor productivity. 
All policy variables are lagged one year to reduce endogeneity issues. We report standardised beta 
coefficients. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. We control for firm fixed-effects 
as well as year dummies. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level 
respectively. 
Annex 3 contains a robustness check for the TFP estimations, examining heterogeneity 
across sectors. 
5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter focuses on identifying the broad effects of competition policy enforcement on the 
functioning of EU energy sectors and its interactions with regulation. The evidence paints a 
broad picture of the different channels through which policy affects outcomes. Specifically, the 
impact of competition policy on measures of competition - the elasticity of relative profits with 
respect to relative costs (Boone indicator) and productivity dispersion - and the effect of policy 
enforcement on outcomes, such as investment and, ultimately, productivity.  
Our framework captures both direct and indirect effects of the policies, because it examines 
broad national energy sectors, capturing both the impact of policy decisions on the firms 
involved, and on other firms in the same market, plus potential spill-overs and deterrence 
effects in other (national) markets.  
One overall picture emerges. EU merger policy enforcement is consistently and significantly 
related to better outcomes, particularly in low-regulated sectors. First, EU key merger 
decisions lower both Boone’s indicator and productivity dispersion, indicating that national 
energy sectors became more competitive after these interventions. A more active EU merger 
control is also related to higher investment and higher total factor productivity. This is 
consistent with the reasoning that EU merger policy actions - through the channel of 
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competition - encourage energy firms to invest more, ultimately generating higher 
productivity.51  
These results are strongest in low-regulated sectors, which reinforces previous studies that 
show competition policy is mostly effective where the competitive process is not influenced by 
high regulation (e.g., Buccirossi et al. (2013)). A potential mechanism at play could be that if 
firms are highly regulated, changing the way competition works through competition policy has 
little impact. For example, if investment is regulated then a different market structure will not 
change investment. If it is not, a different market structure may induce different behaviour from 
market participants.  
Bergman et al. (1998) further argue that once an industry has reached a particular threshold of 
deregulation, competition should be introduced and safeguarded through competition policy. 
According to this logic, regulation and competition are substitutes. Competition policy’s role 
and impact should therefore be higher in low-regulated industries.52 As regulation is reduced 
over time, competition should be gradually introduced. Competition policy should also be 
strengthened to preserve competition. It would be interesting to further explore Time 
dimension.  
There are two important caveats. First, other policy enforcement measures show a more 
patchy impact, i.e. they show a more limited correlation pattern with market outcomes. But this 
does not conclusively prove lack of effectiveness. It is possible that their low frequency of 
occurrence prevented us from empirically identifying consistent relationships. Second, causal 
inferences are important While we tried to deal with issues such as reverse causality bias (by 
lagging the policy variables) and omitted variable bias (by using fixed effects and other 
controls), our identification strategy is not based on a clear source of exogenous variation 
since it is virtually impossible to find exogenous variation in such a broad and heterogeneous 
framework.  
Therefore, we cautiously interpret our results as illustrating strong correlations between EU 
merger policy enforcement and market outcomes rather than truly causal links. But the 
conceptual framework behind our empirical analysis (policy enforcement affects competition, 
which then affects firms’ investment behaviour. Changes in the intensity of competition and 
firms’ investment behaviour generate changes in productivity) suggests a plausible causal link 
between completion policy enforcement and productivity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
51  The reasoning goes as follows: if competition policy authorities perform a good job, then among the mergers 
that go through are several where efficiency gains dominate. Consequently, merger policy actions are 
associated with better market outcomes. Additionally, if key merger decisions involve deterrence, their 
beneficial impact should be substantially higher. 
52  One might also make the argument that the impact of competition policy interventions could sometimes be 
stronger in highly regulated markets, and thus one would observe complementarities between both 
sometimes. For example, in countries where companies are vertically integrated or monopolised, anti-trust 
interventions to avoid market foreclosure and abuse of dominance would be important. 
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6 Case study: E.ON’s alleged abuse of dominant position in the 
German wholesale electricity market  
This case study demonstrates the direct effects of a specific decision on the market under 
consideration and the short-term impact of that decision on competition and, specifically, on 
prices. Because the intervention directly affected the wholesale electricity market, the 
analysis begins with the decision’s effect on wholesale prices, because the suitability of the 
remedies to address the competitive concerns can only be assessed at this level.  
It also looks at the effect of the decision on downstream retail electricity prices to carefully 
measure the overall impact of an alleged misconduct upstream in vertically related markets, 
This should not be considered a direct evaluation of the Commission’s decision, but it does 
enable conclusions on the extent of the pass-through of the reduction of wholesale electricity 
prices on retail prices. This pass-through mainly results from the conditions of competition on 
the retail electricity market.  
6.1 Introduction to the case 
In 2008, the European Commission investigated claims about E.ON withdrawing available 
generation capacity from the German wholesale electricity market to raise prices and deter 
new investors. The investigation confirmed the presence of competition concerns. 
Consequently, E.ON agreed to divest a total of 5,000 MW of generation capacity and the 
case was settled.53  
Figure 6.1 illustrates the location of the plants concerned, whereby the size of the circles 
represent the size of the divestitures. The Commission decision was announced in 2008 and 
the remedies implemented over subsequent years. Specifically, the various plants were sold 
to different buyers between January 2009 and May 201054.  
The Commission also raised concerns that E.ON may have favoured its production affiliate 
for providing balancing services, while passing the resulting costs on to consumers, 
potentially preventing other power producers from exporting balancing energy into its 
transmission zone. To address these   concerns in the electricity balancing market, E.ON 
committed to divest its extra-high voltage network.  The divestiture of E.ON balancing net 
also took place in early 2010. 
Cumulatively, the Commission decision(s) affected two main product markets: the German 
wholesale energy market and the balancing energy market. The following concentrates on 
the former and includes our deliberation that the approach was reasonable.  
                                                     
53  As noted by Sadowska (2011), the E.ON case has to be considered a “commitment decision”. The 
Commission, pursuant to Article 9, did not demonstrate or confirm the existence of a dominant position or an 
abuse but it simply made the undertakings’ commitments binding. This has important policy implications. 
Specifically, Sadowska (2011) discusses the advantages but also the substantial drawbacks of commitment 
procedure in antitrust cases. 
54  Specifically, Electrabel acquired 931 MWh capacity as well as 1,500 MWh drawing rights, EnBW acquired 
781 MWh capactity as well as 159 MWh drawing rights, Statkraft, Verbund, Morgan Stanley, TenneT, and 
Stadtwerke Hannover acquired 753, 312, 403 415, and 345 MWh capacity, respectively. 
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Figure 6.1 The divestiture of capacity in the alleged E.ON abuse case 
 
Source: Own representation based on the Commission information 
Balancing markets are ancillary mechanisms key to a well-functioning energy market, 
because they ensure that demand is equal to supply in real time. In Germany, electricity 
generators are mandated to reserve a fraction of their capacity for the transmission system 
operators, which they can use to restore frequency and load in the electricity grid (Haucap et 
al. (2012)).  
Wholesale electricity markets and balancing markets should be related because there exist 
arbitrage opportunities between the spot market and the balancing mechanism (Just and 
Weber, (2012)). Prices in the balancing markets (capacity prices) constitute a sort of 
opportunity cost for energy suppliers who commit themselves not to use the reserved 
capacity on wholesale spot markets. Therefore, the alleged abuse in the balancing market 
might be expected to have affected competition at the wholesale level.  
However, empirical evidence for the German market suggests that this relationship is less 
strong than one would expect in theory. Just and Weber (2012) try to quantify the effect of 
the strategic arbitrage behaviour between the German wholesale and balancing market. 
They show a “clear tendency that market participants use the arbitrage opportunity to fulfil 
their supply commitment with relatively cheap balancing energy when spot prices are 
relatively high, and vice versa. In periods with intraday spot prices above 120 €/MWh, the 
control zones are predominantly undersupplied. The Amprion control zone is undersupplied 
in 75 per cent a d the GCC control zone in 80 per cent of those 64 ¼-hours, with an average 
imbalance of -267 MW and -488 MW, respectively. The opposite is true for prices roughly 
below -20 €/MWh – with Amprion being oversupplied in 77 per cent with an average of 501 
MW and GCC in 74 per cent of those 196 ¼-hours with 819 MW on average. It should be 
noted that imbalances did not exceed the contracted reserve capacity and that periods with 
extreme spot prices were not overly exploited as the incentives might suggest.” 
We conclude, therefore, that the effect of the unbundling in the balancing market could have 
been important in the long-run to explain the dynamics of wholesale prices, but we consider 
it second order if compared to the direct effect of the potential abuse in the wholesale 
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market, particularly in the short-run. Therefore, here we focus more explicitly on trying to 
evaluate the first part of the decision, i.e. the alleged abuse of dominant position in the 
wholesale electricity market. Specifically, we try to isolate the effect of the implementation of 
the single capacity divestitures. But we admit that we will be unable to cleanly separate the 
different effects from the two parts of the decision, particularly when looking at the long-run 
implications.  
Given that the unbundling of the extra-high voltage network was completed on January 1 
2010 together with the divestiture of some of the E.ON’s capacity, it is also not possible in 
the most disaggregated analysis trying to capture the short-term effects of the decision to 
separately identify the effects of the two remedies. What we will empirically measure is the 
cumulative effect of all remedies imposed.   
To identify the effect of the E.ON alleged abuse and the Commission's decision, we set up 
an empirical methodology specifically tailored to the peculiar structure of energy markets.  
Three main characteristics play a crucial role both for the choice of the appropriate outcome 
variable of our retrospective evaluation and the identification strategy: i) the extent of market 
power upstream and downstream; ii) vertical integration and ownership structure and iii) 
long- term contracts. All these aspects are part of our empirical evaluation strategy, 
discussed below, beginning with a description of the complexity of the German electricity 
market.    
6.2 The German electricity market 
The German electricity sector is characterised by a vertical structure with a generation stage, 
a wholesale market, and retail markets (see Figure 6.2). A transmission system —extra high 
voltage and high voltage networks, 380 and 220 kV respectively— assures that energy 
generated or imported is delivered to regional supply companies, which then distribute them 
via low or medium voltage networks —below 20 kV and 20-110 kV respectively— to energy 
retailers and final customers. Finally, a parallel balancing market ensures that the needed 
tension is present in the network at each point in time (cfr. Case No COMP/M.4110 - E.ON / 
ENDESA). 
Figure 6.2 The Structure of the German Electricity Market 
 Source: Own representation 
6.2.1 Generation and wholesale market 
The generation stage in Germany is dominated by four vertically integrated -  though legally 
unbundled - big players: E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall, and Energie Baden-Württemberg (EnBW), 
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who are also the main players in the retail market and also own a large part of the network.55 
These operators jointly produce 2/3 – 3/4 of total German electricity demand. The rest of the 
German energy needs are covered by the local production of a large number of municipal 
operators (‘Stadtwerke’) and other smaller producers, or imported from abroad.  
In 2004, the European Commission (Case No COMP/M.4110 - E.ON / ENDESA pg. 10) 
reported that “[b]y far the largest proportion of electricity in Germany is generated by four 
vertically integrated energy suppliers: E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW. In generation 
(installed capacity) RWE Power is market leader, with a [30-40 per cent] market share (2004 
data), followed by E.ON ([20-30 per cent]), Vattenfall ([10-20 per cent]) and EnBW ([10-20 
per cent]). Other companies jointly represent [10-20per cent]”. 
This picture remained quite stable duringsubsequent years. In its “Sector Inquiry into 
Electricity Generation and Wholesale Markets (B10-9/09) Report” published in 2011, the 
German Competition authority – the Bundeskartellamt (BKartA) – reported that the German 
electricity market is characterised by joint dominance. The shares of net electricity of the four 
big players for the years 2007, 2008, and 2009 are reported in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Market share of the big four energy company – 2007-2009 
 
Generated Capacity  
(MW)  
Total Electricity Feed-in  
(TW/h) 
Generator 2007 2008 2009  2007 2008 2009 
RWE 34% 33% 31%  35% 36% 31% 
E.ON 23% 23% 19%  23% 22% 21% 
Vattenfall 17% 16% 16%  17% 15% 16% 
EnBW 12% 12% 14%  12% 11% 14% 
Market Volume 94,433 95,756 n.r.  467.9 465.1 n.r. 
Source: Bundeskartellamt, “Sector Inquiry into Electricity Generation and Wholesale Markets (B10-
9/09) Report”, 2011 
The BKartA’s investigation not only looked at market shares of the alleged dominant firms 
but also analysed additional measures of the extent of market power in energy markets. 
Specifically, the BKartA calculated a firm-specific index that measured market power in the 
electricity first-time sales market as the size of a supplier’s available capacity in relation to 
the overall demand: the so-called Residual Supply Index (RSI). 
Based on the result of this analysis, the BKarA stressed that possibly all four big players in 
the German wholesale energy markets in 2007-2008 were “in a position to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of their competitors, customers and ultimately of their 
consumers and to restrict competition on the first-time sales market. […] Each of these 
undertakings was essential for meeting Germany’s electricity demand in a considerable 
number of hours.”  (Bundeskartellamt, 2011, pg. 6). 
The BKartA also indicated that the market power of the big four was expected to decline 
following the implementation of the remedies imposed by the European Commission in its 
antitrust investigation that required E.ON to divest generation capacity as well as a 
consequence of the economic crisis. However, they still expected a joint dominance in the 
German wholesale electricity market to continue during the following years.56  
                                                     
55  Since July 1st 2007, the German „Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung – Energiewirtschafts-
gesetz“ (EnWG) requires vertically integrated energy suppliers to legally unbundle from system operators 
previously related to them. Section 7 (2) exempts from this obligation all those vertically integrated energy 
suppliers serving directly or indirectly less than 100.000 customers. 
56  The BKartA’s Decision Division identified several reasons that would make uncertain whether the observed 
power plant operational management would be an evidence of any possible abusive capacity withholding 
rather than the consequence of “objective reasons for not operating power plants whose marginal costs are 
lower than the day-ahead spot market price” (Bundeskartellamt, 2011, pg. 6). As a consequence, the BKarA 
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For what concerns wholesale markets, most of the generated electricity is either sold 
internally to the retail outlets of the vertically integrated producers or sold to other retailers 
via bilateral, over the counter (OTC) contracts as well as through a centralised energy 
exchange market. Since 2002, the German wholesale energy market is, at least partially, 
determined through the European Energy Exchange (EEX) market located in Leipzig. Most 
energy trade between wholesalers and retailers in Germany is still done by means of OTC 
long-term bilateral contracts between producers and suppliers, with only a minor albeit 
increasing percentage of energy trade covered through the EEX.57  
6.2.2 Transmission and distribution 
The transmission of electricity is achieved through legally unbundled transmission system 
operators (TSOs). In 2004, the European Commission (Case No COMP/M.4110 - E.ON / 
ENDESA pg. 10) reported that “The operation and management of the high voltage grid 
(transmission) is for more than [75-85 per cent] controlled by the same four majors: RWE is 
again the strongest player with [30-40 per cent], closely followed by E.ON with [25-35 per 
cent] and Vattenfall Europe ([25-35 per cent]), whereas EnBW represents a somewhat 
smaller part of this market ([5-15 per ent]). In electricity distribution E.ON is the strongest 
player with a [20-30 per cent] market share, RWE has [15-25 per cent], followed at some 
distance by EnBW ([<10 per cent]) and Vattenfall Europe [<5 per cent]. Other companies 
jointly represent [35-45 per cent].” During subsequent years, not much has changed. In this 
Study we do not concentrate on the transmission and distribution levels. 
6.2.3 Retail 
The German retail energy market is also quite concentrated. The ‘big four’ firms (E.ON, 
RWE, Vattenfall, and EnBW) cover more than half of the market. In 2004, the European 
Commission noted (Case No COMP/M.4110 - E.ON / ENDESA pg. 10): “E.ON is, 
furthermore, active in retail supply of electricity, both to large industrial customers and to 
small customers (private, commerce and public institutions). In the retail electricity supply to 
large industrial customers RWE is market leader ([20-30 per cent]), closely followed by E.ON 
([15-25 per cvent]), EnBW ([10-20 per cent]) and Vattenfall ([10-20 per cent]). The remaining 
part of this market consists of smaller players, such as MVV, EWE, RheinEnergie and 
others. In the market for retail supply to small customers E.ON leads ([5-15 per cent]), 
followed by RWE ([5-15 per cent]), and RWE and EnBW [should read: EnBW and Vattenfall] 
with [<10 per cent] and [<10 per cent] respectively. Other companies, including EWE and 
RheinEnergie, collectively represent [55-65 per cent] of this market.”  
Although there were some dynamics in the evolution of national market shares of the main 
players during the 2000s, looking at national market share, the overall picture did not change 
too much (see Figure 6.3).58 All big players lost some market share over time. Yet looking at 
national level, they continue to cover almost half of the market. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
concluded that “the non-operation of profitable power plants identified in the present inquiry is too limited to 
initiate specific abuse proceedings with respect to the period examined” (Bundeskartellamt, 2011, pg. 6). 
57  For instance, Ockenfels et al. (2008) report that only 15% of energy consumption was traded at the EEX in 
2008. In its final report for 2013, the EEX press release mentions that “The market share of EEX in the 
German market arose by 1/3 to ca. 20%” 
(http://www.eex.com/blob/66776/8ea17d8bc1445c4113d8774772d6dee8/pr-20140114-eex-jahresrueckblick-
pdf-data.pdf). 
58 P lease note that The market shares of the smallest firms are not reported so that market shares do not sum 
to100. 
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Figure 6.3 Time Evolution of National Market Shares 
 
Source: Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW), Berlin.59 
Regional markets 
This rather aggregated picture could be partially misleading. Retail energy markets are 
regional in scope, at least concerning households and small commercial customers. In its 
monitoring report in 2010, the German regulator stated: ‘Geographically, the relevant market 
for the supply of basic household costumers (‘Grundversorgungskunden’) has to be defined 
at the level of the coverage area (‘Versorgungsgebiet’) – i.e., the low voltage network 
necessary to supply [energy]. (Bundesnetzagentur, Monitorbericht (2010) p77-79).  
These regional markets defined by the coverage areas (‘Versorgungsgebiete‘) differ 
substantially in terms of market structure, level of competition and, accordingly, retail prices. 
In particular, the four big players upstream are also incumbent (‘Grundversorger’) 
downstream in different regions.60  
Several of the small vertically integrated operators (particularly the ‘Stadwerke’) are also 
incumbents in different regional markets, generally in the municipalities where they operate. 
Figure 6.4 represents the geographical dispersion of these vertically integrated operators. 
The white spots represent coverage areas where the incumbent is either an independent 
and non-integrated operator or has a mixed ownership structure and it is partially owned by 
one or more of the big players and or one municipal firm. 
                                                     
59 
https://www.bdew.de/internet.nsf/id/C125783000558C9FC125766C0003E862/$file/130314_TopTen%20Mark
tanteile%202003%20bis%202010_Stand%20Mrz2013.pdf. 
60  According to the EnWG, the ‘Grundversorger’ is the firm that serves the majority of household costumers in a 
local market (‘Netzgebiet’) at a given point in time. The incumbent provider is newly defined every three years.  
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Figure 6.4 Incumbents in regional retail markets in 2010 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Verivox data. 
While in each of these regions several retailers offer different tariffs, incumbent operators are 
legally obliged to sell energy at a baseline tariff (‘Grundversorgungstarif’) to all household 
customers who do not explicitly choose another provider. Accordingly, this baseline tariff 
constitutes an upper bound for the energy retail prices in a given region because it is 
automatically chosen by customers unwilling or lacking the information to switch supplier. As 
a consequence, incumbent operators have particularly high market power over their 
customers. So these tariffs should also be expected to be less responsive to changes in 
wholesale tariffs if compared to those offered by the competitive fringe to more informed 
customers with lower switching costs in that region. 
Switching costs 
Although German electricity retail markets were liberalised in 1998 (which resulted in 
substantial new entry), and each retailer has non-discriminatory access to all customers in 
each regional market, there is very little switching among household customers. The German 
regulator mentioned that each customer on average had a choice of 124 operators in each 
regional market in 2010. Yet, the number of energy suppliers in the regional markets varies 
considerably (see Figure 6.5) 
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Figure 6.5 Proportion of Network areas in which a given number of suppliers is active 
 
Source: Bundesnetzagentur, Monitoringbericht, 201261 
Most of these retailers are small firms operating regionally. The German regulator mentions 
that almost two-thirds of the retailers operate in at most 10 local network areas. However, 
between 2007 and 2011, the number of retailers operating in more than one local area has 
substantially increased.  
Notwithstanding the steady increase in the number of competing retailers in each local 
market, German household customers show a great degree of inertia. In 2009, incumbent 
operators still served more than 70 per cent of the households in most German regional 
markets (Bundesnetzagentur, Monitorbericht (2009)).62 Figure 6.6 shows the geographical 
distribution of the percentage of households served by the incumbent. Moreover, most of 
these customers (on average more than 45 per cent) are still served at the most expensive 
baseline tariff. 
                                                     
61  http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Allgemeines/Bundesnetzagentur/Publikationen/Berichte/2012/MonitoringBericht2012.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
62
  http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Sachgebiete/Energie/Unternehmen_Institutionen/DatenaustauschUndMonitoring/Monitoring/Monitoringbericht2009.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 
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Figure 6.6 The geographical distribution of household customers’ switching behaviour 
 
Source: Bundesnetzagentur, Monitorbericht 2009 
During subsequent years, the amount of households that switched operator grew at an 
increasing rate but incumbent operators maintained a very strong customer base (Figure 
6.7) 
Figure 6.7  Number of Final Customers Switching Providers 
 
Source: Bundesnetzagentur, Monitoringbericht 2012 
Retail price structure 
Part of our empirical analysis focuses on retail prices, making it important to clearly 
understand their relationship with wholesale prices. As explained in Section 2, retail tariffs 
entail several components. On the one hand, they are affected by electricity wholesale prices 
that constitute the main essential input for retailers, but are also strongly influenced by other 
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factors such as the (regulated) cost of transmission and distribution as well as taxes and 
other fees. In its 2012 monitoring report, the German regulator discusses in depth the 
structure of retail tariffs for household customers, whose national average composition for 
the period relevant for our study (2007-2012) is reported in Figure 6.8.63 
Figure 6.8  Development of Energy Purchase Prices – Weighted Averages over all Tariff Types 
 
Source: Bundesnetzagentur, Monitorbericht 2012 
Energy purchasing strategy 
While these average values are useful to understand the various components of retail tariffs, 
they also present a lot of cross-sectional variation across and within regions. The German 
regulator mentions that the cost of energy purchase varies within different types of firms. 
Since 2007, entrants achieved on average more favourable conditions mostly because they 
buy energy from the wholesale markets through shorter-term contracts and wholesale 
energy prices have decreased. Figure 6.9 shows the development of energy purchase prices 
on average and differentiating between incumbents and entrants (Bundesnetzagentur, 
Monitorbericht (2012)). 
 
Figure 6.9  Development of Energy Purchase Prices – Weighted Averages per Tariff Type 
 
                                                     
63  An additional in-depth analysis of the composition and trends of retail prices across European country can be 
found in the Commission staff working document “Energy prices and costs report” from the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions Energy prices and costs in 
Europe. For Germany in the second half of 2012 the average household electricity price of 26.8 Eurocent per 
kWh is broken down as follows: 8.3 Eurocent energy cost, 5.9 Eurocent network, 12.4 Eurocent taxation. 
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Source: Bundesnetzagentur, Monitorbericht 2010 
There also appears to be a substantial regional variation in electricity purchase and 
distribution costs as documented in Figure 6.10. 
Figure 6.10 Regional Variation in Energy Purchase Costs. 
 
Source: Bundesnetzagentur, Monitorbericht 2010 
Final retail tariffs are also influenced by interconnection fees (‘Netzentgelte’). On average, 
these decreased from 7.30 to 5.81 ct/kWh between 2006 and 2010 and then increased again 
during subsequent years (Figure 6.11). But there is some regional heterogeneity in the level 
of such fees. 
Figure 6.11 Development of Network Charges for Household Customers 
 
Source: Bundesetzagentur, Monitoringbericht, 2012 
Heterogenous retail tariffs 
The heterogeneity in energy purchase costs, consumer switching behaviour, and network 
costs described above results in significant price dispersion within local markets. Typically, 
the most expensive tariff is the baseline tariff offered by the local incumbent, while the 
cheapest alternative tariffs are typically offered by smaller competitors. In Figure 6.12 we 
represent the yearly average of the within-network area price dispersion in 2010 expressed 
as the difference between the average baseline tariff (the most expensive tariff) and the 
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average cheapest tariff available in each zip code for a typical consumption of 2,800 KWh 
per year. The different colours represent the quartile of the price-dispersion distribution.  
Figure 6.12 Within-Network Areas Price Dispersion – 2,800 KWh yearly consumption (2010) 
 
 
Source: Our calculations based on Verivox Data 
There is significant price dispersion in each area and significant cross-area differences in the 
size of this dispersion. It varies between €65 (lowest value of the first quartile) and €300 
(highest value of the fourth quartile). This is quite substantial given that the average price for 
that consumption bundle is around €600. In our empirical analysis, we exploit this large 
heterogeneity in energy retail tariffs prices within and across regional markets to identify the 
effect of the Commission’s decision. 
6.3 Overall approach to the analysis 
Given that E.ON’s alleged abuse of dominant position directly affected wholesale markets, 
the natural starting point for an ex-post study would be to look at the wholesale prices. As 
mentioned, since 2002, the German wholesale energy market has been determined through 
the EEX market located in Leipzig. For the sake of an evaluation study, it is useful to use 
readily available and transparent EEX prices extensively used in the literature on energy 
markets.  
A potential issue here is that most energy trade between wholesalers and retailers in 
Germany is done by means of OTC long-term bilateral contracts between producers and 
suppliers, while only a small but increasing percentage of energy trade is covered through 
the EEX.64 But since OTC prices should be expected to at least correlate to the EEX prices 
(e.g., Zachmann and Von Hirschhausen (2008)) which constitute a benchmark or opportunity 
cost for energy trading, analysing the evolution of EEX prices will potentially represent the 
effect of competition on upstream energy markets. 
While the wholesale market seems to be a reasonable starting point for a retrospective 
evaluation of the Commission’s decision, the ultimate goal of competition policy is to 
                                                     
64  For instance, Ockenfels et al. (2008) report that only 15% of energy consumption was traded at the EEX in 
2008. In its final report for 2013, the EEX press release mentions that “The market share of EEX in the 
German market arose by 1/3 to ca. 20%” 
http://www.eex.com/blob/66776/8ea17d8bc1445c4113d8774772d6dee8/pr-20140114-eex-jahresrueckblick-
pdf-data.pdf. 
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enhance consumer welfare. Hence, an additional important variable to look at in this Study is 
the price final customers pay to consume energy. Retail prices will therefore be an additional 
focus of our analysis. Equally important is that the retail-market analysis cannot be 
considered part of the ex-post evaluation of the Commission’s decision. Whether or not 
potential savings in the upstream wholesale electricity markets are passed through to 
consumers does not depend on the Commission’s intervention but on the competitive 
structure of the downstream retail electricity market. 
The aim of the retail analysis is therefore to allow us to investigate the more general (and, 
perhaps, crucial) issue of under which conditions the beneficial effects of competition in 
upstream energy markets are passed on to final costumers. Whether and when retail prices 
might have been influenced by upstream changes spurred by the Commission’s decision is 
unclear. To answer this question we build an empirical framework based on the specificities 
of German electricity markets which define our identification strategy 
First, energy retailers are structurally different in the degree of vertical integration with 
wholesalers and producers, their size, geographical scale, ownership structure, and 
objectives. These structural differences also affect their energy purchasing strategies and, 
particularly, the type and length of long-term contracts they stipulate with the wholesalers. 
Therefore, heterogeneous retailers are expected to have different incentives to pass-on 
upstream savings to downstream markets. Specifically, large, vertically integrated 
incumbents are expected to have less incentive to quickly pass-on than small, non-vertically 
integrated incumbents. 
Second, the pass-on of changes in wholesale prices to retail tariffs depends on the extent of 
downstream market power. The large perceived retail costumers' switching costs - 
particularly for private households - create a stable customer base for incumbent retailers, 
which can be exploited with high tariffs (e.g. Hviid and Waddams (2012)). Hence, incumbent 
firms are less likely to pass-on reduced costs than other competitors. 
Third, most contracts among energy suppliers and retailers are long-term. Therefore, if at all, 
one would expect the impact of the Commission's decision on retail prices to come into 
effect gradually as old supply contracts are successively replaced by new ones, meaning 
one should only expect slow changes in retail prices following changes in wholesale prices. 
Finally, other important factors such as the (mostly regulated) cost of transmission and 
distribution and taxes affect retail prices. Wholesale energy prices constitute only a small 
part —in Germany ca. one third— of retail tariffs.65 As a consequence, regional and temporal 
variability in retail prices can potentially be explained by other factors, which need to be 
controlled for.  
For both outcome variables - retail prices and wholesale prices - we suggest a difference in 
difference (DiD) approach to identify the effect of the EU enforcement decision. This 
methodology looks at markets/firms/products that are similar to those affected by the 
conduct and the subsequent policy decision (treated) but which themselves are unaffected 
(control) or, at least, less affected.  
The identification strategy exploits both time and cross-sectional variation in the main 
outcome variables to identify the effect of the decision. It compares the differences in the 
average behaviour and outcomes of the treated group, before and after the conduct and 
policy decision, with the difference in the average behaviour of the control group, during the 
same time span.  
This double differencing removes the time invariant individual effects (of treatment and 
control group) and the common time effects that might be otherwise confounded with the 
effect of the conduct and policy decision. It allows the identification of the average causal 
effect of these actions. The two main issues for identification of the causal effect are 
                                                     
65  An in-depth analysis of the composition and trends of retail prices across European country can be found in 
the Commission staff working document “Energy prices and costs report” from the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions Energy prices and costs in Europe. For 
Germany in the second half of 2012 the average household electricity price of 26.8 Eurocent per kWh is 
broken down as follows: 8.3 Eurocent energy cost, 5.9 Eurocent network, 12.4 Eurocent taxation. 
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therefore (i) the choice of the counterfactual (treated vs. control groups) and (ii) the choice of 
the before-and-after periods. In Appendix 1, we present a short non-technical discussion of 
the DiD methodology. 
6.4 An econometric analysis of the wholesale market 
In theory, the effect of the Commission’s decision on wholesale prices is straightforward. The 
divestiture of generation capacity should lead to an increase in competition since the 
production facilities have been mostly purchased by several medium players in the upstream 
power market and not by one of the other dominant players. This increase in competition 
should lead to an increase in energy supply, which implies an outward shift of the supply 
schedule. Subsequently, wholesale prices should decrease ceteris paribus. 
Yet, it is difficult to clearly identify and empirically measure this impact since there are several 
demand-side and supply-side price drivers (omitted factors) which might correlate to the 
(timing of) Commission’s decision and need to be controlled for. Complex structural models 
may allow one to identify the effect of the policy intervention more precisely, but they are very 
data intensive and rely on mostly untestable assumptions and calibrations. As this approach is 
not feasible with the data available, we adopt a difference-in-difference (DiD) framework to 
identify the causal effect of the Commission’s decision similar to the approach proposed for 
the retail market. 
As explained above, the effect of the policy intervention is then identified within a framework of 
a quasi-natural experiment where the behaviour of a treatment group, which is mostly affected 
by the policy, is compared to the behaviour of a control group, which is not (or to a lesser 
extent) affected by the intervention. Ideally, the control group would consist of the same 
people affected by the treatment had they not been treated. Since this is just a theoretical 
counterfactual situation, other strategies have to be chosen to construct a control group. For 
this case study, we choose a strategy based on a within-country comparison. We look at two 
different outcomes in Germany = the peak and off-peak wholesale electricity prices - that 
should have been differently affected by the policy decision. They constitute the two ‘groups’ in 
our DiD framework.   
Looking at the different evolution of the two outcomes before and after the implementation of 
the divestitures, we expect to identify the causal effect of the Commission’s decision. A main 
advantage of this approach is that the performance of the two groups is equally affected by 
their common institutional drivers. Hence, we might be less worried about potential institutional 
differences across the two groups that are more likely in an across-countries comparison. Put 
differently, the common trend assumption is more likely to hold conditional on adjusting for the 
most crucial drivers of peak and off-peak prices. To control these different dynamics, we use 
demand and supply conditions that are different between peak and off-peak periods. 
6.4.1 The basic framework: A DiD Approach 
The basic empirical model we use to analyse the German wholesale energy market consists 
of a price equation, where the wholesale price is a function of demand and supply drivers. Our 
model is based on Böckers and Heimeshoff (2014) and takes the following form:66 
𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝑁𝑡𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖 + 𝛾𝑝𝑡𝛾𝑁 + 𝛿𝑁𝑡𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖 × 𝑝𝑡𝛾𝑁 + 𝛼1𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼2𝛾𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑖+ 𝛼3𝑐𝑡𝑡𝛾𝛾 − 𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑅𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑡𝑤𝛾𝑖  + 𝜔1𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑛𝑤𝑠𝑢𝑖 + 𝜔2𝑐𝑡𝑁𝑙𝑖 + 𝜔3𝑅𝑁𝛾𝑖+ 𝜔4𝑡𝑤𝑙𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑅𝑢𝑤𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑖 + � 𝜃𝑦𝑌𝑦,𝑖2012
𝑦=2008
+ � 𝜗𝑚𝑀𝑚,𝑖11
𝑚=1
+ �𝜇𝑑𝑅𝑑,𝑖6
𝑑=1
 + 𝜌1 𝑁𝑅𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏1ℎ𝑡𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑜𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖 .                                                                (1) 
 
The daily power price 𝑝𝑖𝑖 at day t for the group i —peak vs. off-peak— is regressed on 
demand-side variables such as seasonal and business cycle dummies (day D, month M, 
                                                     
66  In a model with time fixed-effects, the dummy post is generally not identified it is collinear with the year 
dummies. See footnote 71. 
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year Y, peak and off-peak temperature, and holiday). To address the crucial issue of 
integration of European energy markets that created pricing constraints imposed by 
competition from neighbouring countries,67  we included a variable measuring the cross-
border electricity flows (𝑅𝑡𝑡𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑅𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑡𝑤𝛾𝑖) as well as a dummy for the market-coupling 
period.68  
 
Supply-side controls are the prices of input factors, represented by price indices that cover 
the daily international prices for commodities such as coal, gas, oil, and emission certificates 
(coal, oil, gas, and emission), equal across i for a given day t. Another crucial control is the 
actual production of renewable energy (wind and sun) that substantially shifted the supply 
schedule.69 Since there is no complete data on actual sun energy production for the entire 
sample period, we proxy for it with its most important drivers, as discussed in the data 
section. 70  
 
Finally, the error terms are assumed to be auto-correlated and heteroskedastic. We 
therefore estimate Newey-West standard errors and assume the maximum lag order of 
autocorrelation to be equal to one week (seven days). Since the assumptions on the error 
term are crucial to accurate inference, we then perform several robustness checks to test 
their relevance to our results. 
The dummy treat is equal to 1 for the ‘treated’ prices, i.e. those prices that should be (mostly) 
affected by the Commission’s decision, while the dummy post is equal to 1 during the period 
following the termination of the alleged abuse and the implemented remedies. We examine 
the definition of these variables in the following sections. The double differencing implied by 
a DiD framework and the inclusion of a large set of common demand-side and supply-side 
drivers will help mitigate endogeneity problems due to omitted variables and create more 
confidence on the causal nature of the estimated treatment effect.   
6.4.2 Identification of the treatment group: treatment peak vs. off-peak prices  
As discussed above, the proposed identification strategy is based on the different price 
response to the Commission’s decision between peak (8am-8pm) and off-peak prices (9pm-
7am). Hence, the definition of the treatment group follows this dummy variable:  
                                                     
67  Alternatively, we tried some specifications where we introduced the price of neighbouring countries in 
equation (1) as control variables. Indeed, power exchanges across Europe have increased cooperation and 
set up projects to couple their markets. In this way, power prices of different regions are closely linked one to 
one another. A major issue of this approach is that prices in other countries are clearly endogenous to 
German prices. The large number of potentially endogenous variables makes an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach difficult to implement in this setting; we therefore, opted for a control-function approach. In this 
approach, prices are split into an exogenous and an endogenous component. The exogenous components 
are the country-specific cost and demand drivers. Unfortunately, we had very limited information for this 
country-specific exogenous component as most of the cost drivers (input prices as well as day, month, and 
year dummies) are common to all countries. Therefore we abandoned this approach.  
68  The market coupling mechanism was introduced to optimize of the allocation process of cross-border 
capacities. It works via a coordinated calculation of prices and flows across countries based on implicit 
auctions. We take November 2010 as the date of the introduction of a Central West European market 
coupling mechanism that covers Germany, Benelux, and France. 
69  Potentially, it might be important to control for additional new installed capacity from conventional—rather 
than renewable— sources as it might also influence the supply schedule. Data from the German regulator for 
the period 2007-2014 suggest that the large increase in generation capacity over the sample period comes 
from renewable sources. Only during the second half of 2011 some substantial changes in the generation of 
capacity can be observed due to the shutdown of nuclear plants following the Fukushima's accident. The 
reduced nuclear capacity was however compensated by an increase of gas power plants' capacity. The net 
change was lower than 2,000 MW and much smaller than the change in generation capacity due to 
renewable. Hence these changes cannot substantially affect our results. 
70  Indeed, the boom of wind and solar production capacity spurred by the de-carbonisation of energy supply in 
Germany as well as in all other European countries drastically changed the functioning of power market over 
the past decade. Specifically, the introduction of increasing renewable electricity production changed the merit 
order schedule and, accordingly, the resulting market prices. The renewable energy installed capacity has 
started to substantially increase after 2007 and did so during the entire sample period. 
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𝑁𝑡𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖 = �1, 𝑤𝑓 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑃 𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑁𝑛𝑤0, 𝑤𝑓 𝑂𝑓𝑓 − 𝑝𝑅𝑁𝑃 𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑁𝑛𝑤 
 
Figure 6.13 explains the logic of our identification. The premise is that energy suppliers have 
more market power during peak periods where demand is higher due to business activities. 
Since the supply schedule is highly convex and is much steeper during the peak period, a 
shift to a lower capacity schedule obtained if capacity is withdrawn from the market would 
have much larger effects during peak time.  
The difference in the peak price between the high capacity scenario (PPeak,H) and the low 
capacity scenario (PPeak,L) is much larger than the difference in the off-peak price between 
the high capacity scenario (POff-Peak,H) and the low capacity scenario (POff-Peak,L). Hence, a 
policy intervention that shifts the supply schedule to the ‘high capacity’ scenario should most 
critically reduce market power, and therefore prices, during peak hours with a much smaller 
effect off-peak. 
Figure 6.13 Differential Effect of a shift in Supply Peak vs. Off-Peak Prices 
 
Source: Own representation 
Consequently, for each trading day, we create two series of prices according to peak and off-
peak periods. Figure 6.14 represents the evolution of the monthly average day-ahead prices 
during peak and off-peak periods. We represent monthly averages to wash out the extreme 
daily price volatility and make the comparison clearer. While there is some seasonal 
variability, both prices have been dropping since 2009, and there is a slight and slow 
convergence among the two series after 2009.  
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Figure 6.14 German Monthly Peak vs. Off-Peak Prices 
 
Clearly, this descriptive evidence only suggests a possible convergence. In our econometric 
exercise, we need to control for other factors affecting the evolution of prices to avoid 
problems of endogeneity, i.e., to causally identify the effect of the Commission’s decision, 
which is precisely the purpose of model (1). 
6.4.2.1 Potential alternative counterfactuals and why we did not choose them 
We considered alternatives to define the control group based on cross-country comparisons, 
but decided not to pursue them. First, we considered choosing as a control group a country 
structurally similar to Germany but not impacted by any alleged abuse, merger, or other 
relevant competition policy decision during the sample period.  Selecting such a country has 
proved difficult. Germany has a unique electricity market, particularly since it pursued a 
‘green-strategy’ (the so called Energiewende).This makes it essentially impossible to find 
another national market to compare it with.  
Direct neighbours are a poor counterfactual because electricity markets are becoming 
increasingly connected so cannot be regarded as fully independent of each other. Even 
markets not strongly connected to Germany are a poor counterfactual if they have been 
affected by some competition policy interventions during the sample period. While we 
abandoned this identification strategy, we identified two potentially interesting markets for 
comparison and used them in a ‘placebo’ robustness check, described below.  
A second, promising approach relies on the creation of a so-called synthetic control group 
(e.g., Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010)) to make causal inference in the presence of 
a large cross-section of non-treated observations, none of which is perfectly similar to the 
treated group.  
It consists of creating a synthetic, hypothetical market, whose outcome pre-treatment almost 
perfectly matches the outcome of the treated group. In our case, this ‘synthetic group’ could 
be constructed as a weighted average from a selection of other countries and represents 
Germany as it would be, had it not been treated by the policy decision. The difficulty of this 
approach lays in the selection of suitable candidates countries to be included in the creation 
of the control group. It is also data intensive, requiring a potentially large set of key control 
variables that affect the outcome variable, i.e. energy prices, not only for Germany but also 
for all other countries used to construct the control group. 
In a substantial data collection exercise, we gathered quite complete information on 
wholesale prices and their drivers for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden. By using the ‘synth’ command in Stata, we 
tried to generate a synthetic control group for the two German prices (peak and off-peak) 
using energy consumption, temperature, and holidays as observable characteristics.71  
                                                     
71  Unfortunately, several other important drivers of wholesale energy prices — input prices such as gas, coal, 
etc.— are country-invariant as they are purchased at the global commodity market and could not been used 
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For each of the prices we implement two procedures: one based on daily data and one 
based on monthly data. The procedure would produce a reliable control group if the German 
pre-treatment prices were almost perfectly matched by the prices generated for the synthetic 
control group in the pre-treatment period. Unfortunately, the different specifications produced 
very poor results. We could not match German electricity prices in a satisfactory way by 
using the synthetic control group and abandoned this approach.  
6.4.3 Identification of the treatment period 
The second crucial element of our identification strategy is the definition of the treatment 
period, i.e., the time during which the decision’s effect materialised. We defined three major 
periods: the before period (up to December 2008), the implementation period during which 
the remedies were implemented (January 2009 to April 2010), and the after period (since 
May 2010). Given the high frequency of our data and because wholesale energy markets are 
very dynamic and could  respond swiftly to changes in supply conditions, we consider four 
different impact scenarios that should allow us to identify both the short-term and long-term 
effects of the policy intervention. The advantage of the short-run scenario is to try to identify 
the effect of each single remedy and focus on a very short time period. This lowers the risk 
of contaminating the effect of the intervention with other, unobserved factors but the effects 
of an important policy intervention could be much more pervasive. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to look at long-term effects and at the impact of the decision over several years. 
The disadvantage of the long-term analysis is that the precise causal identification of the 
policy intervention might be weakened by the existence of confounding factors, particularly in 
such a liquid and dynamic market. 
 
Long-Run Effects of the Decision 
In this approach, probably the closest to a standard DiD analysis, we assume that the 
Commission’s decision had long-lasting effects. We then consider two possible situations. 
First, we assume that these effects are apparent as soon as the Commission’s decision was 
implemented. We thus construct the dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 from the first 
divesture onwards, including the implementation year 2009:  
𝑅𝑡𝛾𝑁𝑖 = �1,         𝑤𝑓      𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅 > 𝑅𝑅𝑐 31 2008 0,                                                   𝑅𝑙𝛾𝑅  
 
Alternatively, we assume that the overall effect of the decision can only be observed when 
the last remedy has been implemented. We thus define the post period from the May 10 
2010 onwards and exclude the year 2009 from the analysis. 
                                                           
𝑅𝑡𝛾𝑁𝑖 = �1,         𝑤𝑓        𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅 > 𝑀𝑁𝑜 10 20100,       𝑤𝑓          𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅 < 𝐽𝑁𝑛 1 2009  
 
Cumulative Short-Run Effect of the Remedies 
In the second approach, the impact of the divesture is assumed to be immediate and short-
lived. Thus the dummy variable post takes on the value of 1 for the week after each of the 
eight divestures. One week after each divestiture j out of the J divestitures, the dummy then 
turns to zero again and it then turns to 1 again when the next divestiture is implemented.  
 
𝑅𝑡𝛾𝑁𝑖 = �1,         𝑓𝑡𝑡  𝑤𝑗 = 𝑁1, … , 𝑁1 + 6; … ; 𝑁𝐽, … , 𝑁𝐽 + 6  𝑤𝑗 = 𝑤𝑁𝑜 𝑡𝑓 𝑅𝑤𝐷𝑅𝛾𝑁𝑠𝑡𝑅 𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 0,                                                                                                                  𝑅𝑙𝛾𝑅                                        
                                                                                                                                                                      
in the analysis. Moreover, one main variable that is unfortunately not available for all countries but that plays a 
crucial role in affecting the evolution of wholesale prices is the daily actual solar and wind energy production. 
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Hence, the coefficient’s estimate for this dummy measures the average cumulative short-
term effect of all divestiture together. 
Individual Short-Run Effect of the Remedies 
Since the effects of each divestiture might be heterogeneous, we then split this average 
effect on separate effects for each of the different divestitures j. Also in this case, we 
measure short run effects covering one full week after completion of the divestiture. We will 
then have J dummies, one for each divestiture of the form: 
 
𝑅𝑡𝛾𝑁𝑖𝑗 = �1,         𝑓𝑡𝑡  𝑤𝑗 = 𝑁, … , 𝑁 + 6 , 𝑤 = 𝑤𝑁𝑜 𝑡𝑓 𝑅𝑤𝐷𝑅𝛾𝑁𝑠𝑡𝑅 𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽     0,                                                                                                                            𝑅𝑙𝛾𝑅       
 
This scenario allows us to more flexibly identify the short run effects of each divestiture. 
However, the identification comes from a small number of observations. Specifically, it 
comes from seven observations around each divestiture, making this model much more 
refined and flexible, but potentially less robust. However, the coefficient estimates in this 
case cannot be interpreted as treatment effects. This specification resembles much more an 
event study and the aim is to measure whether there have been quick price adjustments 
around the implementation of the single remedies. 
6.4.4 Robustness check: Placebo regressions using France and Spain 
As mentioned above, instead of using other countries as alternative control groups, we 
chose a ‘placebo’ scenario. We selected France and Spain as two countries that share 
similarities with Germany and where we have good data, particularly regarding the 
production of renewable energy and cross-border flows. These two countries also share the 
peculiarity of being more (France) or less (Spain) connected to Germany through common 
borders. We then implement the same identification strategy used for Germany on the 
French and Spanish prices, comparing peak and off-peak prices and using the same 
definition of the before and after periods.  
If the chosen ‘placebo’ markets are independent from the German market and our divestiture 
dummies identify the effect of the Commission’s decision rather than other omitted factors, 
there should not be any significant results for the ‘placebo’ markets. But since the French 
electricity market is potentially more integrated with Germany than Spain, we might expect 
some potential spill-over effects of the E.ON decision on French wholesale electricity prices.  
This is useful to verify whether our identification of the short-term effect of the remedies was 
accurate. Specifically, if we found significant results for the single divestiture in Spain, a 
country that should not be affected by the behaviour of the German market, we could 
conclude that our divestiture dummies are measuring shocks other than the effect of the 
specific remedy. To summarise, we do not expect to see any of the effects observed in 
Germany in the Spanish market, but do expect them in France.  
6.4.5 The data 
The data for the wholesale analysis come from different sources. The power exchange 
prices are taken from the respective (national) power exchanges and come from the Platts 
database. The coal price is a combined price series of two sources (Platts and Argus 
McCloskey), which is adequate since they are extremely highly correlated and measure the 
daily European reference price for coal imports into North-western Europe.  
The oil price index is chosen from ICE Brent Europe (in $/tonne), the gas price reference is 
that of ENDEX/TTF and the emission price is the weighted emission certificate price from the 
EEX. Electricity consumption is retrieved from the ENTSO-E country packages and 
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measured in MWh.72 Temperature data during peak and off-peak periods in degree Celsius 
(Deutscher Wetterdienst (2014)) is included in our main model in both linear and quadratic 
form to account for the non-linear relationship between temperature and consumption as well 
as the relationship between temperature and power production.  
Data on wind and solar power production is retrieved from the website of the four network 
operators. As data on photovoltaic generation is not available on a daily basis before 2010, 
we need to use proxy variables for solar production. To motivate our choice, we collected 
data on the annual installed capacity from 2010 onwards (inst_solar) taken from BDEW 
(2014) and Solarwirtschaft.de (2014) and daily sunshine duration in minutes (sun per day) 
which is retrieved from the Deutscher Wetterdienst (2014). We then use an auxiliary 
regression to explain the power produced by solar generation. We estimate the following 
regression: 
𝛾𝑡𝑙𝑁𝑡𝑖 = 𝑐𝑡𝑛𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑁 + 𝛾𝑠𝑛 𝑝𝑅𝑡 𝑤𝑁𝑜𝑖 + 𝑤𝑛𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑤 𝑐𝑁𝑝𝑖 + � 𝜗𝑚𝑀𝑚,𝑖11
𝑚=1
+ 𝜖𝑖 
We then compare the observed daily capacity to the prediction of the model for the time 
period during which we do observed solar capacity. The model fits the actual data quite well 
(Figure 6.15). Hence, we use the explanatory variables from this regression as a proxy for 
solar production for the entire sample period. 
Figure 6.15 Solar capacity: Actual vs. Fitted values 
 
Source: Own representation of data from different sources (BDEW, 2014; 
Solarwirtschaft.de, 2014; and Deutscher Wetterdienst 2014) 
Table 6.2 reports the preliminary statistics for the variables that will be used in our 
regression. 
Table 6.2 The German Wholesale Electricity Market – Preliminary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price 2,922 49.347 19.025   -69.756 174.395 
Price peak 1,461     58.18     20.32   -6.64    174.4 
Price off-peak 1,461     40.52     12.46      -69.76 80.59 
Consumption peak 2,916 1,7927.2 18,271.55 0 45,821.27 
Consumption off-peak 2,916 14,819.69 15,019.41 0 39,302.54 
Temperature peak 2,922 3.299 4.563 -5.924 17.703 
Temperature off-peak 2,922 2.258 3.411 -6.227 12.955 
Wind 2,922 4,541.416 3,594.762 333.646 21,233.87 
Solar 2,922 658.712 1,003.094 0 4,389.146 
Sun per day 2,922 279.426 218.847 0 878.555 
                                                     
72  Missing data is replaced by averages constructed by interpolation. 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Installed cap 2,922 14,320.520 6,939.736 5,955 23,962 
Divestiture 2,922 2.366 44.170 0 1,500 
Cross-border flows 2,917   -400.84     1,505.68   -5,702.1    5,175.14 
Cross-border flows peak 1,458       -487.42 1,628.32   -5,702.1    5,175.14 
Cross-border flows offpeak 1,459    -314.32     1,367.31     -4,317.5    4,345.69 
Oil price 2,922 87.316 24.905 33.73 143.95 
Gas price 2,922 19.290 5.878 7.2 31.8 
Uranium price 2,922 53.441 10.435 40 90 
Allowance 2,922 9.968 6.169 0.015 16.865 
Coal price 2,922 107.262 35.632 56 224.75 
6.4.6 Main results: Peak vs. Off-peak Prices 
In Table 6.3 we report the main results of our estimation. First, the model seems to well 
explain the data because we can capture between 73 and 79 per cent of the variation in 
wholesale prices. Second, we observe an average difference between peak and off-peak 
prices that varies between 31 €/MWh in the long run models to ca. 20 €/MWh in the short 
run. Third, we also observe an overall decrease in prices during the post period (‘cumulative 
post effect’), mostly defined from 2009 to 2011.73 On average, all prices have decreased by 
seven to 20 €/MWh depending on the model adopted. Interesting for this study, is the 
interaction between Peak and Post, whose coefficients’ estimate measures the treatment 
effect, i.e. the differential evolution of peak prices if compared to off-peak prices after the 
implementation of the Commission’s decision. 
Table 6.3 The Effect of the Divestitures on German Wholesale Prices 
 Post 2010  
(1) 
Post 2009 
(2) 
Short-Run  
(3) 
Single Div.  
(4) 
Peak 30.84*** 31.03*** 19.68*** 19.83*** 
 (1.89) (1.79) (1.00) (1.03) 
Peak × Post -15.37*** -14.58*** -3.22**  
 (1.65) (1.66) (1.54)  
Peak × Div. 1     -2.48 
    (2.65) 
Peak × Div. 2     -4.47*** 
    (1.62) 
Peak × Div. 3     0.18 
    (2.28) 
Peak × Div. 4     3.57 
    (3.25) 
Peak × Div. 5     -2.40** 
    (1.19) 
Peak × Div. 6     -9.55*** 
    (2.16) 
Peak × Div. 7     -4.37*** 
    (1.31) 
Peak × Div. 8     -6.54*** 
    (2.27) 
Constant 40.32*** 38.38*** 46.66*** 47.89*** 
 (7.46) (6.33) (7.92) (8.24) 
Cumulative post effect -7.09*** -11.85*** -20.06*** -20.84*** 
 (2.74) (4.30) (4.97) (5.62) 
                                                     
73  Since we use year dummies in the regression, the ‘post’ dummy is not identified. Therefore, the ‘post’ effect is 
calculated as the sum of the coefficients’ estimates for the years dummies, what we call the ‘cumulative post-
effect’. In the specification represented in column (1) where we drop the year 2009, we sum the estimates for 
the 2010 and 2011 dummies, while in column (2) to (4) we sum the estimates for the 2009, 2010, and 2011 
dummies. 
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 Post 2010  
(1) 
Post 2009 
(2) 
Short-Run  
(3) 
Single Div.  
(4) 
N 2190 2916 2890 2916 
Adj. R2 0.7800 0.7900 0.7626 0.7625 
The dependent variable is the daily average peak or off-peak price at the EEX power exchange. We control for input 
prices (gas, oil, coal, uranium, and emission), day, month, and year dummies, solar and wind energy production, 
temperature, cross-border capacities, market coupling, as well as holydays. Newey-West standard errors with maximum 
lag order of autocorrelation equal to seven days are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent 
significance at the 15, %%, 10% levels respectively. 
For the long-run scenario we find a significance convergence between peak and off 
peak prices. This effect is not only statistically significant but also economically very large. 
Independently of whether we look at post-December 2008 or post-March 2010 where we 
exclude the entire implementation periods, there is a significant reduction of peak prices with 
respect to off-peak prices of around 15 €/MWh, other things equal. This convergence seems 
to be more marked than our descriptive observation represented in figure 1.15. This is most 
likely because changes in input prices and renewable capacity would partially offset this 
convergence. So it seems particularly important to control for these additional drivers of the 
prices.74 
Looking at short run effects, we also obtain negative and significant coefficient 
estimates for the dummies measuring the interaction between ‘peak’ and the 
divestitures, which hint at a short-run price convergence in the week around the 
implementation of the remedies. In the specification where we assume an average short 
term effect of the remedies, we find a smaller convergence of around 3 €/MWh between 
peak and off peak prices if compared to the long run effects. This is strongly significant 
different from zero.  
The second specification is even more demanding in terms of identification and tries to 
separately identify the short time reaction around each single divestiture. Therefore, it should 
be taken even more cautiously, particularly because these effects cannot be interpreted as 
short-term average treatment effects.  
According to our estimates, five of eight divestitures have a negative and significant impact 
on the difference between peak and off-peak prices. For the three remaining, there is no 
significant effect. The divestiture-specific convergence effect varies between two and nine 
€/MWh. These findings could suggest that the market quickly and substantially reacted to the 
increase in capacity by leading to a significant price convergence but then readjusted to a 
more moderate level, whose average is represented by the three €/MWh estimated above. 
All in all, our results suggest that around the divestitures there was a significant impact 
on German wholesale energy prices and both the short-run and long-run difference 
between peak and off-peak prices was significantly reduced, ceteris paribus. This 
finding is consistent with the Commission’s decision effectively stopping or at least reducing 
E.ON’s alleged abuse of market power. The exact extent of this convergence differs, 
depending on the assumption on the timing framework we consider relevant to observe 
these effects. However, the range seems to be quite large, but still reasonable and varies 
between 3 €/MWh to 15 €/MWh. 
All proposed approaches have advantages and disadvantages. The short-run scenarios are 
possibly more intuitive because the short time window minimises the possibility that other 
unobserved factors or events create a bias. However, they might fail to measure long-term 
changes in the market structure or they might not capture slow adjustment in firms’ bidding 
behaviour. They also cannot be interpreted as clean average treatment effects. The long-run 
effects, which can be better interpreted within a difference-in-difference framework, are more 
likely to capture permanent strategic adjustments in the bidding behaviour of both 
                                                     
74  We do not report the coefficient estimates for all control variables. However, they are all significant and 
conform to our expectations. Specifically, input prices and temperature are significantly and positively related 
to wholesale prices. The coefficients’ estimates for the day and month dummies are also highly significant. 
Finally, the production capacity of wind and solar as well as the cross-border flows significantly decrease 
wholesale prices as expected. The full results are reported in Appendix A4.2. 
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incumbents and the smaller competitors. However, they could be contaminated by other 
policy intervention or market changes occurring during the same period. Indeed, during the 
years 2009-2011 several other national and EU-wide policy interventions affected the 
German electricity wholesale market. But the comparison of the different effects gives us a 
quite coherent picture that consistently points to an increase in competition in the market that 
can be related to the E.ON alleged abuse of dominance case. 
6.4.7 Placebo analysis: the effect of the decision on the Spanish and French wholesale market 
As discussed above to test the robustness of our findings, we conduct two ‘placebo’ tests, 
using data from Spain and France. These countries are similar to Germany along several 
dimensions (particularly size) and provide relatively good information on the main control 
variables, such as the production of renewable energy, cross-border electricity flows, 
holydays, and temperature. We then implement the same identification strategy used for 
Germany, comparing peak and off-peak prices and using the same definition of the before 
and after periods. The logic of the ‘placebo’ test is that: if we measure the effect of the E.ON 
decision and the different geographic markets are not strongly integrated, we should not see 
the same effects in the other countries that we observe for Germany. 
Spain 
During the sample period, the Spanish wholesale electricity market was not closely 
integrated to Germany. For one, Spain does not share borders with Germany, so there is 
essentially no-trade of electricity between the two. The effect of the E.ON alleged abuse 
case on the Spanish market would have only been possible if the German prices have 
significantly affected the French ones and these, in turn, affect the Spanish prices.75 It is 
unlikely that the Commission’s decision significant affected Spanish prices.  
Figure 6.16 shows the evolution of the monthly average peak and off peak Spanish 
wholesale energy prices. The differences between the two price series and their 
convergence appear much smaller than in Germany. 
Figure 6.16 Spanish Monthly Peak vs. Off-Peak Prices 
 
We then more precisely analyse the convergence patterns within our regression framework, 
reported in Table 6.4. Again, the model seems successful because we can explain more 
than 84 per cent of the variation in the Spanish wholesale prices. The difference between 
peak and off-peak prices in Spain seems to be much lower on average —around 1/3— than 
in Germany and ranges between six and 10 €/MWh. After 2009, similar to Germany, prices 
decreased on average eight to 19 €/MWh (the cumulative post-effect). But the convergence 
                                                     
75  During the sample period, the Spanish import and export of energy were almost exclusively with and towards 
Portugal. We therefore control for this cross-border exchange of energy by including the Portuguese 
wholesale prices. 
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between peak and off-peak prices was much smaller than in Germany: around 3 €/MWh as 
compared to the 15 €/MWh price convergence for Germany.76   
 
Table 6.4 The Effect of the Divestitures on Spanish Wholesale Prices 
 Post 2010 
 (1) 
Post 2009  
(2) 
Short-Run  
(3) 
Single Div.  
(4) 
Peak 10.00*** 9.52*** 6.42*** 6.61*** 
 (3.24) (2.68) (2.46) (2.50) 
Peak × Post -3.43*** -3.70*** -1.57  
 (0.99) (0.97) (2.01)  
Peak × Div. 1     -3.99*** 
    (1.38) 
Peak × Div. 2     -1.75 
    (1.07) 
Peak × Div. 3     -1.14 
    (1..26) 
Peak × Div. 4     -1.59 
    (1.66) 
Peak × Div. 5     -0.67 
    (1.70) 
Peak × Div. 6      
     
Peak × Div. 7     -2.31 
    (2.02) 
Peak × Div. 8     -0.73 
    (2.79) 
Constant 32.03*** 31.28*** 32.79*** 33.61*** 
 (4.63) (4.20) (4.24) (4.27) 
Cumulative post effect -13.16* -19.61*** -8.1* -7.17 
 (6.95) (4.58) (4.64) (5.01) 
N 2,148 2,878 2,878 2,878 
Adj. R2 0.8409 0.8439 0.8440 0.8432 
The dependent variable is the daily average peak or off-peak price at the EEX power exchange. We control for 
input prices (gas, oil, coal, uranium, and emission), day, month, and year dummies, solar and wind energy 
production, cross-border production, market coupling, temperature, as well as holydays. Newey-West standard 
errors with maximum lag order of autocorrelation equal to seven days are reported in parentheses. The symbols 
***, **, * represent significance at the 15, %%, 10% levels respectively. 
This small but significant long-term convergence is consistent with the Spanish market 
becoming more competitive between 2009 and 2011, for different reasons. First, price 
convergence might have been determined by an increase of competition in the Spanish 
market due to the enforcement of other competition policy decisions. According to the data 
collected for the broad econometric analysis, several abuse cases were opened by the 
Spanish competition authority in the electricity sector after 2009.77 Two EU merger cases 
affecting the Spanish electricity market were also cleared with remedies.78 An alternative 
explanation relates to the general convergence of Central-West European wholesale 
electricity markets during the sample period, which might have increased the level of 
competition in each (e.g., Böckers and Heimeshoff (2014)). If all European markets are 
                                                     
76  Stretching these results, they might also be useful to improve our identification strategy in terms of a sort of 
difference-in-difference-in-difference approach. By looking at the difference in the convergence effects 
between Germany and Spain, we can identify the long-term level effect of the Commission’s decision on the 
German market. This would be on average around 15-3=12 EUR MWh. Clearly, a more specific estimation 
that controls for cross-countries differences would be needed to confirm the validity of this back-of-the-
envelope calculation. 
77 The cases were: S/0211/09, ENDESA INSTALACIÓN, S/0243/10 IBERDROLA/ SUMINISTRO AYUN, 
S/0255/10 PUNTOS SERVICIO EON, S/0268/10 PUNTOS SUMINISTRO IBERDRO, S/0319/10 ACOGEN, 
S/0361/11 GAS NATURAL COMERCIAL, S/0328/11 TGSS, S/0450/12 CONVENIOS AYUNTAMIENTOS G. 
78  The cases were: M.5978 GDF SUEZ/INTERNATIONAL POWER, and M.5467 RWE/ESSENT.   
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indeed well integrated, then the observed effect could also be attributed to the specific E.ON 
decision. 
Looking at the short-term effects might be particularly useful to better differentiate between 
these alternative explanations and support our identification strategy for Germany. While 
other factors might have affected the convergence between peak and off-peak prices in 
Spain over one or two years as measured by the long-term effects, it is much less likely that 
Spanish prices are significantly affected when we look at one week around each individual 
divestitures, as we do in the short-run scenarios. In this case, we could potentially observe 
significant results either because the divestiture dummies measure other shocks that 
affected energy markets unrelated to the E.ON case, i.e., we wrongly identified the 
divestiture period, or because German and Spanish markets are strongly integrated. 
As expected, there is no significant convergence effect in either short-term specifications. 
First, the short-run effect (column three) is not significantly different from zero. Second, 
almost each of the single divestitures’ estimates is not significantly different from zero. So 
that while German prices significantly react to the implementation of the remedies, Spanish 
prices remain mostly unaffected. 
Overall, the Spanish results substantiate our claim that we are able to identify, even 
imperfectly, the effect of the implementation of the remedies imposed by the Commission on 
E.ON and we are not measuring unrelated shocks affecting electricity markets. 
 
 
France 
Compared to Spain, the French wholesale electricity market is much more integrated with 
Germany. The two countries share a border and the trade of electricity was small but not 
negligible during the sample period. Germany is the main importer and exporter of French 
electricity.79 In our main specifications, we try to control for these cross-border electricity 
flows. It’s reasonable to expect that a decision significantly impacting German wholesale 
prices might also have significant consequences for the French market if prices are related.80 
So our expectation is that the Commission’s decision could have had some significant 
effects on the French prices but these effects should be significantly lower than those in 
Germany. Figure 6.17 reports the evolution of the monthly average peak and off-peak 
French wholesale energy prices.  
The picture seems more similar to the German market, however, 2009 is unusual, 
particularly because of a huge price peak in the autumn. While there is some price 
convergence, prices seem to drift apart during 2011. Again, to more precisely analyse the 
convergence patterns we use our regression framework, reported in Table 6.5. 
 
                                                     
79  For instance in 2009, the interconnection capacities between France and Germany represent ca 25% of the 
total interconnection capacities between France and its 6 neighbouring countries. Specifically, Germany 
accounts for about 2.5%of the installed generation capacities in France in terms of exports and 2.1% in terms 
of import. In terms of cross-flows, Germany was the largest importer (7.2 TWh) and exporter (19.2 TWh) of 
electricity capacity from and to France (CRE, 2010). 
80  In its yearly report for 2010, the Commission de la Régulation de l’Énergie (CRE) mentioned (CRE, 2010, p.1, 
p.4): “Overall the monthly changes of the net trade balances at the borders are correlated with the changes in 
price differentials, with this correlation being particularly clear with Germany and the UK (Graph 5): the trade 
balances observed on all of the borders are consistent with the direction of the average price differentials with 
France (Day-ahead, base).“ 
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Figure 6.17 French Monthly Peak vs. Off-Peak Prices 
 
The results partially correspond to our expectations. The difference between peak and off-
peak prices is estimated on average between 21 and 30 €/MWh and between 2009 and 
2011, all prices decreased on average by 33 to 50 €/MWh (the cumulative post-effect). 
These estimates are even larger than those from Germany. The convergence between peak 
and off-peak prices during the same period appears to be similar to Germany and on 
average around 15 €/MWh. But if we exclude 2009 from the analysis, there is no significant 
convergence between 2010 and 2011. This suggests that France experienced some 
significant shocks during 2009 that influenced the convergence between peak and off-peak, 
which disappeared in the following years.81 
These results are quite different than those from Spain and Germany because they highlight 
that 2009, the year during which most of the E.ON divestitures took place, was an unusual 
year for France. Accordingly, it might be more difficult than for Germany or Spain to clearly 
identify the effect, or otherwise, caused by implementing the remedies. 
The short-run convergence effects show a positive, though not significant, effect of the 
divestitures in both specifications: the difference between peak and off-peak prices 
increased around the divestitures. But in both cases, the standard errors are estimated to be 
extremely large, making these effects not significantly different from zero, meaning no clear 
pattern can be identified in the data. Looking at the convergence results in the week around 
the single divestitures, there are some negative and some positive effects, some of which 
are significant. Again, no clear pattern emerges because only one of the individual 
divestiture’s effects meets the estimations for Germany. 
Table 6.5 The Effect of the Divestitures on French Wholesale Prices 
 Post 2010 
 (1) 
Post 2009  
(2) 
Short-Run  
(3) 
Single Div.  
(4) 
Peak 29.08*** 30.84*** 21.06*** 26.01*** 
                                                     
81  In its yearly report for 2010, CRE mentioned that (CRE, 2010, p.1, p.4): “The wholesale energy markets were 
characterised early 2009 by sharp decreases in electricity and gas prices in the wake of a generalised 
decrease in other fuels (oil, coal) and emission quotas prices. This evolution occurred against the backdrop of 
the financial crisis and the resulting recession. […] On the electricity market, there have been some price 
fluctuations. In particular, a price spike occurred in October 2009 when the sales offers on the Spot market 
were unable to meet the purchase offers over a period of four hours during which the price was €3,000/MWh, 
which is the technical ceiling of the EPEX Spot market. A smaller price spike was also seen in January 2010. 
[…] 2009 also showed a sharp drop in the French electricity net export balance. This deterioration in the 
exchange balance was mainly due to the particularly low availability of nuclear facilities during this period. […] 
The comparison of EDF marginal costs and Spot prices from the EPEX auction shows that, for the periods of 
time when EDF Trading was assumed to be marginal, the price-cost difference in 2009 was 6.5% on average. 
Excluding data of 19 October 2009 price spike and the sometimes negative occurrences of the optimisation 
models, the price-cost difference for 2009 was 3.3%. On the basis of these results CRE considers that, for 
2009, the Spread between prices and marginal costs is at levels that do not represent abuse of a dominant 
position.” 
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 Post 2010 
 (1) 
Post 2009  
(2) 
Short-Run  
(3) 
Single Div.  
(4) 
 (2.82) (2.80) (3.68) (2.79) 
Peak × Post 0.00 -15.34*** 16.38  
 (1.56) (1.94) (18.13)  
Peak × Div. 1     -5.05 
    (4.53) 
Peak × Div. 2     -9.11*** 
    (2.60) 
Peak × Div. 3     -6.74** 
    (2.96) 
Peak × Div. 4     152.56 
    (99.07) 
Peak × Div. 5     5.54*** 
    (1.98) 
Peak × Div. 6     -4.22 
    (2.62) 
Peak × Div. 7     -2.35* 
    (1.21) 
Peak × Div. 8     -3.58 
    (2.87) 
Constant 23.40*** 20.31*** 24.42*** 30.20*** 
 (4.46) (4.43) (5.35) (4.17) 
Cumulative post effect (long run) -35.18***    -33.87*** -57.03*** -54.50*** 
 (8.72) (9.14) (10.89) (9.57) 
N 2188 2916 2916 2916 
Adj. R2 0.4482 0.4014 0.4445 0.5071 
The dependent variable is the daily average peak or off-peak price for France. We control for input prices (gas, oil, 
coal, uranium, and emission), day, month, and year dummies, cross-border production, market coupling, 
temperature, as well as holydays. Newey-West standard errors with maximum lag order of autocorrelation equal 
to seven days are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 15, %%, 10% 
levels respectively. 
In conclusion, the picture for France is mixed. Overall, the model does not perform as well as 
the estimations for Germany and Spain. The adjusted R-squared is between 0.4 and 0.5, 
meaning we can only explain less than half of the variation in French wholesale tariffs. Few 
results are similar to those observed for Germany, while others differ significantly. 
Specifically, both the cumulative divestiture effects and the long run picture differ quite 
substantially from the German analysis, although one of the short-term effects seems to be 
in line with that from Germany. Generally, the integration between the German and the 
French market is not as extreme as the short-term changes in German prices are matched 
by the French ones. Although less clear cut than for Spain, the French analysis also 
supports our identification strategy. 
6.4.8 Robustness checks: High-frequency data and the autocorrelation in the error terms 
Autocorrelation in the residuals is one of the main econometric issues we face by having 
high frequency, time-series data. The use of a Newey-West estimator for the standard errors 
should clearly tackle this issue. However, we try different specifications to understand the 
extent of the potential problem.  
Lower order autocorrelation: First, we use a Newey-West estimator with lower order 
autocorrelation lag (two days). We report our findings in Annex 4. Results are almost 
identical to those reported in our main specification, although we lose some significance in 
the short-term scenario. Hence, controlling for a higher order autocorrelation actually 
reinforce our results. 
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Bootstrapped standard errors: Second, we use a bootstrap estimation with 1,000 
replacements to obtained bootstrapped standard errors.82 We report our findings in the 
appendix in Figure 6.13. Results are again very similar to those reported in our main 
specification, although standard errors tend to be slightly larger in all specifications and, 
therefore, less significant.  
Weekly data: Third, we reduce the frequency of the data and use weekly averages for the 
peak and off-peak prices. Results are again reported in the appendix in Table 5.14. Also in 
this case, our qualitative and quantitative results are the same. We observe significant long-
term effects for Germany in the range of 15 €/MWh and significant short- term convergence 
effects around the divestitures similar in magnitude to those observed in the main 
specification. 
6.5 Econometric analysis of the retail market 
We now analyse the effect of the Commission’s decision on retail prices. The methodological 
approach is similar to that adopted for the wholesale analysis in that we use a DiD 
methodology and a hedonic price equation. However, the data, their level of aggregation, 
and the identification strategy differ substantially. Specifically, the entire analysis is focused 
on exploiting regional variation in retail tariffs within Germany, across different firms, and 
over time. 
6.5.1 The data 
The main data source for the analysis of retail prices is the German price comparison site 
Verivox, which provided  detailed and highly disaggregated data on energy retail prices, 
specifically, monthly price data between January 2007 and August 2014 for 8,241 different 
zip codes (located in 6,249 cities across all 16 German states) from 841 different electricity 
providers.  
For each zip code and month, we have the price for three types of household consumption 
(differentiated by yearly energy consumption: 1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh) and one 
typical commercial costumer (10,000 kWh). For each zip code and month, we also know the 
incumbent provider’s baseline tariff (‘Grundversorgungstarif’), the incumbent provider’s 
cheapest offer, and the overall cheapest offer for that particular regional market. Overall, we 
have 12 different prices for each area and time period. 
In Table 6.6, we present summary statistics related to the Verivox prices. Average tariffs 
substantially vary both within and across consumer groups. The baseline tariff constitutes 
the highest price in a given market. Therefore, we can infer the lower and upper bound of the 
distribution of retail prices. These bounds are used to define the variable ‘price dispersion’ 
which represents the difference between the cheapest and the most expensive tariff in each 
zip code and period. For example, over the entire sample period, the average lowest price 
for a typical household with two children (2800 kWh per year) would have been €536.6 while 
the average annual baseline tariff would have €675.8. On average over all areas and time 
periods, such a representative household could been have saved €139.2 per year (more 
than 20 per cent) by switching from the baseline tariff to the cheapest tariff.  
 
 
                                                     
82  Bootstrapping is a nonparametric econometric approach based on random re-sampling and used to obtain an 
approximated distribution for relevant statistics (e.g., standard errors, confidence intervals, p-values, test 
statistics). It is particularly helpful when the researcher does not clearly know the theoretical distribution of the 
chosen test statistic. The bootstrap command in Stata repeatedly draws samples with replacement from the 
original sample. For each of this sample, we run an OLS regression with White heteroskedastic robust 
standard errors. The bootstrapped standard errors are then calculated as the sample standard deviation of 
the sampling distribution (Guan, 200 able 6.63). 
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Table 6.6 The German energy retail market – Average prices for different consumption 
categories – January 2007 to December 2012 
 
 1,500 kWh 2,800 kWh 4,000 kWh 10,000 kWh 
Baseline tariff 402.8 675.8 927.8 2274.9 
 (36.73) (63.15) (88.75) (252.7) 
Cheapest incumbent tariff 371.3 633.7 871.6 2162.8 
 (36.66) (56.65) (77.54) (214.6) 
Cheapest tariff 294.1 536.6 754.3 1917.7 
 (25.14) (29.05) (41.85) (131.9) 
Price dispersion 108.7 139.2 173.5 357.2 
 (49.62) (60.34) (74.16) (186.5) 
*Standard deviation in parentheses. 
In Table 6.7, we report how frequently each of the different firms is observed to be an 
incumbent retailer and how often each of the different firms is the retailer offering the lowest 
local tariff. E.ON is by far the largest incumbent energy retailer in terms of local network 
areas operated, being the main provider in 25 per cent of the German zip codes. RWE, 
Vattenfall and EnBW are incumbents in 15.7 per cent, 3 per cent and 9.7per cent of zip 
codes respectively, while municipal providers are incumbents in 16.8 per cent of areas. 
Independent retailers only account for 2.2 per cent of incumbents.83 This picture drastically 
changes when we instead consider how often each firm offers the lowest electricity tariff: In 
38.6 per cent of areas the lowest tariff is provided by independent retailers while E.ON, RWE 
and EnBW practically never offer the best price.84  
Table 6.7 The German energy retail market – Incumbent retailers – January 2007 to December 
2012 
 Incumbent Tariff Cheapest Tariff 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
E.ON 0.248 0.432 0.001 0.023 
RWE 0.157 0.364 0.001 0.027 
EnBW 0.097 0.295 0.003 0.051 
Vattenfall 0.030 0.169 0.085 0.279 
Municipal provider (Stadtwerke) 0.168 0.374 0.102 0.303 
Independent retailer 0.022 0.147 0.386 0.487 
Other 0.278 0.448 0.422 0.494 
We represent the average price evolution of the three different tariff types, i.e. incumbent’s 
baseline tariff, incumbent’s lowest tariff, overall lowest tariff, and the price dispersion for the 
different consumption plans respectively in Figure 6.18-Figure 6.21. We differentiate 
between local markets served by one of the big four players, local markets served by 
                                                     
83  Our definition of independent players is rather demanding and based on the name of each firm. Firms that 
have “E.ON”, “RWE”, EnBW”, “Vattenfall”, or “Stadtwerk” in their name are first assigned to their respective 
category. We then researched the ownership structure of all remaining firms. We defined as truly 
“independent” only those firms that are neither directly nor indirectly controlled by one of the big players or a 
municipal provider. The remaining 28% of incumbents are defined as “other”. They have a dispersed 
ownership and are mostly jointly owned by one or more of the big players and/or municipal utility providers 
and/or other firms. 
84  In line with considerations on consumer switching behaviour presented above, the local incumbent is very 
unlikely to offer the most competitive tariff: only in 1.5% of our observations the best tariff offered by the 
incumbent constitutes the cheapest tariff available. 
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municipal providers, and local markets served by independent retailers.85 These figures aim 
to identify tariffs’ trends across different retailers. 
First, all prices exhibit an increasing trend over the sample period. This might be surprising 
given that wholesale prices substantially decreased during the sample period. Yet as 
discussed in Section 5.1, the increase in retail tariffs is mostly due to a substantial increase 
in taxes, fees, and network charges. Changes in wholesale prices also pass through to retail 
market slowly because energy is bought by retailers via long-term contracts spanning 
several years. Finally, retail prices are also influenced by the extent of market power 
downstream. Indeed, the increasing retail prices’ trend is much stronger for the baseline 
tariff, medium for the cheapest tariff of the incumbent, and lowest for the cheapest overall 
tariff in the market. This is consistent with our expectation that market segments that are less 
competitive due to the substantial consumers switching costs (i.e., the incumbent tariffs) 
experience higher price increases over time. We also see that the price dispersion 
significantly increased during the sample period. 
Prices within the different categories seem to follow similar patterns across firms’ types and 
consumption plans i.e., they show a common trend. Yet, some differences emerge. 
Specifically, the lowest baseline tariffs for household customers, particularly those with low 
consumption: 1,500 and 2,800 kWh, and small business customers are offered either by 
municipal providers or independent firms during most of the sample period. A similar, 
although perhaps less marked, picture emerges for the lowest incumbent tariffs. The overall 
lowest tariffs show larger variation in prices than the other two types of tariffs. Typically, the 
lowest tariff is offered by independent providers. Yet again, the size and significance of those 
differences and their evolution over time can only be confirmed through a more rigorous 
econometric approach that should help cleanly identify the drivers of these price dynamics. 
Figure 6.18 The yearly incumbent’s baseline tariff – January 2007 to December 2012 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Verivox Data 
 
                                                     
85  Note that the figure for the ‘big four’ averages out heterogeneous firms: While E.ON, RWE and (at least 
partially) EnBW are big German firms which share many structural similarities, Vattenfall is a Swedish multi-
product firm that entered the German market only in the late 1990s. 
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Figure 6.19 The yearly incumbent’s lowest tariff – January 2007 to December 2012 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Verivox Data 
 
Figure 6.20 The overall yearly lowest tariff in the regional market – January 2007 to December 
2012 
 
Source: Our calculations based on Verivox Data 
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Figure 6.21 Price dispersion – January 2007 to December 2012 
 
Source: Our calculations based on Verivox Data 
Additional data 
In addition to the Verivox pricing data, we use other datasets to control for demand and 
supply shifters that should explain some of the observed regional and time variation in retail 
tariffs. Specifically, we add information on local population structure and the number of 
energy-intensive plants (demand shifters), plus data on grid capacity and firms active in the 
energy sector (supply shifters). 
The data on local population structure are obtained from Regionalatlas Deutschland 
provided by the German Statistical Office.86 The data discern more than 400 ‘Kreise’ (rural 
areas) and cities in Germany, each containing an average of 19 zip codes. To control for 
regional demand variations, we include control variables indicating the local population 
density (inhabitants per square kilometre), the difference between the local birth-rate and 
death-rate, and the local share of non-German population. In addition, the European 
Commission provided a list of 145 energy-intensive industrial plants (EIP) active in Germany, 
likely to affect local energy demand.87 We assign these plants to their respective zip codes 
and use the number of local EIPs as an additional demand control variable. Data on local 
grid capacities and ‘Netznutzungsentgelte’ (network usage fees, i.e. the fees the network 
operators charge firms for power transmission) were provided by Ene’t GmbH (e.g., 
Nikogosian and Veith (2012)).88 As an additional supply side control variable we use the 
Amadeus database to identify the total number of energy firms headquartered in each zip 
code. 
6.5.2 The basic econometric model 
The basic empirical model for the downstream analysis consists of estimating a hedonic 
price equation of the following form:89 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝  +  𝛽𝑖𝑁𝑡𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝑝𝑡𝛾𝑁 + 𝛾𝑖𝑁𝑡𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑡𝛾𝑁 + 𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                     
86  https://www.destatis.de/onlineatlas/ 
87  An energy intensive industrial plant is defined as a Non-power sector installation with an Emission Trading 
System’s Permit according to the European Union Transaction Log database. 
88  http://www.enet.eu 
89  We will separately analyse the price for different consumption plans: three typical household types as well as 
a typical business costumer type. 
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Where the tariff set by retailer i in region r at time t is a function of market demand and 
supply drivers (𝑋𝑖𝑖), firm-region-specific fixed-effects to account for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity across regions, as well as time fixed-effects to account for 
firm/region/ or firm-region invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖  is assumed 
to be heteroskedastic and correlated among observation in the same regional market.90 The 
dummy 𝑁𝑡𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  is equal to one for the firms/region/outcomes that can be expected to be 
more affected by the upstream conduct and zero otherwise (e.g., Hasting, 2004, Aguzzoni et 
al. (2015)). The dummy 𝑝𝑡𝛾𝑁 is equal to one for the post conduct period. In the following 
section we will thoroughly discuss the definition of these two crucial variables. 
The key variable of interest is the interaction between post and treat, whose coefficient (𝛾𝑖) 
measures the price change in the treated regions (or firms in a given region) relative to the 
price change in non-treated regions: the average treatment effect (ATE). This coefficient 
quantifies the additional variation experienced by the prices of those retailers less affected 
by the Commission’s decision with respect to the average price change for those firms that 
were more affected. This coefficient is firm-specific to account for the possibility of firm-
specific heterogeneous effects for different firms. The post coefficient (𝛿) measures any price 
change (between the pre-abuse and the post-abuse period) common to all firms and regions, 
while the coefficient 𝛽𝑖 accounts for any idiosyncrasies   between treated firms/regions and 
non-treated ones unrelated to the alleged abuse. 
6.5.3 Identification 
The two key elements of our identification strategy are the definition of the treated and 
control groups (treatir) and the definition of the before and after periods (post). The 
identification hinges on the institutional details of the German electricity market. As a first 
step in our strategy, we discuss some of these issues in more detail. Specifically, two main 
elements play a crucial role for the identification strategy. First, we consider the 
heterogeneity among the different retailers in the German energy producers, as well as the 
different energy purchasing strategies, which is closely related to the length of the contracts 
stipulated with wholesale energy suppliers. 
As described in the introduction to this chapter, there are different types of firms active in the 
German retail markets. A first group of retailers is represented by the four big vertically 
integrated operators: E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and Vattenfall. These are very large multi-product 
energy firms, mostly active at all levels of the vertical chain. They are the major incumbents 
both in wholesale and in retail markets and own a substantial part of the transmission and 
distribution networks. Yet, their operations at these different levels have been legally 
separated since 2002. Among the four operators, only Vattenfall is different since it is not a 
long-term incumbent in the German market. Vattenfall is a Swedish utility that entered the 
German (and other European) market(s) on a massive scale in the late 1990s.  
The big three German companies account for ca. 50 per cent of the German retail market in 
terms of national market shares. They all have a strong regional focus: E.ON is particularly 
strong in the south (Bavaria) and east of Germany; RWE is the main incumbent in the west 
(particularly North-Rhine Westphalia), and EnBW is the main operator in the south-west 
(Baden-Württemberg). While there were some dynamics in their market shares, they 
maintained a dominant position over the entire sample period. Vattenfall is particularly strong 
in two major city-states (Berlin and Hamburg) and its national market shares remained above 
10 per cent during the sample period as well. These retailers generally offer nation-wide 
tariffs even though there is some cross-regional variation, particularly across their cheapest 
tariffs. 
The other relevant players in the German energy markets are the many municipal 
infrastructure utilities (‘Stadtwerke’). These firms are also often vertically integrated and, in 
most cases, they are multi-utilities, active in electricity and also in other sectors such as gas, 
water, sewerage, municipal waste, etc. They mostly produce energy for their own needs and 
                                                     
90  Also in this case we perform one robustness check to test the relevance of this assumption. 
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not for sale in the wholesale markets. They have a very strong local (political) connection 
and identity. While they are characterised by heterogeneous governance structures, they are 
very often publicly owned or at least they are closely aligned to local politics.  
Several commentators mention that these firms might pursue quite different objectives than 
for-profit energy companies because of their political mandate. They are therefore likely to 
behave very differently to both the established big four incumbents and the smaller, 
independent entrants that mostly focus on electricity retail. Given their large number and the 
governance heterogeneity of different municipal firms, their pricing behaviour is also 
heterogeneous. The regional scope of their operations is also reflected in a cross-regional 
variation in their tariffs. 
The third category of firms active in retail electricity markets is made up of many smaller, 
independent entrants. They are mainly small retailers that are not vertically integrated. The 
majority are partially owned by the big four or by the municipal firms, but there is also a 
substantial number of truly independent companies, with a very different market strategy 
based on their structural difference to the other operators in the market. They are small, their 
capital is limited, and they target their operations mostly at a regional base and to a specific 
group of well-informed and mobile customers. 
Besides different levels of vertical integration, size, and possibly objectives, these groups of 
firms seem to have a very heterogeneous purchasing strategy in wholesale markets. In its 
monitoring report in 2011, the German regulator mentions that (Bundesnetzagentur (2011) 
p41): ‘[…] looking at the purchasing strategies of different [retail] energy suppliers it can be 
seen that new entrants currently purchase energy at a much shorter term than the 
established incumbents. For instance, new entrants order on average only 20 per cent of 
their sales volumes more than one year before its delivery to the end costumers and ca. 35 
per cent during the year of the delivery. On the contrary, incumbents order more than 40 per 
cent of their sales volumes more than one year in advance and only ca. 5 per cent in the 
year of the delivery. Since a short-term purchasing strategy is currently on average cheaper 
than a long-term one, new entrant can offer at present more convenient conditions to their 
customers without losing money in supply and distribution.’ 
Finally, as mentioned above, the very low levels of switching among households customers 
implies that incumbent firms, and particularly especially E.ON, RWE and EnBW, have 
substantial market power over their captive customers. 
These considerations highlight the logic of our identification strategy. We expect large, 
vertically integrated incumbents - i.e., the big four - to behave differently than the small 
independent incumbents and, potentially, the municipal utilities. Specifically, we expect the 
three big large firms and, potentially also Vattenfall, to react less strongly to changes in 
wholesale prices than small, independent providers. Mainly because they have a larger 
degree of market power over their customers and use a less aggressive and more 
conservative purchasing strategy in wholesale markets, probably because they are vertically 
integrated. Given that the prediction for municipal firms and other firms with a mixed 
ownership structure is unclear, we will not include them in the control group but will presume 
that they are also treated. Therefore, we will estimate firm-specific heterogeneous treatment 
effect that might be different for the two groups of firms 
Treatment 
Our treatment group consists of E.ON, RWE, EnBW and potentially Vattenfall, which is expected to 
react less to changes in wholesale prices than independent incumbents. Therefore, their prices are 
expected to increase relative to the control group of small, independent retailers in the post-
treatment period. Municipalities and other firms should react differently than independent retailers, 
therefore they are assumed to be differently treated. 
To increase the power of our identification strategy, we then consider the heterogeneity of 
response according to the market segments. The existence of high consumers switching 
costs implies that many of the German households are captive customers of the incumbent 
firms. Yet, a small but increasing proportion of households seem to have better information 
about the benefit of switching suppliers and began to use it. . We can therefore consider that 
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the German retail electricity market is somehow segmented between a group of captive 
customers who stick to the incumbent base-line tariff – or perhaps another cheaper tariff of 
the incumbent - and a more mobile group of customers willing to switch. The latter market 
segment is probably more competitive, meaning the tariffs in this segment of the market 
should be more responsive to changes in wholesale prices. Therefore, looking at the price 
dispersion among the highest incumbent baseline tariff and the overall cheapest tariff in the 
same regional market allows us to strengthen our identification. 
Additional Treatment 
We expect the price dispersion at the local market to significantly increase post-treatment in 
markets where E.ON, RWE, EnBW and potentially Vattenfall are the incumbent operators. 
To clearly identify the impact of an upstream change in wholesale electricity prices on retail 
tariffs, we use another important characteristic of electricity markets. As discussed in the 
introduction, energy purchase works via long-term contracts. This implies that any change in 
wholesale prices should materialise in retail markets only with a substantial delay. The 
German regulator mentions (Bundesnetzagentur (2011) p41):  “[…] the wholesale prices, 
which have been decreasing since the second half of 2008, started to have a positive effect 
on household retail prices in 2010. However, [these price reductions] are considerably 
delayed if compared to the wholesale market. The main reason for these delayed reductions 
of the suppliers’ acquisition costs lies on the long-term purchasing strategy”. 
In the wholesale analysis, the effect of the Commission’s decision on wholesale prices was 
quite short-term and materialised soon after the individual remedies were   implemented. 
However, as discussed above, we would expect a corresponding decrease in retail prices at 
the earliest several months after the enforcement of the intervention. The decrease in retail 
tariffs should be moderated by the fact that different retailers use different purchasing 
strategies, described above. Looking at time-varying treatment effects should therefore help 
us to better identify the effect of the Commission’s decision on retail tariffs. 
Heterogeneous Treatment 
We expect the effect of the Commission’s decision to slowly materialise over time after the 
implementation of the remedies. 
6.5.4 Main Results 
In this section, we report the results for the different specifications and outcome variables. 
We begin with the regressions on the less competitive tariffs, i.e. the incumbent’s baseline 
tariffs (Table 6.8) and move to the most competitive ones, i.e. the overall cheapest tariffs 
(Table 6.9). We finally analyse a measure of price dispersion defined as the difference 
between the highest and the lowest tariff observed in a given local network area (Table 
6.10). 
The Adjusted R-squared of more than 90 per cent in all specifications shows that our model 
well explains the data. This is very important since it means that we could control for most of 
the relevant drivers of retail prices and account for most of the cross-sectional variation 
across regions. This creates additional confidence that omitted variable bias should not be a 
major endogeneity issue in our context, which reinforces our identification strategy. Some of 
the control variables are also significant and have a positive impact on prices (Pop. Density, 
Share Foreign and, partially, the number of firms located in the regional market), while 
population growth (Births-death) significantly reduces all tariffs. Finally, results related to the 
number of energy intensive plants (EIP) suggest that their presence is, if at all, only weakly 
negatively related to customers’ households and small business customers’ tariffs.91  
                                                     
91  We added this control variable to account for potential important differences in the production and economic 
structure of the areas. Specifically, there may be economies of scale in the distribution of electricity, leading to 
lower prices in areas where EIP are present. Yet, the presence of EIP does not necessarily reflect the effects 
of long-term contracts in the households’ retail energy market since this represents a completely different 
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Looking at the firm-level effects over the entire sample period (the firms’ dummies), RWE 
and EnBW seem to offer baseline tariffs for households customers, which for some profiles 
are significantly higher than the reference group of independents, while Vattenfall and, 
partially, E.ON offer baseline tariffs which for some segments, are significantly lower. 
Table 6.8 Incumbent’s Baseline Tariff 
 1,500 kWh 2,800 kWh 4,000 kWh 10,000 kWh 
  Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. 
E.ON -1.533 (3.941) -1.991 (6.699) 1.606 (10.84) -75.39* (42.74) 
RWE -1.580 (3.436) -0.539 (5.501) 21.38** (9.612) -14.66 (27.06) 
EnBW 0.740 (9.060) 10.34 (9.469) 39.74*** (12.00) 312.7*** (48.37) 
Vattenfall -18.52*** (3.331) -36.74*** (5.391)   -144.3*** (26.86) 
Stadtwerke 0.179 (3.032) -2.710 (5.108) -0.105 (8.894) -13.11 (26.19) 
Other 5.821* (3.321) 8.565 (5.365) 16.24* (9.581) 0.507 (26.80) 
E.ON × Post 5.512*** (1.118) 9.352*** (1.904) 2.192 (2.025) 39.84*** (7.955) 
RWE × Post 7.760*** (1.113) 17.34*** (1.905) 15.96*** (2.023) 64.35*** (8.034) 
EnBW × Post 0.143 (1.101) 3.560* (1.884) -3.667* (2.005) 27.32*** (7.888) 
Vattenfall × Post -0.287 (1.235) 1.490 (2.123) -27.02*** (2.010) 92.45*** (8.135) 
Stadtwerke × Post -5.849*** (1.141) -9.910*** (1.948) -21.52*** (2.095) -32.68*** (8.213) 
Other × Post -0.111 (1.129) -2.020 (1.922) -17.93*** (2.126) -12.60 (8.005) 
# of EIPs -4.180* (2.447) -6.468* (3.823) -7.317 (4.997) -54.18* (31.41) 
Pop. Density 0.008*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.019*** (0.003) 0.046*** (0.008) 
Share foreign 0.203 (0.159) 0.730** (0.288) 1.556*** (0.410) 3.436*** (1.050) 
Births-deaths -0.095*** (0.009) -0.130*** (0.014) -0.213*** (0.019) -0.330*** (0.052) 
# Amadeus firms  0.094* (0.051) 0.089 (0.085) 0.069 (0.131) 0.086 (0.321) 
Constant 346.7*** (3.424) 573.8*** (5.510) 774.5*** (8.980) 1937.3*** (28.29) 
Observations 480,496 480,496 482,231 479,906 
Adjusted R-squared 0.915 0.922 0.919 0.928 
The dependent variable is the price a costumer using the different consumption plans (1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh, and 
10,000 kWh per year) would pay if she chose the incumbent’s baseline tariff. The control category for the firm-type dummies is the 
group of independent firms. We control for 8,208 zip-code fixed effects as well as 60 month fixed-effects. The entire 
implementation period (the year 2009) is excluded from the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the zip-code level. t 
statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
More interesting for our identification strategy are the coefficients estimates of the interaction 
between the firms’ dummies and the dummy for the post-intervention period which takes on 
the value of 1 after May 1 2010. These estimates measure the differential post-treatment trend 
for the tariffs of the different firms’ types compared to independent incumbents. As mentioned 
above, we expect the vertically integrated (though legally separated) big four incumbents to 
react less swiftly to changes in wholesale prices than other firms and, in particular, with 
respect to small non-integrated, independent incumbent retailers.  
Consistent with this expectation, E.ON, RWE and, to a lesser extent, EnBW and Vattenfall 
have significantly increased their tariffs post-intervention with respect to those firms likely to 
more easily pass through lower wholesale prices. This result can also be described as: other 
                                                                                                                                                                      
product market than the market for large industrial plants. In the few regressions where the coefficient 
estimate is significant, it is negative. The presence of energy intensive plants (EIP) is weakly negatively 
related to lower baseline tariffs of incumbent firms both to household customers and small business customer 
in case of the baseline tariff of the incumbent as well as in the case of the cheapest tariffs in a region. Yet, it is 
not significantly related to price dispersion within a region. 
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firms significantly reduced their tariffs after the implementation of the Commission’s 
decision as compared to the big three. As stressed above, it is important to note that all 
retail baseline tariffs significantly increased over time. Our result suggests that the tariffs of 
small incumbents and municipalities would have increased even more had the wholesale 
prices not decreased following the implementation of the Commission’s decision. 
The size of the coefficients’ estimates is heterogeneous across firms and across consumption 
plans, but seems to be non-negligible. For instance, the price increase for E.ON with respect 
to the independent incumbents in the 1,500 kWh consumption plan is  5.512 € per year which 
represents 1.5 per cent of the average conditional annual expenses for that consumption plan, 
represented by the constant (346.7 €). Interestingly, the municipal firms, or ‘Stadtwerke’, seem 
to have reacted even more extremely than the (few) independent incumbents. Their baseline 
tariffs have significantly decreased with respect to that of the independent incumbent retailers 
and, clearly, to those of E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and Vattenfall. In the case of 1,500 kWh 
consumption plan, the price reduction post intervention compared to independent firms is by 
5.85 € per year and it represents ca. 1.7 per cent of the annual bill. Compared to E.ON, the 
reduction of the ‘Stadtwerke’ is therefore ca. 11 € and accounts for more than 3 per cent of the 
annual bill. These findings are consistent across different consumption plans and are even 
stronger for RWE. 
Our interpretation is that the reduction of wholesale prices potentially spurred by the 
Commission’s decision has been differently passed on to final customers by the 
different firms’ types as expected. But we suggest a cautious interpretation of our results in 
terms of demonstrating a causal relationship between the Commission’s decision and the 
outcome in retail markets. Clearly, several other interventions have affected the working of 
wholesale markets during this period such as the national Sector Inquiry of energy production 
and distribution run by the German cartel office (‘Bundeskartellamt’) around 2009. As 
suggested above, there might be several channels to explain why big integrated players might 
have adjusted their prices differently than independent or smaller firms. However, our 
empirical evidence is surely consistent with the claim that the Commission’s decision, by 
reducing market power - and prices upstream - might have also contributed to reducing 
prices downstream. 
Focusing on the incumbent tariffs is clearly important because more than 70 per cent of 
German households were still served by incumbent firms during the sample periods. But it is 
also important to understand the price dynamics of the most competitive segment of the 
market, represented by the cheapest tariffs. Focusing on these tariffs also has the advantage 
that the reference group - the independent firms - are much more prominent because they 
represent on average 49 per cent of the considered local areas. However, the big four 
companies, and particularly E.ON and RWE, are much less represented as they offer the 
cheapest tariffs in less than 3 per cent of the region-time observations. Therefore, in some 
specifications, we are unable to identify the effect for some of the large incumbent. Table 6.9 
shows the results. 
These findings are consistent with the picture presented thus far. When it is identified, the 
effect on the big three (E.ON, RWE, EnBW) is positive and significant, implying that the tariffs 
of these large integrated firms have significantly increased compared to independent retailers. 
Only Vattenfall, seems to have adopted an even more aggressive pricing policy than the 
independent firms in this competitive segment and offered lower tariffs.92 Again, we observe a 
significant negative effect for the municipal firms: they have become relatively cheaper than all 
other firms after the implementation of the Commission’s decision. 
 
 
                                                     
92  One main reason for this differential result might be that Vattenfall operate mostly in Hamburg and Berlin, 
which might are surely structurally different markets if compared to the rest of the country. 
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Table 6.9 Overall lowest tariff 
 1,500 kWh 2,800 kWh 4,000 kWh 10,000 kWh 
  Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. 
E.ON -1.046** (0.463) 27.19*** (0.571) 0.712 (1.698) 24.20*** (1.919) 
RWE 16.39*** (0.516) 16.66*** (2.217) -0.190 (0.492)   
EnBW 6.323*** (0.286) 32.70*** (0.384) 17.57*** (0.884)   
Vattenfall -0.889*** (0.274) 6.042*** (0.188) 5.831*** (0.208) 18.78*** (1.308) 
Stadtwerke -0.402* (0.212) 10.29*** (0.219) 15.84*** (0.269) 63.19*** (0.963) 
Other -1.616*** (0.125) 6.187*** (0.160) 5.425*** (0.204) 17.81*** (0.799) 
E.ON × Post 2.322* (1.189)       
RWE × Post 9.333*** (3.599) 3.384 (3.037)     
EnBW × Post 12.43** (5.502) -25.49*** (4.477) 6.407*** (0.916)   
Vattenfall × Post -5.768*** (0.407) -7.528*** (0.412) 2.487 (3.617) -15.47*** (1.841) 
Stadtwerke × Post -13.04*** (0.430) -9.145*** (0.527) -3.702*** (1.233) -68.01*** (1.393) 
Other × Post -4.474*** (0.200) -1.406*** (0.283) -5.489*** (0.482) -27.11*** (1.028) 
# of EIPs -1.383 (2.247) -1.997 (3.171) -1.303 (3.804) -13.78** (6.481) 
pop1: density -0.003*** (0.001) -0.015*** (0.001) -0.020*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.002) 
pop2: share foreign -0.118 (0.164) 1.140*** (0.212) 1.166*** (0.270) -2.201*** (0.630) 
pop3: births-deaths 0.156*** (0.006) 0.351*** (0.009) 0.371*** (0.012) 0.00291 (0.028) 
# Amadeus firms 0.0326 (0.030) 0.0469 (0.043) 0.101* (0.055) 0.0463 (0.137) 
Constant 330.6*** (1.004) 545.8*** (1.284) 746.4*** (1.604) 1756.5*** (3.903) 
Observations 431,105 471,453 493,538 444,261 
Adjusted R-squared 0.830 0.736 0.788 0.871 
The dependent variable is the price a costumer using the different consumption plans (1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh, 
10,000 kWh per year) would pay if she chose the overall cheapest tariff in her local network area. The control category for the 
firm-type dummies is the group of independent firms. We control for 8,208 zip-code fixed effects as well as 60 month fixed-
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the zip-code level. t statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
The final piece of evidence relates to price dispersion (Table 6.10). The difference between 
the highest (baseline) tariff and the lowest tariff in each regional market has 
significantly increased in all areas where the incumbent firm was one of the big three 
German operators if compared to areas where the incumbent were independent 
retailers.  
This is true for all consumption plans. More markedly than in the previous regressions, the 
coefficients’ estimates for Vattenfall and the municipal firms are negative and significant. This 
means that the price dispersion has even decreased in areas where these firms were 
incumbents. The result for the municipal firms might be related to their potentially different 
objectives, which might make them less focused on profit maximisation. This could explain 
why they priced even more competitively than small independent firms. The fact that Vattenfall 
pricing behaviour is substantially different from the behaviour of the big three German firms 
could be because it mainly operates as in incumbent in unique  markets - Berlin and Hamburg 
- where competition might be tougher due to lower brand loyalty and more informed 
consumers.93   
                                                     
93  Vattenfall is not a traditional German brand that was present in the regions where it operates for several 
decades. It inherited a customer base from the previous incumbents in the 1990ies, but costumers never 
appeared to be particularly attached to the firm.  
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Table 6.10 Price dispersion (Incumbent’s Baseline Tariff – Overall Cheapest Tariff) 
 1,500 kWh 2,800 kWh 4,000 kWh 10,000 kWh 
  Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. 
E.ON -0.266 (4.266) -7.918 (6.668) -2.171 (9.571) -71.61 (45.41) 
RWE 0.948 (4.116) -8.678 (5.553) 12.05 (8.655) -59.96** (27.65) 
EnBW 3.712 (7.460) 8.717 (8.717) 41.33*** (11.20) 251.3*** (39.62) 
Vattenfall -27.83*** (4.054) -23.03*** (5.433)   -133.8*** (27.49) 
Stadtwerke 3.416 (3.648) -3.593 (4.979) 0.502 (7.674) -34.77 (26.92) 
Other 6.382 (4.037) 3.976 (5.426) 13.15 (8.572) -30.17 (27.47) 
E.ON × Post 3.052** (1.421) 4.591* (2.390) -0.749 (2.058) 51.79*** (8.421) 
RWE × Post 9.533*** (1.436) 21.46*** (2.425) 23.59*** (2.100) 118.6*** (8.512) 
EnBW × Post 5.108*** (1.419) 15.12*** (2.384) 13.83*** (2.059) 97.60*** (8.482) 
Vattenfall × Post -8.530*** (1.616) -6.184** (2.429) -30.27*** (2.038) 98.05*** (8.559) 
Stadtwerke × Post -3.170** (1.447) 0.0338 (2.431) -9.491*** (2.130) 7.183 (8.690) 
Other × Post 1.197 (1.428) 6.775*** (2.394) -2.977 (2.125) 36.76*** (8.494) 
# of EIPs -3.622 (2.533) -5.646 (4.300) -6.550 (5.631) -40.15 (33.40) 
pop1: density 0.0123*** (0.00165) 0.0318*** (0.00247) 0.0400*** (0.00306) 0.0378*** (0.00854) 
pop2: share foreign -0.0138 (0.190) -0.552* (0.318) 0.00609 (0.430) 5.496*** (1.074) 
pop3: births-deaths -0.227*** (0.00901) -0.474*** (0.0130) -0.569*** (0.0171) -0.204*** (0.0439) 
# Amadeus firms  0.0619 (0.0571) 0.0483 (0.0940) -0.0236 (0.140) 0.0636 (0.336) 
Constant 16.97*** (3.985) 24.92*** (5.480) 23.10*** (7.956) 162.5*** (28.94) 
Observations 480496 480496 482226 479906 
Adjusted R-squared 0.926 0.897 0.872 0.858 
The dependent variable is the price dispersion within a given zip code defined as the difference between the yearly prices a costumer 
using the different consumption plans (1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh, 10,000 kWh per year) would pay if she chooe the 
incumbent’s baseline tariff or the cheapest tariff in her local network area. The control category for the firm-type dummies is the group 
of independent incumbents. We control for 8,208 zip-code fixed effects as well as 60 month fixed-effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the zip-code level. t statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level 
respectively. 
The findings from these regressions essentially sum up the results obtained for the baseline 
tariff with those obtained for the cheapest tariff. This specification reinforces our identification 
strategy because it represents a difference-in-difference-in-difference strategy. We focus not 
only on the difference between large vs. small incumbents but add the cross-sectional 
variation among more vs. less competitive tariffs. Our results are strongly consistent with the 
expectations generated by our identification strategy. When the incumbent firms are the big, 
vertically integrated incumbents, the price spread within an area increased after the 
Commission’ decision was implemented and, accordingly, wholesale prices went down. Our 
explanation for this is that the incumbent firms pass on less of the wholesale price 
reduction to their customers than more competitive retailers focusing on the more 
mobile customer base. This effect is smaller, when the incumbent itself was a smaller, 
independent firm. 
6.5.5 Heterogeneous treatment effects over time 
The results so far focus on the heterogeneous response to the Commission’s decision 
across firms’ type. For each firm type, we estimated an average treatment effect over time 
that measures the long-term impact after 2010. However as mentioned above, we expect 
changes in wholesale conditions to only slowly affect retail tariffs because energy is 
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purchased from wholesale markets via long-term contracts. This implies that we can clearly 
predict how the treatment effect should manifest over time. As the share of energy 
purchased at a lower price increases over time because some of the existing long-term 
contracts expire, we would expect the treatment effect to slowly materialise after the decision 
is implemented. Moreover, we would expect this trend to be even slower for the tariffs 
offered by large, vertically-integrated incumbents because they tend to purchase energy 
from wholesale markets via longer-term contracts. Therefore, looking at the heterogeneity of 
the treatment effects over time should help us to refine our identification strategy. 
To facilitate the interpretation of our analysis and because we observed that the effects for 
the big three German firms (E.ON, RWE, and EnBW) are similar, we group these three firms 
into one category. We then disaggregate the implementation and the post periods into 
quarters. Finally, we estimate time-heterogeneous effects for each quarter, i.e. instead of 
estimating one coefficient for the ‘post’ period, we estimate 13 different coefficients over 
time.  
Figure 6.22 focuses on the incumbent’s baseline tariff, which covers much of the customers’ 
base and is the less competitive part of the market. It reports the evolution over time of the 
point estimates for the heterogeneous effects together with the 95 per cent confidence 
interval. The reported coefficients represent the differential price-effect of the big three 
utilities if compared to the independent firms.94 We also highlight the implementation period 
(up to March 2010) and the post-period. Finally, the black line represents the average effect 
over that period in time and the results discussed so far. 
Figure 6.22 Heterogeneous Treatment Effect over Time – Incumbent’s baseline tariff 
 
Source: Our calculations based on Verivox Data 
 
During the implementation period, the tariff of the big three was on average lower than those 
of the independent incumbents. However, during 2009, 2010, and 2011 there is a clear 
positive trend that leads tariffs of the big three incumbents to exceed those of the 
independent firms. This is what we would expect: the treatment effect is observed starting at 
the end of the remedies’ implementation period and it gets stronger during 2010 and 2011. 
Figure 6.23 then focuses on the price dispersion within a regional market. The picture is 
similar as above. Comparing regions where the big three utilities were incumbents to regions 
with an independent incumbent, price dispersion is negative and close to zero during the 
                                                     
94  We do not report the coefficients’ estimates for Vattenfall, the municipal utilities and the other firms for the 
sake of simplicity. The results are however in line with those presented above: a negative trend for the 
Stadtwerke and no significant effects for the ‘others’ category. 
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implementation periods and it increases to become positive and significant during the two 
subsequent years. 
Again, we cannot take these findings as clearly identifying a causal link between the E.ON 
alleged abuse in wholesale markets, the Commission’s decision, and retail tariffs. However, 
these results are consistent with our identification strategy. E.ON, RWE, and EnBW are 
expected to increase their prices with respect to the independent firms and to do so 
increasingly over time. 
Figure 6.23 Heterogeneous Treatment Effect over Time – Incumbent’s baseline tariff 
 
Source: Our calculations based on Verivox Data 
 
6.5.6 Robustness checks 
As for the wholesale analysis, autocorrelation is a major issue for inference in the presence 
of relatively high-frequency data with a long time-series component. Different to Section 6.4, 
however, for the retail analysis we can use a very rich panel with many cross-sections. This 
allows us to cluster the White robust standard error at the zip code level which, to some 
extent, provides a way to control for autocorrelation of a general form. We assume that all 60 
observations within one cluster are correlated and this correlation coefficient than picks up 
the time-correlation. 
To test the robustness of our results and be more confident of our inferences, we try to deal 
with the problem of potential autocorrelation by decreasing the frequency of the data. We 
therefore collapse our monthly data into a year average. For each zip code we therefore 
have five observations over time: one year before the treatment (2008), one implementation 
year (2009), and three years after the implementation of the treatment (2010, 2011 and 
2012). Given the large cross-section, we are still left with a very large number of 
observations. Using annual averages, the problem of autocorrelation should in this case be 
much less severe. 
We report the results for the baseline tariffs, the overall cheapest tariff, and the price 
dispersion in Annex 4 in Table A4.6, Table A4.7, and Table A4.8 respectively. In terms of 
sign, size and significance our main results are unaffected. The big three German 
incumbents: E.ON, RWE and, to a lesser extent, EnBW significantly increased their baseline 
and cheapest tariffs with respect to the independent incumbents. Price dispersion also 
increased in regions with one of the big three incumbents if compared to regions with 
independent incumbents. 
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6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we studied the effect of a specific competition policy intervention: the EU 
Commission’s case against E.ON for its alleged abuse of dominant position in the German 
wholesale electricity market. The investigation confirmed the presence of competition 
concerns and, as a consequence, E.ON committed to divest a total of 5,000 MW of 
generation capacity.  
Within our general framework, we analyse how the enforcement of the decision affected the 
short run competitive outcome: prices. The focus on a specific case study allows us to be 
more precise in modelling the peculiarities of the market and the case and provide more 
convincing evidence on the causal effect of the decision. Because the intervention directly 
affected upstream electricity markets, we first study the effect of the Commission's decision 
on wholesale price. However, to get a richer picture of the effect of the firms’ conduct and 
Commission’s decision on final customers, we also analyse the downstream effect of the 
decision on German retail tariffs. For both levels of the analysis we adopt a difference-in-
difference methodology to identify the effect of the policy intervention. Our exact approaches 
and identification strategies are tailored to the specificities of the German electricity market.  
At the wholesale level, we exploit that prices are mostly determined through a centralised 
energy exchange market: the EEX. Even though most electricity is traded via over-the-
counter contracts, the EEX constitutes an opportunity cost for energy trading and, therefore, 
is a good benchmark for measuring wholesale prices. The EEX market is also very liquid and 
swiftly responds to changes in energy supplied and the intensity of competition, which makes 
it particularly well suited for an empirical analysis.  
Our identification is based on the observation that energy suppliers have more market power 
during peak periods when demand is higher. Since the supply schedule is highly convex and 
much steeper during the peak period (8am–8pm), shifts to a lower or higher capacity 
schedule would have much larger effects during peak time.  We therefore expect a 
convergence between peak and off-peak prices if market power is reduced.  
We estimate a wholesale price equation using daily data on peak and off-peak prices from 
the EEX. We control for a very large set of relevant determinants of wholesale prices such as 
input prices, demand conditions, and supply conditions. We identify the short-run effect of 
the Commission by looking at convergence between peak and off-peak prices in the weeks 
around each divestiture, while the long-run effects are identified by looking at the 
convergence over a period of one or two years after the implementation of the remedies.  
Our models perform very well in explaining wholesale prices’ variation. We find strong and 
statistically significant convergence effects in the short-run as well as in the long-run. The 
size of the effects is also economically very relevant, with convergence varying between 
three to 15 €/MWh. Placebo regressions based on Spanish and French data support our 
identification strategy. These findings are consistent the view that the Commission’s 
decision, by affecting competition in the EEX market, reduced wholesale prices. 
The next question is whether this significant reduction in wholesale prices caused by the 
Commission’s decision had an impact on retail tariffs. Again, we tailor our empirical 
framework to other specificities of German electricity markets to carefully answer this 
question. In particular, we base our identification strategy on few empirical observations. 
First, there are three main types of energy retailers active in the German markets: large, 
vertically integrated incumbents, municipal firms, and small, independent retailers. They are 
structurally different in the degree of vertical integration with wholesalers and producers, 
their size, geographical scale, ownership structure, and objectives. These structural 
differences affect their energy purchasing strategies and, particularly, the type and length of 
long-term contracts they stipulate with the wholesalers. Second, the pass-on also depends 
on the extent of downstream market power. The large perceived retail costumers' switching 
costs, particularly for private households, create a stable customer base for incumbent 
retailers, which can be exploited with high tariffs. Third, most contracts between energy 
suppliers and retailers are long-term. Therefore if at all, one would expect changes in the 
upstream market to only gradually affect retail prices as existing supply contracts are 
successively replaced by new ones.  
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We collect a unique dataset from a German price comparison site,Verivox, with monthly 
price data from 2007–2014 for more than  8,000 different zip codes by more than 800 
different electricity providers. We differentiate between three different types of household 
consumption (annual consumption: 1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh) and one typical 
commercial costumer (10,000 kWh). We exploit this enormous variation across firms’ types, 
tariffs’ types, regions, and time periods to implement our identification strategy.  Specifically, 
we expect large, vertically integrated incumbents to less quickly pass-on upstream savings 
than small, non-vertically integrated incumbents, hence, to increase their tariffs. We also 
expect the difference between the highest, less competitive, baseline tariff and the lowest, 
most competitive price within a local market to significantly increase after the Commission's 
decision in markets where the incumbents are the big vertically integrated operators. Finally 
because of the price rigidity introduced by long-term contracts, we expect these reactions to 
only slowly adapt following changes in wholesale prices.  
We find strong and significant evidence that all retail tariffs and the within-area price 
dispersions have increased in areas where the incumbent was one of the big three, vertically 
integrated, energy incumbents (E.ON, RWE, EnBW) if compared to small independent firms. 
We also find evidence that this effect slowly materialised over the two years following the 
implementation of the Commission’s remedies. These results are in line with the view that 
the Commission’s decision, by impacting wholesale tariffs, also impacted electricity retail 
prices.  
As for the previous chapter, a word of caution is necessary to the conclusion. Even though 
we tried to exploit the specificities of electricity markets to very carefully design our empirical 
approach and set up our identification strategy, at both levels of the analysis we cannot 
completely exclude that other relevant events that affected the functioning of markets might 
also drive the observed results. In both analyses we tried to identify these alternative 
channels and we were partially able to provide evidence that they played a less crucial role 
than the E.ON decision.  
However, particularly with regard to retail markets, this is very difficult to do. This is 
specifically because the retail market’s analysis cannot be considered to be a true ex-post 
evaluation of the Commission’s decision, which solely concerned wholesale markets. The 
downstream analysis has the broader purpose to provide quantitative evidence of the 
potential implications of an antitrust decision on adjacent markets and to shed light on other 
important competitive aspects of electricity markets. Specifically, our analysis aimed at 
drawing conclusions on the extent of the pass-through of the reduction of wholesale 
electricity prices (wherever they come) on the retail prices, which mostly result from the 
specific conditions of competition in the retail market.  
On the whole, we believe that the empirical regularities identified in this chapter provide 
consistent and convincing evidence that the Commission’s decision had a key influence on 
the functioning of the German electricity markets after 2009 and benefitted consumers. 
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7 Case study: Merger between Gaz de France and Suez  
In this chapter, we focus on a merger case to more precisely assess the direct effects of a 
merger decision and its associated remedies on the market under consideration. The case 
study is based around Gaz de France’s (GDF) acquisition of Suez in 2006, which aimed to 
create one of the world’s largest energy companies. The merger impacted on both the 
electricity and gas markets at several stages in the supply chain in both Belgium and in 
France. In the case of the Belgium gas market, on which we focus here, there were 
horizontal and vertical competition concerns in supply and wholesale markets.95 
The aim, specifically, is to quantitatively evaluate the price effects of the merger and the 
remedies approved by the European Commission on the market for trading on the 
Zeebrugge hub (ZEE hub).96 The hub, as part of the Belgian gas wholesale market, suffered 
infrastructure access and liquidity issues before the merger. Part of the negotiated remedies 
aimed to free up access to the hub, which - if effective - should have generated higher traded 
volumes and lower prices in the hub. The study will also provide some post-merger insights 
of the supply market at a descriptive level.   
We begin by presenting the specificities of the case followed by a broad description of the 
Belgian market and market changes that took place post-merger. We will then present the 
data and economic analysis of the impact on the market for trading on the ZEE hub. 
7.1 Introduction to the case 
On 19 June 2006, the Commission initiated proceedings under Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger 
Regulation due to competition concerns around a proposed merger between GDF and Suez. 
At the time of the merger, GDF was active in the gas sector at all levels in Belgium and in the 
electricity market, with joint control (along with Centrica) over SPE - the second biggest 
player in the Belgian electricity market. The Suez group’s main energy subsidiaries were 
Electrabel (electricity and gas supply), Distrigas (gas wholesale and supply) and Fluxys (gas 
infrastructure, transit, storage and transport).97 
The Commission’s ensuing investigation found that, given the horizontal and vertical 
overlaps between the two companies’ activities, the proposed transaction raised significant 
competition concerns at all levels of the Belgian gas market. At the gas wholesale market 
level, the Commission was concerned it would significantly impede competition as it would: 
■ Give the new entity (GDF Suez) control of most gas imports into Belgium through its 
ownership of Distrigas. This risked excluding competitors from downstream gas (and 
electricity) markets. 
■ Result in potential vertical problems due to the parties’ control over essential 
infrastructure (such as the transmission and transit networks, as well as storage 
facilities). Due to the parties’ control over Fluxys (the network operator), they would have 
privileged access to supply infrastructure and storage. 
■ Certainly not improve access to the ZEE hub, with Distrigas & Co. (a subsidiary of 
Distrigas) controlling rights of access to the hub. Parties wishing to access the hub had 
to obtain capacity rights through an entry/exit agreement with Distrigas & Co. This meant 
that Distrigas & Co could make non-transparent agreements with all hub customers 
negotiated on a bilateral basis. This central role of Distrigas & Co posed a real problem 
in terms of access, as Distrigas itself was also a competitor in the hub. For example, 
                                                     
95  Throughout this case study we refer to Belgian wholesale markets as the import of gas from abroad and 
trading between gas shippers (among others, on the hub). We refer to Belgian supply markets as the markets 
where gas is sold to large customers, power generators or retailers. 
96  While it would have been interesting to provide a more detailed ex-post analysis on other aspects of the 
Belgian gas market as well, only detailed price data on the hub was made available to the case team. Due to 
confidentiality issues related to other data, it was not released for this study.  
97  While earlier the company was named Distrigaz, it was later renamed Distrigas. We use throughout the 
document ‘Distrigas’. 
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there were issues regarding privileged access to information obtained by its control of 
access to the hub.  
In response to these concerns, GDF and Suez offered extensive remedies including: 
1. Divestiture of the Suez group’s holding in Distrigas to a third party98; 
2. Restructuring of the activities of Fluxys and relinquishing of all control over the company. 
Fluxys’ activities were to be reorganised into two entities – Fluxys SA and Fluxys 
International. Fluxys SA was to own the entire Belgian gas transmission and transit 
system and all Belgian gas storage infrastructure. To this end, Suez would also transfer 
to it Distrigas & Co. The parties undertook not to hold more than 45 per cent of the 
capital of Fluxys SA (with Publigas holding another 45 per cent). Fluxys International was 
to own the Zeebrugge LNG terminal, Huberator (the hub operator) and the other non-
regulated Belgian and international assets (BBL, Gas Management Services Limited, 
Belgian Pipe Control, C4Gas and Endex). The parties further agreed not to hold more 
than 60 per cent of the capital of Fluxys International as well as to give partial control of 
its investment activities to the management committee of Fluxys SA. 
3. A series of additional measures relating to gas infrastructures in Belgium. The parties 
undertook to create a single point of entry at Zeebrugge which would bring together the 
hub, the LNG terminal, the point of arrival of the Interconnector Zeebrugge Terminal and 
the point of arrival of the Zeepipe terminal; and 
4. Divestiture of GDF’s holding (via Segebel) in SPE. GDF were to relinquish their 50 per 
cent shareholding in Segebel (a company that had a majority shareholding in SPE’s 
capital). 
Altogether, these remedies were intended to facilitate the entry of new competitors and 
foster competition between existing competitors. They were also intended generate 
increased access to the hub, which should then lead to higher liquidity and volumes traded, 
and to lower prices. As a result of these remedies, the Commission concluded that the 
merger would not significantly impede competition in the European Economic Area (EEA) or 
any substantial part of it. 
7.2 The Belgian gas market 
7.2.1 An overview of the market 
Belgium imports all the natural gas it consumes, either via gas pipelines through 
‘interconnection points’ or via Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) terminals. The Belgian gas network 
is an integrated network, used for international transit as well as domestic transmission.  
Belgium’s role for international transit is important; with the long-term reserved transit 
capacity in 2006 being 48 billion m3/year, representing two-and-a-half times the volume of 
gas consumed in Belgium, or 10 to 11 per cent of consumption in Western Europe99. The 
ZEE hub is crucial for this transit role (as seen in Figure 7.1), with the pipelines that go 
through the ZEE hub being used almost exclusively for gas transit100. It was initially designed 
to route gas between Britain and the continent (both forward and reverse flows) and aimed to 
help network users achieve a balance between their injection and withdrawal using intra-day 
transactions through ‘over-the-counter contracts’ (OTCs). The role of the ZEE hub became 
more prominent leading up to 2006 with the gradual liberalisation in gas markets, which 
increased short-term negotiations and gas price arbitrage transactions. 
                                                     
98  This remedy also involved arrangements for supply contracts and transference of storage capacity control in 
Belgium to any existing Electrabel Customer Solutions (ECS) public supply customer. 
99  CREG. 2006. ‘Study on the planned merger between Gaz de France and Suez’. Undertaken in application of 
Article 23, paragraph 2 of the law of 29 April 1999 on the organisation of the electricity market and Article 
15/14, 2, paragraph 2 of the law of 12 April 1965 on the transmission of gaseous and other products by 
pipeline. 
100  Heather, P. 2012. ‘Continential European Gas Hubs: Are they fit for purpose?’ The Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies. Available at: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/NG-63.pdf (see p11) 
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Figure 7.1 Schematic overview of the Belgian gas market in 2006 
 
Source: CREG. 2006.101 
At the time of the merger, the Suez group and its subsidiaries played a dominant role in the 
Belgian gas markets, operating across all segments of the supply chain as illustrated in 
Figure 7.2 Figure 7.2. Moreover, GDF was also a key player in the gas markets in Belgium 
as well as being active in the electricity market, with joint control (along with Centrica) over 
SPE – the second biggest player in the Belgian electricity market.  
Figure 7.2 Stylised overview of the structure of the Belgian gas market before the merger 
 
                                                     
101 H-gas is High Calorific Gas, it has a methane content of 87-99%, has high energy content and is sold at a 
higher price. L-Gas is Low Calorific Gas and has a methane content of 80-87%. It has a lower energy content and 
a lower price. 
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Based on information sourced from CREG Annual Reports (years 2005 and 2006) and Cambridge 
Economic Policy Associates (2008) Structure and functioning of the natural gas market in Belgium in a 
European context. Notes: (i) Belgium consumes two different types of natural gas, namely H-gas (with 
high caloric value) and L-gas (with low caloric value) (ii) Distrigas was previously known as Distrigaz 
(iii) the above diagram is a simplification and should not be seen as a comprehensive depiction of the 
Belgian gas market. For example, it does not include the storage segment of the supply chain 
The Suez group had a significant stake across all levels of the markets in 2006: it had a 
stake of 57 per cent in Distrigas, 57 per cent in Fluxys and 98 per cent in Electrabel. Through 
these companies, it also controlled Distrigas & Co, Huberator and Fluxys LNG. While the gas 
directives led to a legal unbundling of Distrigas and Fluxys in transit and transmission 
networks, in terms of ownership, Suez controlled a large part of the Belgian gas 
infrastructure at the time. In particular,  
Regarding domestic transmission: 
■ This was solely owned by Fluxys as a monopoly. Fluxys was responsible for the 
management, maintenance and sale of capacity around the transmission network.  
These domestic transmission activities were regulated with regards to third-party access and 
tariffs, subject to Belgian law and to a ‘code of conduct’.  
The gas transit market had a differing ownership structure by pipeline: 
■ The H-gas pipelines through the ZEE hub belonged to GIE Finpipe, of which Distrigas 
owned 63.3 per cent. All capacity rights had been transferred to Distrigas & Co, while 
Fluxys was responsible for operational management.102 
■ The SEGEO H-gas pipeline between The Netherlands and France belonged to Segeo 
SA, of which Fluxys and GDF owned 75 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. Capacity 
was made available to Etac BV, of which Distrigas and GDF held 75 per cent and 25 per 
cent, respectively. Segeo was responsible for selling capacity and Fluxys for operational 
management. 
■ The pipelines used for L gas belonged to Fluxys, which controlled management and sale 
of capacity. 
Table 7.1 provides a snapshot of the estimated equity participation of the Suez Group along 
various segments of the gas supply chain. 
Table 7.1 Estimated equity participation of Suez group in various supply chain activities before 
the merger remedies 
Supply Chain activity Suez group companies  Total Suez group ownership (%) 
Wholesale 
H-Gas Distrigas 84 
L-Gas Distrigas 88 
Trading (spot market operator) Huberator SA 42 
Supply Distrigas 81 
Transport Distrigas and Fluxys 57.25-75.00 
Distribution 
Flanders Electrabel 30 
Wallonia Electrabel 49 
Brussels capital Electrabel 30 
Storage Fluxys 100 
LNG Fluxys, Tractebel 99 
Hub services Huberator SA 90 
                                                     
102  Capacity rights allow the owner of these rights to move gas through the pipelines. 
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Zeebrugge Hub 
Part of Zeebrugge Hub Operator Owner Ownership (%) 
Terminal Fluxys LNG Fluxys 93 
 Tractebel 7 
Hub services Huberator SA Fluxys 90 
Spot market APX Gas 
Zeebrugge BV 
Huberator SA 42 
Source: Cambridge Economic Policy Associates (2008) Structure and functioning of the natural gas 
market in Belgium  
In 2006, no Code of Conduct or other third-party access document existed in relation to 
transit activities, due to a suspension ordered by Belgium’s Council of State in 2004103. 
Instead, Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 applied to transit activities although this did not 
address the shortcomings in the application of third-party access rules to transit created by 
the Council of State ruling. 
Fluxys owned 90 per cent, through its subsidiary Huberator, of the ZEE hub (which is part of 
the wholesale market). The remaining 10 per cent were held by Distrigas & Co. 
Regarding the distribution network: 
■ Electrabel held majority stockholdings in local authority mixed public- and private-sector 
companies which, as managers of the distribution networks, were responsible for 
distribution. But following the transposition of the Gas Directive, most municipalities had 
agreed with Electrabel that retail activities were to be taken over by Electrabel Customer 
Solutions (ECS) and that the management of the distribution network was to be taken 
over and managed by the local authority utilities. 
7.2.2 Potential competition issues 
There were a number of structural issues prevalent in the Belgian gas market in 2006, and 
there was concern that the proposed merger would exacerbate such issues.  
The Belgian gas market was characterised by high levels of market concentration. The 
proposed merger would increase the concentration at all levels, making the merged entity 
dominant across the entire market (as seen in Table 7.2).  
Table 7.2 Market shares of the Suez group and the Gaz de France group in the Belgian natural 
gas market in 2006, % 
 Wholesale market 
Supply market Transmission / Transit networks 
Distribution 
network H-gas L-gas 
Suez 84.37 
(Distrigas) 
88.21 
(Distrigas) 
86.3 
(Distrigas + ECS) 
100 
(Fluxys + Fluxys 
LNG + Distrigas & 
Co.) 
76 
(mixed distribution 
network operators) 
Gaz de 
France 
9.82 
(GDF) 
11.79 
(GDF) 
7.2 
(GDF + Luminus + 
ALG Negoce) 
0 0 
Total (after 
merger) 94.19 100 93.5 100 76 
Source: CREG. 2006. 
This dominance, particularly in the upstream parts of the market, meant any new entrants 
would be dependent on a vertically integrated incumbent. Distrigas (the incumbent) 
would continue to control upstream gas imports and could obtain details of the positions of 
all other parties through its control of the hub. This meant that Distrigas, through its vertically 
                                                     
103  Judgment No 126.817 of 5 January 2004 (Distrigaz and Distrigaz & Co. v Belgian State). 
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integrated advantage, could unilaterally influence prices, potentially impacting the willingness 
of other parties to develop commercial activities downstream. 
There also existed issues around access to the transmission network despite 
unbundling provisions. New entrants claimed they lacked effective access, with Fluxys 
(the operator) suspected of putting first the interests of the integrated company Suez rather 
than the rest of the network. 
There were potentially distorting incentives to invest in the network, with incentives for 
a dominant company to defer investments (or keep them at lower levels) to drive prices up. 
As claimed by the regulator104, delays in investments at Fluxys had already resulted in 
congestion on the natural gas transmission network in Belgium. This in turn had reduced the 
competitive pressure on Distrigas and led to a poor functioning of the hub in Zeebrugge. 
Finally, in 2006 the ZEE hub provided insufficient liquidity to facilitate access to new 
entrants in the supply market. These problems with liquidity were attributed to the market 
power of Distrigas, poor accessibility to the hub and to capacity rights, as well as to the non-
transparency of market information105. 
 
A focus on the potential competition issues regarding trading on the ZEE hub 
A gas-trading hub is a liquidity instrument that provides services to facilitate exchanges between 
gas buyers and sellers in wholesale markets, enabling them to find sufficient volumes of supplies or 
to sell excess capacity in the short-term106. Trading on the ZEE hub was created to respond to the 
markets’ need for a physical transfer point. It is typical (and important) for the development of an 
open market as it enables the development of an efficient gas market. If operating efficiently, a hub 
can promote competition in the market, allow price transparency, result in savings of transaction 
costs, secure supply and provide wider choice for buyers. It can also increase market liquidity, 
transparency and promote non-discriminatory access to the market. 
Access to the hub was required via the transit network – which Distrigas & Co controlled107. Actual 
or potential competitors of Distrigas in the gas supply market could potentially buy gas at the ZEE 
hub, but third party access was a problem due to Distrigas & Co’s monopolistic role as network 
operator108. Any trade also meant Distrigas could obtain details of the positions of competitors – 
this undermined confidence and discouraged market entry. 
The remedies proposed aimed to reduce the barriers to entry by facilitating access to the hub and 
increasing the hub’s liquidity.  
The remedies, as outlined in Section 6.0, sought to overcome these issues with a range of 
divestitures and restructurings. The remainder of this report looks to assess the impact of the 
                                                     
104  CREG. 2006. ‘Study on the planned merger between Gaz de France and Suez’. 
105  Market liquidity (or liquidity) is a measure of the performance of a commercial market. To create a perfectly 
liquid market, the following conditions have to be fulfilled: (a) a large number and wide variety of buyers and 
sellers, with no company exercising significant influence; (b) entry and exit, with no technical, legal or 
institutional thresholds preventing entry; and, (c) transparent and open information on products, prices and 
quantities exchanged in the market. (CREG, 2006). 
106  A hub can be a physical installation, where gas flows are connected to and pass through this point (as is the 
ZEE hub) or they can be ‘virtual’ whereby no precise geographical locational point is specified, although the 
gas needs still to physically enter and exit a particular geographical zone (for example, TTF where the 
Netherlands is the relevant zone). 
107  The transit route to the hub was marketed by Distrigas & Co. Therefore to access the hub and transport gas 
to the Belgian transmission network it was necessary to have a transit reservation. Parties wishing to access 
the hub only, and who did not want to go any further than the Zeebrugge region, still had to obtain capacity 
rights by means of an entry/exit agreement with Distrigas & Co. All negotiations took place on a bilateral 
basis, with no real transparency. 
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merger and remedies using both a high-level descriptive analysis and a quantitative 
empirical analysis of the ZEE hub. 
7.3 Descriptive analysis: the Belgian gas market post-merger 
To assess the impact of the merger and the remedies, the timing of key milestones are 
crucial. This is also particularly important for the empirical analysis undertaken on the ZEE 
hub. Table 7.3 provides a timeline of the key milestones following the GDF Suez merger.  
Table 7.3 Timeline of key events 
Timeline Event 
May 2006 The merger between GDF and Suez is proposed  
Nov 2006 The Commission approves the merger with remedies  
May 2008 Suez’s sale of Distrigas to ENI.  
This was the first  part of the unbundling process. Due to this action, the vertical 
chain to its subsidiary Electrabel in retail markets was broken 
Jun 2008 The sale of of Distrigas & Co. to Fluxys  
This action potentially opened the pipelines towards the hub for competitors, as 
GDF Suez could no longer control the physical gas flows into / out of the hub. 
On its own, this remedy would have been insufficient to open up competition in 
the hub as Fluxys International (controlling the hub via the Huberator) was still 
60 per cent owned by GDF Suez. However, part of the ruling by the 
Commission was that the decisions in both Fluxys SA and Fluxys International 
would be taken by the same board (see next point below). Given that GDF Suez 
could only control 45 per cent of Fluxys SA, this meant that it could not 
dominate decisions in Fluxys International. This effectively meant Suez lost 
control over the functioning of all of Fluxys’ operations 
Jul 2008 The partial sale of Fluxys by Suez which reduced the shareholding of the 
merged  entity (GDF Suez) as follows: 
 Fluxys SA (transmission and storage):  45 per cent  
 Fluxys International (LNG Terminal, BBL, Huberator, GMSL): 60 per 
cent  
Moreover, it was agreed that decisions in Fluxys SA and Fluxys International 
would be taken by the same board. 
Jul 2008 The newly created GDF Suez officially comes into existence 
May 2009 Publigas (an organisation owned by local municipalities in Belgium) increases 
its share in Fluxys SA to 51.47 per cent and becomes the de facto owner of 
Fluxys 
March 2010 A decision is taken by GDF Suez to sell its remaining stake in Fluxys to 
Publigas  
Overall, the merger remedies implemented in 2008 led to an ownership ‘unbundling’ of the 
merged entity GDF Suez in the hub, the supply markets and the retail market. In particular, 
the transfer of Fluxys and the remaining assets underlying the physical structure of the 
Belgian gas market (such as transit, transmission, hub, LNG and storage) were essential for 
simplifying access to the Belgian gas markets. 
The merger remedies were to a large extent supported by the national regulator CREG, who 
was also involved in their implementation. Interviews with CREG suggest that the merger 
remedies empowered the regulator to further push and bargain for more regulatory changes 
to improve the functioning of the Belgian gas market. These included: 
■ Introduction of pro-active congestion management systems; 
■ Reduction in the number of balancing zones from four to one; 
Implementation of a new Code of Conduct in June 2010 (CREG, 2010).Market outcomes 
post-merger 
This section will provide an overview of some market outcomes for the time period after the 
merger, remedies and ensuing events. This analysis is merely descriptive. 
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7.3.2 Belgian supply markets 
In the time period after the merger, remedies and ensuing events, the market shares at the 
supply market level changed significantly (as seen in Figure 7.3). The decline in Distrigas’ 
market share (seen in dark orange) is notable post-2008 (driven significantly by its sale to 
ENI), with GDF Suez’s (seen in light blue at the bottom) increasing its market share from 13 
per cent in 2008 to over 30 per cent in 2012. The plotted line shows the number of 
companies active in the market, which increased from 20 in 2005 to 34 in 2012.  
Figure 7.3 Evolution of market shares in Belgian supply markets 
 
Source: CREG Annual Reports 2005-2011. 
Alongside this, the number of active suppliers (or shippers) also sharply increased post-2008 
– both for L and H markets (from four to 20 in the L market and from two to 27 in the H 
market)109. 
Sales volume follows a similar pattern to that seen in the market shares. As can be seen in 
Figure 7.4, Distrigas’ share of the sales volume significantly declined post-2008, with other 
companies in the market delivering a much larger share of the total sales volume from this 
point onwards. Table 7.4 details the sales volume per company at a more granular level. 
                                                     
109  Source: Data provided by the CREG (2013). 
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Figure 7.4 Sales volume (TWh) as a proportion of total volume in Belgian market (TWh), % 
 
Source: CREG Annual Reports 2005-2011. 
 
Table 7.4 Sales volume (TWh) 
Company 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
No. of companies in 
market 20 21 24 27 29 31 35 34 
GDF Suez    24.8 24 39.3 50.2 59.1 
Distrigas 162.2 153.3 148 138.1 135.8 112.1 83.8  
ENI        68.4 
Gaz de France Negoce 19.6 25.7 28.8      
Wingas GmbH 7.9 11.3 11.3 12.5 11.7 10.6 6.34 7.42 
Electrabel S.A. 0 0 0 0 0 19.14 0 0 
EDF Luminus SA 0 0 0.178 0.84 1.76 2.35 15.84 19.0 
Source: CREG Annual Reports 2005-2011. 
7.3.3 The ZEE hub 
The ZEE hub also appears to be more accessible as a result of the associated remedies, 
resulting in an increase in the number of participants as well as in traded volumes (as seen 
in Figure 7.5 below): 
■ the market share of Distrigas fell considerably post-2008, as did the market share of 
GDF Suez; and 
■ the number of other market players as a proportion of market share, and in absolute 
figures, steadily increased after 2006. 
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Figure 7.5 Evolution of the ZEE hub: number of customers, HHI and the daily traded volumes 
 
Source: Data provided by Fluxys. 2015. 
In terms of hub liquidity, Figure 7.6 indicates that after 2008 the average daily net traded 
volume slightly increased with respect to the daily average physical throughput. This 
indicates that volumes and liquidity at the hub increased. 
Figure 7.6 Evolution of daily net traded volume with respect to the daily average physical 
throughput 
 
Source: Huberator. 2013. 
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7.4 Econometric analysis of the ZEE hub 
7.4.1 Overall approach 
The empirical analysis aims to quantify the effects of the merger and associated remedy on 
the ZEE hub. As explained in previous sections, removing barriers to entry and facilitating 
access to the hub were part of the objectives of the main remedies imposed to the merging 
parties. We therefore believe that it is meaningful to assess the effect of the merger and 
associated remedies on the ZEE hub. Our analysis focuses on the effect on prices at the 
hub. The main variable of interest is therefore the wholesale day ahead prices at the ZEE 
hub110. It would also be interesting to assess the effect of the merger on traded volumes, but 
unfortunately the available data are not suitable for the proposed empirical analysis111. 
The key events being assessed are detailed in Table 7.5 below. They correspond to the key 
milestones described above.112 We discuss our strategy to identify the effect of each event in 
the following subsections.  
Table 7.5 Key events being assessed 
 Event Date of event Time period over which effects are 
analysed 
1 The Commission’s decision  November 2006 January 2005 (beginning of our sample 
period) and June 2008 (date of event 2) 
2 The effective divestitures of Distrigas 
and Fluxys and the consummation of the 
merger 
June 2008 November 2006 (date of event 1) and 
March 2010 (date of event 3) 
3 Last part of the remedies implemented 
(GDF Suez sells its remaining stake in 
Fluxys to Publigas )+ regulatory changes 
March 2010 July 2008 (date of event 2) until the end of 
2011 
A Difference-in-Difference (DiD) analysis is used to compare prices at the ZEE hub with 
prices of a different hub taken as a control. The main empirical model is similar to the model 
used to estimate the effect of the E.On decision in the German wholesale market. In 
particular, the following price equation is estimated: 
𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝑁𝑡𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖 + 𝛾𝑝𝑡𝛾𝑁𝑗 + 𝛿𝑁𝑡𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖  × 𝑝𝑡𝛾𝑁𝑗 + +𝜔1 𝑝𝑡𝑤𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔2 𝑡𝑤𝑙𝑖 + 𝜔3 𝑐𝑡𝑁𝑙𝑖 + 𝜌1 𝑁𝑅𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑖+ � 𝜑𝑑𝑅𝑑,𝑖 +4
𝑑=1
� 𝜇𝑚𝑀𝑚,𝑖11
𝑚=1
+ � 𝜗𝑦𝑌𝑦,𝑖2010
𝑦=2005
+∊𝑖𝑖 
The dependent variable pit is the daily price in hub i at time t. The regressors are demand-
side variables such as season and business cycles (day D, month M, and year Y), as well as 
temperature (temp)113. Supply-side controls are prices indices of power prices as well as oil 
products, to which gas prices are typically related (power, oil, coal)114.  
The identification strategy relies on the comparison between the ZEE hub and the control 
hub. The dummy treat is therefore equal to 1 for the treated prices, i.e. prices at the ZEE 
hub. We discuss our choice of the control hub in section 6.3.1.  
The dummy postj is equal to one in the period after the events related to the merger took 
place. We discuss the strategy to identify the effects of the different events in section 6.3.2 
below.  
                                                     
110  See below for a description of the database. 
111  Data on traded volumes are available only since 2007 and only on a monthly basis for the control hub. 
112  Since several events took place between May and July 2008, we cannot identify their effect separately. We 
take therefore June 2008 as the reference date for these events. 
113  We also account for non-linearity in the effect of temperature by including a quadratic term in the regression. 
114  Coal prices may influence gas prices as coal and gas plants both are important electricity generators. 
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7.4.2 Identification of the control group  
The robustness of the identification strategy depends on the selection of a suitable control 
group because it represents what would have happened in the absence of the merger and 
remedies. In principle, the control group should be unaffected by the event and as similar as 
possible, in terms of characteristics, to the treated group. The choice of the control group 
proves to be a challenging task in this context for several reasons. First, there are no other 
hubs in Belgium, therefore we have to use a hub in another country as a counterfactual. 
Comparing different countries is generally problematic in the context of a DiD approach, as 
they might be characterized by different institutional features and subject to different shocks. 
However, it must be stressed that here we are not comparing countries as such, but just 
hubs, which are marketplaces sharing many features even if located in different countries. 
The structure and functioning of hubs is similar, and several market players are active in 
more than one hub in continental Europe.  
There is also another issue that makes the choice of a control difficult in this case, namely 
the fact that all European hubs are, to some extent, interconnected. This implies that the 
possibility that a major event affecting one hub does not impact on another hub cannot be 
ruled out.  
Taking into account these limitations, we identified the TTF hub in the Netherlands as the 
most suitable control hub. The reasons that led us to this choice are threefold: 
■ the fact that at the time of the merger the ZEE hub and TTF hub were the two largest 
hubs (in terms of liquidity) in continental Europe115; 
■ the degree of interconnection between the ZEE hub and the TTF hub was low at the time 
of the decision (the European Commission, in her analysis, concluded they belonged to 
different markets);116 
■ data availability – there are few hubs for which prices are available back to the mid-
2000’s and this is an advantage in regards to the TTF hub. In terms of data availability, 
the only alternative control hub would be the British hub, which however is not suitable 
due to the reason outlined in the bullet point above, i.e. the high degree of 
interconnection with the Belgian hub. 
One difference between the Belgian hub and the Dutch hub is that the ZEE hub is a physical 
hub (i.e. where the gas physically passes through the hub) while the TTF hub is a virtual hub 
(i.e. where gas enters only virtually after entering into a national system). However, this 
aspect does not pose too serious problems in terms of comparing both hubs, as even in 
virtual hubs the gas physically passes through, albeit at a national level. 
Figure 7.7 compares prices at the ZEE hub (seen in blue) to those in the Netherlands (seen 
in orange). This comparison is only intended to observe trends at a high level. The two 
prices follow a similar pattern, consistent with the ‘common trend assumption’ on which the 
DiD strategy hinges117. Some short-term price spikes at the end of 2005 and beginning of 
2006 reflect external events, including a cold snap in the UK and a shortage in the UK’s main 
gas storage facility due to a fire outbreak. This had an immediate impact on the spot prices 
given the interconnectedness between the Belgian and UK markets118. 
                                                     
115  See CREG. 2006. ‘Study on the measures needed to improve the functioning and the liquidity of the 
Zeebrugge hub’. (F)060719-CREG-554. 
116  Although the Dutch and UK grids became more connected through the BBL pipeline starting in December 
2006. This may have indirectly increased the connection between the TTF and Zee hubs through the UK grid.  
117  This assumption states that the treatment and control group would follow the same trend in the absence of 
the treatment. 
118  BBC News. 2006. ‘Gas shortage sends prices soaring’. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4802786.stm   
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Figure 7.7 Evolution of prices at the ZEE hub and at the TTF hub, 2005 - 2011 
 
Source: Platts database. 2013. 
7.4.3 Identification of the treatment period 
To quantify the impact of different events related to the merger decision, different definitions 
of the ‘post’ period are tested. Three dates most relevant to assess the overall effect of the 
merger are identified, namely: 
1. The time period after the official publication of the Commission’s decision (in November 
2006). When mergers are subject to authorisation, it is common in the retrospective 
evaluation literature to consider the date of the decision as the main relevant date to 
assess the effect of the merger (see for instance Choné and Linnemer (2012), 
Björnerstedt and Verboven (2012) and Aguzzoni et al. (2015)). In the case under 
consideration, between the Commission’s decision and the actual consummation of the 
merger and its remedies, there was a time lapse of more than one-and-a-half years. 
However, the decision most certainly has triggered the merger and remedy process and 
the parties started negotiations on the terms of the merger and sale of assets. More 
generally, it seems likely that after the decision market operators began to adjust their 
strategies anticipating the finalisation of the merger and its remedies. Therefore, it is 
valuable to assess the impact of the decision itself. There are at least three merger 
retrospective studies finding evidence of price changes before the merger was actually 
completed (see Kim and Singal (1993); Prager and Hannan (1998); and Borenstein 
(1990)). 
2. The time period after the merger was effectively finalised and different structural 
remedies were implemented. These events took place around June 2008.  
3. The time period after GDF Suez sold its remaining stake in Fluxys to Publigas (March 
2010). This is the conclusion of the unbundling process entailed by the remedies. In the 
same period several regulatory changes were implemented (see section 6.2.1 for a 
description of regulatory changes).  
Our identification strategy aims at quantifying both the individual effect of each of these 
events, and their overall effect in the long-run. These effects are summarised in Figure 7.8 
below.  
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Figure 7.8 Individual and overall effects of the events related to the merger 
 
Source: own figure 
We now describe our identification strategy for the different treatment periods. 
Individual Effects of the Merger Events 
To measure the effect of each of the three events, we consider three different definitions of 
the postj dummies, one for each event j, of the form: 
 
𝑅𝑡𝛾𝑁1 = �1,         𝑓𝑡𝑡  𝑁 ∊ (𝑇1,𝑇2)    0,                             𝑅𝑙𝛾𝑅       
𝑅𝑡𝛾𝑁2 = �1,         𝑓𝑡𝑡  𝑁 ∊ (𝑇2,𝑇3)   0,                             𝑅𝑙𝛾𝑅       
𝑅𝑡𝛾𝑁3 = �1,         𝑓𝑡𝑡  𝑁 ∊ (𝑇3,𝑇 )    0,                             𝑅𝑙𝛾𝑅       
 
where T1, T2, T3 are the dates of the three events, and T is the last date in our sample 
period. 
To disentangle the effect of each event, we run three separate regressions on three different 
sample periods, each of which represents the relevant before/after period around each 
treatment. In particular:   
i) Treatment 1 (Event 1): period (0, T2) 
ii) Treatment 2 (Event 2): period (T1, T3) 
iii) Treatment 3 (Event 3): period (T2, T) 
The treatment effects are therefore identified on a reduced sample period. In particular, for 
events 1 and 2, we only measure the effect that is realized before the next event takes place. 
Since the three events are far enough in time (more than one and a half year between each 
event), the number of observations on which we identify each treatment effect is quite 
large119. Therefore these should not be regarded as merely short-run effects. They represent 
the individual effect of each merger-related event in the period in which the event is assumed 
to display its effects.  
                                                     
119  There is of course a trade-off in analysing the effect of additional events, as one would need to further split 
the sample period. Therefore we decided not to analyse separately the effect of the additional event that took 
place in 2009, namely the acquisition of control over Fluxys SA by Publigas. 
Event 1 
(Nov 2006) 
Jan 2005 Dec 2011 
Event 3 
(Mar 2010) 
Event 2 
(Jun 2008) 
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Overall Effect of the Decision 
To measure the cumulative effect of the merger and of its associated remedies, we identify 
the treatment effect in a long-run perspective. In particular, we assume that the overall effect 
of the decision can only be observed when the last remedy has been implemented, and 
compare what happened after all remedies were implemented to the period prior the 
Commission’s decision. We thus estimate the effect of the previously defined post3 dummy 
and exclude the implementation period (December 2006 - February 2010) from the analysis. 
The overall effect is therefore identified on a reduced sample period, but given that we have 
data from January 2005 until December 2011, we have a large enough number of 
observations for both the before and the after periods.  
7.4.4 The Data 
The dependent variables are daily transaction price data for day-ahead wholesale natural 
gas traded during working days as published by Platts, both for the Belgian hub and for the 
Dutch hub. Our sample period goes from January 2005 until December 2011. For each 
working day (i.e., Monday to Friday), these data reflect the price range of a standardised 
quantity of natural gas to be delivered at a constant flow rate throughout the next working 
day after assessment (e.g., Friday’s assessment reflects Monday’s delivery).  
Detailed information on the methodology used to construct these market-on-close price 
assessments, plus other background information, is available in the Platts database. All 
prices are denominated in €/MWh. Given the limited liquidity of within-day markets, the usual 
convention is followed and refer to these day-ahead prices as ‘spot’ since they provide 
traders with a final opportunity to trade gas out of a forward position before physical delivery. 
Platts launched coverage of the continental gas markets in August 1999, with assessments 
for the Belgian hub of Zeebrugge120. Dutch transporter Gasunie created a version of the 
national balancing point called the Title Transfer Facility (TTF). From January 5, 2004, Platts 
also assessed prices at this trading point. 
Included in the estimating equation is a set of control variables that have been collected from 
various sources. The variables used in our analysis are described in Table 7.6 below, with 
the descriptive statistics reported in Table 7.7. 
Table 7.6 Description of the variables 
Variable Description and source 
Price Hub price at time t for hub i. Measured in €/MWh 
Treat Treat dummy, 1 for Zee hub prices in BE and 0 for TTF hub price in NL 
Post_1 Post dummy for date of decision (14 Nov 2006) 
Post_2 Post dummy for time when remedies put in place (considered to be as at 
30 June 2008)121 
Post_3 Post dummy for when GDF Suez sold their remaining stake in Fluxys to 
Publigas + regulatory changes (considered to be as at 01 March 2010) 
Temp Corresponding temperature data for Belgium and the Netherlands. Sourced 
from national administrative bodies. 
Tempsq Quadratic temperature 
Brent_crude_spot Spot price for Brent crude oil as per Platts data place. Measured in $/bbl 
Coal Average daily price of coal. This is a combined price series of two sources 
(as used in case study 1) which measures the daily European reference 
                                                     
120  Platts Zeebrugge gas assessments reflect prices at the so-called “Zeebrugge beach” interconnection point, 
rather than the virtual Zeebrugge Trading  Point launched by the Belgian network operator in late 2012. 
121  We do not know the exact dates of the June 2008 remedies. In the same period (July 2008) the merger was 
finalized. We choose therefore an intermediate date (30 June) as our relevant treatment date, which should 
capture both the remedies and the finalization of the merger. 
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price for coal imports into North-western Europe. 
Power_prices Daily price at the power exchange Sourced from Platts Database 
(BO_Platts_PX-daily_short_v01, same as dependent variable in case study 
1). Since the Belgian Power Exchange (Belpex) started operating on 21 
November 2006, there is no data for Belgium before 2007. As a result, 
Dutch power prices for 2005 and 2006 are used as a proxy for this time 
period122. 
Day_of_the_week Dummy variable for the day of the week 
Month Dummy variable for month 
Year Dummy variable for year 
Table 7.7 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price 3,532 18.77 6.96 3.89 98.44 
Treat 3,532 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Post_1 3,532 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Post_2 3,532 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Post_3 3,532 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Temp 3,532 10.77 6.47 -10.07 28.4 
Brent_crude_spot 3,532 19.10 7.95 3.88 98.43 
Coal 3,532 16.97 19.42 0.01 75.1 
Power_prices 3,532 61.82 26.91 16.32 432.83 
As one can see from Table 7.7 above, the high standard deviations and large differences 
between minimum and maximum of power prices – not only from gas, but also electricity oil 
and other power prices - show that prices are highly volatile. Therefore, only a DiD can really 
assess the impact of the merger and its remedies on hub prices.  
Furthermore, apart from temperature, all other variables take on the value of 0 or 1, as they 
are treatment variables or before-after variables.  
7.4.5 Additional estimation issues and robustness checks 
As usual with high-frequency data, the estimation strategy has to deal with the issue of 
autocorrelation in the error term. We address this in three ways. First, we estimate our 
regressions with Newey-West standard errors, assuming heteroskedasticity and allowing for 
autocorrelation of the error term up to some lag. In our main specification the autocorrelation 
lag is 7, but we also use a 1-lag specification as a robustness check. Another usual way to 
deal with this issue is to estimate bootstrapped standard errors, something we also do as a 
robustness check. Finally, we reduce the frequency of data from daily to weekly. The results 
of these additional robustness checks are reported in Table A5.2-Table A5.4 in Annex 5. 
Retrospective merger studies are faced with the task of correctly defining ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
periods. This task is often challenging because there might be both anticipation effects (i.e. 
strategic behaviours that may take place before the merger is approved) and delayed effects 
(i.e. it might take time before the merger is finalised, particularly if remedies have to be 
implemented).  
One way to partially overcome this problem is excluding from the analysis a time window 
surrounding the merger. It is common practice in this literature to drop the data in the three-
month or a six-month window surrounding the merger. This does not solve the problem 
                                                     
122  It was tested to see if Dutch power prices were similar enough to Belgium, with the correlation between the 
two price series at later dates being very high (.93). This is deemed to be high enough to use as a proxy for 
this gap in the data series. 
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completely, as it may take years before the effects are realised. The same anticipation/delay 
effects might also be relevant for remedies too. In order to address this issue, for each of the 
three events a robustness check is done whereby a three-month window around the event is 
dropped. We further checked that our results are robust to different definitions of the time 
windows (one and six months). The results of these additional robustness checks are 
reported in Table A5.2-Table A5.4 in Annex 5. 
Because we have long time series, we also estimate a specification with real prices rather 
than nominal prices. We also estimate a specification in logs, which should yield a more 
straightforward interpretation of coefficients. The results of these additional robustness 
checks are reported in Table A5.2-Table A5.4 in Annex 5. 
7.4.6 Estimation results 
We present here the results of the main set of estimations using the econometric framework 
described above. We show here two specifications for each treatment, one where the effect 
is measured from the exact day of each event, and one in which we drop a three-month 
window surrounding the event. In both regressions we estimate Newey-West standard errors 
with autocorrelation up to 7 lags. The results of all the additional regressions run as 
robustness checks described above are reported in Annex 5.  
 
 
Individual Effects of the Merger Events  
Presented here are three main sets of regressions; one for each definition of the ‘post’ 
period, corresponding to the three different events related to the merger. 
In Table 7.8 estimation results are presented where the relevant event is the Commission’s 
decision. As explained above, this regression is run on the period from January 2005 
(beginning of our sample period) and June 2008 (date of event 2). 
 
Table 7.8 Effect of the Commission’s decision 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Baseline Dropped time 
window 
   
Treat 2.593*** 2.930*** 
 (0.576) (0.601) 
post_1 1.339 -0.419 
 (1.358) (2.562) 
Treat*post_1 -2.364*** -2.606*** 
 (0.586) (0.611) 
Observations  1,759 1,642 
The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In both specifications we 
control for prices of gas, oil, and coal, as well as temperature (both linear and 
quadratic), day, month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% levels respectively. 
The main coefficient of interest is the interaction coefficient Treat*post, which is negative and 
significant in both specifications. This suggests that there was a price decline at the 
Belgian hub relative to the control hub after the decision. The result is slightly larger if 
a time window around the decision is excluded (column 2). The positive coefficient for 
the treat dummy indicates that prices at the ZEE hub were on average higher than at the 
TTF hub over the period under consideration, controlling for the observable variables. The 
coefficient for the post dummy suggests that prices were not significantly different on 
average in the period after the decision with respect to the period before. The coefficients for 
the other control variables (not shown in the regression in the interest of space) generally 
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have the expected signs, indicating a positive relationship with the prices of other inputs and 
a negative effect of temperatures.  
The robustness checks shown in Table A5.2 in Annex 5 yield very similar results to those 
presented in Table 7.8. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction variable is still negative 
and very significant with real prices instead of nominal prices, with Newey-West with lower 
order of autocorrelation (lag 1), with bootstrapped standard errors, with smaller (1 month) or 
larger (6 months) time windows dropped around the event, and with weekly instead of daily 
data. It is worth noting that the larger the time window dropped around the event, the bigger 
the magnitude of the estimated effect, suggesting that the effect is smaller in the first months 
after the event. 
We should also mention that the results shown in Table 7.8 might partly be driven by the 
large price movements that took place in the period prior to the merger decision. In order to 
test the sensitivity of our results to these price shocks, we run our regressions for event 1 on 
a reduced sample where we cut out the periods with the most extreme spikes (November 
2005 and March 2006)123. The magnitude of the interaction coefficient becomes smaller but 
the sign is unchanged and still significant; this suggests that the size of the effect should be 
interpreted with some caution, but that prices went down in any case around the decision. 
Table 7.9 below shows the results of the regressions that look at the effects of the 2008 
events, namely the effective divestitures and the consummation of the merger. This 
regression is run on the period from November 2006 (date of event 1) and March 2010 (date 
of event 3). 
Table 7.9 Effects of the 2008 events (effective divestitures of Distrigas, Distrigas & Co and 
partial divestitures of Fluxys; consummation of the merger) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Baseline Dropped time 
window 
   
Treat 0.228*** 0.216*** 
 (0.061) (0.065) 
post_2 0.255** 0.417*** 
 (0.101) (0.110) 
Treat*post_2 -0.319*** -0.377*** 
 (0.083) (0.085) 
Observations  1,660 1,540 
The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In both specifications we 
control for prices of gas, oil, and coal, as well as temperature (both linear and 
quadratic), day, month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% levels respectively. 
The coefficients of the treatment effect variable show that the events around June 2008 had 
a negative and significant impact on price at the ZEE hub, relative to our control hub. This 
finding holds true (and is even reinforced) if a window of three months around that date is 
dropped. Note that this is an additional price decrease with respect to the first one already 
produced after 2008. This suggests that there was a price decline at the Belgian hub 
relative to the control hub after the effective implementation of the merger and 
associated remedies. Also in this case, the results of the robustness checks (Table A5.3 in 
Annex 5) confirm the results of the baseline regressions, indicating that our estimations are 
pretty robust to changes in the specification. 
Finally, Table 7.10 reports the result for the last set of regressions, which have March 2010 
as the date of interest (i.e. when GDF Suez sold its remaining stake in Fluxys to Publigas). 
The sample period for these regressions is from July 2008 (date of event 2) until the end of 
2011.  
                                                     
123  Note that results for event 2 and 3 are not affected by the price spikes since the sample period for these 
regressions does not include the period before 2007. 
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Table 7.10 Effect of GDF Suez’s sale of its remaining stake in Fluxys  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Baseline Dropped time 
window 
   
Treat -0.096 -0.097 
 (0.058) (0.061) 
post_3 0.615*** 1.175*** 
 (0.145) (0.311) 
Treat*post_3 -0.105 -0.115 
 (0.074) (0.078) 
Observations  1,772 1,656 
The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In both specifications we 
control for prices of gas, oil, and coal, as well as temperature (both linear and 
quadratic), day, month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% levels respectively. 
The interaction coefficients of Table 7.10 are negative but not statistically significant, 
suggesting that the sale of the remaining stakes of GDF Suez in Fluxys led to a negligible 
reduction (if any) in hub prices. Note, however, that some of the alternative specifications 
shown in Table A5.4 in Annex 5 yield interaction coefficients that are weakly significant. In 
particular, if we use Newey-West with one lag instead of seven or bootstrapped standard 
errors the coefficient is significant at the 5 per cent level.  
Total Effect of the Merger Events  
We also estimate the total effect of the merger and of all associated remedies, assuming that 
this effect can only be observed when the last remedy has been implemented. We thus 
estimate the effect of the previously defined post3 dummy and exclude the implementation 
period (December 2006 to February 2010) from the analysis. As in the three previous sets of 
estimations, we show in Table 7.11 a regression with Newey-West standard errors at the 
baseline specification, and also estimate a regression where we drop a three month window 
around the date124.  
Table 7.11 Overall effect of merger events  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Baseline Dropped time 
window 
   
Treat 2.571*** 2.921*** 
 (0.572) (0.595) 
post_3 9.236** 6.903 
 (4.334) (4.261) 
Treat*post_3 -2.759*** -3.111*** 
 (0.577) (0.599) 
Observations  1,873 1,744 
The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In both specifications we 
control for prices of gas, oil, and coal, as well as temperature (both linear and 
quadratic), day, month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% levels respectively. 
The interaction coefficients are negative and significant, which provides evidence that the 
overall effect of the merger and of its associated remedies was a decrease in prices at 
the hub. It is reassuring that the magnitude of the estimated overall impact is similar to the 
sum of the estimated individual effects of the three main events, suggesting that these were 
                                                     
124  In this case we drop 45 days before event 1 and 45 days after event 3. 
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the main determinants of the merger effect (particularly the decision and the 2008 events). 
Other merger-related events might have played a role, but they do not seem to be of first-
order importance in terms of realised effects on prices.  
To test the sensitivity of these results to the price movements that occurred in the pre-
merger period, we run the regression for the overall effect on a reduced sample where we 
drop the two months with the larger spikes, similarly to what we did for event 1. As expected, 
the interaction coefficients are smaller than those in Table 6.9, but still negative and 
significant. Another way to tackle the issue of price spikes is dropping the entire pre-merger 
period from the sample. We therefore evaluate the overall effect on a sample period that 
starts from 2007 (Table A5.3 in Annex 5). Here as well we find a negative and significant 
overall effect on prices, albeit smaller in magnitude than the one in Table 6.9. 
7.5 Conclusions  
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the Commission’s decision and the 
implementation of the merger and its associated remedies had an impact on wholesale gas 
prices in Belgium. Prices at the ZEE hub fell relative to the TTF hub around November 2006 
and June 2008, and to a less extent around March 2010.  
It is interesting that the first event (i.e. the Commission’s approval of the merger subject to 
conditions) may have had the biggest effect. As argued above, one needs to be cautious of 
drawing implications from the magnitude of this coefficient since it might partly be due to the 
unusual price movements in the pre-merger period.  
However, the finding of a large coefficient for the merger approval might suggest that there 
has been an anticipatory effect. In particular, since the implementation of the remedies and 
the consummation of the merger took quite some time, it is likely that at least some of the 
effects took place before officially the merger and remedy events occurred. This would imply 
that the effect of the merger decision might partly incorporate the effect of the following 
events. In this regard, it is also not surprising to find a very small effect for the last event, 
whose impact might have been largely anticipated by the market and therefore realised in 
advance.  
As a whole, the evidence could suggest that the remedies were effective in limiting the 
potential anti-competitive effects of the merger, as the net effect of merger and remedies 
shows a price decline.125 The estimated decline in prices, together with descriptive 
evidence of increased liquidity and traded volumes at the hub, also supports the view that 
ownership unbundling has generated better access to the hub126. In this respect, the 
remedies seem to have done more than simply mitigate the potential anti-competitive effects 
of the merger.127 
These results are however, subject to the caveats explained above: (i) it is difficult to 
disentangle the effects of the different events related to the merger and the divestitures; (ii) 
the selection of the control group is not perfect, and (iii) other relevant events (in particular 
regulatory changes) that affected the functioning of the wholesale gas market and hubs 
might contribute to our results. One should therefore be cautious when drawing strong policy 
implications from this exercise.   
                                                     
125  It is not possible to disentangle the merger and the remedies, as they occurred around the same time. 
However, the net effect is informative of which effect dominated.  
126  One cannot totally exclude that price declines in principle indicate that the merger has led to efficiency gains, 
which in turn have led to price declines thereafter. However, this is more unlikely, given that no potential 
efficiency gains at the hub were indicated by the merging parties.  
127  Of course, one cannot exclude that other factors that are not related to the remedies have contributed to an 
increased access to the hub. 
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8 Overall conclusions of the study 
This section summarises the key policy and methodological conclusions emerging from this 
study. 
8.1 Policy conclusions 
8.1.1 Q1. Can one observe a change in the functioning of energy markets in the EU over the 
past two decades?  
The structure of European gas and electricity markets has fundamentally altered during the 
last two decades. Most electricity and gas markets in Europe were national (vertically 
integrated) monopolies until the 1990s, when the EU and its Member States decided to 
gradually open them up to competition and establish a common energy market. Nowadays, 
in most Member States, there is a separation between regulated (transmission and 
distribution) and competitive segments (production and retail). Significant progress has also 
been made towards energy market integration: many missing infrastructure links between 
EU countries have been built or are under construction; cross-border trade in gas and 
electricity between EU countries has increased; and wholesale prices are gradually 
converging.    
Notwithstanding these achievements, gas and electricity markets across Europe continue to 
exhibit certain characteristics that are potentially harmful to competition, most notably:  
■ Electricity and gas markets are still very concentrated in both wholesale and retail 
segments, creating scope for incumbents to exercise market power. 
■ While progress has been made in liberalising markets, the positon varies across Member 
States. Many Member States continue to regulate end-user prices and there is still 
insufficient separation of infrastructure and supply functions in energy markets. 
■ Public ownership of the first generation producer remains high in many Member States in 
both gas and electricity markets. 
■ Gas and electricity prices have been rising for consumers (except in 2014 when prices 
fell) and high levels of mark-ups can be observed in a number of Member States 
■ There are significant price differentials for households across Member States, although 
energy prices for industrial consumers appear to be converging 
■ Switching levels are generally very low across Europe, with the exception of a handful of 
Member States. 
How far the above features are actually adversely affecting competition cannot be 
determined here because this requires detailed investigations beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
8.1.2 Q2. Can one observe a change in competition policy enforcement affecting energy 
markets in the EU over the past two decades? 
There has been an increase in EU competition policy enforcement activity overtime and 
particularly since 2000 (when the first liberalisation directives were transposed in Member 
State legislation). As Table 8.1 shows, the number of cases handled by the Commission on 
an annual basis has significantly increased since 2000. 
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Table 8.1 Number of competition cases: electricity and gas sector 
 
Source: DG COMP. Based on data extracted on 26/09/2014. NACE codes D35.1 and D35.2. By case end date. 
Until 2003, merger cases in gas and electricity markets were more commonly handled under 
simplified procedures. Since 2003, a significantly higher share of the merger cases in gas 
and electricity markets have been subject to a full investigation, suggesting an increase in 
merger activity in these markets creating competition concerns.  
EU merger control has been key to improving market structure and functioning by limiting 
further horizontal and vertical integration in energy markets, which are already highly 
concentrated. In some cases, the remedies put in place to mitigate the potential anti-
competitive effects of a merger have also contributed to promoting market liberalisation (e.g. 
EnBW/ EdF case in 2001). In extreme cases, the Commission has prohibited anti-
competitive mergers (e.g. the proposed acquisition of joint control over GDP by EDP in 
2001), although such cases are rare.  
Anti-trust enforcement in gas and electricity markets has predominantly focused on tackling 
three issues: exclusionary conduct by dominant incumbents; exploitative abuses by 
dominant incumbents; and collusive behaviour.     
Overall, energy markets have been subject to increasing competition enforcement action 
over time.  
8.1.3 Q3. Has the enforcement of competition policy in the energy sectors contributed to 
better functioning energy markets? To what extent?  
We compiled several pieces of evidence to provide a broad picture of the different channels 
through which competition policy enforcement affects the functioning of energy markets. 
Specifically, we analysed the impact of competition policy on measures of competition - the 
elasticity of relative profits with respect to relative costs (Boone’s indicator) and productivity 
dispersion - and the effect of completion policy enforcement (through the competition 
channel) on outcomes such as investment, and ultimately productivity. We also sought to 
capture both direct and indirect effects of the policies i.e. not only the impact of policy 
decisions on the firms that are involved, but also on other firms in the same market, plus 
potential spill-overs and deterrence effects into other (national) markets.  
We found that EU merger control has had a robust positive and signiﬁcant effect on the 
functioning of energy markets. Specifically, our analysis shows that the EU merger control 
has lowered both Boone’s beta (elasticity of relative profits with respect to relative costs) and 
productivity dispersion, thereby indicating that national energy sectors became more 
competitive after these interventions. EU merger control is also related to higher investment 
and higher total factor productivity. These findings are consistent with the reasoning that EU 
merger policy actions - through the channel of competition - induce energy firms to invest 
more, which ultimately leads to higher productivity.  
Impacts of antitrust enforcement and State aid control are much less clear cut. This does not 
necessarily imply that these interventions were less effective. This result could reflect the 
limitations of empirical analysis: State aid and antitrust cases were fewer in number as 
compared to merger cases and it is possible that their limited frequency did not allow us to 
empirically identify consistent relationships. 
Although generalisations are not possible on the basis of a single case study, the E.ON 
antitrust case does illustrates the positive impact of EU antitrust enforcement on German 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 ND Total
Anti-trust 1 2 1 1 1 1 7 14
Anti-trust (Cartel) 1 1
Merger* 1 1 2 3 6 4 11 21 15 13 7 6 12 10 13 22 16 17 12 15 7 214
sub-total 1 1 2 3 6 4 11 21 15 13 7 6 12 11 15 22 17 17 13 16 9 7 229
Anti-trust 1 2 2 2 2 12 21
Anti-trust (Cartel) 1 1 2
Merger** 1 1 1 3 4 5 8 6 3 4 11 1 4 13 11 9 8 6 99
sub-total 1 0 1 1 3 0 4 5 9 6 5 4 11 3 4 16 13 9 8 6 13 0 122
Anti-trust 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 2 2 3 0 1 1 13 7 35
Anti-trust (Cartel) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 3
Merger 2 1 3 4 9 4 15 26 23 19 10 10 23 11 17 35 27 26 20 21 7 0 313
sub-total 2 1 3 4 9 4 15 26 24 19 12 10 23 14 19 38 30 26 21 22 22 7 351
electricity
gas
electricity 
+ gas
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electricity markets. In this particular case, the Commission investigated E.ON’s alleged 
abuse of its dominant position on the German wholesale market in 2008, as discussed 
earlier.  
We empirically examined the impact of the Commission’s Decision on wholesale electricity 
prices, using daily data on peak and off-peak prices from the EEX. The results show that the 
Commission’s Decision, by affecting competition in the EEX, led to a reduction in wholesale 
electricity prices in Germany. To determine if wholesale price reductions were eventually 
passed on to consumers by electricity suppliers, an extended analysis of retail electricity 
prices was undertaken using highly disaggregated data (monthly data at zip code level) 
purchased from the German price comparison website, Verivox.  The results suggest that 
the Commission’s Decision - by reducing market power upstream and hence, reducing 
wholesale prices – might have also contributed to reducing prices downstream. 
We also empirically evaluated the price effects of a merger case. The GDF/Suez merger 
finalised in July 2008, which aimed to create one of the world’s largest energy companies, 
would have, as originally planned, weakened competition in the gas and electricity wholesale 
and retail markets in Belgium and in the gas markets in France with the disappearance of 
competition between GDF and Suez in markets. Our case study demonstrates that the 
remedies offered by GDF and Suez were not only effective in limiting the potential anti-
competitive effects of the merger (in Belgian wholesale gas markets which were the focus of 
study), but additionally, ownership unbundling, might actually have improved access to the 
hub.  
The broader econometric analysis together with the two case studies provides a consistent 
picture of positive impact of EU competition policy enforcement. Specifically, the two case 
studies show that commitments and remedies can be effective tools for addressing potential 
anti-competitive behaviour or effects and thus, improving the functioning of markets. 
8.1.4 Q4. Is there complementarity (in terms of objectives and effects) between competition 
and regulatory policies affecting the functioning of the energy markets? To what extent 
have we observed an increase in complementarity over the past two decades? Please 
explain 
Regulation and competition policy can be complementary in several ways. The two can work 
together to support new entrants and smaller rivals in markets with an entrenched 
incumbent. Regulation is ex-ante and can provide certainty and facilitate market entry (by 
helping firms make forward-looking investment and production decisions). The facilitation of 
entry and promotion of effective rivalry creates the environment for more effective 
competition. The tools available to regulators and competition authorities could also generate 
complementarity. If extensive and/or frequent intervention is necessary, or where the 
remedies available to competition authorities are insufficient to address such conduct, 
regulation may be preferable. Competition law, on the other hand, typically has stronger 
powers to address anticompetitive behaviour.  
It was not possible to carry out in-depth analysis of complementarities between competition 
policy and regulation within the scope of this study. Our broad econometric analysis 
(presented in section 4) examined the interplay between competition policy enforcement and 
regulation in energy markets. It shows that competition policy enforcement is more effective 
in liberalised markets as compared to markets that continue to be highly regulated. This 
supports the view that competition policy is mostly effective in markets where competition is 
not substituted by heavy regulation (as measured by the degree of entry regulation, public 
ownership, vertical integration and market structure).  
There is however, the counter-argument that the impact of competition policy interventions 
can sometimes be stronger in highly regulated markets. For example, in countries where 
energy companies are vertically integrated or monopolised, anti-trust interventions to avoid 
market foreclosure and abuse of dominance can be important tools. 
In practice, the Commission has been using instruments of competition policy enforcement 
together with regulation to promote reforms aimed at market liberalisation to improve the 
functioning of energy markets.  
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For instance, the Commission adopted the first liberalisation directives in 1996 (electricity) 
and 1998 (gas) to open up heavily regulated and monopolised national energy markets.  
The 1996 Directive on Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity (96/92/EC) was the first 
attempt to create an internal electricity market in the EU. The Directive established minimum 
regulations for achieving a ‘comparable level of opening-up’ in each Member States’ electricity 
market. Each Member State was then required to choose the specific model of operation and 
regulation. It specifically creates rules in five areas: generation, retail supply, transmission & 
distribution, unbundling, and regulation.  
The 1998 EU Gas Directive (98/30/EC) was the analogous legislation for the gas market. The aim of 
the legislation was to open the gas market across the EU. It imposed responsibilities in the 
construction of major gas facilities, transmission & distribution, unbundling, and regulation.  
A second round of liberalisation directives was agreed in 2003 and by 2007 all its provisions 
had entered into force. 
Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC . The Directive 
established common rules for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. It laid 
down the rules relating to the organisation and functioning of the electricity sector, access to the 
market, the criteria and procedures applicable to calls for tenders and the granting of authorisations 
and the operation of systems. 
Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC. The Directive 
established s common rules for the transmission, distribution, supply and storage of natural gas. It 
laid down the rules relating to the organisation and functioning of the natural gas sector, access to 
the market, the criteria and procedures applicable to the granting of authorisations for transmission, 
distribution, supply and storage of natural gas and the operation of systems. 
Following the 2007 Sector Inquiry the Commission adopted the Third Energy Package to 
address some of the concerns highlighted in the Inquiry (e.g. insufficient unbundling and lack 
of cross border integration).  
Repeated attempts at liberalisation, however, have had uneven success and competition has 
been slow to take off. The Commission has therefore been using the full range of 
competition policy tools at its disposal to improve the functioning of energy markets.  For 
example, alongside regulation, the Commission has been using competition policy tools to 
promote unbundling and market liberalisation (e.g. GDF/Suez case, EdF/EnBW case).   
8.1.5 Q5. Do competition case investigations and case decisions affect the design of sector 
regulations and the enforcement of such regulations? 
Detailed qualitative research is required to answer this question comprehensively, and was 
beyond the scope of this study.  However, it provides some evidence. The GDF Suez merger 
is an example where a specific competition case affected the design of sector regulations 
and the enforcement of such regulations at a national level. In this particular case, the 
merger remedies led to ownership unbundling in the Belgian gas market. In addition to this, a 
number of regulatory changes were enforced by the Belgian regulator, CREG, as a follow-up 
to the merger remedies.  
■ The merger remedies were largely supported by the national regulator CREG, who was 
also involved in their implementation. This empowered CREG to further push and 
bargain for more regulatory changes in the Belgian gas market as described above. In 
particular, the transfer of Fluxys and remaining assets underlying the physical structure 
of the Belgian gas market (such as transit, transmission, hub, LNG and storage) were 
essential for simplifying access to the Belgian gas markets. Thus, merger remedies 
made regulatory changes on national level easier to implement. 
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■ In addition, to improve the functioning of its markets, it implemented a better congestion 
management of the network,  reduced the number of balancing zones to one (instead of 
four) and new rules of conduct. 
■ The part of the E.ON case not discussed (the balancing market) also sheds light on this 
issue because E.ON was forced to sell (unbundle) is balancing network. 
At a European level, the Third Energy Package was designed to address some of the 
competition concerns identified by the 2007 Sector Inquiry. In this case, sector regulations 
were directly influenced by competition policy enforcement. 
8.2 Methodological reflections 
In this study we used different methodological tools to analyse the effectiveness of 
competition policy interventions. This is because of the array of questions needing answers. 
We were interested in analysing the broad impact of a large set of interventions - EU 
competition policy, national competition policy, and regulation - and their interactions on 
more firms active in different geographical markets (as energy markets still largely operate 
nationally). But while such an analysis potentially presents the ‘big picture’, the drawback is 
that the level of aggregation prevents clean answers to important details and specific 
questions.  
We therefore used case studies to analyse single decisions. While this allows us to be more 
precise in modelling the peculiarities of relevant product and geographic markets and to 
carry out a more detailed and granular analysis of the causal effects of specific competition 
policy enforcement decisions, the results of individual cases cannot be generalised.  
The methods proposed should be seen as complementary and designed to answer related, 
but not entirely overlapping questions. A first important conclusion is that each research 
question or policy question requires a specific method. Therefore, each particular result can 
be seen as a piece of the puzzle. A sound evaluation exercise requires several of these 
pieces to be put together in a coherent and convincing way.  
While this study managed to stay close to this approach, the substantial issue of resource 
constraints should be noted. A large team of experts produced four separate empirical 
analyses, based on different data sources and empirical frameworks with a limited budget 
and within a tight timetable (less than 12 months). This inevitably imposed certain limitations 
on the depth and breadth of analysis undertaken. 
A common element of all the approaches is our belief that a sound evaluation can only be 
performed by carefully using quantitative methods based on solid and objective databases. 
Qualitative analysis can help enrich the quantitative results and build a coherent framework. 
But it cannot stand alone. So although the proposed approaches vary, there are several 
common elements worth discussing in more detail: i) data availability, ii) 
identification/causality, and iii) robust inference. 
8.2.1 Data availability 
All different empirical analyses are based on the use of rich micro data from various sources. 
The issue of data availability and data collection is key to any evaluation exercise. The 
quality of the data strongly influences the choice of the cases evaluated, the specific 
econometric approach, and the identification strategy. Good and rich data also enable more 
careful and precise inferences. Although we collected exceptionally good data for the 
different empirical analyses, in each chapter we faced constraints due to data availability. 
Data is rarely freely available and commercial data is generally expensive. A clear lesson is 
that a budget for data acquisition should be allocated to such a project.  
Great care time has to be dedicated to understanding the research question and its 
specificities and choosing the appropriate data. This first step strongly influences the quality 
of the subsequent analysis. 
In the broad econometric analysis, for example, we worked hard to collect reliable, 
disaggregated and comparable data on competition policy enforcement both at EU and 
national levels. Given the limited variation in the data, however, we had to aggregate this rich 
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information to be able to use it in an econometric exercise. This allowed us to generate 
findings easy to interpret but did not allow us to fully identify channels through which policy 
enforcement affected outcomes.  
Limited variation in the data did not allow us to make clear inference on some dimensions of 
policy enforcement. We did not find statistically significant effect for some variables, which 
could be due to the quality of the data, not necessarily because of the absence of true 
effects. There were similar issues to constructing some of the outcome variables. While we 
wanted to keep the aggregation level as low as possible to define product markets 
adequately, data constraints made this impossible. To construct rich outcome measures, 
such as productivity and relative profit elasticity to relative cost, we also needed information 
on several firms’ characteristics that was only partially available, even though we had (costly) 
access to one of the richest firm-level datasets that currently exists. 
Data availability was less of an issue in the E.ON case study. Both for the German wholesale 
and retail electricity markets, we were able to compile very rich databases. These were 
expensive. While the available datasets were rich compared to other studies, we had to 
make some methodological choices because of data constraints. For example, regardless of 
our efforts to collect a rich dataset for several European countries involving information on 
wholesale prices and their drivers, this information was not good enough to create a reliable 
synthetic control group for the German wholesale markets. We therefore had to adapt our 
identification strategy. 
Data availability was a major issue in the GDF Suez case. Gas markets, compared to 
electricity markets, are less transparent and, to some extent, present more complex issues. 
Substantial effort and resources were spent to discuss data access with several 
stakeholders (regulators and firms). Data availability has been such a critical issue 
throughout that while we were finally able to carry out some empirical analysis, data 
restrictions forced us to concentrate on only one part of the affected market. 
8.2.2 Identification and causality 
Relatedly, the second major issue of any evaluation study is the ability to identify causal 
relationships. Identification is the key methodological question of any econometric model. 
For a sound policy evaluation, it is crucial to be able to conclude that exactly that specific 
intervention was causing that specific outcome. It is therefore vital to be able to exclude that 
other omitted factors were the explanation for the empirical findings. 
In every chapter, we worked to make our identification strategy as clean and as transparent 
as possible. In some cases, for example in the broad econometric analysis, it was impossible 
to make strong causality claims. However, the findings can still be carefully interpreted as 
‘controlled correlations’. The focus on heterogeneous effects can also help to improve this 
interpretation. For example, because we observe competition policy enforcement to be more 
effective in countries that are less regulated helps to attach a causal interpretation to the 
results: competition policy cannot be particularly effective in markets where firms are not 
freely competing, but are regulated by state intervention. But because such analysis is 
expected to have significant policy implications, it is important to be honest about the extent 
of the conclusions.  
The issue of identification is also related to the level of aggregation and the quality of the 
data. The more ‘micro’ the level of analysis, the more likely specific peculiarities of the 
case(s) or market(s) under consideration can be exploited to develop a clean identification 
strategy. Specifically in the two case studies, we were able to more cleanly identify causal 
effects by focusing on a difference-in-difference methodology tailored to the specificities of 
the case. The basic idea of this methodology, which is the most popular identification 
strategy in evaluation studies, is to look at the outcome of a group affected by an intervention 
and compare it to the outcome of a control group.  
The variation over time in the outcome variable is then used to establish what would have 
occurred in the absence of the intervention. Such an approach is powerful and appropriate 
when looking at single decisions, but cannot be adopted to evaluate a large policy 
programme because there is more than one policy intervention (treatment) to be analysed 
and therefore, it is impossible to define a good counterfactual.  
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Even in a case study, data availability and the peculiarity of the analysed markets are key 
determinants in the choice of counterfactuals or control groups. The best possible scenario is 
when regional variation is available. Comparing different regions of the same country has the 
advantage to control for common unobservable institutional drivers. However, it is then 
necessary that the policy under investigation has a heterogeneous effect across regions. We 
were only able to fully exploit this regional variation in the analysis of the effect of the E.ON 
decision on the German retail markets. .  
In this case, where cross-sectional variation was limited, the identification strategy was more 
theoretically driven. For example, in the German wholesale electricity market, we knew in 
theory that firms have more market power during peak-times as demand for electricity is 
much stronger than during off-peak times and the supply schedule is very concave. This 
knowledge provided a prediction based on the difference between only two groups. In 
absence of regional variation, as in the case of the German wholesale electricity market, we 
based our identification on within-country variation between peak and off-peak prices.  
Alternative approaches can be based on cross-country variation, for example to estimate 
‘placebo effects’. For the wholesale analysis in the E.ON case, we used data from the 
French and Spanish market as placebos. We tested whether the results obtained for 
Germany and attributed to the Commission’s decision could also be seen in these markets 
which should not have been affected - or at least much less - than Germany. To discover this 
was not the case strongly supported our identification strategy.  
Cross-country variation can be also used to create control groups. A first approach relies on 
the creation of a so-called synthetic control group, consisting of a hypothetical market, 
whose outcome pre-treatment is an almost perfect match for the outcome of the treated 
group.  
We attempted this approach in the E.ON case where this ‘synthetic group’ was constructed 
as a weighted average from a selection of other countries and represents Germany as it 
would be, had it not been treated by the policy decision. Unfortunately, because of the data 
limitation, we could not create a satisfactory synthetic control group so abandoned this 
approach. We do believe, however, that this is promising approach to make causal inference 
in presence of a large cross-section of non-treated observations.  
Finally, cross-country variation can be used to simply compare the treated country to a single 
other country. This approach is perhaps not the perfect choice, because in some cases it 
could be difficult to identify another national market that can be truly compared to the treated 
one or to control for all the events that might impact the outcomes of both treated and control 
countries.  
Direct neighbouring countries might also be a poor counterfactual if national markets are 
becoming more integrated, as in the electricity sector and, to a lesser  extent, the gas sector. 
However, data availability constraints and market characteristics can mean there is no 
alternative to this simpler cross-country comparison. This was the case for the GDF Suez 
merger, where the only viable strategy was to compare prices in the Belgian gas hub to 
those in the Dutch gas hub. Fortunately, in this case, the high-frequency time-series 
dimension of the data partially compensated for some of the drawbacks discussed above 
because it allowed more focus on identifying specific implementation of several parts of the 
decision. 
8.2.3 Robust Inference 
We believe that the last important step in a policy evaluation exercise is to provide evidence 
of the robustness of the inference provided. This involves two main issues: the assumptions 
on the stochastic part of the model, i.e., the error terms and, more generally, the other 
model’s assumptions.  
The first issue is crucial since assumptions on the error term affect the estimation of the 
standard errors and therefore the statistical significance of the results. Interestingly, 
problems of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and within-panel-correlation play a major 
role for inference, particularly when the quality of the data is high. But in these cases, the 
possibility of providing robustness checks is also much larger. In all our empirical exercises 
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we tried to motivate and support our assumptions on the error terms. Particularly for the case 
studies where we had high frequency time-series data, we provided several robustness 
checks based on different assumptions on the standard errors.  
A convergence of findings obtained with different assumptions provides strong additional 
confidence on the quality of the results. We consider this an important lesson of this study: 
there is often no perfect modelling assumption and the only way to deal with this issue is to 
estimate different versions of the model and provide evidence that the main results are 
robust to this model’s perturbations. 
Similarly, such robustness checks can be more generally used to provide additional 
empirical support for specific identification assumptions, discussed in the ‘placebo tests’ 
above, or to provide a broader picture, as in the econometric analysis where we examine  
different outcome variables to understand whether the effect of the policy was consistent 
along these different dimensions. Overall, robustness checks, when they generate consistent 
results, are vital to assess causal relationships and therefore to policy evaluation. 
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Annex 2 Descriptive analysis: overview of key trends 
A2.1 EU Electricity market – time trends 
Table A2.1 Market concentration over time – EU average (standard deviation across Member States in 
brackets) 
Year Electricity 
generation – HHI 
Wholesale – change 
in players 
Retail - HHI Retail – CR3 
2000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2002 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2004 n.a. n.a. n.a. 84.79 (26.94) 
2005 5,157 (3,197) n.a. n.a. 
81.56 
(26.76) 
2006 5,060 (3,202) n.a. n.a. 
77.55 
(25.51) 
2007 4,986 (3,197) n.a. n.a. 
80.00 
(23.71) 
2008 4,938 (3,212) n.a. n.a. 
80.79 
(22.03) 
2009 4,833 (3,175) 
15.33% 
(27.28) n.a. 
78.77 
(22.22) 
2010 4,679 (3,139) 
28.90% 
(90.92) n.a. 
78.64 
(21.07) 
2011 4,504 (3,089) 
4.54% 
(17.68) 
3,493 
(2,631) 
78.33 
(20.18) 
2012 4,316 (2,958) 
30.05% 
(129.60) n.a. 
75.95 
(19.57) 
2013 4,229 (2,901) 
18.89% 
(83.34) 
4,359 
(3,103) 
73.35 
(20.97) 
Table A2.2 Market concentration over time – by Member State 
Member State Electricity generation (HHI) Wholesale (change in players) Retail (CR3, HHI time trend 
not available) 
 2007 Change since 
2007 
2009 – latest 
available 
Change since 
2009 
2007 Change since 
2007 
Belgium 6,397 -2,614 n.a.  n.a.  64 -7.00 
Bulgaria 3,583 -933 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  22.2 
Cyprus 10,000 -444 -                -    97.5 -48.5 
Czech Republic 4,917 -870 50.00 -      50.00  100 -2.19 
Denmark 2,859 -619 -                -    100 0 
Germany 1,188 86 0.65           4.35  99 -29 
Estonia 9,128 -1,928 - -      10.71  n.a.  0 
Ireland 3,494 -953 -         5.00           9.17  99 0 
Greece 7,942 -3,613 -         1.39 -        2.67  40 0 
Spain 1,680 -157 1.13      425.90  94 -10 
France 7,992 -1,539 -         10.41  46.1 -0.6 
Technical report 
197 
Member State Electricity generation (HHI) Wholesale (change in players) Retail (CR3, HHI time trend 
not available) 
Croatia 9,910 -1,182 17.65 -      20.77  n.a.    
Italy 2,338 -810 54.05 -      54.05  100 -0.28 
Cyprus 10,000 -444 35.71 -      40.06  87.18 -0.76 
Latvia 9,176 -79 -                -    85 -1.7 
Lithuania 7,104 -1,761 8.00           3.48  60 -13.8 
Luxembourg 5,548 -363 -         33.33  100 -1 
Hungary 1,831 320 50.00 -      46.92  100 -47 
Malta 10,000 -690 -       23.08           4.90  93 3 
Austria 1,936 -143 -                -    100 0 
Poland 1,866 -167 14.29         16.27  n.a.  -0.6 
Portugal 4,958 -1,111 12.00 -      90.25  44.9 22.46 
Romania 2,092 -611 50.00 -      36.84  99.6 -14.1 
Slovenia 5,791 -399 8.70           9.19  44 14 
Slovakia 6,227 -327 14.20         27.17  35 29.55 
Finland 1,308 -144 8.33                -    68 -10.9 
Sweden 2,955 -177 106.67 -    127.23  83.9 -12.47 
The Netherlands 1,384 -159 -         3.23           4.88  n.a.  n.a.  
 
Figure A2.1 Retail electricity prices – households 
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Figure A2.2 Retail electricity prices – industrial customers 
 
A2.2 EU Gas market – time trends 
Table A2.3 Market concentration over time – EU average (standard deviation across Member States in 
brackets) 
Year Production (CR3 gas 
shippers) 
Retail (CR3) 
2000 n.a. n.a. 
2001 n.a. n.a. 
2002 n.a. n.a. 
2003 n.a. n.a. 
2004 97.56 (6.13) 
89.86 
(14.38) 
2005 97.32 
(5.99) 
81.08 
(25.27) 
2006 92.95 
(17.71) 
83.36 
(22.51) 
2007 85.74 
(22.29) 
83.62 
(23.1) 
2008 88.52 
(15.24) 
80.28 
(24.08) 
2009 88.5 
(15.94) 
81.01 
(19.7) 
2010 87.85 
(14.06) 
82.33 
(18.41) 
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Year Production (CR3 gas 
shippers) 
Retail (CR3) 
2011 86.48 
(14.94) 
78.98 
(19.08) 
2012 85.54 
(15.18) 
77.16 
(19.05) 
2013 88.44 
(15.65) 
77.16 
(17.89) 
Table A2.4 Market concentration over time – by Member State 
Member State Gas shippers (CR3) Retail (CR3, HHI time trend 
not available) 
 2007 Change since 
2007 
2007 Change since 
2007 
Belgium 80.00 10.00 n.a.   -22 
Bulgaria 99.40 -24.30 92.3 -22.97 
Cyprus 32.47 67.53 32.47 50.53 
Czech Republic 100.00 -7.00 n.a. -12.35 
Denmark n.a.   n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Germany n.a.   n.a. n.a.   -38.66 
Estonia n.a.   n.a. n.a.   n.a. 
Ireland 99.00 1.00 99 -1 
Greece 100.00 0.00 n.a.   n.a. 
Spain 88.97 -6.97 98.5 -26.5 
France 58.65 n.a. 26.3 2.2 
Croatia 28.00 9.64 n.a.   n.a. 
Italy 100.00 0.00 100 0 
Cyprus 92.80 7.20 75 -15.7 
Latvia n.a.   n.a. 100 -34 
Lithuania 86.70 -4.90 66.5 -19.7 
Luxembourg 100.00 0.00 100 0 
Hungary 100.00 0.00 100 0 
Malta 100.00 0.00 88.5 10.5 
Austria n.a.   n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Poland n.a.   n.a. 100 -3 
Portugal 100.00 n.a. n.a. -3.7 
Romania n.a.   n.a. 83 -22.64 
Slovenia 74.00 n.a. 100 -14.1 
Slovakia 100.00 -14.10 86 -13 
Finland 100.00 -0.74 74 -4.4 
Sweden 75.00 -5.00 n.a.   n.a. 
The Netherlands n.a.   n.a. n.a.   -0.5 
The economic impact of enforcement of competition policies on the functioning of EU energy markets  
200 
Figure A2.3 Retail gas prices – households 
 
Figure A2.4 Retail gas prices – industrial customers 
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Annex 3 Broader econometric analysis 
A3.1 Appendix 1. Estimation of total factor productivity (TFP) 
We calculate total factor productivity of firm i in year t as the residual of a sector-specific (s), 
translog production function: 
𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝐹𝑖𝑖 −  𝑓𝑖(𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑛 𝑀𝑖𝑖)                                             (2) 
where 𝑉𝐹𝑖𝑖 is the value added
128 of firm i in year t, 𝐾𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝑖𝑖 , and  𝑀𝑖𝑖 represent its capital (as 
measure by total assets), labour (as measured by staff costs) and material expenditures129 
respectively. The sector s specific production function fs(.) is a second-order translog 
specification (Christiansen, Jorgenson, and Lau, 1972) comprising all terms 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑗 , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑗 , and 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑗 with 𝑗 ≤ 2 (for a total of 20 terms of up to degree 6) as well as year fixed effects and 
firm fixed effects. This functional form can be interpreted as a second-order Taylor 
approximation to a general, but unknown, production function. The sector-specific production 
function is estimated separately for firms in electricity production, electricity transmission, 
electricity distribution and electricity trade, as well as for firms in gas transmission.130 The 
results of the estimation in the specific sub-samples represented by the different NACE 
codes are reported in Table A3.1Table A3.1. 
The models perform very well as they are able to explain more than 90% of the variation in 
the log turnover. They also produce reasonable coefficients estimate for the marginal 
productivities. Specifically, we can calculate the average marginal productivity for each input 
at the mean value of the other inputs. We estimate and average marginal productivity of 
labour between 0.11 and 0.36, an average productivity of materials between 0.28 and 0.55 
and an average marginal productivity for capital between 0.26 and 0.45. 
  
                                                     
128 As a proxy for value added we use the log of operating revenues which are a measure of turnover. 
129 For Denmark, Ireland and the UK no data on material expenditures are available; we proxy for these values by 
calculating the difference between total cost and staff expenditures. 
130 We could not estimate the function in gas production and gas trade due to the too limited number of 
observations. 
The economic impact of enforcement of competition policies on the functioning of EU energy markets  
202 
Table A3.1 Production function regressions for the different sectors 
 Electricity 
Production 
Electricity 
Transmission 
Electricity 
Distribution 
Electricity  
Trade 
Gas 
Transmission 
 Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er. 
lnL 0.340*** (0.090) 0.412* (0.222) 0.809*** (0.103) -0.163 (0.170) -0.564 (0.382) 
lnM 0.406*** (0.058) 1.018*** (0.339) 0.235*** (0.077) 0.840*** (0.057) 0.644*** (0.204) 
lnK -0.133 (0.100) 1.174*** (0.315) -0.250** (0.110) 0.730*** (0.137) 1.710*** (0.316) 
lnL lnM -0.043*** (0.017) -0.117** (0.046) -0.215*** (0.023) -0.079*** (0.024) 0.130* (0.067) 
lnL lnK -0.061* (0.033) 0.028 (0.113) -0.127*** (0.031) 0.209*** (0.065) 0.181 (0.124) 
lnK lnM 0.030 (0.023) -0.402*** (0.113) 0.143*** (0.032) -0.293*** (0.027) -0.300*** (0.086) 
lnL lnM2 0.005*** (0.001) 0.015** (0.007) 0.004*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.006** (0.003) 
lnL lnK2 0.004 (0.003) -0.000 (0.012) 0.003 (0.003) -0.029*** (0.006) -0.003 (0.013) 
lnK lnM2 0.017*** (0.002) -0.013 (0.016) -0.012*** (0.004) -0.026*** (0.003) -0.008 (0.011) 
lnL2 0.057*** (0.010) -0.039 (0.043) 0.122*** (0.018) -0.002 (0.026) -0.166** (0.079) 
lnM2 -0.035*** (0.009) 0.112** (0.051) 0.063*** (0.012) 0.147*** (0.010) 0.110*** (0.033) 
lnK2 0.079*** (0.011) -0.090*** (0.032) 0.069*** (0.012) 0.046** (0.019) -0.153*** (0.035) 
lnL2 lnM -0.007*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.011) -0.020*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) 
lnL2 lnK -0.002 (0.003) 0.020 (0.016) -0.017*** (0.005) -0.006 (0.009) 0.051** (0.021) 
lnK2 lnM -0.009*** (0.002) 0.045*** (0.009) -0.023*** (0.004) 0.029*** (0.003) 0.038*** (0.009) 
lnL2 lnM2 -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) 0.001* (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 
lnL2 lnK2 -0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.002) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 
lnK2 lnM2 -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001** (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 
lnL lnM lnK 0.005* (0.003) -0.011 (0.008) 0.029*** (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) -0.040*** (0.011) 
lnL2 lnM2 lnK2 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Constant 1.386*** (0.246) 0.104 (0.832) 2.562*** (0.247) -0.942*** (0.278) -1.562** (0.685) 
R-squared 0.952 0.991 0.986 0.947 0.960 
Obs 2,725 396 1,298 1,289 633 
The level of observation is country-firm-year. The dependent variable is the country-firm-year specific log of operating revenues. 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the country-sector level. We control for firm fixed-effects as well as year 
dummies. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
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A3.2 Appendix 2: Robustness checks for the productivity dispersion equations 
As mentioned in the data section, we estimate productivity at the four-digit NACE level — i.e. 
electricity production, electricity transmission, electricity distribution, electricity trade, and gas 
transmission. Hence to provide an additional robustness check, we can also define 
productivity dispersion at this more disaggregated level. We report the full results in A3.2. 
Results are quite comparable. Specifically, we still observe a significant negative coefficient for 
EU merger enforcement in the low-regulation subsample.  
Table A3.2 Standard deviation of TFP, full sample and low/high regulation subsamples – based on four 
digits NACE codes 
 
Full sample Low Regulation High Regulation 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
EU merger enforcement (lagged) -0.055 (-1.46) -0.091** (-3.10) -0.098 (-0.70) 
EU State aid enforcement (lagged) -0.028 (-0.77) 0.027 (1.01) -0.137
** (-2.26) 
EU abuse & cartel enforcement (lagged) 0.059 (0.67) -0.062 (-0.67) 0.163
** (2.47) 
National merger enforcement (lagged) 0.003 (0.07) 0.020 (0.54) 0.037 (0.47) 
National cartel fines (lagged) 0.005 (0.16) -0.051 (-1.13) -0.017 (-0.46) 
National abuse & cartel enforcement 
(lagged) 
0.057 (0.68) 0.090 (0.70) 0.078 (0.54) 
Sector Inquiry (elect. production) -0.006 (-0.20) 0.012 (0.22) -0.003 (-0.15) 
Sector Inquiry (elect. transmission) 0.060 (0.99) 0.069 (0.70) 0.066 (0.64) 
Sector Inquiry (elect. distribution) -0.007 (-0.18) 0.007 (0.06) 0.013 (0.16) 
Sector Inquiry (elect. trade) 0.040 (0.86) 0.133 (1.22) 0.018 (0.25) 
Sector Inquiry (gas transmission) -0.063 (-0.39) -0.451 (-0.65) -0.016 (-0.08) 
Regulation (OECD index) (lagged) -0.057 (-0.67) -0.129
* (-1.94) 0.261 (1.20) 
EU merger cases (lagged) 0.105
* (2.06) 0.105 (1.56) 0.207*** (4.04) 
State aid cases (lagged) -0.046 (-0.34) 0.184
** (2.89) -0.181 (-1.77) 
National merger cases (lagged) -0.018 (-0.17) 0.082 (1.00) -0.108 (-0.65) 
GDP per capita  1.171 (1.04) 0.400 (0.32) 0.708 (0.53) 
Population growth -0.230 (-1.52) -0.625
* (-2.09) 0.055 (0.61) 
Energy imports (% of tot. cons.) 0.099 (0.30) 0.310 (0.44) 0.336 (1.05) 
R-squared 0.35 0.41 0.48 
Observations 413 206 207 
The level of observation is country-sector-year. The dependent variable is the country-sector-year specific 
standard deviation of total factor productivity. All policy variables are lagged one year to reduce endogeneity 
issues. We report standardised beta coefficients. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. We control for country-sector fixed-effects as well as year dummies. 
The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
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A3.3 Appendix 3: Robustness checks for the investment equations 
Sector Heterogeneity 
There may be heterogeneity among different sectors. When separating countries based on the 
degree of regulatory intensity, we indeed obtain some significant heterogeneous results.  
As an additional robustness check we estimated our model (7) on different sub-samples based 
on the same NACE codes of the analysed firms, which were used to generate the productivity 
measures. Specifically, we distinguish between firms active in electricity production, electricity 
transmission, electricity distribution, electricity trade, as well as gas transmission. The full 
results are reported in Table A3.3.  
Table A3.3 Investment by different NACE codes 
 
Electricity
Production 
Electricity 
Transmission 
Electricity 
Distribution 
Electricity
Trade 
Gas 
Transmission 
EU merger enforcement (lagged) 0.005 0.202* 0.013 -0.005 0.087 
 (0.20) (1.95) (0.26) (-0.11) (0.58) 
EU State aid enforcement (lagged) 0.014 -0.031 0.005 -0.019 -0.000 
 (0.73) (-0.63) (0.26) (-0.45) (-0.00) 
EU abuse & cartel enforcement (lagged) -0.066 0.133 -0.028 0.036 -0.118 
 (-1.05) (0.95) (-0.30) (0.55) (-0.85) 
National merger enforcement (lagged) -0.033 0.105 0.075* 0.017 0.003 
 (-1.07) (0.74) (1.98) (0.69) (0.17) 
National cartel fines (lagged) 0.016 0.008 0.000 0.049 0.027 
 (0.64) (0.16) (0.01) (1.43) (1.39) 
Sector Inquiry 0.013 0.005 -0.084 0.122 -0.079 
 (0.46) (0.06) (-0.87) (0.86) (-0.46) 
Regulation (lagged) 0.067 -0.846** 0.759 -0.074 0.666 
 (0.99) (-2.35) (1.54) (-0.24) (1.10) 
EU merger cases (lagged) 0.052 -0.023 0.068 -0.043 -0.022 
 (0.75) (-0.17) (0.99) (-0.83) (-0.40) 
State aid cases (lagged) 0.018 0.087 -0.092 0.008 -0.062 
 (0.96) (0.97) (-1.20) (0.10) (-0.60) 
National merger cases (lagged) 0.024 -0.085 0.047 -0.113 -0.084 
 (0.30) (-0.30) (0.32) (-0.53) (-0.73) 
National cartel cases (lagged) 0.028 -0.005 -0.033 0.006 0.036 
 (1.07) (-0.04) (-0.36) (0.08) (0.41) 
Electricity capacity (combustible) -0.198 0.359 2.197 -0.043 0.634 
 (-0.31) (0.22) (1.40) (-0.07) (0.56) 
Electricity Capacity (nuclear) -0.142 4.565 -0.997 0.658 -0.254 
 (-0.63) (0.86) (-1.49) (0.67) (-0.28) 
Electricity Capacity (renewable) 0.046 0.306 -0.722 0.296 -0.298 
 (0.25) (0.75) (-1.17) (1.22) (-0.49) 
GDP per capita  -0.108 -1.505 0.372 -0.365 0.610 
 (-0.47) (-1.35) (0.41) (-0.99) (0.63) 
Population growth 0.025 0.042 0.307*** -0.023 0.107 
 (0.66) (0.20) (3.15) (-0.36) (1.39) 
Energy imports, % of tot cons -0.071 0.513 -0.474 0.149 -0.146 
 (-0.87) (0.59) (-1.66) (0.39) (-0.61) 
R-Squared 0.02 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.12 
Observations 3,388 371 1,172 1,205 658 
The unit of observation is firm-country-year. The dependent variable is firm level investment. All policy variables are lagged 
one year to reduce endogeneity issues. We report standardised beta coefficients. Standard errors are robust and clustered at 
the country level are reported in parentheses. We control for firm fixed-effects as well as year dummies. The symbols ***, **, * 
represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
We find a positive and significant impact of EU merger enforcement in electricity transmission 
as well as a positive and significant impact of national merger enforcement on investment in 
electricity distribution. We find little evidence of a sizeable impact of competition policy on 
investment in other sub-markets 
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Autoregressive investment equation 
When we use investment as a dependent variable, we also estimate an autoregressive model 
as a robustness check where we add the lagged dependent variable as an additional 
regressor. This augmented model allows us to more carefully specify the investment process, 
which is often characterised by inertia. Results are comparable to those obtained in the main 
specification. The coefficient estimate for lagged investment is not significantly different from 
zero, casting doubts on the fact that this model is more appropriate in our context. 
Table A3.4 Investment with lagged investment, full sample and low/high regulation subsamples 
 
Full Sample Low Regulation High Regulation 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Investment (lagged) -0.010 (-0.10) -0.019 (-1.13) 0.006 (0.32) 
EU merger enforcement (lagged) -0.007 (-0.31) 0.258*** (3.16) -0.005 (-0.16) 
EU State aid enforcement (lagged) -0.000 (-0.00) - - -0.006 (-0.24) 
EU abuse & cartel enforcement 
(lagged) 0.011 (0.30) -0.277*** (-2.62) 0.048* (1.75) 
National merger enforcement (lagged) 0.012 (0.47) 0.016 (0.39) 0.010 (0.47) 
National cartel fines (lagged) -0.001 (-0.02) -0.010 (-0.08) -0.017 (-0.92) 
Sector Inquiry 0.075 (1.22) -0.031 (-0.34) 0.076 (1.43) 
Regulation (lagged) 0.089 (0.96) 3.093*** (3.50) 0.059 (0.56) 
EU merger cases (lagged) -0.037 (-1.30) -0.412*** (-3.02) -0.093 (-1.55) 
State aid cases (lagged) 0.024 (1.55) 0.221*** (2.62) 0.021 (0.73) 
National merger cases (lagged) 0.041 (0.78) -0.326 (-0.93) 0.017 (0.18) 
National cartel cases (lagged) 0.038 (1.27) 0.001 (0.01) 0.084 (1.44) 
Electricity capacity (combustible) -0.606 (-1.59) -0.580 (-0.82) -0.529 (-1.18) 
Electricity Capacity (nuclear) -0.510 (-1.15) 11.679*** (4.24) 1.210 (0.36) 
Electricity Capacity (renewable) 0.346** (2.71) 1.134*** (3.14) 0.251* (1.78) 
GDP per capita  -0.694** (-2.77) -0.763 (-1.54) -0.486 (-1.12) 
Population growth 0.090* (2.08) 0.707*** (5.51) 0.027 (0.62) 
Energy imports, % of tot cons 0.077 (0.57) 0.433 (1.25) 0.208 (0.90) 
R-squared 7696 3797 3899 
Observations 0.170 0.194 0.206 
The unit of observation is firm-country-year. The dependent variable is firm level investment. All policy 
variables are lagged one year to reduce endogeneity issues. We report standardised beta coefficients. We 
control for firm fixed-effects as well as year dummies. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
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An alternative definition of investment: Country-specific electricity capacity investment 
As we mention in the data section, the chosen monetary measure of investment has some 
clear advantages but also the main disadvantage that we do not exactly know which kind of 
investment we are measuring. Hence as a robustness check, we collected information on an 
additional investment variable based on production capacity in electricity markets which is 
calculated at the (market)-country level. We collected publicly available information on 
generation capacity in electricity markets as published in the Country fact sheet by DG Energy 
that measure energy production capacities from combustible fuels, nuclear fuels and 
renewable fuels separately. Table A3.5 illustrates the evolution of aggregate European 
capacity from 1990 to 2013. 
Table A3.5  Aggregate European energy production 
 
Source: DG ENER country factsheets 
In the regressions we use the change in aggregated generation capacity in each country 
from one year to the next.131 The advantage of this variable is that it represents a very clean 
measure of specific investment. The disadvantage is that data are only available at country 
level and that it only covers a small part of energy markets, i.e., electricity generation.132 
Hence, the results obtained with it can only be partially compared to those obtained with 
firm-level data and these measures should rather be considered as complementary. 
Table A3.6 reports the coefficients’ estimates representing the impact of competition policy 
measures on production capacities in the full sample, as well as in low- and high-regulation 
samples. To increase the efficiency of our estimates and since we have three different 
measures of capacity (combustible, nuclear, renewable), we pooled them into a single 
regression. Therefore for each year and country, we have three observations.133   
 
 
                                                     
131  In the main regressions we pool all capacities for the sake of econometric efficiency. The results from these 
regressions are only reported in the appendix. 
132  Unfortunately, there is no publicly available data on infrastructure investment for the period of interest of this 
study. 
133  Most of the results obtained in this specification are however driven from the effects of the policy on capacity 
investment in renewable energies. Indeed, if we ran the same set of regression only using the data for 
renewable only, we obtain similar results on the full sample. However due to the limited number of 
observations, we cannot run reliable regressions on the sub-sample of low- and high-regulated countries. 
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Table A3.6 Country-level capacities, full sample and low/high regulation subsamples 
 
Full sample Low Regulation High Regulation 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
EU merger enforcement (lagged) -0.021 (-0.61) -0.043 (-0.75) 0.041 (0.51) 
EU State aid enforcement (lagged) 0.056 (1.16) 0.090 (1.22) -0.017 (-0.55) 
EU abuse & cartel enforcement (lagged) 0.135*** (3.19) 0.134** (2.59) 0.242** (2.86) 
National merger enforcement (lagged) -0.025 (-0.83) 0.046 (1.37) -0.102** (-2.91) 
National cartel fines (lagged) 0.026 (0.68) 0.092*** (3.65) -0.039 (-1.31) 
National abuse & cartel enforcement (lagged) 0.116 (1.24) 0.122** (2.68) -0.120 (-1.31) 
Sector Inquiry (Combustible) -0.119 (-1.46) -0.145 (-1.24) -0.283* (-1.79) 
Sector Inquiry (Nuclear) -0.204** (-2.20) -0.272* (-2.08) -0.326* (-2.15) 
Sector Inquiry (Renewable) -0.111 (-1.35) -0.144 (-1.24) -0.245* (-2.03) 
Regulation (OECD index) (lagged) -0.076 (-0.50) 0.351 (1.57) -0.002 (-0.02) 
EU merger cases (lagged) 0.270** (2.20) 0.320** (2.51) 0.413** (2.31) 
State aid cases (lagged) -0.019 (-0.46) -0.031 (-0.54) -0.050 (-0.75) 
National merger cases (lagged) -0.083 (-0.51) -0.184 (-1.09) 0.117 (1.54) 
GDP per capita  0.141 (0.26) -0.405 (-0.61) 1.567* (2.14) 
Population growth 0.087 (1.14) 0.226** (2.81) 0.018 (0.18) 
Energy imports (% of tot. cons.) 0.062 (0.53) -0.550 (-1.40) -0.127 (-0.40) 
R-squared 0.39 0.43 0.45 
Observations 411 204 207 
The dependent variable is the change of energy capacity for the different production sources (combustible, 
nuclear, renewable). We report standardised beta coefficients. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
country level. We control for country fixed-effects as well as year dummies. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
In contrast to the firm-level sample, we estimate a significant impact of the enforcement of 
EU as well as national abuse and cartel policies. Specifically, the number of abuse and cartel 
cases at the EU level significantly increase investment in capacity in the full sample, as well 
as in both sub-samples. A standard deviation increase in merger notifications implies 0.13 
standard deviations increase in capacity investment for the full sample and the low-regulated 
markets sub-sample and 0.24 standard deviations increase for high-regulated markets. 
Moreover in the case of national cartel and abuse cases as well as fines, we estimate 
positive and significant effects on investment in low-regulated markets. 
An additional effect that we did not observe in the main specifications is found for the Sector 
Inquiry. It significantly decreased investment in electricity capacity especially for nuclear 
capacity both in low- and high-regulated industries as well as for combustible and renewable 
capacities in high-regulated industries. 
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A3.4 Appendix 4: Robustness checks for the TFP equations – Sector 
heterogeneity 
Similarly as above as an additional robustness check, we run our regression separately in 
the different sectors based on the NACE codes. We report the results in Table A3.7.  
Similarly as above, we again find that the effect of EU merger control on productivity solely 
comes from the electricity transmission sectors. Moreover, we also observe a negative 
impact of state aid schemes but also of state aid control on productivity in electricity 
production and transmission. This additional result suggests that state aid schemes have 
indeed a negative impact on market outcomes and that state aid enforcement does not seem 
to be enough to counterbalance these effects. Finally, we also find a positive effect of 
national merger enforcement on productivity in gas transmission, a positive effect of national 
cartel investigations on productivity in electricity transmission and a negative effect of 
national cartel fines on productivity in electricity trade. 
Table A3.7 TFP levels by different NACE codes 
 Electricity Production 
Electricity 
Transmission 
Electricity 
Distribution 
Electricity 
Trade 
Gas 
Transmission 
Leader Productivity 0.037 0.105 0.059 0.006 -0.499 
 (0.27) (1.69) (0.42) (0.16) (-0.78) 
EU merger enforcement (lagged) 0.047 0.377*** 0.147 0.001 0.096 
 (1.07) (5.28) (1.66) (0.05) (0.86) 
EU State aid enforcement (lagged) -0.079** -0.064* 0.024 -0.023 -0.058* 
 (-2.69) (-1.77) (1.67) (-0.45) (-1.87) 
EU abuse & cartel enforcement 
(lagged) 0.010 -0.114 -0.140 0.108
* 0.039 
 (0.13) (-1.10) (-1.45) (2.06) (0.65) 
National merger enforcement (lagged) -0.034 0.155** 0.000 -0.005 0.035 
 (-0.97) (2.59) (0.01) (-0.26) (0.53) 
National cartel fines (lagged) 0.025 0.109* 0.029 -0.017 -0.070** 
 (0.48) (1.90) (0.51) (-0.51) (-2.40) 
Sector Inquiry -0.062 -0.207 -0.267 0.033 -0.050 
 (-0.32) (-1.73) (-1.46) (0.52) (-0.29) 
Regulation (lagged) 0.447* -0.429 -0.551 0.010 0.919** 
 (1.84) (-0.78) (-1.05) (0.04) (2.52) 
EU merger cases (lagged) 0.049 -0.108 0.110 -0.043 -0.160 
 (0.81) (-1.18) (1.15) (-0.41) (-1.65) 
State aid cases (lagged) -0.132*** -0.275*** -0.066 0.034 -0.001 
 (-2.94) (-3.99) (-1.36) (0.42) (-0.01) 
National merger cases (lagged) -0.002 0.468* -0.025 0.051 -0.014 
 (-0.03) (2.09) (-0.09) (0.38) (-0.09) 
National cartel & abuse enforcement 
(lagged) -0.028 0.279
** 0.083 -0.089 -0.138 
 (-0.46) (2.83) (0.76) (-0.91) (-1.65) 
Electricity capacity (combustible) 0.583 0.265 1.881 0.782 -1.564 
 (0.65) (0.26) (0.94) (1.09) (-1.34) 
Electricity Capacity (nuclear) 0.059 2.412 0.945 -9.421 -0.165 
 (0.12) (0.42) (1.13) (-1.30) (-0.21) 
Electricity Capacity (renewable) -0.357 -0.093 -1.009** 0.101 0.170 
 (-0.92) (-0.31) (-2.26) (0.39) (0.77) 
GDP per capita  0.144 -1.087 0.561 0.465 -0.219 
 (0.20) (-1.44) (0.62) (0.96) (-0.65) 
Population growth -0.107 -0.309** -0.220 0.051 -0.026 
 (-1.26) (-2.26) (-1.59) (0.67) (-0.31) 
Energy imports, % of tot cons -0.146 -0.303 0.044 -0.663 -1.478*** 
 (-0.59) (-0.46) (0.07) (-1.44) (-3.13) 
R-squared 0.10 0.37 0.13 0.15 0.07 
Observations 1844 258 872 889 442 
The dependent variable is firm level total factor productivity. We report standardised beta coefficients. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered at the country level. We control for firm fixed-effects as well as year dummies. The symbols ***, **, * 
represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
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Annex 4 E.ON case study 
A4.1 Appendix 1: The Difference in Difference methodology 
The DiD approach is probably the most popular identification strategy in applied work 
nowadays. It attempts to mimic the random assignment with treatment and “comparison” 
groups which is often used in natural sciences. One group of agents is ‘treated’ with an 
intervention and we have pre-post data for group receiving intervention. By examining the 
changes over time for an outcome variable of this group, we can measure the difference in 
the outcome before and after the intervention. However, given that other factors might have 
influenced the time evolution of the outcome, we are unsure how much of the change is due 
to these other factors and how much is due to the treatment itself. The basic idea of the DiD 
methods is therefore to look at the outcome of another group not affected by the treatment 
(the control group) and use the variation over time in its outcome variable to establish what 
would have occurred in the absence of the intervention. Key for the identification is of course 
that the control group is similar enough to the treated group so that it can be correctly used 
to represent the treated group in absence of the intervention. A simplified tabular description 
of the methodology is represented in the following table Table A4.1 
Table A4.1 The Difference in Difference Approach 
 Outcome before 
intervention 
Outcome after 
intervention 
Difference 
Treated group: t Yt1 Yt2 ∆Yt= Yt1 - Yt2 
Control group:  Yc1 Yc2 ∆Yc= Yc1 - Yc2 
Difference-in-
Difference 
  ∆∆Yt= ∆Yt – ∆Yc = 
= Yt1 - Yt2 - Yc1 + Yc2 
 
In most analyses using a DiD approach (as in this case), the researchers tend not to just 
observe the outcome before and after the intervention; rather they observe the evolution of 
the outcome for a longer period of time. In Figure A4.1 and Figure A4.2, we discuss the role 
of time and of the key assumption of a ‘common trend’ between treated and control groups in 
more detail. In this example, we observe the time evolution of the outcome variable for the 
treated group, which is decreasing over time. Moreover, we observe that between t1 and t2, 
this group is affected by a treatment.  
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Figure A4.1 Graphical Interpretation: DiD and Treatment Effect 
 
Source: Own representation 
 
To measure the treatment effect we have to define a valid counterfactual. The control group 
should serve this goal by identifying the time path for the outcome that would have happened 
in the absence of the treatment. Specifically the outcome Y would have decreased by (Yc2 -
Yc1) even without the intervention. It is crucial to notice that the ‘levels’ of the outcome 
variable are not important because we are focusing on the difference over time for each 
group, therefore the group-specific time-invariant effects are levelled out. The treatment 
effect is identified by the different evolution over time for the outcome of the treatment group 
and it is represented by (∆∆Yt = Yt1 - Yt2 - Yc1 + Yc2).  
A key assumption for the identification of the treatment effect is that the time trends in the 
absence of the intervention must be the same in both groups. Indeed, if the control group 
has a different trend than the treated group, then the DiD method will provide a biased 
estimate of the treatment effect. Imagine for instance that the outcome for the treatment 
group decreased over time faster than for the control group, i.e. the slope of the schedule for 
the treatment group is steeper than for the control group (figure 1.14). In this case, the 
estimated treatment effect is larger than the true treatment effect. 
In our specific application, the DiD method should help assess the impact of the specific 
competition policy intervention by comparing the outcomes (the prices) among the group 
mostly affected by the enforcement of the Commission’s decision before and after the 
intervention with the outcomes of the group not affected by the intervention (the control 
group), over the same time period. As we mention, the two key element to the DiD method 
are the identification of the treated and control groups as well as the definition of the before 
and after periods. The DiD requires satisfying an assumption that both groups have common 
characteristics. This means that in the absence of the policy intervention, all other time-
varying factors would affect the treatment and control groups in the same way. This is the 
reason why the challenge for a successful DiD design is the identification of a control group, 
i.e. the choice of a group which has not been affected by the policy intervention, but 
resembles the characteristics of a group that has been. Hence, the choice of the control 
variables is also very important as we want to condition out as many observable 
characteristics as possible that differentiate the different groups. 
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Figure A4.2 Graphical Interpretation: Biased Treatment Effect 
 
Source: Own representation 
 
We will adopt this basic methodological approach in both our case studies. However, a key 
element of each of the proposed analyses will be the choice of the appropriate control group 
and before-and-after periods. 
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A4.2 Appendix 2: Robustness Checks for the Wholesale market 
Table A4.2 The Effect of the Divestitures on German Wholesale Prices – Full specification 
 Post 2010  
 
Post 2009 
 
Short-Run  
 
Single Div.  
 
Peak 30.84*** 31.03*** 19.68*** 19.83*** 
 (1.89) (1.79) (1.00) (1.03) 
Peak × Post -15.37*** -14.58*** -3.22**  
 (1.65) (1.66) (1.54)  
Peak × Div. 1     -2.48 
    (2.65) 
Peak × Div. 2     -4.47*** 
    (1.62) 
Peak × Div. 3     0.18 
    (2.28) 
Peak × Div. 4     3.57 
    (3.25) 
Peak × Div. 5     -2.40** 
    (1.19) 
Peak × Div. 6     -9.55*** 
    (2.16) 
Peak × Div. 7     -4.37*** 
    (1.31) 
Peak × Div. 8     -6.54*** 
    (2.27) 
Wind capacity -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.001*** -0.00*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Sun per day -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Installed solar capacity -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Temp offpeak -1.05*** -1.04*** -1.23*** -1.25*** 
 (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) 
Temp sq. offpeak 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Crossboarder offpeak 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Crossboarder peak -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Market Coupling 2.48 3.09 3.09 3.13 
 (2.34) (2.13) (2.42) (2.47) 
Brent -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.51) (0.05) 
TTF price 1.32*** 1.35*** 1.34*** 1.33*** 
 (0.2) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Uranium price -0.31*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.25*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
EUA price 0.80*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.56** 
 (0.27) (0.18) (0.19) (0.23) 
coal_price 0.10** 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Holiday -11.54*** -11.11*** -11.07*** -10.90*** 
 (1.7) (1.69) (1.65) (1.67) 
Temp peak -1.48*** -1.54*** -1.35*** -1.42*** 
 (0.34) (0.28) (0.30) (0.31) 
Temp sq. peak 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Tue 1.85 0.54 1.51** 0.11 
 (1.15) (0.98) (0.43) (1.04) 
Wed 1.22 0.3 1.58** -0.32 
 (1.68) (1.37) (0.46) (1.46) 
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Thur 2.85 0.37 2.14*** -0.27 
 (2.14) (1.78) (0.48) (2.11) 
Fri -2.01 -2.17 -0.13 -2.98 
 (2.3) (1.75) (0.49) (2.07) 
Sat -1.39 -0.78 -6.96*** -1.42 
 (2.52) (1.87) (0.73) (2.13) 
Sun -2.64 -1.17 -13.77*** -1.76 
 (2.44) (1.95) (0.86) (2.24) 
Feb -3.7 -1.74 0.45 -2.31 
 (2.32) (1.97) (0.99) (2.24) 
Mar 4.58* 4.74** 0.11 4.31* 
 (2.38) (1.92) (1.45) (2.29) 
Apr 8.66*** 8.37*** 0.20 7.87*** 
 (1.86) (1.52) (2.08) (1.68) 
Mai 1.57 1.12 -2.25 0.81 
 (2.09) (1.62) (1.98) (1.93) 
Jun -3.36 -4.91*** -0.84 -5.38*** 
 (2.54) (1.78) (2.07) (1.99) 
Jul -7.09*** -5.09*** -1.23 -7.90*** 
 (2.74) (1.76) (2.21) (2.17) 
Aug   -1.82  
   (2.21)  
Sept 1.43*** 1.51*** 4.69** 1.51*** 
 (0.49) (0.42) (2.23) (0.44) 
Oct 1.53*** 1.58*** 8.27*** 1.58*** 
 (0.53) (0.45) (1.62) (0.47) 
Nov 2.14*** 2.13*** 1.07 2.14*** 
 (0.54) (0.47) (1.86) (0.48) 
Dec -0.06 -0.12 -5.00*** -0.12 
 (0.57) (0.48) (1.95) (0.49) 
2009 -7.12*** -6.96*** -12.42*** -6.92*** 
 (0.81) (0.72) (3.16) (0.73) 
2010 -14.41*** -13.74*** -7.64*** -13.73*** 
 (0.96) (0.85) (1.97) (0.86) 
Constant 40.32*** 38.38*** 46.66*** 47.89*** 
 (7.46) (6.33) (7.92) (8.24) 
Cumulative post effect -7.09*** -11.85*** -20.06*** -20.84*** 
 (2.74) (4.30) (4.97) (5.62) 
N 2190 2916 2916 2916 
Adj. R2 0.7800 0.7900 0.7657 0.7625 
The dependent variable is the daily average peak or off-peak price at the EEX power exchange. Newey-West standard errors 
with maximum lag order of autocorrelation equal to seven days are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent 
significance at the 15, %%, 10% levels respectively. 
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Table A4.3 The Effect of the Divestitures on German Wholesale Prices: Robustness check I: Newey-West 
max lag 1 day 
 Post 2010 
 (1) 
Post 2009  
(2) 
Short-Run  
(3) 
Single Div.  
(4) 
Peak 30.84*** 31.03*** 19.68*** 19.83*** 
 (1.43) (1.36) (0.77) (0.80) 
Peak × Post -15.37*** -14.58*** -3.22**  
 (1.21) (1.21) (1.30)  
Peak × Div. 1     -2.48 
    (3.52) 
Peak × Div. 2     -4.47* 
    (2.69) 
Peak × Div. 3     0.18 
    (3.08) 
Peak × Div. 4     3.57 
    (3.61) 
Peak × Div. 5     -2.40 
    (1.78) 
Peak × Div. 6     -9.55** 
    (2.92) 
Peak × Div. 7     -4.37** 
    (2.02) 
Peak × Div. 8     -6.54** 
    (2.69) 
Constant 40.32*** 38.38*** 46.66*** 47.89*** 
 (5.33) (4.53) (5.16) (5.40) 
Cumulative post effect -7.09*** -11.85*** -20.06*** -20.84*** 
 (1.98) (3.24) (3.51) (4.00) 
N 2,190 2,916 2,916 2,916 
Adj. R2 0.780 0.790 0.763 0.762 
The dependent variable is the daily average peak or off-peak price at the EEX power exchange. We control for 
input prices (gas, oil, coal, uranium, and emission), day, month, and year dummies, solar and wind energy 
production, cross-border production, temperature, as well as holydays. Newey-West standard errors with 
maximum lag order of autocorrelation equal to one day are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * 
represent significance at the 15, %%, 10% levels respectively. 
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Table A4.4 The Effect of the Divestitures on German Wholesale Prices: Robustness check II: Bootstrapped 
Standard Errors 
 Post 2010 
 (1) 
Post 2009  
(2) 
Short-Run  
(3) 
Single Div.  
(4) 
Peak 30.84*** 31.03*** 19.68*** 19.83*** 
 (1.18) (1.10) (0.64) (0.66) 
Peak × Post -15.37*** -14.58*** -3.22***  
 (0.99) (0.96) (1.18)  
Peak × Div. 1     -2.48 
    (3.87) 
Peak × Div. 2     -4.47 
    (2.92) 
Peak × Div. 3     0.18 
    (3.45) 
Peak × Div. 4     3.57 
    (3.90) 
Peak × Div. 5     -2.40 
    (2.01) 
Peak × Div. 6     -9.55*** 
    (3.38) 
Peak × Div. 7     -4.37 
    (2.68) 
Peak × Div. 8     -6.54*** 
    (2.50) 
Constant 40.32*** 38.38*** 46.66*** 47.89*** 
 (4.24) (3.80) (4.18) (4.43) 
Cumulative post effect -7.09***    -11.85*** -20.06***    -20.84*** 
 (1.57) (2.67) (2.82) (3.17) 
N 2190 2916 2916 2916 
Adj. R2 0.780 0.790 0.763 0.763 
The dependent variable is the daily average peak or off-peak price at the EEX power exchange. We control for 
input prices (gas, oil, coal, uranium, and emission), day, month, and year dummies, solar and wind energy 
production, cross-border production, temperature, as well as holydays. Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 
replications are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 15, %%, 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Table A4.5 The Effect of the Divestitures on German Wholesale Prices: Robustness check III: Weekly data 
 Post 2010 
 (1) 
Post 2009  
(2) 
Short-Run  
(3) 
Single Div.  
(4) 
Peak 30.28*** 30.73*** 19.30*** 19.46*** 
 (2.38) (2.25) (1.33) (1.44) 
Peak × Post -15.50*** -14.37*** -3.06*  
 (1.99) (1.99) (1.68)  
Peak × Div. 1     -2.44 
    (2.28) 
Peak × Div. 2     -3.96** 
    (1.95) 
Peak × Div. 3     -0.97 
    (1.81) 
Peak × Div. 4     3.59** 
    (1.68) 
Peak × Div. 5     0.38 
    (4.58) 
Peak × Div. 6     -8.14*** 
    (2.21) 
Peak × Div. 7     -6.64*** 
    (1.47) 
Peak × Div. 8     -8.84*** 
    (1.58) 
Constant 35.54*** 29.93*** 37.89*** 38.85*** 
 (7.51) (5.50) (7.11) (7.56) 
Cumulative post effect (long run) -8.80*** -12.80***    -21.03***    -21.69***    
 (3.16) (4.75) (6.02) (6.77) 
N 312 416 416 416 
Adj. R2 0.873 0.884 0.845 0.842 
The dependent variable is the weekly average peak or off-peak price at the EEX power exchange. We control for 
input prices (gas, oil, coal, uranium, and emission), day, month, and year dummies, solar and wind energy 
production, cross-border production, temperature, as well as holydays. Newey-West standard errors with 
maximum lag order of autocorrelation equal to one week are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * 
represent significance at the 15, %%, 10% levels respectively. 
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A4.3 Appendix 3: Robustness checks for the retail market 
Table A4.6 Incumbent’s Baseline Tariff – Yearly data 
 1,500 kWh 2,800 kWh 4,000 kWh 10,000 kWh 
  Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. 
E.ON 1.187 (3.653) 1.958 (6.470) 7.609 (10.40) -49.02 (40.87) 
RWE -1.540 (3.010) -5.877 (5.238) -3.519 (8.820) -22.73 (27.16) 
EnBW -1.380 (3.447) -1.626 (5.681) 20.33** (9.629) -12.65 (28.08) 
Vattenfall -21.62*** (3.338) -43.57*** (5.563)   -143.2*** (27.84) 
Stadtwerke -1.129 (9.172) 5.872 (10.32) 33.67*** (12.55) 252.6*** (70.37) 
Other 5.446 (3.329) 6.270 (5.544) 11.12 (9.620) -2.711 (27.82) 
E.ON × Post 4.760*** (1.187) 7.081*** (2.074) -3.310 (2.174) 26.91*** (8.905) 
RWE × Post 7.778*** (1.186) 16.05*** (2.081) 11.06*** (2.174) 54.88*** (8.991) 
EnBW × Post 11.00*** (1.349) 21.13*** (2.361) -4.276** (2.179) 147.8*** (9.162) 
Vattenfall × Post 9.118*** (1.174) 18.71*** (2.059) 14.45*** (2.160) 75.02*** (8.855) 
Stadtwerke × Post -1.705 (1.222) -3.472 (2.135) -15.88*** (2.258) -15.65* (9.192) 
Other × Post 2.877** (1.195) 2.570 (2.088) -13.37*** (2.243) -1.009 (8.955) 
# of EIPs 0.009*** (0.002) 0.019*** (0.002) 0.0193*** (0.004) 0.056*** (0.010) 
Pop. Density 0.253 (0.175) 0.809** (0.320) 2.205*** (0.471) 3.680*** (1.163) 
Share foreign -0.086*** (0.010) -0.113*** (0.015) -0.206*** (0.021) -0.259*** (0.058) 
Births-deaths -4.948 (3.206) -7.718 (4.919) -8.606 (6.261) -58.68 (37.07) 
# Amadeus firms  0.102* (0.058) 0.104 (0.094) 0.0766 (0.147) 0.136 (0.353) 
Constant 349.7*** (3.412) 580.2*** (5.679) 780.4*** (8.980) 1956.7*** (29.24) 
Observations 40,720 40,720 40,867 40,670 
Adjusted R-squared 0.920 0.932 0.926 0.934 
The dependent variable is the price a costumer using the different consumption plans (1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh, and 
10,000 kWh per year) would pay if she chose the incumbent’s baseline tariff. The control category for the firm-type dummies is the 
group of independent firms. We control for 8,208 zip-code fixed effects as well as 4 year dummies. The entire implementation 
period (the year 2009) is excluded from the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the zip-code level. t statistics in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
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Table A4.7 Overall lowest tariff 
 1,500 kWh 2,800 kWh 4,000 kWh 10,000 kWh 
  Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. 
E.ON -8.613*** (0.622)     -0.890 (4.827) 
RWE 2.042*** (0.303) 1.134*** (0.364) 7.902*** (0.351) 23.70*** (3.251) 
EnBW 22.62*** (8.694) -1.338 (1.523) 8.075*** (0.712)   
Vattenfall -1.461*** (0.409) 2.467*** (0.342) 2.468*** (0.240) -4.822 (3.014) 
Stadtwerke 6.155*** (0.340) 6.356*** (1.933) 6.284*** (0.519)   
Other -1.392*** (0.203) 1.606*** (0.335) 5.258*** (0.300) -11.85*** (3.060) 
(E.ON + RWE) × Post 0.053*** (0.004) 0.190*** (0.003) 0.201*** (0.004) 0.213*** (0.005) 
EnBW × Post -5.975* (3.254) -13.01*** (3.234) 15.62*** (0.549)   
Vattenfall × Post 3.913*** (1.272) -10.14*** (0.822) 12.87** (6.138)   
Stadtwerke × Post -1.334 (1.225) -2.206*** (0.758) 9.436*** (0.652) 10.85 (15.43) 
Other × Post -0.662 (1.210) -11.21*** (0.867) -4.904*** (1.708) 35.97*** (3.365) 
# of EIPs -0.003*** (0.0007) -0.014*** (0.001) -0.0187*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.003) 
pop1: density -0.153 (0.179) 1.128*** (0.221) 0.598** (0.286) -2.159*** (0.625) 
pop2: share foreign 0.172*** (0.006) 0.380*** (0.010) 0.412*** (0.012) 0.071** (0.028) 
pop3: births-deaths -2.249 (2.505) -2.838 (3.963) -0.266 (5.461) -11.63 (10.54) 
# Amadeus firms 0.013 (0.032) 0.044 (0.042) 0.0770 (0.056) 0.083 (0.166) 
Constant 300.4*** (1.805) 419.0*** (2.390) 564.0*** (3.572) 1,344.6*** (11.00) 
Observations 
40,720 40,720 40,867 40,670 
Adjusted R-squared 
0.834 0.774 0.857 0.911 
The dependent variable is the price a costumer using the different consumption plans (1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh, 
10,000 kWh per year) would pay if she chose the overall cheapest tariff in her local network area. The control category for the 
firm-type dummies is the group of independent firms. We control for 8,208 zip-code fixed effects as well as 4 year dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered at the zip-code level. t statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance level respectively. 
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Table A4.8 Price dispersion (Incumbent’s Baseline Tariff – Overall Cheapest Tariff) – Yearly data 
 1,500 kWh 2,800 kWh 4,000 kWh 10,000 kWh 
  Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. 
E.ON 5.072 (4.141) -3.161 (6.554) 2.176 (9.407) -33.35 (45.13) 
RWE 3.599 (3.760) -4.149 (5.262) -2.011 (7.927) -33.98 (30.38) 
EnBW 2.447 (4.253) -8.943 (5.854) 10.55 (9.004) -38.71 (30.82) 
Vattenfall -28.05*** (4.180) -23.54*** (5.738)   -127.6*** (30.65) 
Stadtwerke 4.110 (7.401) 7.164 (8.832) 38.29*** (11.72) 218.1*** (57.03) 
Other 7.494* (4.173) 3.381 (5.736) 12.47 (8.952) -9.838 (30.66) 
E.ON × Post 0.229 (1.612) 3.989 (2.756) -2.129 (2.239) 38.77*** (9.598) 
RWE × Post 8.093*** (1.637) 18.55*** (2.790) 21.60*** (2.263) 109.7*** (9.687) 
EnBW × Post -2.143 (1.803) -11.51*** (2.817) -21.32*** (2.252) 150.5*** (9.856) 
Vattenfall × Post 8.940*** (1.619) 24.21*** (2.753) 24.56*** (2.244) 104.9*** (9.666) 
Stadtwerke × Post -0.137 (1.654) 0.738 (2.815) -5.096** (2.327) 20.09** (9.912) 
Other × Post 3.300** (1.628) 8.803*** (2.768) 0.999 (2.311) 36.32*** (9.679) 
# of EIPs 0.013*** (0.002) 0.032*** (0.003) 0.039*** (0.004) 0.048*** (0.010) 
pop1: density -0.055 (0.220) -0.826** (0.355) 0.242 (0.499) 5.559*** (1.244) 
pop2: share foreign -0.223*** (0.010) -0.463*** (0.014) -0.574*** (0.019) -0.168*** (0.051) 
pop3: births-deaths -4.110 (3.245) -5.888 (5.313) -7.385 (6.887) -41.88 (38.83) 
# Amadeus firms  0.066 (0.063) 0.046 (0.100) -0.0212 (0.154) 0.0991 (0.374) 
Constant 31.33*** (4.117) 57.41*** (5.779) 62.54*** (8.268) 204.5*** (31.93) 
Observations 40,720 40,720 40,867 40,670 
Adjusted R-squared 0.948 0.930 0.904 0.887 
The dependent variable is the price dispersion within a given zip code defined as the difference between the yearly prices a costumer 
using the different consumption plans (1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh, 10,000 kWh per year) would pay if she chooe the 
incumbent’s baseline tariff or the cheapest tariff in her local network area. The control category for the firm-type dummies is the group 
of independent incumbents. We control for 8,208 zip-code fixed effects as well as 4 year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at 
the zip-code level. t statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
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Annex 5 Gaz de France and Suez case study 
Table A5.1 The effects of the Commission’s decision and associated remedies - full specification 
Long run model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3_mth_window Newey_1 Newey_7 Newey_7_3mth 
     
treat 2.921*** 2.571*** 2.571*** 2.921*** 
 (0.275) (0.348) (0.572) (0.595) 
post  9.236*** 9.236**  
  (2.750) (4.334)  
treat_post  -2.759*** -2.759***  
  (0.351) (0.577)  
Post_3mth window 5.345***   6.903 
 (1.867)   (4.261) 
treat_post_3mth window -3.111***   -3.111*** 
 (0.278)   (0.599) 
tempsq 0.00615*** 0.00576** 0.00576* 0.00615* 
 (0.00201) (0.00234) (0.00328) (0.00339) 
temp -0.222*** -0.202*** -0.202** -0.222** 
 (0.0562) (0.0647) (0.0911) (0.0953) 
brent_crude_spot 0.664*** 0.676*** 0.676*** 0.664*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0639) (0.0895) (0.0928) 
coal 0.0561 0.109** 0.109 0.0561 
 (0.0380) (0.0498) (0.0785) (0.0788) 
power_prices 0.000215 0.000333 0.000333 0.000215 
 (0.00719) (0.00793) (0.00947) (0.00954) 
_Iday_of_th_3 0.00132    
 (0.238)    
_Iday_of_th_4 0.00983    
 (0.219)    
_Iday_of_th_5 0.0675    
 (0.225)    
_Iday_of_th_6 0.0254    
 (0.222)    
_Imonth_2 -0.301    
 (0.342)    
_Imonth_3 1.113***    
 (0.424)    
_Imonth_4 0.755**    
 (0.302)    
_Imonth_5 1.130***    
 (0.331)    
_Imonth_6 1.475***    
 (0.370)    
_Imonth_7 1.448***    
 (0.374)    
_Imonth_8 1.322***    
 (0.407)    
_Imonth_9 1.408***    
 (0.413)    
_Imonth_10 1.333***    
 (0.450)    
_Imonth_11 0.635    
 (0.391)    
_Imonth_12 0.781    
 (0.638)    
_Iyear_2006 3.990**    
 (1.834)    
o._Iyear_2007 -    
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Long run model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3_mth_window Newey_1 Newey_7 Newey_7_3mth 
     
o._Iyear_2008 -    
     
o._Iyear_2009 -    
     
o._Iyear_2010 -    
     
_Iyear_2011 1.558***    
 (0.253)    
3.day_of_the_week  -0.0191 -0.0191 0.00132 
  (0.167) (0.0962) (0.0985) 
4.day_of_the_week  0.00265 0.00265 0.00983 
  (0.211) (0.113) (0.119) 
5.day_of_the_week  0.0609 0.0609 0.0675 
  (0.219) (0.149) (0.159) 
6.day_of_the_week  0.0256 0.0256 0.0254 
  (0.217) (0.137) (0.145) 
2.month  -0.244 -0.244 -0.301 
  (0.441) (0.673) (0.658) 
3.month  0.578 0.578 1.113 
  (0.511) (0.741) (0.777) 
4.month  0.690* 0.690 0.755 
  (0.372) (0.535) (0.554) 
5.month  1.388*** 1.388** 1.130* 
  (0.406) (0.589) (0.607) 
6.month  1.764*** 1.764*** 1.475** 
  (0.458) (0.665) (0.681) 
7.month  1.732*** 1.732*** 1.448** 
  (0.464) (0.672) (0.688) 
8.month  1.682*** 1.682** 1.322* 
  (0.504) (0.724) (0.745) 
9.month  1.797*** 1.797** 1.408* 
  (0.507) (0.758) (0.788) 
10.month  1.697*** 1.697** 1.333 
  (0.568) (0.864) (0.880) 
11.month  1.358*** 1.358* 0.635 
  (0.486) (0.734) (0.756) 
12.month  1.390 1.390 0.781 
  (0.869) (1.310) (1.278) 
2006.year  6.260** 6.260 3.990 
  (2.449) (3.885) (3.846) 
2010.year  -1.976*** -1.976*** -1.558*** 
  (0.375) (0.560) (0.500) 
2011o.year  - - - 
     
Constant 0.634 -3.040 -3.040 0.634 
 (2.510) (2.943) (4.582) (4.936) 
     
Observations 1,744 1,873 1,873 1,744 
R-squared 0.814    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5.2 Robustness checks on the effects of the Commission’s decision  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Baseline 
(Robust 
s.e.) 
Real prices Logs Newey- 
West s.e. 
(1 lag) 
Bootstrap 1-month 
window 
3-month 
window 
6-month 
window 
Weekly 
average 
          
treat 2.593*** 2.162*** 0.068*** 2.593*** 2.593*** 2.660*** 2.930*** 3.314*** 2.519*** 
 (0.266) (0.257) (0.008) (0.350) (0.269) (0.271) (0.278) (0.296) (0.563) 
post_1 1.339* 1.451** 0.040** 1.339 1.339* 1.132 -0.419 10.57*** 1.102 
 (0.730) (0.702) (0.020) (0.921) (0.718) (1.035) (1.443) (2.731) (1.509) 
treat_post_1 -2.364*** -2.506*** -0.059*** -2.364*** -2.364*** -2.395*** -2.606*** -2.985*** -2.290*** 
 (0.271) (0.262) (0.009) (0.357) (0.275) (0.276) (0.283) (0.301) (0.573) 
Observations 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,717 1,642 1,502 366 
The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In all specifications we control for prices of gas, oil, and coal, as well as temperature (both linear and quadratic), day, month, 
and year dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5.3 Robustness checks on the effects of the 2008 events  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
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VARIABLES Baseline 
(Robust 
s.e.) 
Real prices Logs Newey- 
West s.e. 
(1 lag) 
Bootstrap 1-month 
window 
3-month 
window 
6-month 
window 
Weekly 
average 
          
treat 0.228*** -0.345*** 0.009*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.218*** 0.216*** 0.179*** 0.229*** 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.002) (0.040) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.060) 
post_2 0.255*** -0.039 0.023*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.289*** 0.417*** 0.469*** 0.291*** 
 (0.064) (0.058) (0.004) (0.073) (0.064) (0.067) (0.071) (0.081) (0.106) 
treat_post_2 -0.319*** -0.399*** -0.022*** -0.319*** -0.319*** -0.332*** -0.377*** -0.409*** -0.330*** 
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.003) (0.058) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.083) 
Observations 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,618 1,540 1,402 344 
The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In all specifications we control for prices of gas, oil, and coal, as well as temperature (both linear and quadratic), day, month, 
and year dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
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Table A5.4 Robustness checks on the effects of 2010 events (implementation of the last of the remedies)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) 
VARIABLES Baseline 
(Robust 
s.e.) 
Real prices Logs Newey- 
West s.e. 
(1 lag) 
Bootstrap 1-month 
window 
3-month 
window 
Weekly 
average 
         
treat -0.096*** -0.750*** -0.013*** -0.096** -0.096*** -0.098*** -0.097** -0.105* 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.002) (0.042) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.059) 
post_3 0.615*** 0.894*** 0.029*** 0.615*** 0.615*** 0.711*** 1.175*** 0.497*** 
 (0.090) (0.086) (0.005) (0.107) (0.088) (0.110) (0.209) (0.133) 
treat_post_3 -0.105** -0.426*** 0.002 -0.105** -0.105** -0.108** -0.115** -0.103 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.003) (0.053) (0.046) (0.0463) (0.0476) (0.074) 
Observations 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,730 1,656 364 
The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In all specifications we control for prices of gas, oil, and coal, as well as temperature (both linear and quadratic), day, month, 
and year dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 

